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
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From the Publishers

HISTORY
OF
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.



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HISTORY
OF
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 457

FROM THE
FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE
TO THE
DISRUPTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

by
EDWARD A. FREEMAN, M.A.

LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD.

VOLUME I.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION—HISTORY OF THE GREEK
FEDERATIONS.

"Could the interior structure and regular operation of the Achaian League be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown by it on the science of Federal Government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted."

THE FEDERALIST, No. xviii.

6
MACMILLAN AND CO.

London and Cambridge.

1863.

~~102-6.1~~
AH 4038.63

A
1870, Aug. 8.

Salisbury Fund.

LONDON:

R. CLAY, SON, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS,
BREAD STREET HILL.

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TO

SPYRIDON TRIKOUPEs,

LATE GREEK MINISTER AT THE COURT OF LONDON.

MY DEAR MR. TRIKOUPEs,

There is no man to whom I can inscribe so fittingly as to yourself a volume which deals mainly with the restoration of Grecian freedom after a period of foreign oppression. As the native historian of regenerate Greece, you fill a position strikingly analogous to that of the illustrious writer who forms my chief guide throughout the present portion of my work. Like Polybios, your youth was spent among men and exploits worthy of the countrymen of Aratos and Philopoimên; like Polybios too, your later years have been spent in recording, in the still

living tongue in which he wrote, the great events of which you were an eyewitness and a partaker. You have helped to win for your own immediate country an honourable name among the divisions of the Greek race; you have helped to place *Ætolia* on the same level as *Achaia*, and to raise the name of *Mesolongi* to a reputation no less glorious than that of *Megalopolis*. And in one respect you are more happy than your great predecessor. *Polybios* lived to see a time when the freedom of his country was wholly extinguished, and when all that he could do for her was to procure for her some small alleviation of her bondage. You have lived to see your country answer the calumnies of her enemies by conduct which they cannot gainsay; you have seen Greece once more draw on her the eyes of admiring Europe by one of the justest and purest Revolutions in all recorded history. While all that he could do was to obtain some contemptuous concessions from an overbearing conqueror, you are called on to take your share in the deliberations of an Assembly where every honest heart in Europe trusts that twice-liberated *Hellas*.

will be at last allowed to fix her own destinies. Whatever may be the result of those deliberations, whether a King is again to sit on the throne of Theseus or a President again to bear the seal of Lydiadas, that they may lead to the full establishment of law and freedom in the land where law and freedom first arose is the earnest wish of

Your sincere and obliged friend,

EDWARD A. FREEMAN.

SOMERLEAZE, WELLS,

January 3rd, 1863.



P R E F A C E.

I trust that no one will think that the present work owes its origin to the excitement of the War of Secession in America. It is the first instalment of a scheme formed long ago, and it represents the thought and reading of more than ten years. All that late events in America have done has been to increase my interest in a subject which had already long occupied my thoughts, and, in some degree, to determine me to write at once what otherwise might have been postponed for some time longer.

The present volume is mainly devoted to the working of the Federal system in Ancient Greece. The Federal period of Grecian history is one which has been generally neglected by English scholars, and I trust that I may have done something to bring into more notice a period than which none is richer in political lessons. But it must be remembered that I am not writing a history of Greece or a history of Achaia, but a history of Grecian Federalism. From this difference of object it follows that I have treated my subject in a somewhat different manner from that

which I should have thought appropriate to a regular history of Greece or of any other country. First, As a historian of Federalism, I look to everything mainly as illustrating, or not illustrating, the progress of Federal ideas. I dwell upon events, or I hurry over them, not according to their intrinsic importance, but according to their importance for my particular purpose. I have disposed in a line or two of battles which were of high moment in the history of the world, and I have dwelt at length on obscure debates and embassies, when their details happened to throw light on the Achaian Constitution or on the mode of proceeding in the Achaian Assembly. It so happens that much of the information most valuable for my purpose comes in the form of details of this kind, which a general historian would, naturally and properly, cut very short. I mention this merely that I may not be thought to have either depreciated or overvalued subjects which, writing with a special object, I have looked at mainly from the point of view dictated by that object.

Secondly, In writing the history, not of a particular country, but of a form of government which has existed in several countries, I have constantly endeavoured to illustrate the events and institutions of which I write by parallel or contrasted events and institutions in other times and places. I have striven to make the politics of Federal Greece more intelligible and more interesting, by showing their points of likeness and unlikeness to the politics of modern England and America. I should have done this, in some degree, in a history of any sort, but I have done it

far more fully in a history of a form of government than I should have done in an ordinary history of Greece or of any other country. And I trust that I have not compared ancient and modern politics in the mere interest of any modern party. I have certainly not written in the interest of either the North or the South in the American quarrel. I see too much to be said for and against both sides to be capable of any strong partizanship for either. Possibly this may not be a bad frame of mind in which to approach the history of the quarrel, when the course of my subject brings me to it. At present, what I have had to do has mainly been to argue against the false inferences on the subject of Federalism in general which some have drawn from recent American history. And, if I do not write in the interest of either side in the American dispute, neither am I conscious of writing in the interest of any English political party. I am conscious of holding strong opinions on many points both of home and foreign politics; for historical study does more than anything else to lead the mind to a definite political creed; but, at the same time, it does at least as much to hinder the growth of any narrow political partizanship. A historical student soon learns that a man is not morally the worse for being Whig or Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Royalist or Republican, Aristocrat or Democrat, Unionist or Confederate. He soon learns to sympathize with individuals among all parties, but to decline to throw in his lot unreservedly with any party. But he will not carry his political toleration so far as to confound political differences and moral crimes. Indignation at successful wickedness is a feeling of which

no honest man will ever wish to rid himself ; no honest man, above all no honest student of history, will ever bring himself to look on the Tyrant whose very being implies the overthrow of right with the same eyes with which he looks on the mere political adversary whose motives may be as honourable as his own.

In writing the present volume, I have endeavoured to combine a text which may be instructive and interesting to any thoughtful reader, whether specially learned or not, with notes which may satisfy the requirements of the most exacting scholar. In the text therefore I have, as far as possible, avoided technicalities, and I have thrown the discussion of many points of detail into the notes. I have throughout been lavish in the citation of authorities, as I hold that an author should not require his readers to take anything on his bare word, but should give them the means of refuting him out of his own pages, if they think good. If I have overdone it in the matter of references, I am sure that every real student will allow that it is a fault on the right side. I have felt such deep gratitude to those authors who — really act as guides and not as rivals to the original writers, and I have felt so aggrieved at those who follow another course, that I was determined to do all I could to avoid blame on this most important score.

The nature of the authorities for this period of Grecian history has been explained in several passages of the volume itself, and the chief among them, Polybios and

Plutarch, ought to be familiar to every scholar. But besides the evidence of historians, there are few parts of history on which more light is thrown by the evidence of coins. In this branch of my subject, I am bound, at every step, to acknowledge the benefits which I have derived from the numismatic knowledge of my friend the Hon. John Leicester Warren. A careful comparison of his numismatic and my historical evidence has enabled us together to fix several points which probably neither of us could have fixed separately. I should have drawn more largely on Mr. Warren's resources, which have been always open to me, were scholars not likely to have the benefit of his researches into Greek Federal Coinage in a separate form.

At the risk of offending some eyes by unaccustomed forms, I have spelled Greek names, as closely as I could, according to the Greek orthography. This practice is now very general in Germany, and it is gradually making its way in England. Mr. Grote first ventured to restore the Greek *K*; Professor Max Müller, in the *Oxford Essays*, went several degrees further. For the Latin spelling, nothing can be pleaded but custom—a custom, which is merely a part of that unhappy way of looking at everything Greek through a Latin medium, which has so long made havoc of our philology and mythology. In exactly the same way, serious mischief—I believe I may say serious political mischief—has been done by our habit of looking at nearly everything in modern Europe through a French medium, and of speaking of German,

Italian, and Flemish places by French corruptions of their names. Strange to say, while we clothe Italian names in a French dress, we usually clothe Modern Greek names in an Italian dress. Inexplicable confusion is the necessary result; names which have not altered since the days of Homer are written in endless ways to adapt them to a Western pronunciation which is hardly ever that of Englishmen. The island of *Mélos* has never changed its name, and its name is sounded in the same way by a Greek and by an Englishman. It seems eminently absurd to talk about *Mélos* in the history of the Peloponnesian War, but, if the island happens to be mentioned in a modern book or newspaper, to change its name into that of *Milo* the slayer of Clodius. The only way to preserve consistency is to write every Greek name, old or new, according to the native spelling, and to leave each reader to pronounce according to accent or quantity as he pleases. This I have done throughout, with two exceptions. When a name has a really English, as distinguished from a Latin or French, form, such as Philip, Ptolemy, Athens, Corinth, I should never think of making any change; indeed I rather regret that we have not more forms of the kind. Again, a few very familiar names, like Thermopylæ, Bœotia, &c., though the form is not thoroughly English, I have left as they are usually spelled. The change which has the most unusual look is the substitution of the Greek *ai* for *æ* in the ending of plural feminine names. In many cases, however, there is also a singular form in use, which I have preferred wherever I could.

I have given three maps, showing the boundaries which the different states treated of assumed at different times. These have been reduced, with the necessary changes from Kiepert's *Atlas von Hellas*. The boundaries of the Achaian League at the different times fixed on will be found, I trust, to be accurately given, but the position of a few of the cities is matter of uncertainty. But among the states of Northern Greece, the Ætolian and Macedonian conquests and losses made every frontier fluctuating, and we have less accurate information about those regions than we have as to the changes in Peloponnêsos. It is therefore extremely difficult to fix the boundaries of any state north of Bœotia at any particular moment, and my attempts, or any others, must be taken for what they are worth, as merely probable approximations.

I trust that the second volume, containing the history of the Swiss and other German Leagues, will follow the present with all reasonable speed. But it involves a minute examination of some very obscure portions of history, and I cannot fix any certain time for its appearance.

SOMERLKAZE, WELLS,

January 2nd, 1863.

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B.C. 183—168.

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B.C. 167—146.

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HISTORY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

IN undertaking to write the History of Federal Govern- CHAP. I.
ment, I propose to myself a task somewhat different
from that which has fallen to the lot of any of those
writers who have hitherto treated of the subject. It has Object of
been dealt with as a matter of political philosophy, of the work.
International Law, and of local or temporary political con-
troversy. I shall draw upon the materials which have
been gathered together by writers of all these classes;
but my own object is not exactly the same as the object
of any one of them. I purpose not so much to discuss
the abstract nature of Federal Government, as to ex-
hibit its actual working in ages and countries widely
removed from one another. The exact definition, both
of a Federation in general and of the particular forms
of Federations, has often taxed the ingenuity both of
political philosophers and of international lawyers. For
the purposes of the historian a less rigid accuracy of
definition may be allowed. History often recognizes both
likenesses and unlikenesses which it would be hard to
define with any precision, either legal or philosophical.

CHAP. I. Federal Government, as I shall presently attempt to show, is, in its essence, a compromise between two opposite political systems. Its different forms occupy the whole middle space between two widely distant extremes. It is therefore only natural that some of these intermediate forms should shade off imperceptibly into the extremes on either side. Controversies may thus easily be raised both as to the correct definition of a Federal Government, and also whether this or that particular government comes within the definition. The examples of Federal Constitutions which history supplies are scattered over widely distant ages and countries; they are found among nations widely differing from one another in the amount of their political advancement and general civilization. But all of them agree in some points which history easily recognizes, though it may be hard to bring them within the grasp of legal definition. There is what may be called a certain Federal ideal, which has sometimes been realized in its full, or nearly its full, perfection, while other cases have shown only a more or less remote approximation to it. To establish a definition and a nomenclature for all these several classes of governments, is the business of the political philosopher. The historian, in recognizing the unlikeness, will also recognize the likeness, and will acknowledge them all, perfect and imperfect alike, as forming natural portions of his subject. The first rude approach to any particular form of government is as much a part of the history of that form of government as the most fully developed shape which it can afterwards assume. I shall therefore not scruple to apply the name of Federal Government to many states to which philosophical and legal inquirers would probably refuse it. The name of Federal Government may, in this wider sense, be applied to any union of component members, where the degree of union between the members sur-

Federalism
a compro-
mise;

therefore
hard to
define.

General
definition
for histori-
cal pur-
poses.

passes that of mere alliance, however intimate, and where the degree of independence possessed by each member surpasses anything which can fairly come under the head of merely municipal freedom. Such unions have been common in many ages and countries, and many of them have been far from realizing the full ideal of a Federal Government. That ideal, in its highest and most elaborate development, is the most finished and the most artificial production of political ingenuity. It is hardly possible that Federal Government can attain its perfect form except in a highly refined age, and among a people whose political education has already stretched over many generations. Two requisites seem necessary to constitute a Federal Government in this its most perfect form. On the one hand, each of the members of the Union must be wholly independent in those matters which concern each member only. On the other hand, all must be subject to a common power in those matters which concern the whole body of members collectively. Thus each member will fix for itself the laws of its criminal jurisprudence, and even the details of its political constitution. And it will do this, not as a matter of privilege or concession from any higher power, but as a matter of absolute right, by virtue of its inherent powers as an independent commonwealth. But in all matters which concern the general body, the sovereignty of the several members will cease. Each member is perfectly independent within its own sphere; but there is another sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence, vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one class of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which it is as incapable of separate political action as any province or city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic. The making of peace and war, the sending and receiving of ambassadors, generally all that comes within the depart-

Definition
of a perfect
Federal
Govern-
ment.

Internal
independ-
ence of
the several
members.

Sove-
reignty of
the Union
in all
external
matters.

CHAP. I. ment of International Law, will be reserved wholly to the central power. Indeed, the very existence of the several members of the Union will be diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which will never be called upon to deal with any power except the Central Government. A Federal Union, in short, will form one State in relation to other powers, but many States as regards its internal administration. This complete division of sovereignty we may look upon as essential to the absolute perfection of the Federal ideal. But that ideal is one so very refined and artificial, that it seems not to have been attained more than four or five times in the history of the world. But a History of Federal Government must embrace a much wider range of subjects than merely the history of those states which have actually realized the Federal idea. We must look at the idea in its germ as well as in its perfection. We shall learn better to understand what perfect Federalism is by comparing it with Federalism in a less fully-developed shape. In order thus to trace the Federal principle from its birth, we shall have to go back to very early times, and, in some cases, to very rude states of society. But of course it will not be needful to dwell at much length on those commonwealths of whose constitution and history it would be impossible to give any detailed account. For some commonwealths, which may fairly claim the name of Federal Governments in the wider sense, a mere glance will be enough. Our more detailed examination must be reserved for a few more illustrious examples of Federal Union. There are a few famous commonwealths which, either from having perfectly, or nearly perfectly, realized the Federal idea, or else from their importance and celebrity in the general history of the world, stand out conspicuously at the very first glimpse of the subject, and whose constitution and history will deserve and repay our most attentive study.

Wider
range of
the his-
torical
view.

Choice of
examples
for special
illustra-
tion.

Four Federal Commonwealths, then, stand out, in four different ages of the world, as commanding, above all others, the attention of students of political history. Of these four, one belongs to what is usually known as "ancient," another to what is commonly called "medieval" history; a third arose in the period of transition between medieval and modern history; the creation of the fourth may have been witnessed by some few of those who are still counted among living men. Of these four, again, one has been a thing of the past for many centuries; another has so changed its form that it can no longer claim a place among Federal Governments; but the other two, one of them among the least, the other among the greatest, of independent powers, still remain, exhibiting Federalism in a perfect, or nearly perfect, form, standing, in the Old World and in the New, as living examples of the strength and the weakness of the most elaborate of political combinations.

CHAP. I.

Four great
examples
of Federal
Govern-
ment.

These four famous Commonwealths are,

First, the ACHAIAN LEAGUE in the later days of Ancient Greece, whose most flourishing period comes within the third century before our own era.

The
ACHAIAN
LEAGUE,
B.C. 281-
146.

Second, the Confederation of the SWISS CANTONS, which, with many changes in its extent and constitution, has lasted from the thirteenth century to our own day.

The SWISS
CANTONS,
A.D. 1291-
1862.

Third, the SEVEN UNITED PROVINCES of the NETHERLANDS, whose Union arose in the War of Independence against Spain, and lasted, in a republican form, till the War of the French Revolution.

The
UNITED
PRO-
VINCES,
A.D. 1579-
1795.

Fourth, the UNITED STATES of NORTH AMERICA, which formed a Federal Union after their revolt from the British Crown under George the Third, and whose destiny

The
UNITED
STATES,
A.D. 1778-
1862.

CHAP. I. forms one of the most important, and certainly the most interesting, of the political problems of our own time.

Oh, they came through a 90-year fight!

Character-
istics of
the Four
great Con-
federation-
tions.

Of these Four, three come sufficiently near to the full realization of the Federal idea to be entitled to rank among perfect Federal Governments. The Achaian League, and the United States since the adoption of the present Constitution, are indeed the most perfect developments of the Federal principle which the world has ever seen. The Swiss Confederation, in its origin a Union of the loosest kind, has gradually drawn the Federal bond tighter and tighter, till, within our own times, it has assumed a form which fairly entitles it to rank beside Achaia and America. The claim of the United Provinces is more doubtful;¹ their union was at no period of their republican being so close as that of Achaia, America, and modern Switzerland. But the important place which the United Provinces once filled in European history, and the curious and instructive nature of their political institutions, fully entitle them to a place in the first rank for the purposes of the present History. All these four then I purpose to treat of at some considerable length. Over less perfect or less illustrious examples of the Federal system I shall glance more lightly, or use them chiefly by way of contrast to point out more clearly the distinguishing characteristics of these four great examples. Thus, for instance, the modern German Confederation is, in point of territorial extent and of the power of many of the states which compose it, of far greater importance than any of the European instances among the Four. But its constitution is so widely removed from the perfection of the Federal idea that, for our present purpose, this Union, which includes two of the Great Powers of Europe, is chiefly valuable as illustrating by contrast the more perfect constitutions of Achaia and

7
The Ger-
man Con-
federation.

¹ See Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 415.

Switzerland. On the other hand there can be little doubt that there were in the ancient world several other Confederations, whose constitutions must have realized the Federal idea almost as perfectly as the more famous League of Achaia. But some of these possessed so little influence in the world, that they can hardly be said to have a history. In the case of others we know absolutely nothing of the details of their constitutions. Northern Greece, especially, in the later days of Grecian freedom, abounded in small Federal States, but we have no such minute knowledge of their history and constitution as we have of those of Achaia. Even the great and important League of Ætolia, so long the rival of Achaia, is far better known to us in its external history than in its internal constitution. Again it is clear that the Thirty Cities of Latium, and probably some other similar Leagues among the old Italian commonwealths, must have been united by a Federal bond of a very close kind. But we know hardly anything about them except what may be picked up from the half-mythical narratives of their wars and alliances with Rome. Lykia too, beyond all doubt, had a Federal constitution which was in some respects more perfect than that of Achaia itself. But then Lykia has nothing which can be called a history, and its Federal constitution arose at so late a period that its independence was provincial rather than strictly national. So, in later times, the Swiss Confederation was really only one of several unions of German cities, which happened to obtain greater importance and permanence than the rest. One of these unions, the famous League of the Hanse Towns, still exists, though with diminished splendour, in our own day. So, in days later still, the precedent of Federal union given by the English settlements in North America, has been followed, though as yet with but little success or credit, by several of the Republics which have arisen among the ruins of Spanish

CHAP. I.

Other
ancient
examples ;

in Greece ;

in Italy ;

in Lykia.

Other
German
leagues ;the Hanse
Towns.Other
American
Confede-
rations.

CHAP. I. dominion in the same continent. All these instances, Greek, Italian, German, and American, will demand some notice in the course of our present inquiry. But they will not need that full and minute attention which must be reserved for Achaia, Switzerland, the United Provinces, and the United States.

Before, however, we go on to describe in detail the constitution and history of any particular Federal state, it will be desirable to make some further remarks on Federal Government in general, and to draw out at some length the points of contrast between that and other political systems.

CHAPTER II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

CHAP. II.

I HAVE already given something like a definition of Federal Government in its perfect form, premising that that perfect form is not to be looked for in all the examples which will come under our present survey. We have seen that it is not to be found in all even of the four illustrious Confederations which I have selected for special examination. Compared with the constitutions of Achaia and America, the Federal compact of the Swiss Cantons before the French Revolution, and even the Union of the Seven Provinces, will appear to be only remote approaches to the Federal idea. But in the present Chapter, where I propose to contrast Federalism with other political systems, I shall take my picture of a Federal Government wholly from the most perfect examples. Much, therefore, that I shall say, will be quite inapplicable to the United Provinces or to the old Swiss League, much more so to the so-called German Confederation of our own day.

A Federal Commonwealth, then, in its perfect form, is one which forms a single state in its relations to other nations, but which consists of many states with regard to its internal government. Thus the City of Megalopolis in old times, the State of New York or the Canton of Zürich now, has absolutely no separate existence in the face of other powers: it cannot make

CHAP. II. war or peace, or maintain ambassadors or consuls.

Illustrations of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal Commonwealth. The common Federal Government of Achaia, America, or Switzerland, is the only body with which foreign nations can have any intercourse. But the internal laws, the law of real property, the criminal law, even the electoral law, may be utterly different at Megalopolis and at Sikyôn, at New York and in Illinois, at Zürich and at Geneva. Nor is there any power in the Assembly at Aigion, the Congress at Washington, or the Federal Council at Bern, to bring their diversities into harmony. In one point of view there is only a single commonwealth, as truly a national whole as France or Spain; in another point of view, there is a collection of sovereign commonwealths as independent of one another as France and Spain can be. We may then recognize as a true and perfect Federal Commonwealth any collection of states in which it is equally unlawful for the Central Power to interfere with the purely internal legislation of the several members, and for the several members to enter into any diplomatic relations¹ with other powers. Where the first condition is not obtained, the several members are not sovereign; their independence, however extensive in practice, is a merely municipal independence. Where the second condition is not obtained, the union, however ancient and intimate, is that of a mere *Confederacy* rather than that of a real *Confederation*. But another distinction will here arise. Even among those commonwealths which at once secure to every member full internal independence, and refuse to every member any separate external action, there may be

Two conditions of a true Federal Government.

¹ I reserve the exceptional case, to be discussed in the course of the history, of a particular State holding diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers by express licence of the Federal power. See an instance in Polybios, ii. 48. This is most conspicuously a case in which the exception proves the rule.

wide diversities as to the way in which the Central Power exercises its peculiar functions. It is here that we reach that division of Federal Governments into two classes which has been laid down by most of the writers on the subject. In the one class the Federal Power represents only the Governments of the several members of the Union; its immediate action is confined to those Governments; its powers consist simply in issuing requisitions to the State Governments, which, when within the proper limits of the Federal authority, it is the duty of those Governments to carry out. If men or money be needed for Federal purposes, the Federal Power will demand them of the several State Governments, which will raise them in such ways as each may think best. In the other class, the Federal Power will be, in the strictest sense, a *Government*, which, in the other class, it can hardly be called. It will act not only on the Governments of the several States, but directly on every citizen of those States. It will be, in short, a Government co-ordinate with the State Governments, sovereign in its own sphere, as they are sovereign in their sphere. It will be a Government with the usual branches, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; with the direct power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a Government; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all the usual apparatus of a Government, all bearing directly upon every citizen of the Union without any reference to the Governments of the several States. The State administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as an Union; the Federal administration, within its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such thing as a separate State. This last class is what writers on International Law call a *Com-*

CHAP. II.

Two classes of Federal Commonwealths. First, The "System of Confederated States," where the Central Power deals only with the State Governments.

Second, The "Composite State," where the Central Power acts directly on all citizens.

CHAP. II. *posite State*, or *Supreme Federal Government*.¹ The former class they commonly remand to the head of mere Confederacies, or, at most, *Systems of Confederate States*.² Yet it is quite possible to conceive the existence of a Federal Commonwealth, in which the Federal Power shall act solely upon the several State Governments, which yet shall fully answer the two conditions of external unity and internal plurality. The American Union under the Confederation forbade diplomatic action to the several States;³ it therefore formed a single commonwealth in the eyes of other nations. Yet the Federal Power acted only on the several State Governments, and not at all directly on individual citizens. The Swiss Confederation of 1815 even allowed diplomatic action to the several Cantons within certain prescribed limits.⁴ Yet, on the whole, even the Swiss Confederation, and much more the American Confederation of 1778, had far more in common with perfect Federal, or "Composite" States, than with lax Confederacies like the German *Bund*. The real difference between the two classes seems to be that the one is a good, the other a bad, way of compassing the same objects.⁵ Both America and Switzerland found by experience that, without the direct action of the

The distinction one rather of means than of ends.

¹ This is what, in the *Federalist*, No. 9 (p. 47, ed. 1818) is called a *Consolidation of the States*. But Hamilton is here only using the language of objectors, and the name *consolidated* would seem better to apply to *non-Federal* commonwealths, as distinguished from Federal. It is so used by M. de Tocqueville, *Démocratie en Amérique*, i. 271.

² See Wheaton's *International Law*, i. 68; Austin's *Province of Jurisprudence*, p. 217; Calhoun's *Works*, i. 163; *Federalist*, Nos. 9, 21, 39 et passim. The distinction between the two classes is most fully and clearly drawn by Mr. J. S. Mill (*Representative Government*, p. 301), by Professor Bernard (*Lectures on American War*, Oxford, 1861, p. 68-72), and by Tocqueville (*Démocratie en Amérique*, i. 250, 265, et seqq.)

³ Articles of Confederation, Art. vi. § 1.

⁴ See Wheaton, i. 90.

⁵ "The attributes of Congress under the Confederation and under the

Federal Power upon individuals, the objects of the Federal Union could not be carried out. The several State Governments are indeed, under the other system, constitutionally bound to carry out all requisitions which do not transcend the limits of the Federal authority. But we may be sure that the State Governments will always lie under a strong temptation to disobey such requisitions, not only when they really transcend the limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply displeasing to local interests or wishes.¹ Such a compact, in short, may constitutionally be a Federal Union, but practically it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance.² Still a Confederation of this sort aims, however ineffectually, at being a true Federal Union. The American Confederation of 1778 professed, while the German Confederation does not profess,³ to form one power, one nation,⁴ or whatever may be the proper word, in the face of other powers and nations. The articles of Confederation wholly failed to carry out their own

Inadequacy of the system of requisitions.

Constitution were (with some not very important exceptions) the same. What was done was to make them real and effective in the only possible way, by making them operate directly on the people of the States, instead of on the States themselves."—Bernard, p. 69.

¹ See Mill, p. 301.

² Mill; Cf. Bernard, p. 68. See also Marshall's *Life of Washington*, iv. 256–62.

³ On the German Confederation, see Mill, p. 300.

⁴ I do not feel called upon, at all events at this stage of my work, to enter into the great American dispute between *National* and *Federal* (see *Federalist*, Nos. 39, 40; Tocqueville, i. 268; Calhoun, i. 112–161; Bernard, p. 72). I confess that it seems to me to be rather a question of words. A power which acts in all its relations with other powers, as a single indivisible unity, is surely a nation, whether its internal constitution be Federal or otherwise. So to call it in no way takes away from the independent rights of the several members. In the language of Polybios, the word *ἔθνος* is constantly applied to the Achaian and other Federal commonwealths; indeed he seems to use it as the special formal title of such bodies. See, for instance, xx. 3, where *ἔθνος*, the Federal State, is opposed to *πόλις*, the single city-commonwealth.

According to Tocqueville (i. 268) the American constitution is neither

CHAP. II. purpose ; and the closer union of 1787, under the existing constitution, was the result. Still, for my immediate purpose, it does not seem needful to attend very closely to the distinction between these two classes of Federations. In many of the ancient Leagues with which we shall have to deal, it is evident that, on the one hand, the League formed a single state in the face of all other states, and that, on the other hand, the independence of the several members was strictly preserved. But it is not always easy to say how far the Federal Assembly and the Federal Magistrates exercised a direct power over the individual citizens of each city, and how far it was exercised through the Assemblies and Magistrates of the several cities. We know, for instance, that in the Achaian League there were Federal taxes;¹ we do not know whether they were directly gathered by Federal collectors, or whether they were merely requisitions to the several cities, which their Assemblies and Magistrates apportioned by their own authority. The latter arrangement is just as likely as the former ; but, if it could be shown to be the ~~plan~~ actually in use, it would hardly have the effect of degrading the Achaian League from the rank of a Composite State to that of a mere Confederacy.² It is enough to enable a commonwealth to rank, for our

The distinction not always to be made in history.

National nor Federal, but some third thing, for which no name exists. He calls it "un gouvernement national incomplet."

The truest difference between a Federation and a perfectly consolidated Government is that already given. In a Federal state the several members retain their sovereignty within their own range ; that is, the Federal power cannot alter their internal institutions. In an ordinary monarchy or republic, the supreme central power, in whomever it is vested, can alter the institutions of any province or city. See Bernard, p. 71.

¹ Pol. iv. 60. *al kowal elafopai*.

² The system of requisitions is indeed in no way confined to Federal commonwealths ; it is quite compatible with monarchy, and indeed it has always been exceedingly common under barbaric despotisms. The Sultan requires a certain contribution from a district, which the authorities of the district levy as best suits them. The royal administration is thus eased

present purpose, as a true Federation, that the Union is one which preserves to the several members their full internal independence, while it denies to them all separate action in relation to foreign powers. The sovereignty is, in fact, divided ; the Government of the Federation and the Government of the State have a co-ordinate authority, each equally claiming allegiance within its own range. It is this system of divided sovereignty which I propose to contrast at some length with the other principal forms of government which have prevailed at different times among the most civilized nations of the world.

Forms of government may be classified according to so many principles that it is needful to state at the onset what principle of division seems most suited for the comparison which I have taken in hand. The old stereotyped division into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is sufficient for many purposes. A more philosophical division perhaps is that which does not look so much to the nature of the hands in which supreme power is vested, as to the question whether there is any one body or individual which can fairly be called supreme. This is the division of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively, into *absolute* and *constitutional* examples of their several classes.¹ Thus the old Athenian commonwealth, where all power was directly exercised by the People, was an Absolute Democracy. An American State, on the other hand, where the People is recognised as the ultimate sovereign, where all power is held to flow from the people, but where a delegated authority is divided in different proportions between a Governor, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, is said to be an example of

Classification of government ;

Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.

Absolute and Constitutional Governments.

of a certain amount of trouble, and the district at once acquires a certain amount of municipal freedom. But that freedom, great or small, exists merely by concession or sufferance, not of right, as in a Federal State.

¹ See Calhoun's Works, i. 28, 34, et seqq.

CHAP. II. Constitutional Democracy. In this way of looking at them, an Absolute Government of any of the three kinds has quite as many points in common with an Absolute Government of one of the other kinds, as it has in common with a Constitutional Government of its own class. But neither of these divisions seems suited to our present purpose. A Federal commonwealth may be either aristocratic or democratic; or some of its members may be aristocratic and others democratic; those Aristocracies and Democracies again may exhibit either the Absolute or the Constitutional type of their own classes; indeed, though Federal States have commonly been republican, there is nothing theoretically absurd in the idea of a Federal Monarchy. The classification of governments, which we must make in order to work out the required contrast between Federalism and other forms, will be in fact a cross division to the common classification into Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies. Federalism, as I have already said, is essentially a compromise; it is something intermediate between two extremes. A Federal Government is most likely to be formed when the question arises whether several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or shall be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tie harmonizes the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount of union with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Government then is a mean between the system of large states and the system of small states. But both the large states, the small states, and the intermediate Federal system, may assume a democratic, an aristocratic, or even a monarchic form of government, just as may happen.

A cross
division
needed.

Federalism
a compromise
between
Great and
Small
States.

The two extremes then, with which the Federal system has to be compared, are the system of small states and the system of large states. Speaking roughly, the one is the

ordinary political system of what is called classical antiquity, the other is the ordinary political system of modern Europe. The system of small states finds its most perfect development in the independent city-commonwealths of Old Greece; the system of large states finds its most perfect development in the large monarchies of Europe in our own day. It is not too much to say that the large and the small state alike may be either monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic. As a general rule, small states have flourished most as republics, and large states have flourished most as monarchies, and the natural tendency of the two classes of states seems to lie in those two directions respectively. But there is no sort of contradiction in the idea of a small state being monarchic or of a large state being republican. Many small principalities have enjoyed a fair amount of prosperity and good government, and the experiment of governing a large country as a single republic has been so seldom tried that we are hardly in position to decide whether it is necessarily a failure or not.¹ But, this question apart, it is clear that a small republic may be either aristocratic or democratic, that a large kingdom may be either despotic or constitutional. And it is also clear that, while free states, great and small, have certain points of resemblance, large states and small states respectively have also some points of resemblance, irrespective of their several forms of government. It is in these points, where large states, whatever their constitution, form one class, and small states, whatever their constitution, form another, that Federalism takes its position, as a mean between the two, sharing some of the characteristics of both. I may add, that while Federalism, as a compromise, is liable to some of the inherent disadvantages of a compromise, it manifestly, in those positions for which it is suited at all, goes

The
Division
irrespec-
tive of
their
several
Forms of
Govern-
ment.

¹ See *Torquerville*, i. 270, 271; ii. 250.

CHAP. II. a good way to unite the opposite advantages of the two opposite systems between which it stands as a mean term.

I shall therefore now proceed, first to contrast at some length the two great systems of large and of small states, and then to show the way in which a Federal Government occupies a position intermediate between the two.¹

Definition
of Large
and Small
States.

Speaking roughly, I understand by a small state one in which it is possible that all the citizens may, if their constitution allows or requires it, habitually assemble for political purposes in one place. By a large state I understand one in which such personal assemblage is impossible; one, therefore, where, if the state be constitutional, the constitution must be of the representative kind. The large state, however, to have all the characteristics and advantages of a large state, must commonly be much larger than is absolutely necessary to answer the terms of this definition. But I by no means intend to confine the name to what are commonly understood by the name of Great Powers. All the Kingdoms of Europe, and even some principalities which are not Kingdoms, will count as large states for the purposes of this inquiry. All alike share the characteristics which distinguish them from the system of small states. The most perfect form of this last is found when every City, with its immediately surrounding territory, forms a commonwealth absolutely independent and enjoying all the rights of a sovereign power.

This was the political system usual in the commonwealths of ancient Greece and Italy, and it has been fully elucidated by the various great modern writers on Greek and Roman history, but most fully and elaborately by

¹ It may be objected that a Federation may consist either of small or of large states as they are here defined. I shall recur to this point presently.

Sh. 1/11 3
19
19-

Mr. Grote. The ruling idea of the politicians of those ages was what Mr. Grote calls the "autonomous city-community." A man's "country", in those days, was not a region, but a city¹; his patriotism did not extend over a wide surface of territory, but was shut up within the walls of a single town. His countrymen were not a whole nation of the same blood and language as himself, but merely those who shared with him in the local burghership of his native place. A man, in short, was not a Greek or an Italian, but an Athenian or a Roman. Undoubtedly he had a feeling, which may, in a certain sense, be called a patriotic feeling, for Greece or Italy as wholes, as opposed to Persia or Carthage. But this feeling was rather analogous to that which modern Europeans entertain for the great brotherhood of European and Christian nations, than to the national patriotism which an Englishman or a Frenchman entertains for England or France. The tie between Greek and Greek was indeed closer than the tie between European and European, but it was essentially a tie of the same kind. Real patriotism, the feeling which we extend to regions far larger than the whole of Greece, did not reach beyond the limits of a single Grecian city. This state of things is by no means peculiar to ancient Greece and Italy; traces of it are still to be seen in modern Europe; and it existed in its full force in some European states down to very recent times. But it was in the brilliant times of ancient Greece and Italy that this system found its fullest development, and that it made its nearest approach to being universal over the civilized world. In modern Europe independent cities have existed and flourished; a few indeed even now

¹ Παιρλις. The same use of the word is common in Modern Greek.

² Aristotle excludes from his definition of πόλις anything at all approaching to the size of a nation. Babylon is hardly a city—ἔχει περιγραφὴν ἔθνους μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεως.—Polit. iii. 3, 5. Cf. Polyb. ii. 87.

CHAP. II. retain a nominal existence. But such independent cities have been for the most part, merely exceptional cases, surrounded by larger states whose form of government was monarchical. In ancient Greece and Italy the independent city was the ruling political conception, and in ancient Greece, in the days of her greatest glory, it was the form of political life almost universally received.

Full develop-
ment of
city-inde-
pendents
in Greece.

Early ap-
proaches
to Consti-
tutional
Monarchy,

and to
Federal
Repub-
licanism.

Indeed the greater and more civilized the state, the more completely do we find the idea of municipal republicanism carried out. Neither of the other alternative forms of freedom, the constitutional monarchy and the Federal republic, was at any time absolutely unknown in the Grecian world. The polity of the Homeric age, the King or chief of each town, with a King of Kings at Mykênê as suzerain over at least all Peloponnêsos, might conceivably have grown into a monarchy, first of the feudal, and then of the modern constitutional type. And, in the half-Greek states of Epeiros and Macedonia, we actually find that the heroic royalty did develop into something which may be fairly called a rude and early form of constitutional monarchy. The Epeirot Kings swore obedience to the laws; the Macedonian, though a subject of a King, looked on himself as a freeman, and there were Macedonian Assemblies which, however great may have been the royal influence, did impose at least some formal restraint upon the royal will.¹ On the other hand, the robbers of Ætolia, the respectable but obscure townships of the Achaian shore, and some other of the less advanced and less important members of the Hellenic body, possessed, as far back as we can trace their history, some germs of a polity which may fairly entitle them to rank

¹ On the Macedonians and their Kings, see *Edinburgh Review*, Vol. CV. (April, 1857), 317-20, and the note and references in p. 327. See also Polybios, v. 27, 29; cf. *Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls*, p. 23. Of the Molossian kingdom I shall have occasion to speak in my fourth Chapter.

among Federal commonwealths. But both the monarchic and the Federal states lagged for a long time far behind the purely municipal ones. In the Greece of Herodotus and Thucydides, they play no distinguished part. In the Greece of Xenophôn and Isokratês, they still remain far from prominent; for the greatness of Thebes is really a municipal and not a Federal greatness. In short, constitutional monarchy never attained any full developement in the ancient world, and Federalism became important only when the most brilliant days of Greece were past. Both in Greece and Italy, the most important states so early threw aside regal government altogether that the idea of the King ruling according to Law, though certainly not unknown to Greek political thinkers, had no opportunity to assume any fully developed form. And though a day came when nearly all Greece was mapped out into Federal Republics, that day did not come till the system of perfectly independent separate cities had run its short and glorious career. Throughout the most brilliant days of Greece, all the greatest Greek states were strictly sovereign municipalities. The political franchise of the state was co-extensive with the municipal franchise of the city. And this was equally true whether the form of government of that city was aristocratic or democratic. The difference between a Greek aristocracy and a Greek democracy was simply whether legislative power and eligibility to high office was extended to the whole, or confined to a part, of the class of hereditary burghers. In no case did they extend beyond that class; in no case could the freedman, the foreigner, or even the dependent ally, obtain citizenship by residence or even by birth in the land. He who was not the descendant of citizen ancestors could be enfranchised only by special decree of the sovereign Assembly. In the democracy and the oligarchy alike the City was the only political existence,

CHAP. II.

Their comparative unimportance before the Macedonian period.

Municipal character of the Greek Commonwealths,

aristocratic and democratic alike.

CHAP. II. the one centre of patriotism. To live at a distance so great that it was impossible to appear habitually at Assemblies held within its walls was felt to be equivalent to sentence of exile.¹ The essentially civic character of a Greek state was not even affected by the occurrence of that irregular form of Monarchy to which the Greeks gave the name of *Tyranny*.² Even the Tyrant is still the Tyrant of the City; however oppressive his internal rule may be, he identifies himself with the military glory and outward prosperity of that particular city, and does not think of merging its separate being in any larger kingdom. He may conquer other cities by force of arms, but those cities are not incorporated like the annexations of modern potentates. Their inhabitants do not become the fellow-subjects of the inhabitants of the Tyrant's own city; the conquered city remains a dependency of the conquering capital. It was not till Greece had, in the days of Macedonian influence, become familiarized with extensive monarchies, that the old Tyranny of Dionysios gradually grew up, in the hands of Agathoklès and Hierôn, into something like a Kingdom of Sicily. Everywhere, whatever might be the internal form of government in the particular city, the autonomous town-community, owning no sove-

Civic
Tyrannies.

¹ "The natural limit of a democracy, is that distance from the central point, which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand."—Federalist, No. xiv. p. 71. This is equally true of all Greek commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike.

² I shall, in my fifth Chapter, have occasion to speak more at length of the Greek Tyrannies. I will here only remark that I use the word throughout in its Greek sense. The Greek *τύραννος* is one who holds kingly power in a state whose laws do not recognize a King. He differs from the King (*βασιλεύς*) in the origin of his power, rather than in the mode of its exercise. The King may rule ill; the Tyrant may (though he seldom does) rule well; still the authority of the King is lawful, that of the Tyrant is unlawful. In short, the word *Emperor*, in its modern sense, exactly translates *τύραννος*; but one cannot talk of an Emperor of Megalopolis.

reign, no feudal or Federal superior, beyond its own walls, CHAP. II. was the ruling political idea of Greece in her best days, and the more advanced and civilized was the state, the more closely did it cling to that one favourite ideal of a commonwealth.

As in many other cases, we shall be better able to take in the force and prevalence of the rule by looking at cases which formed exceptions to it. The sovereign and independent city was indeed the political ideal of Greece, but there were many Grecian cities which were far from being sovereign and independent. But this was simply because the force of some stronger city stood in the way of their sovereignty and independence. There were many towns which were not independent; but every town looked on independence as its right; every town which was not independent deemed its loss of independence to be an injury, and was constantly looking out for opportunities to recover the right of which it felt itself deprived. The call to make all Greeks autonomous was the popular cry set up by Sparta against imperial Athens.¹ But the condition of a city thus shorn of its sovereignty sets more clearly before us what the nature of the city-sovereignty was. Such a dependent city, as Mr. Grote has shown in the case of the allies of Athens, was by no means necessarily subjected to anything which we should call foreign oppression. It might, and in many cases did, retain its own laws, its own local administration, its own political constitution, oligarchic or democratic according to the strength of parties within its own walls. It might, or it might not, be subject to a tribute to the superior State; it might even, in some favoured cases, retain fleets and armies of its own, raised by its own government and commanded by its own officers. It

Condition
of Depend-
ent Cities
in Greece.

¹ Thucydides, i. 139, et al.

CHAP. II.
Difference
between a
dependent
City and a
member of
a Federa-
tion.

is clear that a city in such a condition retains a degree of local independence far greater than is allowed to any merely municipal body in the least centralized of European kingdoms. Its condition at first sight seems rather to approach to the purely internal sovereignty of a Swiss Canton or an American State. What it lacks of full sovereignty is exactly what they lack; it lacks a separate being among the nations of the earth; it cannot make war or conclude foreign alliances; its public quarrels are decided for it by a tribunal external to itself. Where then lies the difference? It is this. The municipality in a Constitutional Monarchy, the State in a Federal Republic, has indeed no direct corporate voice in the general administration, but that general administration is carried on by persons or bodies in whose appointment the citizens of the municipality or of the State have a direct or indirect voice. But a dependent city in Greece had its foreign relations marked out for it by a power over which it had no control whatever. An English town, as such, has nothing to do with peace or war, or with general taxation and legislation. But then laws are made and taxes are imposed by an Assembly to which that town sends representatives; peace and war are virtually made by Ministers who are virtually appointed by that Assembly. An American State, sovereign as it is within its own sphere, has no more corporate voice than a mere municipality in those high national concerns which are entrusted to the Federal Government.¹ But then the Government to which those concerns are entrusted consists of a President and Congress in the choice of

¹ The Federal Senators in the United States are indeed elected by the State Legislatures, and are held specially to represent the State Sovereignities. But the State Legislatures themselves are not consulted, and the Senators, when elected, vote as individuals, just like the Representatives.

whom the citizens of that State have a voice no less than in the choice of their own local Governor and Legislature. Thus, in both cases, if national questions are not submitted to the smaller body in its corporate capacity, it is simply because, in relation to such questions, the citizens of the smaller body act directly as citizens of the larger. But in relation to this same class of questions, the citizens of a dependent Greek city had no means of acting at all. The most favoured ally of Athens, Chios, for instance, or Mitylênê, quite as independent internally as an American State, had absolutely no voice, in any shape, in the general concerns of the Confederacy. So far were Chios and Mitylênê from themselves declaring war and peace that they had no sort of control over those who did declare war and peace. Their fleets and armies were at the absolute bidding, not of a President in whose election their citizens had a voice, not of a King governed by Ministers whom their citizens indirectly chose, but at the bidding of the Assembly of the City of Athens, an Assembly in which no Chian or Mitylênæan had a seat. A public dispute between Methymna and Mitylênê was not judged, like a dispute between New York and Ohio,¹ by a Supreme Court nominated by a President of their own choice, but by the local tribunals of a distant city, over whose nomination they had not the slightest influence of any kind. In many respects the condition of a dependent Greek city resembled that of an English Colony. The two agree in most of those points which effectually distinguish both from the member of a Federation. Both, unlike the Confederate City or Canton, are strictly dependencies of a greater power. The Colony, like the Athenian ally, is independent internally, but its relations towards other nations are determined for it by

Comparison with English Colonies.

¹ See Tocqueville, *Démocratie en Amérique*, i. 254.

CHAP. II. a power over which neither the Colony nor its citizens have any sort of control.¹ But there is one all-important difference between the British Colony and the Athenian Ally. The disqualifications of the colonist are purely local; he is a British subject equally with the inhabitants of Britain; he can come and live in England, and may become, no less than the native Englishman, elector, representative, or even Minister. The disqualifications of the Athenian ally were personal; the Chian or Mitylenæan was not an Athenian, but a foreigner; if he transferred his residence to Athens, he lost his influence in his own city, while he acquired none in the city in which he dwelt. Partly because he personally remains an Englishman, partly because the instinct of perfect independence is not now so keenly felt as it was in old Greece, the colonist commonly acquiesces in the dependent position of his Colony. It is felt that dependence is more than counterbalanced by perfect internal freedom combined with the gratuitous protection of the mother-country. As long as the mother-country abstains from practical oppression, as long as the Colony does not become so strong as to make dependence palpably incongruous, an English Colony has really no temptation to separate. But, in a dependent Greek city, the citizens were personally in an inferior position to the citizens of the ruling state, while the city itself was deprived of a power to which the political instinct of the Greek mind held that it had an inherent right. The sway of Athens did not necessarily involve either actual oppression² or any loss of purely local freedom; it was the loss of all share in Sovereignty in the highest sense

¹ See Lewis, *Government of Dependencies*, p. 155, et seqq.

² That there were isolated cases of oppression on the part of individual Athenian commanders, like Pachês, there is no doubt. But there was certainly no habitual oppression on the part of the Athenian government.

which the Greek city deplored when it was reduced to a condition of dependent alliance. CHAP. II.

It follows therefore that a system like the Athenian Alliance or Empire always remained a system of detached units. A Greek city either remained independent, retaining its full sovereign rights, or else it became more or less dependent upon some stronger city. There was no means by which it was possible to fuse any large number of cities, like the members of the Athenian Alliance, into a single body with equal rights common to all. A Federal Union easily effects this end, but it effects it only by depriving each city of the most precious attributes of separate sovereignty. A Constitutional Monarchy, by means of the representative system, also easily effects it, though of course at a still greater sacrifice of local independence. Even under a despotism, there is not the slightest need for placing the inhabitants of a conquered, ceded, or inherited province in any worse position than the inhabitants of the original kingdom. But a Greek city had no choice but either absolute independence or a position of decided inferiority to some other city. It is clear that a city-commonwealth can incorporate only within very narrow limits. In such a commonwealth the city itself is everything in a way into which the inhabitants of large kingdoms can hardly enter. And the representative system, by which all the inhabitants of a large country are enabled to have a share in the government, is not likely to occur to men's minds in such a state of things. Every citizen in a Democracy,

No means
of Incorporation
under
the system
of Independent
Cities.

This has been forcibly brought out by Mr. Grote (vi. 47, and elsewhere). See also *North British Review*, May, 1856, p. 169. Cf. Lewis, *Government of Dependencies*, p. 102.

I have drawn my picture of a Greek dependent city from the most favoured of the Athenian allies. But the condition of different allies of Athens differed much; and the position of a dependency of Sparta or Thebes in the next generation was far inferior to that of the least favoured subject of Athens.

CHAP. II.

Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens,

In the case of the old Attic Cities.

every citizen of the ruling order in an Aristocracy, deems it his inalienable right to discharge his political functions in his own person. Consequently incorporation cannot be carried out over an extent of territory so large as to prevent the whole ruling body from habitually assembling in the city. Athens indeed, in a remote and unchronicled age, actually carried incorporation as far as a city-commonwealth could carry it. There is no record of the causes and circumstances of the change, but there is no reasonable doubt that the smaller towns of Attica, Eleusis, Marathôn, and the rest, were once independent states,¹ which were afterwards incorporated with Athens, not as subjects of the ruling commonwealth, but as municipal towns whose inhabitants possessed the common Athenian franchise equally with the inhabitants of the capital.² But then Attica was not so large a territory as to hinder all its free inhabitants from frequently meeting together in a capital whose position was admirably central. All Attica therefore was really incorporated with Athens. Athens became the only City, in the highest sense, in all Attica, and all the free inhabi-

¹ See North British Review, May, 1856, p. 150.

² There can be no doubt that this incorporation was the main cause of the great power and importance of Athens. As such, it is one of the great events in the history of the world. No other Greek city possessed so large an immediate territory, or so great a number of free and equal citizens. The territory of Sparta was much larger; but then Sparta held the Lakonian towns as subjects; their inhabitants had no voice in general politics; whatever freedom they had was merely that of municipalities under a despotism. Thebes called herself the head of a Boeotian League, but the smaller Boeotian towns, as we shall see when we reach that part of her history, looked on her as a Tyrant rather than as a President. A Boeotian town was practically a subject dependency of Thebes, but throughout Attica, a territory hardly smaller than Boeotia, the smaller towns were free municipalities, and their inhabitants were citizens of Athens. This was a wonderful advantage, precluding all fear of internal treason or discontent.

There is a dialogue in Xenophôn, comparing Boeotia and Athens at length, in which the Athenians are always set against the Boeotians as a whole, not against the Thebans only. οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλεῖστοι μὲν οὐδὲν μέλουσιν εἰσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν; οἶσα γὰρ, ἔφη.—Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 2.

tants of Attica became her citizens. But this incorporation, CHAP. II.
 which geographical position rendered possible in the case of
 the old Attic towns, could never have been extended to all
 the members of the later Athenian Empire. If the jealousy
 of the Sovereign People could have stooped to communi- Impossible
in the case
of the later
Athenian
Empire.
 cate its franchise to subjects, or even to allies, it was utterly
 impossible that the rights of Athenian citizens could have
 been exercised by the inhabitants of Rhodes or of Byzan-
 tium. Even a Federal Union, except one which admitted
 the representative principle, could hardly have bound
 together such distant members; to unite them into a
 single commonwealth of the ancient type was physically
 impossible. So in later times, wherever the system of city-
 commonwealths existed, we find subject cities and districts
 following naturally in the wake of other cities, which bear Depen-
dencies of
mediæval
and
modern
Italian
cities,
 rule over them. We find the system of the Athenian
 Empire followed, even in cases where no geographical
 obstacle prevented the imitation of the earlier Athenian
 system of incorporation. Venice, Genoa, Florence, held
 sway over other cities and districts, sometimes near neigh-
 bours, sometimes dependencies beyond the sea. In both
 cases the subject countries often retained large municipal
 privileges, but in neither case did the sovereign City
 ever dream of conferring on their inhabitants any share in
 its own more exalted rights. So in the old state of things and of
Swiss
Cantons,
 in Switzerland, both the League as a whole and many
 of the several Cantons, democratic Uri no less than oli-
 garchic Bern, assumed the character of despotic sovereigns
 over subject districts, which they too often governed yet
 more purely in the interest of the sovereign state than
 had been done by Athens or Venice. In short among
 city-commonwealths, where the Federal principle is not
 admitted, absolute political independence or absolute poli-
 tical subjection are the only alternatives. Once only in
 the history of the world has incorporation on a large scale

CHAP. II. been tried in the case of a city-commonwealth. And in that one case the experiment undoubtedly failed. The geographical position of Rome allowed an extension of the Roman franchise far wider than was possible with the franchise of Athens or of any other Greek city. From the narrow limits of the old *Ager Romanus* the freedom of the Roman city was gradually spread over the whole of Italy, and, when it had long ceased to confer any real political rights, its name was further extended to the inhabitants of the whole civilized world. Within certain bounds, this liberal extension of the franchise made Rome the greatest and mightiest of all cities. But the same system, carried beyond those bounds, led directly to the destruction of Roman freedom. Federation was not tried; it would have been inconsistent with the dignity of the Sovereign City. Representation was unheard of; so the hundreds and thousands of citizens of the allied states were gradually admitted to a personal vote in the Roman Assembly. The result naturally was that the Assembly became at last a frantic and ungovernable mob, utterly incapable of peaceful deliberation. When called on to discharge any political function, to pass a law or to elect a magistrate, it commonly appealed at once to violence, murder, perhaps to open civil war. From such a state of things even the despotism of the Cæsars was felt to be a relief. The Athenian, Venetian, or Bernese system was much as if the local Livery of London were invested with the supreme power over the whole United Kingdom, leaving to the other towns and counties full municipal, but only municipal, independence. The Roman system was as if the Livery of London were invested with the supreme power, every elector in the United Kingdom being at the same time invested with the freedom of the City.¹

Effects of
incorpora-
tion at
Rome.

¹ See National Review, April, 1859, p. 337.

Greece then was the true home of the system of independent city-commonwealths, the land where the system reached its fullest and its most brilliant development, the land where its good and its evil results may be most fairly balanced against each other. In ancient Italy the system hardly attained to full perfection; it was modified by a far stronger tendency than in Greece to unite many cities by a Federal tie, and also by the steady and increasing power of the one City of Rome. In modern, and even in mediæval, Europe Town-autonomy has always had but a comparatively feeble life. Many commonwealths of Italy, Germany, and the old Burgundian Kingdom,¹ have attained to fame, wealth, and power; but, even in the most brilliant days of mediæval Italy, town-autonomy was the exception and not the rule. Most European states, great and small, have always been monarchies. Such city-commonwealths as have existed have always had a far greater tendency than in Greece, sometimes to join themselves into Confederacies, sometimes to degenerate from great Cities into petty Principalities.² And, in truth, the perfect city-autonomy of old Greece could not exist in mediæval Europe. The still abiding life of the Roman Empire forbade it. The parts of Europe where the cities attained to the greatest splendour lay within the bounds of one or other of the

CHAP. II.

Town-
autonomy
in mediæ-
val Europe.

Independ-
ence of
cities
modified
by the
claims of
the Em-
perors.

¹ I must remark, once for all, that mediæval history cannot be properly understood unless it be fully understood that the Kingdom of Burgundy, the region between the Saône, the Alps, and the Mediterranean, is historically no part of France. It has been gradually acquired by the Kings and "Emperors" of Paris, by a series of stealthy robberies (*réunions*), reaching from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth. Part of the country still retains its freedom as the Western Cantons of Switzerland. Lyons, Besançon, Marseilles, were anciently Free Cities of the Empire; they have been swallowed up, while Geneva and Bern have as yet escaped; that is the only difference.

² Most of the points touched on in this paragraph I have worked out more at large in the Oxford Essays for 1857, "Ancient Greece and Mediæval Italy," p. 156 et seqq.

CHAP. II. monarchies which retained the style and imperial pretensions of old Rome. Cherson¹ and the Campanian Republics were dependencies of the Byzantine Emperor; so was Venice, in name at least, long after she had attained to practical independence. The other cities which possessed republican constitutions, in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Provence, and the Netherlands,² all lay within the limits of the Empire of the West. However carefully the Imperial power might be limited in practice, no commonwealth absolutely denied its existence in theory. The city then was not absolutely independent; it had an earthly superior, entitled always to honorary respect, often to some measure of practical obedience. A Greek city owned no king but Zeus; a German or Italian city had at least a nominal king in Cæsar.³ The title of "Free Imperial City," borne as a badge of honour by many a proud mediæval commonwealth, would have sounded like a contradiction in terms in the ears of an Athenian. Venice alone, through her peculiar position and her peculiar policy, obtained complete independence in name as well as fact. The island city retained her nominal allegiance to the Emperor of the East till she became strong enough to dispense with all recognition of the successor either of Constantine or of Charles. But even Florence and Genoa in the days of their might would hardly have denied that

¹ For the deeply interesting history of Cherson, literally the Last of the Greek Republics, see Finlay, *Byzantine Empire*, i. 415 et seqq.

² Strictly speaking, the cities in the County of Flanders should be excepted, as Flanders, or its greatest portion, was a fief of the Crown of France. But the history of Flanders can hardly be separated from that of the neighbouring and kindred provinces which were all fiefs of the Empire. Provence, of course, was not French till late in the fifteenth century.

³ The Emperor of course was supreme, in theory at least, everywhere. But the independence of a town was often much more practically modified by the neighbourhood of some local Duke, Count, or Bishop.

some vague and shadowy superiority over them belonged of right to the chosen King of Germany and Italy, the crowned and anointed Emperor of the Romans. From all these causes, the independence of city-commonwealths, even in mediæval, and still more in modern, Europe, must be looked on as merely a secondary element, existing only in an imperfect shape. It is to old Greece that we must ever look for its one great and splendid manifestation.

CHAP. II.

Let us now strive to picture to ourselves the condition of a country whose great political doctrine is that of the perfect independence of each separate city. Such a land is crowded with towns, each of them acknowledging no superior upon earth and exercising all the rights of sovereignty as fully as the mightiest empires. Within limits, it may be, less than those of an English county, among a people one in blood, language, manners, and religion, you may pass, in a short day's journey, through several independent states, each of which makes war and peace at its pleasure, and whose relations to its neighbours are regulated only by the public Law of Nations. From any lofty peak you may look down on several capitals at a glance, and see the territory of several sovereign commonwealths lying before you as in a map. Within this narrow compass there may be perfect examples of every varying shade of political constitution. In one city pure Democracy may reign; magistrates may be chosen, laws may be enacted, treaties may be ratified, by an Assembly in which every free citizen has an equal voice. In another, an hour or two from its gates, all power may be in the hands of a narrow Oligarchy, who bind themselves by oath to be evil-minded to the People.

General
view of
the system
of Independent
Cities.Varieties
in internal
Constitutions.

¹ Arist. Pol. v. 9, 11. *Nûn μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις [ὀλιγαρχίαις] ὁμόθυνοι, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσσομαι, καὶ βουλευέσω ὃ τι ἂν ἐχω κακόν.*

CHAP. II. In a third, at no greater distance, we may even find that name of fear, the Tyrant—the ruler whose power rests on no hereditary right, on no popular choice, but who dwells entrenched in his citadel, lording it over unwilling subjects by the spears of foreign mercenaries. Thus, within this narrow compass, we may see every form of government in its extremest shape, and we may see them too in all those intermediate forms by which each shades off imperceptibly into the others. We may see Democracies in which an acknowledged sovereignty of the People is found not to be inconsistent with the practical ascendancy of a high-born and wealthy class, the leaders of the People but not their masters. We may see Aristocracies, where the ruling order is not a band of sworn oppressors, but a race of hereditary chiefs, submitted to, if not with cordial love, at least with traditional respect. We may even see Tyrannies, where the Tyrant would scarcely, in modern language, deserve the name, where he is sometimes hardly to be distinguished from a popular chief, sometimes hardly to be distinguished from a hereditary King.¹ And besides every variety of internal government, we may also see, within this same narrow compass, every possible variety of political relation between city and city. For, though every city claims independent sovereignty as its right, it may well be that every city is not strong enough practically to maintain that right. One city may stand absolutely alone, neither ruling over others, nor ruled by others, nor yet entering into habitual alliance with any other power.² Others, though not connected by anything which can be called a Federal tie, may

Varieties
in external
Relations.

¹ In the islands and in the colonies Tyranny seems to have been less carefully distinguished from lawful Kingship than in continental Greece. Both Pindar and Herodotus freely apply the name *βασιλεύς* to Sicilian and other Tyrants.

² See the policy of Korkyra as set forth in Thucydides, i. 32, 37.

yet be attached to each other by ancient affection; they may be accustomed to have friends and enemies in common, and they may, without resigning any portion of their independent sovereignty, habitually follow the political lead of some mightier and more venerable city.¹ Others may have sunk from independent into dependent alliance; their internal laws and government may be their own, but their fleets and armies may be at the absolute control of another state.² Or they may even be without any fleet or army of their own; they may pay tribute to some imperial city, which engages in return to defend them against all aggressors.³ Or some unhappy cities may have fallen lower still; dependent alliance may have sunk into absolute subjection. Law and life and property may all be at the absolute command of a foreign governor, for whom even the domestic Tyrant would be a good exchange. And his yoke may be embittered rather than alleviated, when his power is supported by the intrigues of degenerate citizens who find their private advantage in the degradation of their native city.⁴ Again, as there may be every conceivable variety of relation between city and city, so we may also find, within the same narrow compass, every con-

¹ This was the condition of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta during the great Peloponnesian War. Lacedæmôn took the habitual lead, but matters of common interest were debated by the voices of the whole Confederacy, and each city was free to act, or not to act, as it thought good. See Thuc. i. 125; v. 80; Grote, vi. 105. It is instructive to see how, after the temporary confusions following the Peace of Nikias (B.C. 421), the different states gradually fell back into their old places and relations. Cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 8.

² This was the condition of Chios, Mitylênê, and the other allies of Athens which never exchanged contributions of men for contributions of money. See Grote, vi. 2.

³ This was the condition of the great mass of the Athenian allies.

⁴ This was the condition of the extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta after the great victory of Áigospotamos (B.C. 405). On the harmosts and dekarchies, see Grote, ix. 271, et seqq.; Isok. Panath. 58.

CHAP. II. **ceivable variety of relation between the city itself and its surrounding territory. In one district, as we have seen in the case of Attica, every free inhabitant, that is every man who is neither a slave nor a foreigner,¹ enjoys the full franchise of the City, votes in its Assemblies, and is eligible to its honours. In another, the rural inhabitants may be personally free, protected by the laws in all their private rights, but shut out from the political franchise, subjects in short, rather than citizens, of the sovereign commonwealth.² In the third, the City, the abode of free warrior-nobles, may be surrounded by lands tilled for them by serfs, Lakonian Helots or Thessalian Penests, whose highest privilege is to be the slaves of the Commonwealth, and not the slaves of any individual master. But, in all these cases alike, the City is the only recognized political existence. Each city is either sovereign or deems itself wronged by being shorn of sovereignty. At a few miles from the gates of one independent city we may find another, speaking the same tongue, worshipping the same gods, sharing in the same national festivals, but living under different municipal laws, different political constitutions, with a different coinage, different weights and measures, different names, it may be, for the very months of the year, levying duties at its frontiers, making war, making peace, sending forth its Ambassadors under the protection of the Law of Nations, and investing the bands which wage its border warfare with all the rights of the armies and the commanders of belligerent empires.**

Now what is the comparative gain and loss of such a

¹ It must be of course borne in mind that the children of a foreigner, though born in the land, still remained foreigners. This seems strange to us as applied to the question of nationality, but it is simply the rule of burghership as it was carried out in many an old English borough.

² This is essentially the condition of the Lakonian *νεπλουκοι*. They had towns, but all notion of their separate political being was so utterly lost, that their inhabitants had more in common with a rural population.

political system as this? There are great and obvious advantages, balanced by great and obvious drawbacks. Let us first look at the bright side of a system to which the nation on which the world must ever look as its first teacher owed the most brilliant pages of that history which still remains the text-book of all political knowledge.

CHAP. II.
Comparative gain and loss of the system.

First of all, it is clear that, in a system of city-commonwealths, the individual citizen is educated, worked up, improved, to the highest possible pitch. Every citizen in the Democracy, every citizen of the ruling order in the Aristocracy, is himself statesman, judge, and warrior. English readers are apt to blame such a government as the Athenian Democracy for placing power in hands unfit to use it. The truer way of putting the case would be to say that the Athenian Democracy made a greater number of citizens fit to use power than could be made fit by any other system. (No mistake can be greater than to suppose that the popular Assembly at Athens was a mob such as gathers at some English elections, or such as the Assembly of the Roman Tribes undoubtedly became in its later days. It was not an indiscriminate gathering together of every male human being to be found in the streets of Athens. Citizenship was something definite; if it was a right, it was also a privilege.) The citizen of Athens was in truth placed in something of an aristocratic position; he looked down upon the vulgar herd of slaves, freedmen, and unqualified residents, much as his own plebeian fathers had been looked down upon by the old Eupatrids in the days before Kleisthenês and Solôn.¹ The Athenian

Advantages of small commonwealths.

Political Education of the individual Citizen.

¹ This quasi-aristocratic position of the citizen necessarily follows from the nature of a civic franchise. The freedom of the city could be acquired only by inheritance or by special grant. But in a great commercial and imperial city like Athens a large unqualified population naturally arose,

CHAP. II **Assembly was an assembly of citizens, of ordinary citizens without sifting or selection; but it was an assembly of**

among whom the citizens held a sort of aristocratic rank. Such an unqualified population may exist either in an Oligarchy or in a Democracy, and their position is legally the same in either case. The difference between Oligarchy and Democracy is a difference *within* the citizen class. In a Democracy civil and political rights are coextensive; in an Oligarchy political rights are confined to a portion only of those who enjoy civil rights.

The really weak point of Greek Democracy is one which I have not mentioned in the text, because I wish to make my remarks as far as possible applicable to city-commonwealths in general, whether aristocratic or democratic. Each gives the same political education to those who exercise political rights; the difference is that in the Democracy this education is extended to all the citizens, in the Aristocracy it is confined to a part of them. The real special weakness of pure Democracy is that it almost seems to require slavery as a necessary condition of its existence. It is hard to conceive that a large body of men, like the qualified citizens of Athens, can ever give so large a portion of their time as the Athenians did to the business of ruling and judging (*ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀνδρῶν*), without the existence of an inferior class to relieve them from at least the lowest and most menial duties of their several callings. Slavery therefore is commonly taken for granted by Greek political thinkers. In Aristotle's ideal city, (Pol. vii. 10, 13) the earth is to be tilled either by slaves or by barbarian *πρόλοιποι*. In an Aristocracy no such constant demands are made on the time of the great mass of the citizens; in an Aristocracy therefore slavery is not theoretically necessary. It might therefore be argued that Democracy, as requiring part of the population to be in absolute bondage, was really less favourable to freedom than Aristocracy. In the Aristocracy, it might be said, though the political rights of the ordinary citizen were narrower, it was still possible that every human being might be personally free. But the experience of Grecian history does not bear out such an inference. Slavery was no special sin of Democracy; it was an institution common to the whole ancient world, quite irrespective of particular forms of government. And in fact, the tone of feeling, the general sentiment of freedom and equality, engendered by a democratic constitution actually benefitted those who were without the pale of citizenship or even of personal freedom. It must doubtless have been deeply galling to a wealthy *μέτοικοι*, whose ancestors had perhaps lived at Athens for several generations, to see the meanest hereditary burgher preferred to him on all occasions. It must have been more galling than it was in a city like Corinth, where strangers and citizens were alike subject to the ruling order. But Democracy really benefitted both the slave and the stranger. The slave was far better off in democratic Athens than in aristocratic Sparta or Chios. (On the Chian slaves, see Thuc. viii. 40.) The author of the strange libel on the Athenian Commonwealth attributed to Xenophon

citizens among whom the political average stood higher than it ever did in any other state. Our own House of Commons, though a select body, does not necessarily consist of the 658 wisest men among the British people. Many of its members will always be mere average citizens, neither better nor worse than many among their constituents. A town sends a wealthy and popular trader, an average specimen of his class. A county sends a wealthy and popular country gentleman, an average specimen of his class. Very likely several of those who vote for them are much deeper political thinkers than themselves. But the average member so elected, if he really be up to the average and not below it, will derive unspeakable benefit from his political education in the House itself. He cannot fail to learn much from the mere habit of exercising power in an assembly at once free and orderly, and from the opportunity of hearing the speeches and following the guidance of those who are really fitted to be the leaders of men. This sort of advantage, this good political education, which the English constitution gives to some hundreds of average Englishmen, the Athenian constitution gave to some thousands of average Athenians. Doubtless an assembly of thousands was less orderly than an assembly of hundreds; but it must never be thought that the Athenian Ekklesia was a

CHAP. II.
Comparison with the English House of Commons.

makes it a sign of the bad government of Athens that an Athenian could not venture to beat a stranger (*μέτρουκας*) or another man's slave! (Xen. de Rep. Ath. i. 10.) This accusation speaks volumes as to the condition of slaves and strangers in aristocratic cities.

In modern times the experiment of a perfectly pure Democracy, one, that is, in which every citizen has a direct vote on all questions, has been confined to a few rural Cantons, where the demands on the citizen's time are immeasurably smaller than they must be in a great city. The question of slavery therefore has not arisen. American slavery is, of course, a wholly different matter.

On the general subject of ancient citizenship see Arnold, Thuc. vol. iii. p. xv. (Preface.)

CHAP. II. mere unruly crowd, ignorant of all order and impatient of all restraint. The mode of proceeding was regulated by fixed rules just as much as the proceedings of our Parliaments. As far as we know the history of Athenian debates, breaches of order were rare, and scenes of actual violence—common enough in the Roman Forum—were absolutely unknown. It was surely no slight gain to bring so many human beings into a position habitually to hear—and that not as mere spectators, but as men with an interest and a voice in the matter—the arguments for and against a proposal brought forward by Themistoklès and Aristeidès, by Periklès and Thucydidès, by Kleôn and Nikias, by Dêmosthenès and Phôkiôn.¹ It is the habitual practice of so doing which is the true gain. Popular Assemblies which are brought together only at rare intervals are incapable of wise political action, almost incapable of free and regular debate. The Parliament of Florence, for instance, was a mere tumultuous mob, which seldom did anything except vote away its own liberties. Such a political franchise could give no political education whatever. But the Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the history of mankind has ever been found to equal."

Contrast
with the
Florentine
Parliament.

¹ Tocqueville, *Dém. en Am.* ii. 241. "C'est en participant à la législation que l'Américain apprend à connaître les lois; c'est en gouvernant qu'il s'instruit des formes du gouvernement." How much more truly could this be said of the Athenian.

² One of the few faults in M. de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* is his failure to appreciate the Greek republics. Such words as the following sound strange indeed to one who knows what Athens really was. "Quand je compare les républiques grecque et romaine à ces républiques d'Amérique; les bibliothèques manuscrites des premières et leur populace grossière, aux mille journaux qui sillonnent les secondes et au peuple éclairé que les habite," &c. (ii. 237). Fancy the people who heard and appreciated *Æschylus*, *Periklès*, and *Aristophanès*, called a "populace grossière," because they had no newspapers to enlighten them! And this by a writer

The ordinary Athenian citizen then must really be compared, not with the English ten-pound householder, but with the English Member of Parliament in the rank-and-file of his party. In some respects indeed the political education of the Athenian was higher than any which a private member in our Parliament can derive from his parliamentary position. The comparison is instructive in itself, and it is more closely connected with my immediate subject than might at first sight appear. When I come to the political history of the Achaian League, I shall have to compare the working of popular government, as applied to a large Confederation of cities, with its working as applied, on the one hand, to a single city like Athens, and, on the other, to a large country, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy. I shall then show how the principles of the Achaian constitution, no less democratic in theory than the Athenian constitution, were modified in practice by the requirements of the wholly different state of things to which they were applied. Athens, in short, is the typical City and the typical Democracy. A clear view of the Athenian constitution is absolutely necessary in order to understand, as we go on, the modifications which later Greek Federalism introduced into the old ideal of the democratic city. I therefore do not scruple, with this ulterior purpose, to enlarge somewhat more fully on Athenian political life than would be of itself necessary in a comparison between the system of separate city-commonwealths and the system of larger states. The Athenian citizen, the Achaian citizen, the English Member of Par-

CHAP. II.
Comparison of the Athenian citizen and the English member.

Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism.

who, in his own walk, ranks deservedly among the profoundest of political philosophers.

It is some comfort that Lord Macanlay, at all events, could have set him right. See the well-known and most brilliant passage on the working of the Athenian system in his *Essay on Boswell's Life of Johnson* (p. 177, one vol. ed.)

CHAP. II. liament, resemble each other in being members of popular bodies each invested with the most important powers in their respective countries. But the functions of the three are not exactly the same, nor is the political education received by the three exactly of the same kind. The Athenian had the highest political education of all, because he had the highest responsibility of all. The comparison between Athens and Achaia I will put off to another Chapter; I will now rather try to show what the Athenian political education really was by comparing the powers and responsibilities of the ordinary Athenian citizen with those of an ordinary Member of our own House of Commons.

Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English Member.

Position of the English Ministry.

There can be no doubt that an Athenian citizen who habitually and conscientiously discharged his political duties was called on for a more independent exercise of judgement, for a more careful weighing of opposing arguments, than is practically required of the English private member. The functions of the Athenian Assembly were in a few respects more limited,¹ but, on the whole, they were much more extensive than those of the English House of Commons. The Assembly was more directly a governing body. Dêmos was, in truth, King, Minister, and Parliament, all in one. In our own system the written Law entrusts the choice of Ministers, the declaration of war, the negotiation of peace, in general the government of the country as distinguished from its legislation, to the hereditary Sovereign. But the conventional Constitution adds that all these powers shall be exercised by the advice of Ministers who, as chosen by the

¹ Matters of legislation, which we think so preeminently the business of a popular Assembly, were at Athens by no means wholly in the hands of the Ekklesia. Its powers were a good deal narrowed by the institution of the Nomothetes (see Grote, v. 500). On the other hand, the Assembly exercised exactly those functions of electing to offices, and declaring war and peace, any direct share in which we carefully refuse to the House of Commons.

Sovereign out of the party which has the majority in the House, may be said to be indirectly chosen by the House itself. These Ministers, a body unknown to the written Law, but the most important element in the unwritten Constitution, exercise royal power during the pleasure of the House.¹ As long as they retain the confidence of the House, they take the management of things into their own hands.² The House asks questions; it calls for papers; it approves or censures after the fact; but its vote is not directly taken beforehand on questions of peace, war, alliance, or other matters of administration. It leaves such matters to the Ministers as long as it trusts them; if it ceases to trust them, it takes measures which practically amount to their deposition. No Minister remains in office after a direct vote of censure, or even after the rejection of a Government motion which he deems of any importance. He may indeed dissolve Parliament; that is, he appeals to the country. But if the new Parliament confirm the hostile vote of the old one, he has then no escape; he is hopelessly driven to resignation. No Minister receives instructions from the House as to the policy which he is to carry out; least of all, when he rises in his place in Parliament to advo-

CHAP. II.

¹ With us a body which has no existence in the eye of the Law exercises the chief power in the name of the Sovereign and during the pleasure of the House of Commons. We shall presently have to contrast this with the Achaian and American system by which a magistrate, chosen for a fixed time, exercises nearly the same powers in his own person. Athens differs from all these by what may be called vesting the royal authority in the House of Commons itself.

² The gradual change of political language and political habits is curious. The Sovereign no longer presides at a Cabinet Council, because the practical function of the Ministers is no longer to advise the Sovereign, but to act for themselves, subject to responsibility to Parliament. Therefore it has of late become usual to apply the name of "Government" to the body which used to be content with the humbler title of "Ministry" or "Administration." Its members are felt, subject to their parliamentary responsibility, to be the real rulers.

CHAP. II. cate one policy, is he bidden by the House to go to his office and take the requisite administrative steps for carrying out another policy. Hence, under our present parliamentary system, the average member is in truth seldom called on to exercise a perfectly independent judgement on particular questions of importance. He exercises his judgement once for all, when he decides whether he will support or oppose the Ministry; by that decision his subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted; it is enough for our present purpose that it is the political morality commonly received. Matters were widely different in the Athenian Assembly. Every citizen who sat there exercised much higher functions than those of an English private member. He sat there as a member of a body which was directly, and not indirectly, sovereign. His own share of that corporate sovereignty it was his duty to discharge according to his own personal convictions. Athens had no King, no President, no Premier; she had curtailed the once kingly powers of her Archons till they were of no more political importance than Aldermen or Police Magistrates. She had no Cabinet, no Council of Ministers, no Council of State.¹ The Assembly was, in modern political language, not only a Parliament but a Government. There was indeed a Senate, but that Senate was not a distinct or external body: it was a Committee of the Assembly, appointed to put matters in regular order for

Received
duties of
the private
Member.

Different
duties
of the
Athenian
Citizen.

The As-
sembly a
Govern-
ment as
well as a
Parlia-
ment.

Functions
of the
Senate;

¹ I cannot but think that Mr. Grote, to whom, more than to any other man, we are indebted for true views of the Athenian Democracy, has been sometimes led astray by his own English parliamentary experience. He clearly looks on Nikias and other official men as coming nearer to the English idea of a "Government," and Kleon and other demagogues as coming nearer to the English idea of a "Leader of Opposition," than the forms of the Athenian commonwealth allowed. I have tried to set this forth at some length in an article in the North British Review, May, 1856, p. 157.

the Assembly to discuss. There were Magistrates, high in dignity and authority—the ten Generals, on whom, far more than on the pageant Archons, rested the real honours and burthens of office. But those Magistrates were chosen by the Assembly itself for a definite time; it was from the Assembly itself that they received those instructions which, in all modern states, whether despotic, constitutional, or republican, would issue from the “Government.” There was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call “Office” and “Opposition.” Periklêa, Nikias, Phôkiôn, appeared in the Assembly, as Generals of the Republic, to propose what measures they thought fit for the good of the state. Their proposals, as coming at once from official men and from eloquent and honourable citizens, were doubtless always listened to with respect. But the acceptance of these proposals was by no means a matter of course; their rejection did not involve immediate resignation, nor did it even imply the rejection of their proposers at the next yearly choice of Magistrates. The Assembled People was sovereign; as sovereign, it listened to its various counsellors and reserved the decision to itself. Periklêa, Nikias, and Phôkiôn were listened to; but Thucydidês,¹ Kleôn, and Dêmosthenês were listened to also, and their amendments, or their substantive proposals, had as fair a chance of being carried as those of the Generals of the commonwealth. A preference given to the proposal of another citizen involved no sort of censure on the official man who was thus placed in a minority; it in no way affected his political position, or implied any diminished confidence on the part of the People. The Sovereign Assembly listened patiently to the arguments of Nikias against the Sicilian expedition, and then sent him, with unusual

CHAP. II.

of the
Generals.Nothing
analogous
to “Office”
and “Op-
position.”

B.C. 415.

¹ I mean of course Thucydidês son of Melêsias, the rival of Periklêa; quite a different person from Thucydidês the historian.

CHAR. II. marks of confidence, to command the expedition against which he had argued. It was the Assembly which, by its direct vote, decided questions of peace and war; it was the Assembly which gave its instructions to the Ambassadors of Athens; and it was the Assembly which listened, in broad daylight and under the canopy of heaven, to the proposals which were made by the Ambassadors of other powers. In modern times, even a republican state has some President, Secretary, or other official person, to whom diplomatic communications are immediately addressed. The consent of a Senate may be needed for every important act, but there is some officer or other who is the immediate and responsible actor.¹ We shall see a very close approach to this system when we come to look at Greek Democracy as modified in the Federal constitution of Achaia. But in the pure Democracy of Athens there is no approach to anything of the kind.

B.C. 348. When King Philip has to communicate with the hostile republic, he does not commission a Minister to address a Minister; he writes in his own name to the Senate and People of Athens.² The royal letter is read, first in the Senate before hundreds, and then in the Assembly before thousands, of hearers, each of whom may, if he can gain the ear of the House, take a part in the debate on its contents. So, when the reading and the

¹ By the American Constitution the assent of the Senate is needed for the treaties entered into by the President, and the power of declaring war is vested in Congress. But all diplomatic business up to these points is carried on after the forms usual with the Governments of other states. Despatches are not addressed to Congress, nor even to the President, but to a Secretary of State, whose office is not mentioned in the Constitution. According to Athenian practice, the letters of Earl Russell on the affair of the Trent would have been addressed, not to Mr. Seward, but to the Houses of Congress, and the liberation of the Southern Commissioners would have needed a vote of those bodies.

² See the Speech of Demosthenes (or rather of Hægeippus) about Halonnêsos (Oratores Attici, vol. iv. p. 82).

debate are over, it is by the sovereign vote of those thousands of hearers that the policy of the commonwealth is finally and directly decided. It is evident that the member of an Assembly invested with such powers as these had the very highest form of political education opened to him. If he did his daily duty, he formed an opinion of his own upon every question of the day, and that not blindly or rashly, but after hearing all that could be said on either side by the greatest of orators and statesmen. Of course he might blindly follow in the wake of some favourite leader—so might a Venetian Senator, so may an English Peer—but so to do was a clear forsaking of duty. The average Athenian citizen could not shelter himself under those constitutional theories by which, in the case of the average English member, blind party voting is looked upon as a piece of political duty, and an independent judgement is almost considered as a crime.

CHAP. II.

Effect
of these
powers on
individual
citizens.

The great advantage then of the system of small city-commonwealths, the system of which the Athenian Democracy was the greatest and most illustrious example, was that it gave the members of the ruling body (whether the whole people or only a part of the people) such a political education as no other political system can give. Nowhere will the average of political knowledge, and indeed of general intelligence¹ of every kind, be so high as in a commonwealth of this sort. Doubtless

¹ General intelligence, not of course general knowledge, which must always depend upon the particular age and country in which the commonwealth is placed. The average Englishman knows far more than the average Athenian knew, because the aggregate of knowledge in the world is incomparably greater than what it was then. But the average Athenian probably knew far more in proportion to the aggregate of knowledge in his own day; most certainly he had a general quickness, a power of appreciation and judgement, for which we should look in vain in the average Englishman.

CHAP. II. to take Athens as the type is to look at the system
Athens the in its most favourable aspect. The Athenian people
highest seem to have had natural gifts beyond all other people,
type and the circumstances of their republic brought each
of the citizen into daily contact with greater political affairs
system. than could have been the case with the citizens of an
average Greek commonwealth. At Rome, again, the
vast numbers of the Assembly and the comparatively
narrow range of its functions must have effectually
hindered the Comitia from ever becoming such a school
of politics as the Athenian Pnyx. The Roman Tribes
elected Magistrates, passed Laws, and declared war; but
they did not exercise that constant supervision over
affairs which belonged to the Athenian Dêmos. The
ordinary powers, in short, of a Government, as distin-
guished from a Parliament, were exercised by the
Senate and not by the Tribes. It was not every
city-commonwealth which could give its citizens such
opportunities of improvement as were enjoyed by the
citizens of Athens. But, in estimating the tendencies
of any political system, they must be estimated by
their most perfect manifestations both for good and
for evil. And undoubtedly even commonwealths which
gave their citizens far less political education than was
to be had at Athens must have given them far more
than is to be had in any modern kingdom or republic.
We idolize what is called the press,¹ as the great
organ of modern cultivation; but, after all, for a man
to read his newspaper is by no means so elevating a
process as it is to listen with his own ears to a great
statesman and to give his own independent vote for
or against his motion. And great statesmen moreover
grow far thicker on the ground in commonwealths of

¹ It is worth notice that the "press" in common language always means newspapers and not books.

this kind than they do in great kingdoms. Many a man who has a high natural capacity for statesmanship is, in a large state, necessarily confined to the narrow range of private or local affairs. Such a man may, under a system of small commonwealths, take his place in the Sovereign Assembly of his own city and at once stand forth among the leaders of men. In a word, it can hardly be doubted that the system of small commonwealths raises the individual citizen to a pitch utterly unknown elsewhere. The average citizen is placed on a far higher level, and the citizen who is above the average has far more favourable opportunities for the display of his special powers.

This elevation of the character of the individual citizen is the main advantage of the system of small states. It is their one great gain, and it is an unmixed gain. It does not indeed decide the question in favour of small Commonwealths as against Federations or great Monarchies. These last have their advantages which may well be held to outweigh even this advantage; but it clearly is unmixed gain as far as it goes. Less absolutely unmixed is another result of the system, which is closely connected with both its good and its bad features. A system of small commonwealths raises in each citizen a fervour and intensity of patriotism to which the natives of larger states are quite unaccustomed.¹ It is impossible, even in a fairly homogeneous country, to feel the same warmth of affection for a large region as for a single city or for a small district. An Englishman is patriotic; a Dane, as a countryman of a smaller state, is more patriotic still; but neither England nor Denmark can awaken the same glow of patriotic zeal as the great

CHAP. II.
Opportunity for the development of genius.

Intensity of patriotism in Small States.

¹ On the intensity of patriotism in small commonwealths, see Macaulay, *Hist. Eng.* i. 350 et seqq.

CHAP. II. name of Athens.¹ A man loves his birthplace, he loves his dwelling-place, he has a loyal respect for the seat of his country's government. But with the great mass of the subjects of a large kingdom these three feelings will severally attach to three different places. With an Athenian or a Florentine they all attached to the city of Athens or of Florence. In a smaller state, like Megara or Imola, the local patriotism might be yet more intense still, for the Athenian citizen might really be a native and resident, not of Athens, but of Marathôn or Eleusis. But the inhabitant of the rustic Dêmos was still an Athenian; if his birthplace and dwelling-place were not within the city walls, they could hardly be far out of sight of the spear-head of Athênê on the Akropolis. In any case the City was far more to him than the capital of a modern state can ever be to the great bulk of its inhabitants. To adorn a capital at the expense of a large kingdom is one of the most unjust freaks of modern centralization; but in adorning the city of Athens every Athenian was simply adorning his own hearth and home. Walls, temples, theatres, all were his own; there was no spot where he was a stranger, none which he viewed or trod by the sufferance of another. The single city will ever kindle a far more fervid feeling of patriotism than can be felt towards a vast region, large parts of which must always be practically strange. And this intensity of local patriotism is closely connected with all that is noblest and all that is basest in the history of City-commonwealths. Where the single city is all in all, no self-devotion is too great which her welfare demands, no deed of wrong is too black which is likely to promote her interests. The unselfish heroism of Leônidas and Decius sprang from the very same source as the massacre of Mêlos and the destruction of Carthage.

Identifica-
tion of all
citizens
with the
City.

Thuc. vii. 64. τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

CHAP. II.

Bad side of the system of city-commonwealths.

Greatness of small states less permanent than that of greater ones.

For that there is a weak and a bad side to this system of separate city-commonwealths is as obvious as that there is a great and noble one. First of all, the greatness of such commonwealths is seldom so enduring as that of larger states. A democratic city, above all, if it would preserve at once freedom at home and a high position abroad, has need of a certain high-strung fervour of patriotism which is not likely to endure through many generations. This Mr. Grote has remarked in the case of Athens, when he compares the feeble resistance offered by the contemporaries of Dêmôsthênês to the growing power of Macedonia with the vigour displayed by their fathers in the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.¹ A state again whose political franchise depends wholly on the hereditary burghership of a single city cannot so easily strengthen itself by fresh blood from other quarters, as can be done by a great nation. A conquest destroys a city; it not uncommonly regenerates a nation. Of all city-commonwealths none ever had so long a day of greatness as Rome. One main cause doubtless was because the Roman People was less of a purely civic body than any other city-commonwealth, and because no other city-commonwealth was ever so liberal of its franchise. Rome thus grew from a city into an empire; other cities, aristocratic and democratic alike, have often seen their day of greatness succeeded by a long and dishonoured old age. Nothing could well be more miserable than the latter days of democratic Athens and of oligarchic Venice. During the period of Grecian history with which we shall chiefly have to deal, the once proud Democracy of Athens sinks into the most contemptible state in Greece. And surely the dregs of a close body like the Venetian patriciate afford the very lowest spectacle which political history can produce.

¹ Grote, iv. 240.

CHAP. II.

B. C. 508-
405.Common
fallacy as
to the
weakness
of small
states.

Here then lies the real cause of the inherent weakness of these small commonwealths. Nothing can be so glorious as the life of one of them while it does live. The one century of Athenian greatness, from the expulsion of the Tyrants to the defeat of Aigospotamos, is worth millenniums of the life of Egypt or Assyria. But it is a greatness almost too glorious to last ; it carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. This kind of weakness, at all events this want of permanency, is inherent in the system itself. But another kind of weakness, with which the ancient commonwealths are often reproached by superficial observers, is not inherent, or rather it has no existence at all. Men who look only at the surface are tempted to despise Athens and Achaia, because of the supposed insignificance of what are called "petty states" in modern Europe. There are men who, when they look at the colossal size of despotic France or Russia, are led to despise the free Confederation of Switzerland and the free Monarchy of Norway. How utterly contemptible then must commonwealths have been, beside which even Switzerland and Norway would seem empires of vast extent. Such a view as this involves the fallacy of being wholly physical and forgetting all the higher parts of man's nature. France and Muscovy have indeed incomparably greater physical strength than Switzerland or Norway, but the Swiss or the Norwegian is a being of a higher political order than the Frenchman or the Muscovite. And this view also involves another fallacy. It goes on a mistaken analogy between small states, when they are surrounded by greater ones of equal material civilization, and small states, when small states constituted the whole of the civilized world. There is a certain sense in which the interests of Switzerland are smaller than the interests of France, but there was no possible sense in which the interests of Athens were smaller than the interests of Persia. The small states of modern Europe

exist by the sufferance, by the mutual jealousy, possibly to some extent by the right feeling, of their greater neighbours.¹ But the small commonwealths of old Greece were actually stronger than the contemporary empires; they were less than those empires only in the sense in which Great Britain is less than China. The few free cities now left in Europe are mere exceptions and anomalies; they could not resist a determined attack on the part of one even of the smaller monarchies. Cracow could have been wiped out of the map of Europe at a less expenditure of force than the combined energies of three of the Great Powers. If Germany and Europe chose to look on, Denmark could doubtless annex Hamburg, and Bavaria annex Frankfort. So it must ever be when Free Cities are merely exceptions among surrounding Kingdoms, when every Kingdom maintains a standing army, when a city can be laid in ashes in a day, and when the reduction of the strongest fortress has become simply a question of time. But when we discuss the merits of a system of Free Cities, we do not suppose those Free Cities to be mere exceptions to a general state of things, mere relics of a political system which has passed away; we suppose a state of things like that of old Greece, in which the independence of every city is the universal, or at least the predominant, rule of the civilized world. And even in much later times, in those centuries of the middle ages when Free Cities, though not predominant, were still numerous, a city surrounded by strong walls and defended

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Different
position of
small
states

where they
are merely
exceptions,

A.D. 1846,

and where
they are
the general
rule.

¹ Just at this moment Federal Government in general has acquired a certain amount of popular discredit from some of the acts of the power to which a momentary caprice has specially attached the name. It therefore cannot be out of place to point out the admirable union of dignity and modesty, the unswerving assertion of right combined with the absence of all unseemly bravado, which has distinguished all the acts of the Swiss Federal Government during the recent aggressions of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, both in the annexation of Savoy and in the more recent violation of Swiss territory in the Dappenthal. (February, 1862.)

CHAP. II.

Free cities
in the
Middle
Ages.

by valiant citizens might successfully resist the resources of a great empire. Feudal levies could not be kept to constant service, and, before the invention of gunpowder, the art of attacking fortified places lagged far behind the art of defending them. A single city nowadays is weak as compared with a small kingdom, just as a small kingdom is weak as compared with a great kingdom. The fact that no state can resist a power which is physically stronger than itself proves nothing as to the merits of particular forms of government. Aristocratic Rhodes, democratic Athens, federal Achaia, and kingly Macedonia were all alike, as their several turns came round, swallowed up by the universal power of Rome.

Constant
warfare
among
Free
Cities.

But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate Free Cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. This is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes which, in a great monarchy or a Federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neighbouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with tenfold force, in the case of independent city-commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to individual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay; but a rival whose dwellingplace is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The

highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities. The German historian of Frederick Barbarossa speaks with horror of the hate which raged between the several Italian towns, far surpassing any feeling of national dislike between Italians and Germans.¹ In old Greece the amount of hatred between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically upon their distance from one another. Athens and Sparta are commonly rivals, often enemies. But their enmity is not inconsistent with something of international respect and courtesy. When Athens was at last overcome, Sparta at once rejected the proposal to raze to the earth a city which, even when conquered, she still acknowledged as her yoke-fellow.² That proposal came from Thebes, between whom and Athens there reigned an enmity which took the form of settled deadly hostility.³ The greatest work that orator or diplomatist ever achieved⁴ was when D  mo- sthen  s induced the two cities to lay aside their differences, and to join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader. But even Athenian hatred towards Thebes was gentle compared with the torrents of wrath which were poured forth upon unhappy Megara.⁵ So too in B  otia itself; just as Frederick entrusted the destruction of Milan, not to his own Germans, but to Milan's enemies of Lodi and

CHAP. II.

Force of antipathy between neighbouring towns.

B.C. 404.

B.C. 339.

Examples in Greece and Italy.

A.D. 1162.

¹ See Radevic of Freising, iii. 39. Cf. National Review, No. XXIII. (January, 1861) p. 52.

² Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19, 20.

³ Circumstances led Athens and Thebes to receive help from one another in the very crisis of their several revolutions (B.C. 403 and 382); but when these exceptional causes had passed by, the old enmity returned. It never was stronger than during the later campaigns of Epamein  ndas and during the Sacred War.

⁴ See Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. p. 331.

⁵ This comes out strongly in those scenes in the Acharnians of Aristophan  s, in which the B  otian and the Megarian are severally introduced.

CHAP. II. Cremona,¹ so Alexander left the fate of Thebes to the
 B.C. 335. decision of his own Greek allies, and the vengeance, not of Macedonia, but of Plataia and Orchomenos, soon swept away the tyrant city from the earth.² A system of Free Cities therefore involves a state of warfare, and that of warfare carried on with all the bitterness of almost personal hostility. The more fervid the patriotism, the more intense the national life and vigour, the more constant and the more unrelenting will be the conflicts in which a city-commonwealth is sure to find itself engaged with its neighbours.

→ The same causes tend also to produce a greater degree of cruelty in warfare, and a greater severity in the recognized law of war, than is found in struggles between great nations in civilized ages. An army of citizen soldiers is a very different thing from an army of professional soldiers. Undoubtedly the citizen soldier never sinks to the lowest level of the professional soldier. He never attains that pitch of fiendishness which is reached when the professional soldier degenerates into the mercenary, and when the mercenary degenerates into the brigand. Old Greece was full of wars, of cruel and bloody wars, but she never knew the horrors with which France, Germany, and Belgium were familiar from the wars of Charles of Burgundy to those of Wallenstein and Tilly. Such scenes
 Comparison between citizen soldiers and professional soldiers. as the sack of Magdeburg and the Spanish Fury at Antwerp are all but without parallel in Grecian history, they are altogether without a parallel among the deeds of Athenian or Lacedæmonian citizens.³ But if the citizen

A.D. 1631.
 A.D. 1576.

¹ Otto Morena, ap. Muratori, vi. 1103. Sire Raul, ib. 1187.

² Arrian, i. 8. 14; 9. 16.

³ Two events alone in Grecian history at all approach what was almost the normal condition of European warfare in the sixteenth century. One occurs in the Greece of Thucydides, the other in the Greece of Polybios. But in the earlier instance the guilty parties were not Greeks at all, in the latter they were the lowest of Greeks, the professional robbers of Ætolia.

soldier does not degenerate into the wanton brutality of the mere mercenary, yet the very feelings which elevate the spirit of his warfare serve, on the other hand, to render it far more cruel than warfare waged by a civilized army in modern times. The modern professional soldier does as he is bid; he does what is required by professional honour and professional duty; he is patriotic, no doubt, but his patriotism would seem vague and cold to an Athenian marching to Delion, or to a Milanese going forth to Legnano. In any case the war is none of his own making; he is probably utterly indifferent to its abstract justice, and utterly ignorant of its actual origin. The enemy are nothing to him but something which professional duty requires him to overcome; they never did him any personal wrong; they never drove away his oxen,¹ or carried off his wife. It is another matter when two armies of citizens meet together. The war is their own war; the general is probably the statesman who proposed the expedition; his army is composed of the citizens who gave their votes in favour of his proposal. The hostile general and the hostile army are not mere machines in the hand of some unseen and distant potentate; they are the very men who have done the wrong, and on whom the wrong has to be avenged. Defeat will at once involve the

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B.C. 424.
A.D. 1176.

In B.C. 413 the little Boeotian town of Mykaléssos was fallen upon, and the inhabitants massacred, by Thracian mercenaries in the service of Athens (Thuc. vii. 29, 30). Even in the midst of the terrible Peloponnesian war, this deed of blood raised a cry of horror throughout all Greece. The other case is the seizure of Kynaitha by the Ætolians in B.C. 220 (Pol. iv. 18). They were admitted by treachery; once admitted, they massacred friend and foe alike, and even put men to the torture to discover their hidden treasures. This last extremity of cruelty is unparalleled in Grecian warfare, and any Greek but an Ætolian would have shrunk from it, but it was a matter of every-day business with the Spanish soldiers of the sixteenth century.

¹ II. A. 154. οὐ γὰρ πάποτε' ἐμὰς βοῦς ἤλασαν, οὐδὲ μὲν ἵππους,
οὐδέ ποτ' ἐν Φθίῃ ἐριβόλακι, Βαυτιανείῳ,
καρπὸν ἐδηλήσαντ'.

CHAP. II. bitterest of evils, ravaged lands, plundered houses, friends and kinsfolk led away into hopeless slavery. Men in such a case fight for their own hands ; they fight, in very truth and not by a metaphor, for all that is dear to their hearts,

*παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τε πατρίων ἱδρῆ,
θῆκας τε προγόνων.*¹

Severity of
the Laws
of War.

War of this sort is habitually carried on with much cruelty. A modern kingdom seeks in its warfare the mere humiliation, or at most the political subjugation, of the enemy. The Greek or Italian warrior, as we have seen, not uncommonly sought his destruction. A nation may be subdued, but it cannot well be utterly wiped out ; a single city, Milan or Thebes, can be swept away from the face of the earth. The laws of war, under these circumstances, are cruel beyond modern imagination. The life of the prisoner is not sacred unless the conqueror binds himself by special capitulation to preserve it.² To kill the men and sell the women and children of a conquered—at all events of a revolted—town was a strong, perhaps unusual, act of severity, but it was a severity which did not sin against the letter of the Greek Law of Nations, and which it was held that particular circumstances might justify. Even when the supposed rights of war were not pushed to such fearful extremes, the selling of prisoners as slaves was a matter of daily occurrence.³ In such a state

¹ *Æsch. Pers.* 396.

² See *Thuc.* i. 30 et *passim*.

³ The familiarity of this practice comes out strongly in an incidental notice in *Polybios* (v. 95). Certain *Ætolians* were taken prisoners by the *Achaïans* ; among them was one *Kleonikos* who had formerly been the *πρόξενος* or public friend of the *Achaïan State*. On account of this personal claim on the regard of his captors he was not sold (*διὰ τὸ πρόξενος ὑπάρχειν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν παρὰ μὲν οὐκ ἐπράθη*), but after a while released without ransom. The sale of the prisoners who had no such claims is assumed as a matter of course. The same author elsewhere (ii. 57) distinctly asserts that the sale of the inhabitants of a conquered city, even

of things we can even understand the most fearful CHAP. II.
 spectacle of all, the cold-blooded slaughter of the captive
 leaders at a Roman triumph. One shudders at the thought
 that Caius Pontius was¹—that Hannibal might have been B.C. 291.
 —led in chains, scourged, and beheaded in a Roman
 prison. But we should remember that Hannibal had been
 to every Roman a deadly personal foe such as no hostile
 general has ever been to us. In our wars, the hostile
 sovereign, Philip or Lewis or Napoleon, has at most
 threatened at a distance what Hannibal had himself in-
 flicted on the Roman at his own hearth and home. The
 received war-law then was one of terrible cruelty; but the
 soldier was still a citizen soldier; arms were only occa-
 sionally in his hands; warfare was not his trade; his heart
 was not hardened nor his conscience seared by a constant
 life of butchery and plunder. Hence, if one sort of cruelty
 was more rife, we find much less of another and a viler
 kind. We may believe that Charles the Fifth, or even
 his son, would have shrunk from pronouncing in cold
 blood such a judicial sentence as the Athenian Dêmos
 pronounced upon the people of Mitylênê, Mêlos, and
 Skiônê.² But then no Athenian army would ever have
 been guilty of the long horrors of plunder, outrage,
 torture, and wanton mockery which were the daily occupa-

when no special provocation had been given, was according to the laws of
 war; ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε [μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν παρῆναι] καὶ τοῖς μηθὲν
 δόεβες ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους ὑπόκειται παθεῖν.

¹ See Arnold's Rome, ii. 365.

² I know of no modern parallel to these judicial massacres of a whole
 people. The massacre at Limoges by the Black Prince in 1371 (see
 Froissart, i. cap. 289, vol. i. p. 401, ed. Lyons, 1559) was the result of a
 vow, and was carried out by the Prince personally; still, as being done in
 a stormed town, the case is not exactly the same. In much earlier times
 a nearer parallel is found in the execution of 4000 Saxon prisoners or
 rebels by Charles the Great in 782. Eginhard, who does not scruple to
 blame his hero on occasion (Vit. c. 20; cf. Ann. 792), records it without
 remark (Ann. 782) just as Thucydides (v. 116) does the massacre of
 Mêlos.

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tion of the soldiers of Bourbon and of Alva. The citizen-soldier is a man, stern, revengeful, it may be even needlessly cruel, but he never utterly casts off humanity, like the mercenary soldier in his worst form.

Increased
bitterness
of faction
in small
states.

Again, as the system of small commonwealths tends at once to make wars more frequent and to aggravate the severity of the laws of war, so it has a similar result in aggravating the bitterness of internal faction. In saying this, I do not refer to any extreme or monstrous cases. The bloody seditions of Korkyra¹ no more represent the normal state of things in a Greek republic than the horrors of the great French Revolution represent the normal state of things in an European monarchy. Such scenes of blood as either point to some circumstances of position or national character, independent of particular forms of government. Civil conflicts have been, in all ages, far more bloody in France than in England.² So all Greek democracies were not like the democracy of Korkyra; all Greek aristocracies were not like those selfish oligarchs who took the fearful oath to be evil-

¹ *Kórkupa* and not *Kérkupa* is the correct local form used on the coins of the island. It is always so written in Latin, as well as by Pausanias and Strabo.

² The French Revolution at the close of the last century, as being the most recent and the most permanent in its results, is naturally the best known event of the kind; but it is only one among several similar events in the history of France. The civil broils of France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries read exactly like similar scenes in the eighteenth. In all cases we have refined and elaborate constitutional theories which in practice take the form of indiscriminate massacre. Our civil wars, again, in the seventeenth, the fifteenth, or even the thirteenth century, seem child's play beside the brutal strife of Burgundians and Armagnacs, and the long catalogue of internal warfare which may be almost said to form the civil history of France from Lewis the Eleventh to Lewis the Fourteenth. Philip of Comines, who had seen both lands with his own eyes, bears witness (*Memoires*, liv. iii. c. 5) to the comparative mildness of English civil warfare. Englishmen killed nobody except in fair fighting; even in battle, as far as might be, they smote the leaders and spared the Commons. So the deeds of 1572, of 1792, of 1851, have no parallel in the

minded to the people. But on the other hand all Greek democracies were not like the democracy of Athens; all Greek aristocracies were not like the wise senates which bore rule at Rhodes and Chios. Athens, in its general obedience to law, in its strict observance of public faith,¹ in its civil contests carried on, with sharpness and bitterness indeed, but still within the known limits of a defined parliamentary law, stands doubtless at the very head of all Greek commonwealths. The brutal mob of Korkyra doubtless stands no less preeminently at the bottom of the scale. Some unusually bad elements in the national character, some monstrous provocation on the part of their former rulers, can alone account for the equally monstrous excesses of the reaction. The normal state of an independent city-commonwealth doubtless lies somewhere between the peaceful debates of Athens and the bloody warfare of Korkyra. It is a state of things in which political enmity, though not reaching the fearful extremes of Korkyraian atrocity, will yet be far bitterer than it is in any modern constitutional kingdom. It will perhaps occasionally break out into deeds of open violence; it will still more frequently lead to unjust judicial sentences, and to no less unjust legislative enactments. Actual massacres will perhaps be unknown, and single judicial murders will not be very common; but the general expulsion of the leaders of a defeated faction will be, if not so common as the resignation of a defeated ministry is with us, yet certainly more common than the extremer measure of impeachment has become in modern times.

CHAP. II.

Athens
and Kor-
kyra ex-
treme
cases for
good and
for evil.

Normal
state of a
city-com-
monwealth
something
inter-
mediate.

worst times of English history; Strafford and Cromwell alike, one might rather say any Englishman of any sort since the days of Stephen, would have shrunk from the crimes of Guise, or Robespierre, or Louis Napoleon Buonaparte.

¹ *Tois ἑκκοῖς ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος* (Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 43) is the witness of an enemy to the good faith of the Athenian Democracy under the most trying circumstances. Thuc. viii. 97; Grote, viii. 122.

CHAP. II. Doubtless the comparison is hard to make, because we have to compare city-commonwealths of one age with kingdoms and federations of another, the Athens and Florence of a past time with the England and America of our own day. But, on the whole, the experience of ancient Greece, of mediæval Italy, of states like Geneva down to our own time, certainly seems to show that the bitterness of political enmity is greatly heightened in these small commonwealths. In such a commonwealth men of all sorts, men of whom but few are kept in restraint by the checks of personal character and position, are brought together face to face, with the most precious interests of both sides directly depending on the result. A great addition to the fierceness of the civil struggle can hardly fail to follow. We see that it is so among ourselves. Far greater bitterness, at any rate far greater outward expression of bitterness, accompanies an election or a local controversy of any kind than is ever to be seen among political leaders within the walls of Parliament. For the same reasons which make political differences in city commonwealths more bitter, they are also more apt to become hereditary, to be made a point of family honour, at last to sink into mere watchwords of dislike without any rational political meaning. Even among ourselves it is not always easy to distinguish the Conservative from the Liberal or the Liberal from the Conservative; but who can point out the real political difference between a Guelf and a Ghibelin at the end of the fifteenth century?

Local disputes more bitter than general ones.

Enmities more permanent in small commonwealths.

General balance of gain and loss in small states.

We may then thus sum up the balance of gain and loss in a small city-commonwealth, as compared with a greater state. A small republic develops all the faculties of individual citizens to the highest pitch; the average citizen of such a state is a superior being to the average subject of a large kingdom; he ranks, not with its average subjects, but, at the very least, with its average legislators.

It kindles the highest and most ennobling feelings of patriotism ; it calls forth every power and every emotion of man's nature ; it gives the fullest scope to human genius of every kind ; it produces an *Æschylus* and a *Dêmosthenês*, a *Dante* and a *Macchiavelli*. But, on the other hand, the glory of such a state is seldom lasting ; it is tempted to constant warfare, and to warfare in some respects of a cruel kind ; it is tempted to ambition and acquisition of territory at least as constantly as a larger state ; and annexation by a city-commonwealth commonly brings with it more evils than annexation by a kingdom. Again, civil strife is intensified, and party hatred becomes at once more bitter and more enduring. And we may add that city-commonwealths cannot really flourish save when they either have the whole field to themselves or else have a marked advantage in civilization over the surrounding monarchies. The former was the case in old Greece, the latter in mediæval Italy. In mediæval Germany and Flanders the superiority of the cities was less marked ; their freedom therefore was less complete, and their career was less glorious. As the surrounding monarchies advance in power, as they become more settled and civilized—above all, when they take to the employment of standing armies—the city-commonwealths gradually vanish, or exist only by the contemptuous toleration of the neighbouring potentates. Be the powers which surround them despotisms, constitutional kingdoms, or even consolidated republics, the tendencies of an age of large states are equally opposed to the retention of any practical independence by single unconfederated cities.

I have dwelt the longer on the nature of these independent city-commonwealths, because the subject, as one remote from our own political experience, is especially liable to be misunderstood, and because a clear and

CHAP. II. full grasp of it is absolutely necessary to understand the characteristics of that old Greek Federalism which was a modification of the system of independent cities.

System of large states.

On the system of large states with which we are all familiar I need not dwell at the same length. I will only point out one or two of its direct political consequences, and then compare this system with that of independent cities and balance their comparative loss and gain. And I would again remark that among large states I reckon not only great kingdoms, but all states which are too large to allow all their citizens habitually to meet in one place. And I include alike republics, constitutional monarchies, and despotisms of the modern European kind. In a modern European despotism, though the sovereign may be the sole legislator, yet there is such a thing as Law, and, in matters which do not touch the sovereign's interest, the administration may be as good as in a free state. But I exclude mere Eastern despotisms, in which Law and Government, in the true sense of those words, can hardly be said to exist at all.

Definition of large states, irrespective of their forms of government.

Two immediate results ; smaller importance of the Capital ;

representative character of National Assemblies.

Two consequences immediately follow from the difference between a city-commonwealth and a large state as above defined. First, whatever be its form of government, there will be no such preponderating influence in any single city as exists under the other system. Secondly, if the state be free, whether as a republic or as a constitutional monarchy, its national assembly must assume the representative form. These two differences are direct, one might say physical, results from the increased size of the state.

Position of the Capital in a large State.

First then, as to the position of the capital. I assume that in the large state there will be an equal freedom or an equal bondage spread over the whole land. States like Rome, Carthage, Venice, or Bern, where a single city

bears rule over a large territory, do not come within our present consideration. They are not legitimate large states, but a corrupted form of the city-commonwealth. In the large modern state there is no such overwhelming preponderance in the Capital. Indeed, the very use of the word Capital shows it. The Capital—the *Hauptstadt*—implies the existence of other cities, with which it may be compared, and among which it has the preeminence. In a pure city-government there is strictly no Capital, because there is but one City, and that City is co-extensive with the State. In a state like Carthage or Venice, the ruling City is something more than a mere Capital; it is absolute mistress over other cities. But the smallest European monarchy contains several cities, none of which is subject to any other, but of which one will be the Capital, the seat of Government, the official dwelling-place of the Sovereign. Still, that Capital is only the first among many equal cities; the national life is not inseparably bound up with it; it is the seat of government, simply because the seat of government must be somewhere, because the requirements of modern politics do not allow the Sovereign and his Councillors to wander at large over the whole realm, like an old Teutonic King. The Capital will be the centre of politics, society, and literature; its inhabitants will perhaps affect to look down upon the rest of their fellow-countrymen; they may, especially when the Government is of a centralized kind, obtain an undue and dangerous political weight, but they will have no direct legal privileges above the rest of their fellow-subjects. The influence of a Capital in a large state is almost sure to be for evil, because it must be either indirect or violent. Even in the best regulated states, an undue attention will often be given to the local interests of the Capital, and advances from the national treasury will be more freely made in its behalf, than in behalf

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Indirect
and violent
influence
of Capitals
in large
states.

CHAP. II. of other parts of the kingdom. But this is simply because they are more prominent and better understood, because they force themselves upon the notice of the Sovereign and the Legislature in a way in which the interests of other towns and districts cannot do. In a despotic state, where the Sovereign does what he pleases, where he is in no way controlled by the representatives of other parts of the country, money will be still more recklessly and unjustly squandered in adorning one town at the expense of a whole kingdom. The other form of the influence of a Capital is that by which we have so often seen a Parisian riot accepted as a French Revolution. A government is violently upset and another installed—it may be by the mere mob of the town, it may be by a perfidious magistrate who has a military force at his command; in either case the people of the whole land, who have never been consulted about the matter, submit without resistance to the King, Republic, or ten-years' President thus provided for them. In the one case the influence of the Capital is indirect, in the other it is violent; in either case it is illegitimate. The only legal weight of London or Paris consists in the representatives which those towns, in common with other towns, send to the common Legislature of the whole country. In a modern European kingdom, the Capital and the rest of the country are legally placed on perfectly equal terms. In a free state they are equally free; in a despotism the yoke will not, avowedly at least, press more heavily upon one town or district than upon another. This state of things, where political rights and political wrongs are evenly spread over the whole extent of a large country, differs equally from the state of things in which the Capital bears rule over the whole land, and from that in which the franchise of the Capital is extended over the whole land. An inhabitant of Eleusis was a

citizen of Athens ; an inhabitant of Lausanne was a sub- CHAP. II.
 ject of Bern ; but an inhabitant of any English town or
 county is neither a citizen of London nor a subject of
 London ; he is a member of a great commonwealth of
 which the capital and his own dwelling-place are alike
 integral and equal portions.

The second direct result from the increased largeness of territory is that, if the state be constitutional, its constitution must necessarily take the representative form. The people, or that portion of the people which is invested with political rights, will not exercise those rights in their own persons, but through chosen persons commissioned to act in their behalf. The private citizen will have no direct voice in government or legislation ; his functions will be confined to giving his vote in the election of those who have. This is the great distinction between free states of the modern type, whether kingly or republican, and the city-commonwealths of old Greece. It is the great political invention of Teutonic Europe, the one form of political life to which neither Thucydides, Aristotle, nor Polybios ever saw more than the faintest approach. In Greece it was hardly needed, but in Italy a representative system would have delivered Rome from the fearful choice which she had to make between anarchy and despotism. By Representative or Parliamentary Government I would not be understood as speaking only of that peculiar form of it which has grown up by the force of circumstances in our own country. A Cabinet Government, where the real power is vested in Ministers indirectly chosen by the House of Commons—that is, chosen by the King out of the party which has the majority in the House of Commons—is only one out of many forms of Representative Government. It suits us, because it is, like our other institutions, the growth of our own soil ; it by no means follows that

Necessity of representative institution in a free state of large size.

Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government.

CHAP. II. it can be successfully transplanted whole into other countries, or even into our own colonies.¹ By a Representative constitution I mean any constitution in which the people, or the enfranchised portion of them, exercise their political rights, whatever be the extent of those rights, not directly, but through chosen deputies. Such a Representative constitution is consistent with the full personal action of the Sovereign within the legal limits of his powers ; it is consistent with any extent, or any limitation, of the elective franchise. I include the constitutions of mediæval England and Spain, of modern Sweden and Norway, the constitutions of the United States and of the several States, even the old theoretical constitution of France in the days of the States-General. All these are strictly representative constitutions, though some of them differ widely enough from what a modern Englishman generally understands by the words Constitutional Government. A Representative Constitution may be monarchic or republican, it may be aristocratic or democratic. The Representative system would be as needful in the case of a franchise vested in a large noble class scattered over the whole country, as it is in the case of a franchise vested in every adult male. But if political rights were confined to a hereditary body so small that its members could habitually meet together, say if our House of Lords possessed the whole powers of the state, the government would probably assume another form. The ruling aristocracy would almost unavoidably be led to take up their chief residence in the capital. The constitution would, in fact, become a city-aristocracy, like that of Bern or Venice, bearing rule over a subject district.

¹ On this subject the eighth chapter of Earl Grey's *Essay on Parliamentary Government* (London, 1858) is well worth reading ; but of course there is another side, or rather several other sides, to the question.

The necessity of the Representative system in a large state is so universally accepted as the result of all European and American experience, that I need not stop to argue the point at any length. But it may be necessary to speak a few words on two or three real or apparent exceptions, in which political power is, or has been, directly exercised by the people, or the qualified part of them, in large modern states. The exceptions which occur to me are: First, the way of electing the Kings of Poland under the old monarchy; Secondly, the new-fangled Napoleonic fashion of electing "Emperors," approving constitutions, annexing provinces, by what is called "Universal Suffrage;"¹ Thirdly, the practical (not the constitutional) aspect of the election of the President of the United States. In all these cases the people, or the qualified portion of them, takes a more direct share than usual in political action. But even in these cases the representative system, as the means of ordinary legislation and government, is not disturbed.

CHAP. II.
 Exceptions to the representative system in modern Europe and America.

The old Kingdom of Poland called itself at once a Kingdom and a Republic. In fact its constitution ingeniously united the evils of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, without the redeeming features of any of the three. The political franchise was vested in a nobility so numerous, and many of them so poor, that, while they formed a close aristocracy as regarded the rest of the people, they formed a wild democracy among themselves. Such a nobility, it need not be said, has absolutely nothing in common with the British Peerage. The Polish

Election of the Polish Kings.

¹ The Florentine Parliaments and the Venetian Great Council are not real exceptions, as being found in the constitutions of single cities. The latter was a part of the ordinary system of government in an aristocratic state. But the Florentine Parliament, which I have already once mentioned (p. 40), may be well referred to again, as it is so strikingly analogous to the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. The whole Florentine people, perhaps once in a generation, met together in the square and presently entrusted absolute power to some Commission, sometimes to some Tyrant.

CHAP. II.
Nature of
the Polish
Nobility.

nobles were not so much a nobility in any common sense of the word, as a people, like the Spartans or the Ottomans, bearing rule over a subject race.¹ Such a very numerous nobility differs from the electoral body of a constitutional state as a Greek aristocracy differed from a Greek timocracy. In the one case the political franchise can be obtained only by hereditary succession, and, when once obtained, it cannot be lost. In the other case, it is attached to the possession of a certain amount of property, and may be gained and lost many times by the same person, if his property, at different times of his life, rises above, or sinks below, the necessary qualification. The difference is analogous to that between the hereditary burghership of a town and a municipal franchise attached to ownership or occupation. According to all ordinary political notions, the Polish nobility was a body which could not possibly meet together; it was as much under the necessity of delegating its powers to representatives as the electoral bodies of England or America. And for most purposes it did so delegate them. The common functions of a legislature were entrusted to an elective Diet, a body which had some strange peculiarities of its own,² which do not bear on our present subject. But, once in each reign, the whole body met to elect a King; they met armed; and, in theory at least, the assent of every elector present was required to make a valid election. It is not wonderful if election by such a body, like election by the Roman People in their worst days, often took the form of a

¹ I do not mean to imply that the Polish nobility was historically an aristocracy of conquest. Aristocracies which have grown up gradually, like that of Venice, often become narrower than those which really owe their origin to conquest.

² The best known is the requirement of unanimity, which gave every member of the Diet a veto upon all its acts. See Calhoun, i. 71. He really does not seem wholly to disapprove of the practice.

pitched battle. That this mode of electing a King, or of CHAP. II.
discharging national business of any kind, was an absurd
and mischievous anomaly few probably will dispute. It
was in fact merely an innovation of the latest and worst
days of the Polish Republic.¹ And it was felt to be an
evil by all wise and patriotic Poles. The constitution of
1791, by which Poland, in her last moments, tried to
assimilate herself to other European nations, abolished
election altogether, and instituted a hereditary monarchy.

The Napoleonic Universal Suffrage, which has de-
stroyed freedom in France and has reduced Savoy and
Nizza to the same level of bondage, is simply a palpable
cheat, which, had its results been less grave, would have
been the mere laughing-stock of Europe. It is a mere
device to entrap a whole people into giving an assent to
proposals which would not be assented to by their lawful
representatives. Hitherto it has been in every case a
mere sham. There has been no free choice, no fair
alternative between two or more proposals or between
two or more candidates. The people have only been
asked to say Yea or Nay to something which has been
already established by military force. The election of a
Polish King was a real election, a real choice between
candidates; the pretended election of Louis Napoleon
Bonaparte to the pseudo-Imperial Crown of France was
no election at all. But supposing a vote of this kind
ever offered a fair alternative, the system would be no
less pernicious. A people cannot be fit to exercise direct
political power, unless they are habitually trained to

Napo-
leonic
Universal
Suffrage;
its delu-
sive
nature.

¹ Till the extinction of the House of Jagello in 1572, Poland followed the common law of early European Kingdoms. There was a Royal Family, out of which alone Kings were chosen, but the Crown did not necessarily pass to the next in succession. The peculiarity of Polish history is that, in an age when other kingdoms had become purely hereditary, the Poles made their Crown purely elective. The practice of choosing Kings without regard to descent and by the voice of the whole nobility dates only from the election of Henry of Anjou in 1573.

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English
and Ame-
rican ways
of attain-
ing the
same ob-
ject.

exercise it. In a great kingdom they cannot be so habitually trained. They may be perfectly fit to choose legislators;¹ they cannot be fit to legislate themselves. Least of all can they be fit to legislate now and then on the most important of all questions, the choice of a dynasty or a constitution. Such an occasional and, so to speak, spasmodic exercise of power must be utterly worthless. Undoubtedly a great exceptional power of this kind may well be entrusted, not to the ordinary Legislature, but to a body specially chosen for the purpose. In the United States the meeting of such extraordinary Conventions under certain circumstances is specially provided for both in the Federal Constitution and in the Constitutions of the several States. In our own country it would doubtless be thought right by all parties that the introduction of any great constitutional change should be preceded by a Dissolution of Parliament. The election of the new Parliament in such a case would practically come to the same thing as the choice of a Convention in America. The whole body of electors would have, rightly and fairly, a special opportunity given them for considering the subject; but the final voice of the nation would speak through its lawful representatives, and not through the mockery of "Universal Suffrage." The English and the American practice both give full scope to the popular will in a way con-

¹ It must be remembered that the Napoleonic "Universal Suffrage" has nothing in common with the use of the words "Universal Suffrage" in English political controversy. Nobody has ever proposed that every adult male should vote in the making of laws, but only in the choosing of lawgivers. Whether this is desirable is a separate question, quite unaffected by the results of the Napoleonic device. An impartial thinker will probably say that those, whether many or few, who are fit to use votes, ought to have votes; that it is desirable that the whole people should be fit to use them; but that, except possibly in the New England States, it would be hard to find a country where the whole people are fit to use them. See Tocqueville, *Dém. en Am.* ii. 120.

sonant with the received principles of all modern constitutional states. The Imperial invention is simply a blind; it is the device of a despot to deceive people by promising them something freer than freedom. CHAP. II.

The election of the American President is, not indeed formally, but practically, another exception to the rule by which, in all modern free states, the political powers of the people are exercised solely by their representatives. Formally, it is not such an exception. The President is not chosen by the people at large, but by special electors chosen for the purpose.¹ But as those electors exercise no real choice, as it is known before the election how every candidate will vote if elected, this election of electors practically comes to much the same as a direct popular election of the President. There can be no doubt that this is one of the weak points in the American system; it is the point in which the calculations of the illustrious men who framed the American Constitution have most signally failed.² Still, the popular election of the President has several points of advantage over the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. First, the mere form of electing electors pays a certain outward homage to the representative system, while it is openly trampled under foot by the Napoleonic device. Secondly, the

election of the American President practically another exception.

democratic right

Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage.

¹ How those electors shall be chosen is left by the Federal Constitution (Art. ii. § 1, 2) to be settled by the Legislature of each State. Originally, in most of the States, the Legislature itself chose the electors; but, in all the States, except South Carolina, this power has been gradually transferred to the people at large. There are some good remarks on this subject in Shaffner's *War in America*, p. 187, et seq.

The Confederate Constitution (Art. ii. § 1, 2) copies the old provisions.

² See Hamilton in the *Federalist*, No. 68. He remarks that "the mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents."

Even when Tocqueville wrote, this particular evil had hardly manifested itself. Cf. Calhoun, i. 369, 385.

CHAP. II. indirect mode of election, even as it is, has at least this result, that the President who is elected need not have a numerical majority of the people in his favour. This alone is no inconsiderable check on the tyranny of mere numbers. Thirdly, regarding the election of the President as really placed in the hands of the people, still it is a very different matter from electing "Emperors" and voting the annexation of provinces. The election of a President is not an irregular, occasional business like saying "Oui" or "Non" to the perpetrator of a successful conspiracy; it comes regularly at stated intervals, about as often as our Parliamentary elections. There is therefore no reason why the American people may not be as well trained to elect Presidents as the English people are trained to elect Members of Parliament. Still, the election of the President, as it is now practically conducted, though by no means such an evil as the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage or the election of the Polish Kings by the whole body of the nobles, is certainly a deviation from the representative principle, and is so far an anomaly in the practice of modern free states.

General
view of the
system of
large
States.

One such
State
answers
to many
City-
Common-
wealths.

We will then assume these two immediate results of the increased size of territory, the legal equality of all parts of the country, and the necessity for representative institutions, if the state be constitutional. Let us then pass, in imagination or in reality, through such a large state, through any kingdom, in short, of modern Europe. Its mere divisions, its Counties or Departments, may well be equal in size to the territories of several independent cities of old Greece or of mediæval Italy. A glance at the map of modern Italy or modern Greece at once sets forth this difference. We look on the Kingdom of Greece as one of the pettiest states in Europe; its weight in European politics is hardly so great as that of one of

its smallest cities might have been in the days of Athens and Sparta. But a province of the Greek Kingdom is made up of what was once the domain of several Greek commonwealths. Corinth, Sikyôn, Pellênê, Phlious, are all found in a single department; Orchomenos, Mantinea, Tegea, and Megalopolis are all subordinate to the modern local capital of Tripolitza. So too the portion of Lombardy which free Italy has lately wrung from the Austrian Tyrant contains some ten or twelve cities, which once appeared as free republics, fighting for or against the Swabian Emperor. So again not a few cities, which once were free commonwealths under the suzerainty of the Empire, have been swallowed up during the six hundred years' aggression of the Kings and Tyrants of Paris against the old realms of Germany and Burgundy. We find then, in traversing a modern kingdom, that an extent of territory which, on the other system, would be cut up into countless independent commonwealths, is governed by a single Sovereign and is, in most cases, administered according to a single code of laws. If the state be despotic, the despot is equally master of the whole kingdom; if the state be constitutional, the highest power in the land will be an assembly in which the whole kingdom is represented.¹ But within these limits the amount of local freedom and of local diversity may vary infinitely. In one kingdom everything may be squared out according to the most approved modern cut-and-dried system. No man may be allowed to move hand or foot without licence from some officer of the Crown; local liberties, local by-laws, magistrates or public officers of any sort locally elected, may be something unknown and proscribed. In

Extent of
local di-
versity in
large
States.

¹ The whole kingdom, not necessarily all the dominions of the sovereign. Every integral part of the United Kingdom is represented in the British Parliament—the disfranchisement of a County would not be thought of for a moment—but the Colonies and dependencies are not represented, not being parts of the kingdom.

CHAP. II. another kingdom all this may be reversed ; local and historical rights may be carefully respected ; the assemblies of towns and districts may retain extensive powers of local legislation ; magistrates and public officers may be elected by the districts which they are to govern, or, if they are appointed by the Crown, they may be appointed according to a principle which gives them nothing of the character of Government functionaries.¹

Opposite Systems of Centralization and of Local Freedom independent of the form of the central Government.

These two opposing systems, of Centralization and of Local Freedom, do not at all necessarily depend upon the constitution of the central government. Local freedom is quite possible under an absolute monarchy ; local bondage is quite possible under a representative Democracy. A wise despot will humour his people by allowing them local liberties which will not affect his real power, and which, by acting as a safety-valve, may really stave off revolution for many years. On the other hand many states nominally free have had no idea of freedom beyond giving each citizen that degree of influence in the general Government which is implied in the possession of an electoral vote. That general Government may be one which he helps to choose, and yet he may be left, in regard to all those things which most directly concern him, as helpless a machine in the hands of an official hierarchy as if that hierarchy derived its commission from a despot. But, in any case, whether the local Government be centralized or municipal, its character is wholly dependent on the general Law of the Land. Wherever there are rights

Difference between Municipal and Federal rights ;

¹ An English County is an aristocratic republic ; the magistrates, though formally appointed by Royal Commission, are practically co-extensive with the local aristocracy. An English borough, as regards its administration, is a representative democracy, tempered in some degree by the indirect election of the Mayor and Aldermen. The borough magistrates, appointed by the Crown from among the chief inhabitants, introduce a slight aristocratic element into the judicial department. But neither Town-Councillors, nor Aldermen, nor County and Borough Magistrates, have the least analogy with the administrative hierarchies of foreign states.

which are beyond the powers of King and Parliament, we have passed the bounds of strict municipality and are approaching the border-land of Federalism.¹ We might easily conceive the municipal principle carried much farther than it is in England; one might conceive towns and counties at home, no less than Colonies abroad, possessing nearly the same internal powers as a Swiss Canton or an American State. But such towns and counties would still possess their powers, not of inherent right, but merely by positive law. Their rights, however extensive, would be delegated and not independent; they would still remain mere municipalities, and would not become Sovereign States. That portion of sovereignty which is vested in the State or the Canton cannot, without an unconstitutional usurpation, be in any way touched by the Federal power. But the most extensive rights of a mere municipality are the mere creation of Common or Statute Law; they may be legally altered or abolished without the consent of the municipality itself being asked. A vote of the national Legislature in a free country, a Royal Decree in a despotic country, can legally found, modify, or destroy all merely municipal institutions, just as it seems best to the sovereign power. A single Act of Parliament might at once cut down all English local rights to the level of French or Russian centralization. An Imperial Ukase might at once invest Russian

CHAP. II.

Municipal
rights de-
pendent
on the
General
Legisla-
ture;

Federal
rights in-
dependent
of it.

¹ England and Wales, though local bodies retain much local freedom, form a perfectly consolidated Kingdom. But the relations between England and Scotland, where certain points are reserved under the terms of a Treaty between two independent kingdoms, make a slight approach to the Federal idea. The relations between the United Kingdom and the Colonies approach more closely to a Federal connexion, but they differ essentially from it. The Colony, as we have seen above (see p. 26) may have the same internal independence as the Canton, but it differs in having no voice in the general concerns of the Empire. The relation therefore of the Colony to the mother-country is not a Federal but a dependent relation. See Lewis, *Government of Dependencies*, caps. ii. iv.

CHAP. II. towns and counties with all the rights enjoyed by those of England, or with rights more extensive still. The one measure would in no way deprive the English elector of that portion of influence over public affairs which he at present enjoys. The other measure would in no way infringe upon the sole legislative authority of the Autocrat. In any consolidated kingdom or republic, whatever be the extent of local freedom, the variety of local law and custom, it exists purely on sufferance; it emanates from, and may be altered by, a central power external to itself. The local body is, in most cases, strictly confined to local affairs; it has no voice, even by representation,¹ in the general legislation of the kingdom; if a local body takes any part in national affairs, its voice is purely consultative; in most countries indeed it has not even a consultative voice, it can make its wants known to the Sovereign or the Legislature only in the form of a Humble Petition, a process equally open to every human being in the nation.

General
character-
istic of
large
States.

The great state then, whether it be a despotism, a constitutional kingdom, or a consolidated republic, confines local action to purely local matters, and vests all general power in the national sovereign or the national legislature. That sovereign and that legislature may indeed derive their powers from the popular will, but in the exercise of those powers neither individuals nor local bodies can have more than an indirect influence. Rights are equal throughout the whole land; the capital has no legal privilege beyond any other city; the constitution, where there is a constitution, is of the representative kind. From these characteristics of large states at once follows a

¹ The body holding local authority, the Town Council or the Quarter Sessions, is not represented, as such, in Parliament. The county or borough members represent the inhabitants of the county or borough, not the municipal government.

chain of gains and losses which are the exact opposites of the gains and losses which attend on the system of city-commonwealths.

CHAP. II.

Balance of
Gain and
Loss.

First and foremost, the blessing of internal peace is at once secured to a large country. This alone is an advantage so great that it must be a very bad central government indeed, under which this one gain does not outweigh every loss. A large modern kingdom will contain perhaps hundreds of cities, whose districts, under the old Greek system, might continually be the scene of a desolating border-warfare. All of these will, under the modern European system, repose safely under the protection of one common authority, which has power peaceably to decide any differences which may arise among them. And the same cause which hinders local quarrels, when they do arise, from growing into local wars, will also go very far to prevent local quarrels from arising at all. Towns and districts may indeed often retain irrational local prejudices, and the clashing of commercial interests may often arouse local jealousies which are not irrational. But when, as in the best regulated modern kingdoms, the inhabitants of every town and county are all citizens of a common country, when the inhabitants of one district may, without losing any civil or political rights, transfer their abode to any other, there can never be any very serious local differences between fellow-subjects of the same race and language. Even when such differences of race and language exist as may be found within the limits of France or of Great Britain, provincial diversities may now and then afford a subject for pseudo-patriotic talk, but it is in talk that they are sure to evaporate.¹ Indeed, it often happens that the country

Advan-
tages of
great
States.Peace
secured to
a large
country.Lessening
of local
prejudices.

¹ It has been gravely declared at a Welsh Eisteddfod that Her Majesty is properly Queen of Wales with the province of England annexed.

CHAP. II. which fancies itself to be subject and degraded is, in very truth, a favoured district. Such a country often has its full share of the advantages of the common government, while it keeps its own local advantages to itself.¹ When differences of race and speech assume a really serious character, it shows that they are real national diversities, and that the two countries ought to be under separate governments. 'But mere local jealousies between town and town, between county and county, become of no political importance whatever. Towns which, in old Greece or in mediæval Italy, would have sent armies against one another, towns which would either have lived in constant warfare, or the stronger of which would have reduced the weaker to dependence, have, in a large modern kingdom, hardly any disputes which require the interference of the Legislature or the Law Courts. Under a good central government, which gives perfectly equal rights to all its subjects, peace and good brotherhood will reign throughout the whole realm. And a really good central government will not attempt to push union too far. It will not seek to extinguish that moderate amount of local distinction, local feeling, and local independence, which is both a moral and a political gain. The utter wiping out of local distinctions goes far to reduce the whole realm to that state of subjection to a single dominant city which, whether under a monarchy or a republic, is the worst political condition of all.

However this be, the province and the kingdom have shown no tendencies towards separation for several centuries.

In Gaul matters seem to be different; the existence of the Breton Archæological Society, which one would have thought was a harmless body enough, has been found inconsistent with the safety of the "Imperial" throne of Paris.

¹ Scotchmen are eligible to the highest offices in England, and they constantly fill them without any Englishman feeling the least jealousy. Englishmen are, I suppose, equally eligible to offices in Scotland, but they hardly ever fill them.

The same system, again, which tends to take away all causes of dispute between different portions of the same nation, tends equally to diminish the horrors of external war between different nations. We have already seen that the recognized war-law between contending kingdoms is much less severe than it is between contending cities. The severity of its actual exercise between the disciplined armies of two civilized states is lessened in an almost greater proportion. But take war between great states in its worst form, take such a war as might be waged between Alva on one side, and Suwarrow on the other. Even such a war as this will inflict, in proportion to its scale, a far less amount of human misery than a really milder conflict between two rival cities. It will not recur so often; wars indeed, when begun, may last longer, but the intervals of peace will be proportionally longer still. And when war does come, it will be, so to speak, localized. A happily situated, especially an insular, nation may wage war after war, and spend nothing except its treasures and the blood of the soldiers actually engaged. To an Englishman war has long meant only increased taxation and the occasional death, what he deems the happy and glorious death, of some friend or kinsman. It is quite another sort of thing to endure all this, and at the same time to have your lands ravaged by Archidamos or your city sacked by Charles the Bold. But there is one very important difference between the warfare of Archidamos and the warfare even of Charles the Bold. Archidamos could ravage every corner of Attica, Charles the Bold could ravage only a very small part of France. While Charles lay before Beauvais, the inhabitants of Bourdeaux might sleep, as far as Charles was concerned, in perfect safety and tranquillity. Even of an invaded territory it is only a very small portion which directly feels the horrors of invasion. Besides, the Great Powers have

CHAP. II.
Lessening
of the evils
of War.

CHAP. II. not uncommonly agreed upon the ingenious plan of sparing each other's territories altogether, and fighting out their quarrels on neutral ground. Thus, for a century or two, whenever there was a war between France and Austria, it was generally carried on by common consent on the convenient battle-ground of Flanders or Lombardy. The worst war of modern Europe, the War of the Thirty Years, derives its peculiar horror from its having less than usual of the character of a war between two great nations. France, Sweden, and other powers, took a share in it, but it was primarily a civil war of religion. As such, it combined, in a great degree, the horrors of a war waged between small states with the scale of a war waged between great ones. The wars which we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854-6 and the Lombard campaign of 1859, have been mere child's play compared with the great internal wars either of Greece or of Germany. The scale of the powers engaged of course caused a tremendous loss of life among actual combatants, but the general amount of misery inflicted on the world was trifling in proportion to what was caused either by the Peloponnesian War or by the War of Thirty Years. Cases of special cruelty or perfidy in modern warfare have been almost wholly confined to local and civil conflicts, and those most commonly among the less civilized nations of Europe. On the whole, the substitution of large kingdoms for city-commonwealths has immeasurably softened the horrors of war.¹

Lessening
of party
strife.

And as the system of large states abolishes local warfare and diminishes the severity of national warfare, so we have seen by implication that it very seriously diminishes the bitterness of political strife. These advantages form a great, indeed an overwhelming, balance

¹ See however, on the other side, an eloquent description in Sismondi, *Repub. Ital.* ii. 448.

of gain on the side of the large state. But it must not be forgotten that there is a reverse to this picture also. CHAP. II.

We have seen that the great advantage of the city-commonwealth is the political education which it gives, the high standard which it tends to keep up among individual citizens. This is the natural result of a franchise, like that of the city-commonwealth, which makes it at once the right and the duty of every man to exercise direct deliberation and judgement on public affairs. This education a city-democracy gives to all the citizens; even an aristocracy or timocracy¹ at all liberally constituted gives it to a large portion of them. But in a large state the only way in which the mass of the citizens can have any share in the government is by choosing their representatives in the Parliament or other National Assembly. It is plain that such a franchise as this, indirect in itself and rarely exercised, cannot supply the same sort of political teaching as a seat in the Athenian Assembly. A large number of the electors will always remain ignorant and careless of public affairs to a degree that we cannot believe that any citizen of Athens ever was. Under any conceivable electoral system, many votes will be given blindly, recklessly, and corruptly. Men who are careless about political differences, if well to do in the world and not devoid of a conscience, will not vote at all; if they are at once poor and unprincipled, they will sell their votes. Many again who are not corrupted will be deceived; a hustings speech has become almost a proverb for insincerity. This ignorance, carelessness, and corruption among the electors appears to be the inherent vice of

Disadvantage of large states.

Inferior political education.

Ignorance and corruption of many electors.

¹ In Greek political language a *Timocracy* (τιμοκρατία) is a government where the franchise depends on a property qualification, distinguished from the Democracy, which is common to all citizens, and from the Aristocracy, which is in the hands of a hereditary class.

CHAP. II. representative government on a large scale. There is probably no form of government under which bribery can be wholly prevented. It is a vice which occurs everywhere in some shape or other, but which varies its shapes infinitely. If bribery appears in a despotism or in a city-commonwealth, it commonly takes the form of bribery of the rulers; in a representative government, it takes the form, the really worse form, of bribery of the electors. The ministers of despotic Kings, the chief citizens of aristocratic republics, have been open to bribes in all ages. The chief citizens of democracies lie equally under the same slur. At Athens we hear constant complaints of bribery; but it is always bribery of that particular kind which is unknown among ourselves. We hear of demagogues and generals being bribed to follow this or that line of policy. The charge was probably in many cases unfounded, for charges of corruption are easy to bring and hard to disprove. But the fact that it was so often brought and so readily believed shows at least that it was felt not to be improbable. It is certain that any citizen who was known to be 'above corruption obtained, on that account, a degree of public confidence which sometimes, as in the cases of Nikias and Phôkiôn, was above his general desert. But of bribery in the popular courts of justice we hear very little, and of bribery in the Assembly itself we hear absolutely nothing. That Assembly doubtless passed many foolish, hasty, and passionate votes, but we may be quite sure that it never passed a corrupt vote. But we may believe that Kleôn or Hyperbolos often had his reward for the motion which he made to the People, and to which the People assented in good faith. Among ourselves the vice manifests itself in an exactly opposite shape. Kleôn was accused of receiving bribes himself, but never of bribing others. No recent English statesman has

> Different
forms of
bribery at
Athens
and in
England.

ever been suspected of receiving bribes, but few perhaps are altogether innocent of giving them. It is long indeed since any great English Minister has made a fortune by corruption of any kind. But in the last century Members of Parliament were bought with hard cash; in the present century the representatives are no longer bribed themselves, but they do not scruple to bribe the electors. The example of Rome might possibly be quoted on the other side. Rome was a city-commonwealth, and yet, in the later and corrupt days of the republic, bribery at elections was as common at Rome as it is among ourselves. But this was evidently for the same reason which makes it common among ourselves. The Tribes were open to bribery, because they had, in those days, become little more than an electoral body; their legislative power had long been hardly more than a shadow. There are then two forms of corruption, each the natural growth of a particular state of things, and each of which has its peculiar evils. The corruption of a single great Minister may do greater immediate harm to the state than the wholesale corruption of half the boroughs in England. But when electors generally come to look on a vote as a commodity to be sold instead of a duty to be discharged, when they look on a seat in Parliament as a favour to be paid for instead of a trust to be conferred, more damage is done to the political and moral instincts of the people than if a corrupt Minister took hostile gold to betray an army to defeat or to conduct a negotiation to dishonour.

These vices of ignorance and corruption in the electoral body seem to be the inherent evil of modern representative government. There is no panacea, whether of conservative or of democratic reform, which can wholly remove them. Vote by Ballot would probably do a good deal to lessen intimidation and something to lessen corruption; but there is

These
vices in-
herent in
the sys-
tem.

CHAP. II. no reason to think that it would entirely wipe out the stain. Nor can corruption be got rid of by limiting the franchise to some considerable property-qualification. Actual bribery may be got rid of, but not corruption in all its forms. Those whose social position sets them above being bribed with hard cash will easily find out ways of repaying themselves for their votes by appointments in the public service or by jobs at the public expense.¹ And the vices of ignorance and prejudice are beyond the reach of Reform Bills. Ignorance and prejudice are the monopoly of no particular social class and of no particular political party. Really wise men and good citizens are to be found scattered up and down among all classes and all parties. No system has yet been found which will make them, and none but them, the sole possessors of political power. No class has any real right to despise any other class, whether above or below it in the social scale. In times of any widespread political delusion, a Papal Aggression, for instance, or a Russian War, the madness seizes upon all ranks and all parties indiscriminately. The few who still hearken to the voice of reason are a small minority made up out of all classes and all parties. Very little then is gained by mere legislative restrictions of the franchise. The vices of electoral ignorance and corruption are inherent in the system. They are the weak side of European Parliamentary Government, just as Athenian Democracy and American Federalism have also their weak sides of other kinds. But though the evil can never be overcome, much may be done to alleviate it. If well informed men will make it their business to diffuse sound political knowledge among

They may
be allevi-
ated but
not wholly
removed.

¹ Tocqueville (*Dem. en Am.* ii. 88) says that in the reign of Louis Philip the bribery of an elector was almost unknown in France. This was doubtless because the high qualification at which the franchise was fixed engendered forms of corruption different from those which are rife in our own boroughs.

the people ; if they will deal with the people as men to be reasoned with, not as brutes to be chained or as fools to be cajoled ; if as large a portion of the people as possible has some direct share in local matters however trifling ; much may be done to raise the character of the electoral body. But it is in vain to hope that the average standard of the electoral body of a large state will ever stand so high as the average standard of the popular Assembly of a small one. We must not dream of ever seeing the every-day Englishman attain the same political and intellectual position as was held by the every-day Athenian.

On the whole comparison, there can be little doubt that the balance of advantage lies in favour of the modern system of large states. The small republic indeed develops its individual citizens to a pitch which in the large kingdom is utterly impossible. But it so develops them at the cost of bitter political strife within, and of almost constant warfare without. It may even be doubted whether the highest form of the city-commonwealth does not require slavery as the condition of its most perfect development. The days of glory of such a commonwealth are indeed glorious beyond comparison ; but it is a glory which is too brilliant to last, and in proportion to the short splendour of its prime is too often the unutterable wretchedness of its long old age. The republics of Greece seem to have been shown to the world for a moment, like some model of glorified humanity, from which all may draw the highest of lessons, but which none can hope to reproduce in its perfection. As the literature of Greece is the groundwork of all later literature, as the art of Greece is the groundwork of all later art, so in the great Democracy of Athens we recognize the parent state of law and justice and freedom, the wonder and the example of every later age. But it is an example which we can

CHAP. II.
Balance of
advantage
in favour
of large
states.

CHAP. II. no more reproduce than we can call back again the inspiration of the Homeric singer, the more than human skill of Pheidias, or the untaught and inborn wisdom of Thucydides. We can never be like them, if only because they have gone before. They all belong to that glorious vision of the world's youth which has passed away for ever. The subject of a great modern state leads a life less exciting and less brilliant, but a life no less useful, and more orderly and peaceful, than the citizen of an ancient commonwealth. But never could we have been as we are, if those ancient commonwealths had not gone before us. While human nature remains what it has been for two thousand years, so long will the eternal lessons of the great Possession for all Time,¹ the lessons which Periklēs has written with his life and Thucydides with his pen, the lessons expanded by the more enlarged experience of Aristotle and Polybios, the lessons which breathe a higher note of warning still as Dēmōsthenēs lives the champion of freedom and dies its martyr—so long will lessons such as these never cease to speak with the same truth and the same freshness even to countless generations. The continent which gave birth to Kleisthenēs and Caius Licinius and Simon of Montfort may indeed be doomed to be trampled under foot by an Empire based on Universal Suffrage; but no pseudo-democratic despot, no Cæsar or Dionysios ruling by the national will of half-a-million of bayonets, will ever quite bring back Europe to the state of a land of Pharaohs and Nabuchodonosors, until the History of Thucydides, the Politics of Aristotle, and the Orations of Dēmōsthenēs, are wholly forgotten among men.

We have thus compared together the two systems of government which form, as it were, the poles of our

¹ Κτῆμα ἐς δελ. Thuc. i. 22.

inquiry. We have contrasted the city-commonwealth, which sacrifices everything else to the full developement of the individual citizen, and the great modern kingdom, which sacrifices everything else to the peace, order, and general well-being of an extensive territory. Each, if it be a really good example of its own class, attains its own object perfectly; but each leaves much that is highly desirable unattained. May there not be a third system, intermediate between the two, borrowing something from each of them, and possessing many both of the merits and of the faults inherent in a compromise? May there not be a system which aims at both the objects which are aimed at singly by the other two systems, a system which will probably attain neither object in the perfection in which it is attained by the system which aims at it singly, but which may at least claim the merit of uniting the two in a very considerable degree? Such a third system, such a compromise, is to be found in that form of government which is the special object of our present inquiry, that namely of the Federal Republic. A Federal Government does not secure peace and equal rights to its whole territory so perfectly as a modern Constitutional Kingdom. It does not develop the political life of every single citizen so perfectly as an ancient city-commonwealth. But it secures a far higher amount of general peace than the system of independent cities; it gives its average citizens a higher political education than is within the reach of the average subjects of extensive monarchies. This form of government is a more delicate and artificial structure than either of the others; its perfect form is a late growth of a very high state of political culture; it is, even more than other forms of government, essentially the creation of circumstances, and it will, even less than other forms, bear thoughtlessly transplanting to soils where circumstances have not prepared the ground for it. For all

CHAP. II.

FEDERAL
GOVERN-
MENT a
system in-
termediate
between
great and
small
States.

It com-
bines,
though in
an inferior
degree, the
special ad-
vantage
of both
systems.

L

CHAP. II. these reasons there is no political system which affords a more curious political study at any time. And, at this present moment, the strength and the weakness which it is displaying before our eyes make its origin and its probable destiny the most interesting of all political problems.

Federal
Govern-
ment a
Compro-
mise,

only suited
to certain
positions.

I have said that Federalism is essentially a compromise,¹ an artificial product of an advanced state of political culture. Near approaches to it may be found in very early stages of society, and yet it is clearly not a system which would present itself at the very beginnings of political life. It is probable that both the great kingdom and the independent city existed before the system of Federations was thought of. It is quite certain that both great kingdoms and independent cities had reached a high degree of splendour and of political importance before Federal Governments played any remarkable part in the history of the world. Federalism is a form of government which is likely to arise only under certain peculiar circumstances,² and its warmest admirers could hardly wish to propagate it, irrespective of circumstances, throughout the world in general. No one could wish that Athens, in the days of her glory, should have stooped to a Federal union with other Grecian cities. No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a Federation, to invest English Counties with the rights of American States, or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to the quasi-Federal position which they held before their respective Unions. A Federal

¹ See Bernard's Lectures, p. 73.

² The circumstances under which a Federation is possible and desirable are discussed by M. de Tocqueville (*Dem. en Am.* i. 269, et seqq.) and by Mr. Mill (*Rep. Gov.* p. 298). It is curious to see the different aspects in which the matter is looked at by two such able writers. There is no contradiction between them, but each supplies something which is wanting in the other.

Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establishment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct, not by the division of members which have been hitherto more closely united. All that I here claim for Federal Government—though, to be sure, no more can be claimed for any other sort of government—is that it may be looked upon as one possible form of government among others, having its own advantages and its own disadvantages, suited for some times and places and not suited for others, and which, like all other forms of government, may be good or bad, strong or weak, wise or foolish, just as may happen. At this moment there is unreasonable prejudice abroad against Federal Government in general. This is partly because we hold ourselves, and that quite justly, to have lately suffered a wrong at the hands of one particular Federal Government,¹ partly because it is thought by many that the disruption of the greatest Federal Government that the world ever saw proves that no Federal Government can possibly hold together. A moment's thought will show the fallacy of any such inferences. They are exactly the sort of hasty conclusions which a knowledge of general history dispels. All that these facts prove is the indisputable truth that a Federal constitution is not necessarily a perfect constitution, that the Federal form of government enjoys no immunity from the various weaknesses and dangers which beset all forms of government. They undoubtedly prove the existence of mismanagement in the conduct of the American Republic; they probably prove that circumstances have

Popular
prejudice
on the
subject.

¹ January, 1862. These errors are fostered by the strange habit which the newspapers have of calling the Government at Washington, "*the* Federal Government," as if it were the only one in the world, or as if the Government of the Confederate States were not equally a Federal Government. It would be about as reasonable to call any kingdom with which we had a dispute "*the* Royal Government," and to make inferences unfavourable to monarchy.

CHAP. II. rendered it undesirable that the whole Union should remain united by a single Federal bond. But they prove no more against Federalism in the abstract than the misgovernment of particular Kings and the occasional disruption of their kingdoms prove against Monarchy in the abstract. At this stage of my work I desire to keep myself as clear as possible from the tangled maze of recent American politics. I postpone to a later stage any definite judgement on questions which have as yet hardly become matters of history. I am not now concerned to judge between North and South, to act as the accuser or the champion either of President Lincoln or of President Davis. I have to deal only with such mistaken inferences from recent events as affect the general question of Federal Government. I am not concerned to defend either Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Davis; but I am concerned to answer any inferences which reflect on the wisdom either of Markos and Aratos or of Washington and Hamilton. The South has seceded from the North, whether rightly or wrongly I do not here pronounce. There can be no doubt that, to say the least, a plausible case can be made out on behalf of Secession on the ground of expediency.¹ It is quite possible that there may not have been that degree of mutual sympathy² between the States without which a Federal Government cannot be successfully carried on. It is quite possible that the Union, as it stood, was too large to be properly governed as one Federal commonwealth, perhaps as one

No general
deductions
to be made
from
recent
American
events.

¹ Mr. Spence's arguments (American Union, p. 198) to show the *constitutional right* of Secession carry no conviction to my mind, but his arguments on the ground of expediency deserve, to say the least, the most careful answer that the North can give them.

Professor Bernard's Lectures on the constitutional question seem to me to maintain a very just mean between the extreme views of Mr. Spence on the one side and Mr. Motley on the other.

² See Mill, Representative Government, p. 298.

commonwealth of any kind. All these admissions would prove nothing, either against Federal Government in the abstract, or against the wisdom of the founders of the particular Federal Government of the United States. Let it be granted that the continuance of the American Union was undesirable, that it was expedient and just for the Southern States to separate. This proves no more than is proved by similar disruptions in the case of monarchies. In different ages of European history, Sicily has seceded from Naples, Portugal has seceded from Spain, Greece has seceded from Turkey, Belgium has seceded from Holland, Hungary, we all trust, is about to secede from Austria. These examples are not generally looked upon as proving the inherent weakness and absurdity of Monarchy. The secession of South Carolina and her sisters goes exactly as far and no further to prove the inherent weakness and absurdity of Federalism. What all these instances prove is merely this, that, both under Monarchies and under Federations, States are sometimes joined together which had better be separated. So far from the disruption proving anything against Federalism in the abstract, it does not even prove anything against the American Union as it came forth from the hands of its founders. Those founders, when they legislated for thirteen States on the Atlantic border, could not foresee the enormous extension of the Republic from Ocean to Ocean. Nor could they foresee those vast diversities of interest and feeling which have, since their time, arisen between the different sections of the original Union. The opposition between slaveholding and non-slaveholding States, between agricultural and manufacturing States, is an opposition which has arisen since the establishment of the Federal Constitution. Could they have foreseen all that has happened since their day, Washington and his colleagues would have been, not

CHAP. II.

Similar disruptions in the case of Monarchies.

No case against Federalism in general,

nor against the original American Union.

CHAP. II. merely the wise but fallible men which they undoubtedly were, but unerring prophets, a character to which they laid no claim. And, after all, the Southern States have, in their very secession, paid the highest tribute that could be paid to the general principle of Federalism. They have seceded from one Federal Government only to set up another. Their first act has been to re-enact the old Federal Constitution, with only such changes in detail as the experience of seventy years had shown to be needful.¹ That Belgium, in separating from the Dutch Monarchy, still remained a kingdom, proves far more in favour of Monarchy than its separation proves against it. So the fact that the Southern States, in separating from the old Federal Union, forthwith set up a new Federal Union of their own, proves far more in favour of Federalism in the abstract than their separation proves against it. I abstain at present not only from entering on the details of the recent Secession, but even from entering on the details of the Federal Constitution itself. I refer to them here only to answer popular objections, to show that recent events in America prove absolutely nothing against Federalism in the abstract, and that we ought to be able to discuss the comparative merits and defects of Federalism and other forms of government as dispassionately in 1862 as we could have done in 1860.

Testimony
of the
Southern
States
to the
Federal
Principle.
1861.

Parallel of
Belgium
and Hol-
land.

I have several times, when speaking of Federal Governments, assumed incidentally that their constitution will be republican, just as I have also sometimes assumed incidentally that the constitution of a large consolidated state will be monarchical. I have done so simply because, up to this time, experience has shown that they commonly

¹ See the Confederate Constitution in Ellison's *Slavery and Secession* (London, 1861), p. 812.

are so. There is indeed no absurdity in supposing that the government of a large country might permanently assume the form of an Indivisible or Consolidated Republic. There is no reason in the nature of things why a large state, with an Assembly representing the whole nation, might not intrust executive functions, not to a hereditary King directed by Ministers approved by the Assembly, but to an avowedly elective Council of State or to a President chosen for a term of years. The attempts hitherto made to establish such a government have been so few that their failure by no means proves that some future attempt may not be successful. They have commonly been made under much less favourable circumstances, and under much less worthy leaders, than the Federal Constitution of the United States. Some Cromwell or Buonaparte has commonly soon appeared to convert the Republic into a Tyranny. No one can mourn over the extinction of the Rump in England. The republican constitution was in no sense the work of the nation; the mockery of a representative body which ordained it was in truth an oligarchy in no whit better than the royal despotism which it succeeded or the Tyranny by which it was followed. The last French Republic fell because of the twofold madness of placing a born conspirator at the head of a free state and of entrusting a republican President with the command of an enormous army. Instances like these certainly do not show that the Consolidated Republic is at all an impossible form of government for a large country. But since, as a matter of fact, all the greatest states of the world are, and commonly have been, monarchically governed, I have, for convenience, in my comparison of the great state with the small commonwealth, assumed that the great state would be a monarchy. So, on the other hand, there is no abstract absurdity in supposing that a league of

CHAP. II.
A large state may be a Republic without being a Federation.

No argument to be drawn from failures in England and France.

A Federation may consist

CHAP. II. monarchies, especially constitutional monarchies, might assume the true Federal form. But, as a matter of fact, all the greatest and most perfect Federations, past and present, have always been Republics. I have therefore, in like manner often assumed, in contrasting Federal states with others, that the Federal state would be a Republic.¹

Approach
to kingly
Federalism
in the
Feudal
system.

The question of the possibility of a Federal Monarchy is one which it may be worth while to follow out a little further. The relation of lord and vassal between sovereign princes, if strictly carried out, would produce something very like a kingly Federation.² The vassal prince is sovereign in his internal administration, but his foreign policy must be directed by that of his suzerain. He must never wage war against him, and he must follow his standard against other enemies. But in truth this is an ideal which has never been fully carried out, and, if it were carried out, it would not produce a perfect Federal Government. It has never been carried out, because the harmonious relation of lord and vassal which it supposes has never permanently existed. Sometimes a too powerful suzerain has reduced his vassals from the estate of vassals to that of subjects. Sometimes too powerful vassals have thrown off vassalage altogether, and have grown into independent sovereigns. The one process took place in France and the other in Germany. By annexing the dominions of their vassal princes, the Kings of Paris extended their territories to the sea, the Rhone, and the Pyrenees.³ In Germany the vassal princes and commonwealths gradually grew into practical independence of their nominal King the Emperor. The very

The theory
never fully
carried
out,

¹ See Archdeacon Denison's Prize Essay on Federal Government (Oxford, 1829), p. 33.

² See the Federalist, No. 17, p. 90.

³ The Rhone and the Pyrenees, not the Rhine and the Alps, which have been reached by another process. See above, p. 31.

name of the German Kingdom died out in popular thought and popular language.¹ The old Germanic body is often spoken of as a Confederation, and it may fairly claim to rank among Confederations of the looser kind. But it was a Confederation only so far as it had ceased to be a monarchy. Its modern successor, the so-called German Confederation, has but little of the true Federal character about it, and, so far as it is Federal, it is not monarchic. Some of its members are even now Republics, and it has not, like the old Empire, any acknowledged monarchic head. And, even if the feudal theory had ever been harmoniously carried out, the relation of vassal principalities to an Imperial head would not of itself amount to the true Federal relation. It would rather resemble the relation of dependent alliance in which Chios and Mitylênê stood to Athens. To produce anything like true Federalism, all national affairs should be ordered in a National Assembly, an institution which in feudal France was never attempted, and to which the Imperial Diet of Germany presented only a very feeble approach. It is indeed possible in theory that the powers of the American President, as they stand, might be vested in a hereditary or elective King, and that the functions of the Governors of the States, as they stand, might be vested in hereditary or elective Dukes. Such an Union would be a true Monarchic Federation. The connexion would be strictly Federal, and Kings and Dukes would be invested with really higher powers than were held by a King of Poland or a Duke of Venice. But such a constitution has never existed; it would be a political machine even more delicate and hard to work than a Federation of

CHAP. II.

and, if carried out, would not produce a true Federation.

Scheme of a true Federal Monarchy;

unlikely to last.

¹ The name however remained down to the last. The formal titles, even of Francis the Second, were "Erwählter Römischer Kaiser, König in Germanien und Jerusalem." These he laid aside, and, dissatisfied with his hereditary rank of Archduke, assumed the portentous title of "Emperor of Austria."

CHAP. II. Republics. We may safely say that it could not last through a single generation.

Other approaches to Federal Monarchy. But kingly states have sometimes made a nearer approach to true Federalism than anything that could practically grow out of the relation of lord and vassal.

We may pass by instances in remote ages and barbarous countries, of whose details we have no record. Such may, or may not, have been the Twelve Kings of Egypt¹ and the Five Lords of the Philistines.² We may pass by the

A.D. 1859. abortive scheme of a Confederation of Italian Princes with the Pope at their head, which was put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte only to become the laughing-stock

Two or more Kingdoms under one King. of Europe. A far nearer approach may be found in the case of the union of two or more kingdoms under one King.³ The kingdoms so joined may form one state in all

their relations with other powers, while they may retain the most perfect independence in all internal matters ; they may keep their own laws, their own constitutions, and a distinct administration of the ordinary government.

A.D. 1603-1707. Such were England and Scotland during the century between the Union of the Crowns and the Union of the

A.D. 1782-1800. Kingdoms ; such were Great Britain and Ireland during the last eighteen years of the last century ; such have

A.D. 1814-1862. been Sweden and Norway for nearly fifty years past. But

such unions have been few in number, and they have commonly been the result of accident. A Kingdom has been conquered or inherited by the King of another Kingdom ; it has received the stranger as its sovereign, but it has retained its own constitution and laws. When many states have been so united, as by the Dukes of Burgundy, the Kings of Castile, and the so-called "Emperors" of Austria, had they been governed with any regard to right and justice, something like a Federal Monarchy might

¹ Herod. ii. c. 147.

² 1 Sam. vi. 4.

³ Mill, Representative Government, p. 303.

have been the result. But in Spain, the rights of independent kingdoms first sank into mere provincial liberties, Spain ; and then were absorbed by the general despotism of the common Sovereign. Spain has risen again, not indeed as a Confederation, but as a constitutional kingdom, which lacks nothing except rulers worthy of the nation. In the case of the "Austrian Empire," long years of tyranny and faithlessness have produced a hatred of the central power which separation alone can satisfy. But, were this otherwise, it may be doubted whether a union of such utterly incongruous nations, even on the mildest and justest terms, could ever satisfy the conditions necessary for a Federation of any kind. Where only two crowns have been thus united, a tendency to more perfect union has commonly arisen. This, in its best form, has taken the form of an equal fusion of the two kingdoms ; in its worst form it has degenerated into an absorption of the weaker kingdom by the stronger. In our own country, Scotland has first been united with England, and then Ireland has been united with Great Britain. Of cases where such more perfect union has not followed, the most permanent and beneficial has been the union of Sweden and Norway. That is to say, the terms of union preserved to Norway liberties which otherwise she might have lost. The union was a desirable mean between mere absorption by Sweden, and an attempt at perfect independence which would probably have been fruitless. The union has worked well, through the indomitable love of freedom which reigns in the noble Norwegian nation. But it is hardly a system which a patriotic Norwegian would have hit upon as desirable for its own sake. On the whole the general tendency of history is to show that, though a Monarchic Federation is by no means theoretically impossible, yet a Republican Federation is far more likely to exist as a permanent and flourishing system. We may therefore, in the general

CHAP. II.

The
"Austrian
Empire ;"Great Bri-
tain and
Ireland ;Sweden
and
Norway.

CHAP. II. course of our comparison, practically assume that a Federal state will be also a Republican state.

Members
of a Fede-
ration may
be either
Cities or
States of
consider-
able size.

When I speak of the Federal system as one intermediate between the systems of large and of small states, it may be objected that the states which compose a Federation may be either large or small states, according to the definitions of large and small states which I have already given. It is undoubtedly true that the members of a Confederation may be either single cities or states of a considerable size. The Achaian League was a League of Cities, the United States are a League of countries, many of which exceed in size the smaller kingdoms of Europe. It therefore naturally follows, that in Achaia the internal governments of the several cities resembled those of any other Greek democracy, while the internal governments of the several American States follow the common type of modern European constitutions. That is to say, the Achaian cities had primary, the American States have representative Assemblies. It is clear that a great commonwealth, like the State of New York, is as much obliged to adopt representative institutions as England or Italy.¹ But though the component parts of a Federation may be as large on the map as some European kingdoms, they are not likely to be states which really occupy the same position. This great size of the States is peculiar to the American Union, and we must take into account the

¹ Switzerland exhibits an intermediate state of things. Some Cantons have primary, others have representative Assemblies. It is only in one or two of the largest Cantons that representation can have been absolutely necessary on geographical grounds. It must have been introduced elsewhere by the influence of the common type of European freedom. A Canton like Geneva, consisting of a large town with a very small surrounding territory, would have seemed the place of all others to revive a Democracy of the Athenian kind. But the constitution of Geneva, though democratic, is representative; Dêmos, in his purity, is to be found only in some of the small rural Cantons which contain no important town.

difference of scale between America and Europe. In a newly settled continent, a country which covers as much ground as France or Spain may, in population, in everything in short except mere extent, be only on a level with a small Swiss Canton or German Duchy. The difference may be seen not only between Europe and America, but between the older and newer parts of the American Union itself. The area of Texas is between three and four times as great as the area of all the New England States ; the population of Texas, bond and free, is less than half the population of the one State of Massachusetts.¹ Though several of the States are of the size of kingdoms, it is only one or two in which it would not be perfect madness to set up as wholly independent powers. A Federal connexion with other states is just as necessary to most of them as it was to the Achaian cities, or as it now is to the Swiss Cantons. Still it undoubtedly makes a great difference in the character of a *Fédération*, whether its members are single cities or states of such a size as to require Representative Assemblies. That is to say, while Federations, as a class, occupy a position intermediate between the two other systems, some particular Federations will approach nearer to one extreme, and others to the other. A League of the Achaian sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of independent city-commonwealths. A League of the American sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of large monarchies or republics. And yet the position of Federations as a class still remains distinct and intermediate. The position of Megalopolis and that of New York, both being sovereign in their internal affairs, and mere municipalities as regards foreign

¹ Area of Texas, 237,504 square miles, of all New England, 65,038, of Massachusetts, 7,800. Population of Texas, 601,039, of all New England, 3,318,681, of Massachusetts, 1,231,065. I take my figures from Ellison's *Slavery and Secession*, p. 362.

CHAP. II.
Difference
of scale in
Europe
and Ame-
rica to
be con-
sidered.

CHAP. II. powers, have really more of resemblance to one another, notwithstanding the difference of scale, than the position of Megalopolis has to the position of Athens and the position of New York to that of England. Though one Federation will incline more to one extreme and one to the other, it is still true that Federal Governments, as a class, occupy a middle position between the two extremes. Along with some of the defects inherent in a compromise, they have the advantage of a middle position in uniting, to a considerable extent, the merits of both the opposite systems.¹

General
view of
Federalism
as an in-
termediate
system.

A Federal Government then secures peace, order, and unity to a large territory, not so perfectly as a large kingdom does, but far more perfectly than can be done by a system of small independent states. It affords to its citizens a political education less perfect than is afforded to the citizens of a city-commonwealth, but far more perfect than is afforded to the subjects of a large kingdom. In theory indeed the Federal Government secures peace, order, and national unity just as well as the kingdom does. The Federal power supplies legal means for settling disputes between State and State, just as readily available as those which a large kingdom supplies for settling disputes between district and district. The Federation is as truly sovereign in its own department as the State is in its own department. Resistance to the lawful commands of its Government is as much rebellion as resistance to the lawful commands of a monarch. An injury done by one State to another State or to a citizen of another State is not a matter of international wrong; it is a mere breach of the peace, to be rectified by the Federal Courts or,

Inter-
mediate
position
as regards
govern-
ment of
the whole
territory.

¹ So Tocqueville, i. 278. *L'Union est libre et heureuse comme une petite nation, glorieuse et forte comme une grande.* Again, ii. 208. *La forme fédérale que les Américains ont adoptée, et qui permet à l'Union de jouir de la puissance d'une grande république et de la sécurité d'une petite.*

if need be, to be chastised by the Federal army. The theory is exactly the same; but the Government of a Federation will have more difficulty in carrying the theory into practice than the Government of a consolidated state. For Federal purposes the several States are merely municipalities or individuals, but they possess infinitely greater powers than can ever belong to municipalities or to individuals.¹ If they wish to resist, the means of resistance are far easier. In the looser kind of Federation, that which works only by requisitions, disobedience to an unpleasant requisition will be a matter of course. Even where the Union is closest, the coercion, however just, of a recalcitrant State is sure to be a difficult and invidious business. The mere threat of nullification or secession by several States may weaken the action of the Federal power in a way which their constitutional opposition in the Federal Assembly could not do. There is therefore no doubt that a Federal Government is practically less efficient to maintain peace, order, and national unity than a consolidated Government. That it is more efficient to maintain them than a system of small independent states, which in truth does not seek to maintain them at all, needs no demonstration.

In like manner it is easy to show that a Federal State will afford its average citizens a degree of political education, greater than they can obtain in a large kingdom, less than they can obtain in a city-commonwealth. Doubtless the amount of developement and education which a Federal State gives to the individual citizen will mainly depend upon the size and the internal constitution of its several members. In a Confederation of Cities the several cities will approach to the character of independent

Inter-
mediate
position
as regards
Political
Education.

¹ On these subjects there are many striking passages in Tocqueville. See especially, i. 241, 251, 252, 254, 256. Some of these passages have been strangely misunderstood by his English translator.

CHAP. II. city-commonwealths ; in a Confederation of large States the several States will approach to the character of large kingdoms or republics. Yet certain general tendencies will run through both classes. It is impossible that any member of a Federation of either kind can give to the mass of its citizens such a degree of political education as may be given by a perfectly independent democratic city. The Achaian Cities possessed, some of the Swiss Cantons still possess, Democracy in its purest form, where every adult male citizen has a direct voice in the popular Assembly. But no such City or Canton can possibly give its citizens the same political education as was given to the citizens of democratic Athens.¹ The very condition of the case forbids it. The mere existence of the Federal tie at once prevents the citizen of Pellênê or of Schwytz from being called on to deliberate and decide on such important and instructive questions as were laid before the citizen of Athens. It was the discussion of those high questions of imperial policy on which Periklês and Dêmosthenês harangued, which gave their hearers the very highest of all political teaching. But these questions, so far as any parallel to them can exist at all, are, by the Achaian and Swiss system, transferred from the Assemblies of each particular City or Canton to the Federal Assembly at Aigion or at Bern. The chief means of improvement is therefore at once placed out of the reach of the ordinary citizen of the Federation.² Still, the powers of the City or Canton are far more than municipal ; it is really sovereign in all purely internal matters. A share therefore in its government must afford a political edu-

¹ That pure Democracy is now confined to some of the most backward among the Cantons is purely accidental. The argument would apply equally if it existed at Geneva or Basel.

² The Achaian Assembly was in theory a Primary Assembly, but it had practically much more of the character of a Representative one. This will be discussed at length in Chapter V.

cation, if inferior to that of the Athenian, yet at least superior to any that can be obtained in the purely municipal Assemblies of an extensive kingdom. Again, in a city or small district, the constitution may legally be representative; the legal function of the private citizen may be, not to make laws, but only to choose law-makers. Still, in such a commonwealth, the people at large will always have a far greater insight into public affairs, and will always exercise a far greater influence over their course, than can possibly happen in a large kingdom. In a Confederation of larger States, where some members may be as large in geographical extent as some European kingdoms, the direct share of the people in the government cannot well be greater in kind than it is in a constitutional monarchy. It may be greater in amount, because more offices may depend upon popular election; but in the State of New York, no less than in the Kingdom of Britain or of Italy, the direct influence of the people cannot go beyond the election of legislators and magistrates. But their indirect influence will be far greater in the State than it can be in the Kingdom. Republican habits and feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common and far more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political meetings and regularly organized Conventions will be far more common and far more influential. There will not be the same wide difference as to regularity of proceeding and as to moral weight between such self-appointed bodies and the constitutional Assemblies of the country. And this indirect influence of the people will not only be greater than it can be in the constitutional Kingdom; it will be greater than it can be in the consolidated Republic. It will doubtless be greater in the consolidated Republic than it can be in the Kingdom; but it may be doubted whether in a consolidated Republic it will be at

CHAP. II.

Comparison of a State and a Kingdom.

Comparison of a State with a consolidated Republic.

CHAP. II. all more enlightened or useful than it can be in a Kingdom. In a large Republic, say France in its short republican day, the danger is that the people will gain increased influence without increased means of improvement. The institutions of a smaller commonwealth, while they give the people the increased influence, give them the increased means of improvement along with it. No means of improvement, save the unattainable standard of the Athenian Assembly, is equal to that afforded by a good system of local Self-Government.¹ Now of all systems the Federal Republic is the most favourable to local Self-Government; the Consolidated Republic would seem to be less favourable to it than the Constitutional Monarchy. In such a Republic, the one Sovereign Assembly, the true and sole representative of the nation, will, in its natural love of power, be far from favourably inclined towards any authority which does not directly proceed from itself, towards assemblies or magistrates over which it has only an indirect control. The Parliament of a Monarchy, whose sphere is limited by its very nature, is not likely to have the same jealousy of local rights as the omnipotent National Assembly of a Republic. And both a Federal Congress and a State Legislature may be expected to have less jealousy still. Both Assemblies are accustomed to limitations of various kinds; the Federal Congress indeed is limited in a way which prevents it from touching local rights at all. And the State Legislature, which might touch them, is itself accustomed to limitations of one kind at the hands of the Federal body, and will therefore be more inclined to tolerate limitations of another kind at the hands of local bodies. The very model of the Federal Govern-

Self-
Govern-
ment in
Federal
States.

¹ Tocqueville, ii. 208. Les institutions communales qui, modérant le despotisme de la majorité, donnent en même temps au peuple le goût de la liberté et l'art d'être libre.

ment, the perfect liberty retained by each State within its own walk, will naturally suggest the retention of a large amount of municipal liberty by the smaller divisions of which the State itself is composed. In the New England States, where the true Federal model is best carried out, local Self-Government seems to have reached its fullest developement.¹ The Township, the County, the State, the Union, are wheels within wheels, governments within governments, each lower office preparing and educating for the office above it, from the Select-Man of the Township to the President of the United States. It is clear that no system, short of the Athenian Democracy, can give the mass of the people a political education at all comparable to this. It may indeed be that even the general diffusion of political intelligence is not an unmixed good; it is possible that where everybody is a statesman, nobody will be a great statesman; it is possible that the constant occupation of the mind on political subjects may tend to diminish some qualities, even some political qualities, which may be no less practically useful than political intelligence itself. The English people are certainly not remarkable for a high average of political intelligence; but they often display an amount of political good sense, of rational confidence in well-chosen leaders, which we might look for in vain among the busier spirits of America. But I believe that the faults, which, among many virtues, have disfigured the political working of the United States are owing to the peculiar circumstances of that Republic, and are not inherent results either of Democratic Government or of Federal Government. } For the discussion of these points I trust to find a more fitting place in a later stage of my history. It is enough now to refer to the counter-examples of Athens, Achaia, Holland, and Switzerland. My present

¹ See Tocqueville, i. p. 103 et seqq.

CHAP. II. position simply is that, as the tendency of a Federal State is to give each individual citizen ¹ greater political powers and greater political responsibility, so it also gives him the opportunity of submitting himself to a more thoroughly educating and improving process than lies within the reach of the ordinary subject of a great monarchy. But all that Achaia or Switzerland or America can give is utterly inferior to that political training, which the constant habit of ruling and judging, of hearing the greatest affairs discussed by the greatest men, offered to one and all of the twenty thousand citizens of Athens.

Circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable.

Such then are the advantages and disadvantages which seem naturally to belong to Federal Governments as such. But it must be remembered that, of all political systems in the world, the Federal Republic is the last which it would be prudent in its admirers to preach up as the one political system to be adopted in all times and places. It is a system eminently suited for some circumstances, eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears in the form of closer Union. Europeans, accustomed to a system of large consolidated states, are apt to look upon a Federal system as a system of disunion, and therefore a system of weakness. To a Greek of the third century B.C., to an American in 1787, it presented itself as a system of union and therefore of strength. The alternative was not closer union, but wider separation. A Kingdom of Peloponnêsos or of America was an absurdity too great to be thought of. A single Consolidated Republic was almost equally out of the question. The real question was, Shall these Cities, these States, remain utterly isolated, perhaps hostile to one another, at most united by an inefficient and precarious alliance?—or shall they, while retaining

¹ In an aristocratic Federation this must of course be understood of those citizens only who are invested with the highest franchise.

full internal independence, be fused into one nation as CHAP. II.
regards all dealings with other powers? Looked at in
this light, the Federal system is emphatically a system
of union, and of that strength which follows upon union.
The Federal connexion is in its place wherever the
several members to be united are fitted for that species
of union and for no other. It requires a sufficient degree
of community in origin or feeling or interest to allow the
several members to work together up to a certain point.
It requires that there should not be that perfect degree of
community, or rather identity, which allows the several
members to be fused together for all purposes. Where
there is no community at all, Federalism is inappropriate ;
the Cities or States had better remain wholly independent,
and take their chance of the advantages and disadvantages
of the system of small commonwealths. Where commu-
nity rises into identity, Federalism is equally inappropriate ;
the Cities or States had better sink into mere Counties of
a Kingdom or Consolidated Republic, and take their
chance of the advantages and disadvantages of the system
of large states. But in the intermediate set of circum-
stances, the circumstances of Peloponnêsos struggling
against Macedonia, of Switzerland struggling against
Austria, of the Netherlands struggling against Spain,
of the American colonies struggling against England,
Federalism is the true solvent. It gives as much of union
as the members need and not more than they need. At
the present moment, by the confession of both sides, the
Federal tie is the appropriate one to bind together New
York and Massachusetts, South Carolina and Georgia.
The only question is whether the requisite degree of
community of interests, feelings, and habits exists
between New York and Massachusetts on the one
hand and South Carolina and Georgia on the other.
If it does not, the interests of the world will be better

CHAP. II. promoted by the existence of two Federations instead of one. Even should a third Federation arise in the remoter West, the principle of Federalism will remain untouched, as long as the Federal tie, and nothing tighter or looser, is applied to those States whose degree of fraternity with one another makes the Federal relation the appropriate degree of connexion. Wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Federalism is out of place. It is out of place if it attempts either to break asunder what is already more closely united,¹ or to unite what is wholly incapable of union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is capable of a certain amount of union and no more. It is an intermediate point between two extremes, capable either of being despised as a compromise or of being extolled as the golden mean.

General
results of
Modern
Fede-
ralism.

My object, at this particular stage of my argument, is, more than anything else, to answer certain popular fallacies with regard to my subject. I will therefore slightly forestall some things which are more appropriate to a later stage, and will ask what Federalism, applied in its proper place, has really done, and is still doing, before our eyes. What have been its real results in America? I do not ask what have been the results of American institutions generally; that is an inquiry which I postpone altogether. I do not ask what has been the result either of a democratic state of society or of a democratic form of government. I ask, What has been the result of the Federal system, as such, in the United States? I ask again, What has been its

¹ I mean of course countries really united like England and France. Where the tie is merely artificial or violent, as in the lands unequally yoked together under Austrian or Turkish tyranny, Federalism may (or may not be) the proper relation for the different states on acquiring freedom. The decaying Ottoman Empire certainly affords a most tempting field for the experiment of some form or other of monarchic Federation.

result in a land nearer to us though less closely connected? What has a Federal Union done, or failed to do, for Switzerland, and, through Switzerland, for Europe? CHAP. II.

No one who really understands the position of the United States at the time when their Federal Constitution was formed will doubt that the establishment of a Federal system was absolutely the only course open to the founders of the Republic. Thirteen independent, and possibly hostile, commonwealths hardly formed a desirable alternative. A consolidated State of thirteen counties was a notion utterly chimerical. The reasons which may now make two or three Confederations more desirable than one had not then shown themselves. Washington and his coadjutors did what wise men would do in the circumstances in which they found themselves. Like Solón, they established, not the best of all possible constitutions, but the constitution which was the best possible in that particular time and place. And what has been the result of their work? Their constitution has at least outlived countless constitutions both in Europe and in America. When the American Constitution was drawn up, France was still under the absolute and undisputed sway of a Most Christian King. The American Union has been contemporary with a Constitutional King of the French, a Convention, a Directory, a Consulate for a term, a Consulate for life, an Emperor of a Republic, an Emperor of an Empire,¹ a Constitutional King of France, an Emperor again, a Constitutional King of France again, a King of the French, a Provisional Government, a Dictator, a President for four years, a despotic President for ten years, an Emperor for what period no one can foretell. The constitution-making of Philadelphia has been at least

Results
of the
American
Union.

Its comparative
permanency as
compared with
France.

¹ The early Imperial coins of the first Buonaparte bear on the reverse the legend "République Française," which in the later ones is exchanged for "Empire Français."

CHAP. II. more permanent than the constitution-making of Paris. At all events, the American Union has actually secured, for what is really a long period of time, a greater amount of combined peace and freedom than was ever before enjoyed by so large a portion of the earth's surface. There have been, and still are, vaster despotic Empires, but never before has so large an inhabited territory remained for more than seventy years in the enjoyment at once of internal freedom and of exemption from the scourge of internal war. Now this is the direct result of the Federal System. Either entire independence or closer union would have brought with it evils which the Federal relation has prevented. Had the thirteen States remained wholly independent commonwealths, had new States, equally independent, grown up to the West of them, we cannot doubt that the American continent would, before this time, have become the theatre of constant wars between so many independent and rival powers. Had the States formed a single Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, some attempt would long ago have been made to force upon the whole country one uniform law, either allowing or forbidding Slavery. Who can doubt that a Civil War, even more fearful than the present one, would have been the immediate consequence? The Federal Union has at least staved off either evil for no inconsiderable term of years. It has staved it off for a period as long as the greatest glory of Athens, for a period not far short of half the duration of the truest glory of Rome.¹ There have been bitter dissensions and bitter hatreds, violent words and violent actions, there have been nullifications and threats

Evils
which the
Federal
Union has
hindered.

¹ From the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the Secession of 1861 is 85 years. From the battle of Marathôn (B.C. 490) to the conquest of Athens by Lysander (B.C. 404) is 86. The period of Roman History between the settlement of the quarrels of the Orders (B.C. c. 337) and the beginning of the later struggles under the Gracchi (B.C. 133) is about 200 years.

of secession and attempts at local insurrection, but, till CHAP. II. this present outbreak, there has been nothing really deserving the name of Civil War. The Federal system has at least saved that vast continent for nearly three generations from the mutual slaughter of men of the same race and speech, from the sight of ravaged provinces and of cities taken by storm. During all these years, the amount of union between the several States, the amount of independence retained by each State, has been found to be exactly that amount which answered the required purpose. If the system has broken down at last, we may be sure that any other system would have broken down much sooner. And, after all, it has only broken down very partially. One Federation has been divided into two, just as one Kingdom has often been divided into two; but neither of the powers thus formed has thought of setting up anything but a Federal system as the form of its own internal constitution.

It is often said that the Disruption of the United States at once puts Federalism out of court by proving the inherent weakness of the Federal tie. To make a general political inference from a single example in history is not a very philosophical way of reasoning. The alleged weakness of the Federal tie is moreover, in a certain sense, a truism. The Federal tie is in its own nature weaker than the tie which unites the geographical divisions of a perfectly consolidated state. But what Federalism ought really to be compared with is not perfect union, but the complete separation which has commonly been its only alternative. I freely admit, in a certain sense, the weakness of the Federal tie. But the real question is not whether the tie is weak or strong, but whether there are not certain circumstances in which a weak tie is better either than a strong tie or than no tie at all. The Federal tie is weak because it is artificial. It is hardly possible that

Alleged
weakness
of the
Federal
Tie.

True in a
sense, but
not neces-
sarily inju-
rious.

- CHAP. II. a man can feel the same love for an ingenious political creation as he may feel either for a single great nation or for a single city-commonwealth. The Achaian League or the American Union can hardly call forth either that feeling of hereditary loyalty which attaches to Kings descended from Alfred or Saint Lewis, or that burning patriotism which the Athenian or the Florentine felt for the City in which his whole political and personal being found its home. A Federal Union, in short, must depend for its permanence, not on the sentiment but on the reason of its citizens. If circumstances remain as they were at the time of its formation, if the particular degree of union which it secures is found to be practically better than either closer union or more complete independence, a Federal Government may well be as permanent as any other. If circumstances change, if it be found that either consolidation or separation is desirable, then the Federal Union, essentially a compromise, may be found to have worked well as a system of transition. Let us suppose that the members of a Federal Union, by long connexion and familiarity, by the habit of united action for many important purposes, have at last formed the desire for a still more complete union. To turn a Federation into a Consolidated state will be found at least as easy as to unite a group of isolated atoms into a Federation. The several States have already delegated a large portion of their rights to a common Government of their own choosing; all that is needed is to go a step further, and to invest that common Government with rights more extensive still. Let us take the other alternative. Let us suppose that the union of a number of weak states has given to each a power and prosperity which it never could have obtained alone; that, under the wing of the central power, its childhood has grown up into maturity, and its weakness has developed into strength. The several States
- Circumstances under which a Federal Union may be lasting.
- Circumstances under which it may be useful as a Transitional state.
- Cases for Consolidation.
- Cases for Separation.

may feel that they are able to go alone, that the Union, which once strengthened, now only restrains them. In such a case the impulse towards complete independence would probably be irresistible. Such a separation would in a certain sense prove the weakness of the Federal tie; in another sense it would prove that there was strength in its very weakness. Or let us take the case which has actually happened. Let us not suppose a general disruption, a dissolution of the whole Union into independent atoms; let us suppose that, through circumstances unforeseen when the League was founded, certain parts of the Union have ceased to have that community of feeling and interest with certain other parts which it is essential that the members of a Federal body should have with each other. Here too the weakness of the Federal tie may be said to come in. In either of these cases, the idea of secession will present itself more readily, and the idea can be more easily carried out, than can happen when one portion of a consolidated state feels itself aggrieved by the common Government. Whenever the tendency in a Federation runs towards separation, the tendency will be almost irresistible. The amount of political independence retained by the several States is so great that it may both lead them to aspire to, and actually make them capable of, an independence still more complete. Each citizen will always entertain a warmer and more immediate patriotic feeling for his own State than he entertains for the whole Union. If he think that his own State is wronged by the Union, the idea of its perfect independence is one which may easily occur. And if the idea does occur, it will be found far more easy to carry out into practice than similar schemes of secession could be under any other form of Government. The secession of an English county or of a French department is something too ludicrous to think of. To say nothing of the inherent absurdity of the wish, to say

Easiness of
separation
when
needed.

4

CHAP. II. nothing of the certainty of the rebellion being at once crushed, the new commonwealth would be utterly helpless. It has no political traditions apart from the whole country, it has no form of local government which it can at once convert into a sovereign power. But the American State has already a Governor and a Legislature on exactly the same model as the President and Congress of the whole Union. That Governor and Legislature already possess very large political powers; in the older States they are actually institutions of more ancient date than the Federal Government itself. It needs no great stretch of imagination to invest with greater powers a Government which possesses such large powers already, and for the State to enter alone upon the general stage of the world, to commission Ambassadors and to levy armies on its own account. So to do is, always in legal theory, sometimes in sober historic truth, only to fall back on the state of things when as yet the Sovereign State had ceded no portion of its powers to the Federal Union. This facility of Secession is what is meant when the weakness of the Federal tie is spoken of. But in truth it may be doubted whether this very weakness may not bring with it some incidental advantages. At any rate a plausible case may be made out in favour of this facility of Secession. Rebellion is sometimes necessary, and Secession is certainly the mildest form that Rebellion can take. For, beyond all doubt, Secession is, legally and formally, Rebellion. The Federal Union is essentially a perpetual union; a Federal Constitution cannot, any more than any other constitution, contain provisions for its own dissolution. The Federal power is entitled to full obedience within its own sphere, and the refusal of that obedience, whether by States or by individuals, is essentially an act of Rebellion. It does not at all follow that such rebellion is necessarily either wrong or inexpedient; but it does follow that Secession

Easiness of
separation
has a good
side.

is not an every-day right to be exercised at pleasure. A seceding State may be fully justified in seceding; but to justify its secession it ought to be provided with at least as good a case as the original States had for their secession from the Crown of Great Britain. Granting therefore that separation between members of a Federation will be sometimes expedient, surely a system which supplies the means of a peaceable divorce is not without its good side. It is, on every ground, far easier to secede from a Federation than from a Consolidated State. Some reasons I have already given. In the case of a Kingdom, a feeling will often come in which, unreasonable as it is, is none the less powerful for being unreasonable. In many men's minds loyalty is simply a blind attachment to a person or to a family, not a rational conviction of the duty of obedience to all lawful authority. To such minds the most reasonable rebellion against a King will seem a far more heinous crime than the most unreasonable rebellion against a Republic. Again, Kings, whether despotic or constitutional, and Consolidated Republics too, can seldom indeed be got to give up a single inch of their territories, except by force. The supposed honour and the supposed interest of the Monarch requires that, if he does not extend, he at least should not diminish, the boundaries of the realm which he has inherited. And nations have such a way of identifying themselves with their Kings that popular feeling will, in such cases, run for a long time in the same current with royal feeling. Every wise English statesman disliked the American War; but to George the Third on the one hand, and to the mass of Englishmen on the other, the honour of England seemed to require the recovery of the revolted colonies. The experience of Federal States on this point is not very extensive. But the reason of the case would lead us to expect that the members of a League from which one

Why it is easier to secede from a Federation than from a Consolidated State.

CHAP. II.

Probability that a Federation will be less anxious than a kingdom to recover revolted members.

or more members have seceded would be less anxious to retain them, at all events less ready to make great sacrifices to retain them by force, than either a monarch or his subjects will be to recover a revolted province. Every Englishman thought his personal honour involved in the reconquest of Delhi; it does not seem so directly to concern a citizen of New York whether South Carolina is, or is not, a member of the same Federal body as his own State.¹ The War in the United States has not yet lasted a year and a half²; it has hitherto been chequered by victories and defeats on both sides, and, after all, the real difficulty on the part of the North is not to win battles or to capture towns, but to occupy, that is, to conquer in any practical sense, the whole of so vast a territory.³ It still remains to be seen whether the people of the Northern States will be ready to endure so prolonged a struggle for the forcible reduction of their revolted brethren, as Spain or even as England endured for the forcible reduction of their revolted dependencies. It is dangerous to try to prophesy, but one cannot help thinking that the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged Ambassadors before the year 1941 or even before the year 1869.⁴ Besides the physical difficulties of conquering a large country, besides the difficulty of seeing what interest the conquerors have

¹ Of course the question of geographical possibility is here of great importance. If Kentucky or Tennessee had seceded all by itself, without the support of any other State, the thing would have been as ridiculous as a secession of Northamptonshire, and the nuisance would have been abated by the combined forces of the whole Union. But the secession of Maine or of Florida would not have so clearly touched the interests of other parts of the Federation.

² July, 1862.

³ This is forcibly put in Mr. Spence's Seventh Chapter.

⁴ The Dutch War of Independence began in 1568; the Thirteen Years' Truce was concluded in 1609, but the independence of the United Provinces was not formally recognized by Spain till 1648. Our own American War lasted eight years, 1775-83.

Don't
Worry!
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in the conquest, there is the absurdity of the process of conquest itself. A Federation, though legally perpetual, is something which is in its own nature essentially voluntary: there is a sort of inconsistency in retaining members against their will. What is to be done with them when they are conquered? They can hardly be made subjects of the other States; are they then to be compelled at the point of the bayonet to recognize their conquerors as brethren, and to send, under the penalties of treason, unwilling Senators and Representatives to Washington? Either alternative is utterly repugnant to the first principles of a Federal Union. Surely the remedy is worse than the disease. The revolted State, as a foreign power, may become a friendly neighbour; as an unwilling Confederate, it will simply be a source of internal dissension and confusion. A State will hardly think of Secession as long as it is its manifest interest to remain in the Union. When it ceases to be its manifest interest to remain, there may at least be grave doubts as to either the justice or the expediency of retaining it by force. The Achaian League was weakened, indeed we may say that it finally perished, by nothing so much as by the attempt to retain members in the Confederation against their will.

CHAP. II.
Incon-
sistency of
striving to
retain
unwilling
members.

The truth is that the disruption of the United States has been mainly owing to their unparalleled prosperity. In that boundless continent, with no neighbour at once able and willing to contend with them on equal terms, Secession has been possible. No despot stands at either end of the Union ready to swallow up each seceding State as soon as it loses the protection of its neighbours. Federalism cannot be said to have been found wanting, where it has not been really tried. What a Federal union really can do when it is tried is best seen by another example. From America let us turn our eyes to Switzerland. The territory of the Swiss Confederation is, both

Example
of Switzer-
land.

CHAP. II. in a military and a political point of view, one of the most important in Europe. Lying between the two great despotisms of France and Austria, it is above all things needful that it should be held by a free and an united people. But disunion seems stamped upon the soil by the very hand of nature, no less than on the soil of Hellas itself. Every valley seems to ask for its own separate commonwealth. The land, small as it is, is inhabited by men of different races, different languages, different religions, different stages of society. Four languages are spoken within the narrow compass of the League. Religious and political dissensions have been so strong as more than once to have led to civil war. How are such a people to be kept united among themselves, so as to guard their mountains and valleys against all invaders? I need hardly stop to show that the citadel of Europe could not be safely entrusted to twenty-two wholly independent Republics or to twenty-two wholly independent princes. But would consolidation answer the purpose? Shall we give them the stereotyped blessing of a hereditary King, a responsible Ministry, an elected and a nominated House of Parliament? Or shall we, by way of variety, give them some neatly planned scheme of a Republic one and indivisible? Such a Kingdom, such a Republic, would but present, on a smaller scale, much such a spectacle as the Empires of Austria and Turkey. The Burgundian and the Italian provinces would rebel against a dominant German government, and would fly for support to their neighbours of kindred speech beyond the limits of the Kingdom. France would soon become to Vaud what Piedmont has been to the Italian provinces of Austria, what Russia has been to the Slavonic provinces of Turkey. The Federal relation has solved the problem. Under the Federal system, the Catholic and the Protestant, the aristocrat and the democrat, the citizen of Bern and the

Perfect separation and perfect Consolidation alike impossible.

The problem solved by a Federal

mountaineer of Uri,—the Swabian of Zürich, the Lombard of Ticino, the Burgundian of Geneva, the speakers of the unknown tongues of the Rhætian valleys—all can meet side by side as free and equal Confederates. They can retain their local independence, their local diversities, nay, if they will, their local jealousies and hatreds, and yet they can stand forth, in all external matters, as one united nation, all of whose members are at once ready to man their mountain rampart the moment that the slightest foreign aggression is committed on any one of their brethren. The Federal system, in short, has here, out of the most discordant ethnological, political, and religious elements, raised up an artificial nation, full of as true and heroic national feeling as ever animated any people of the most unmixed blood. An American State can secede, if it pleases: no Swiss Canton will ever desert the protection of its brethren, because it knows that Secession, instead of meaning increased independence, would mean only immediate annexation by the nearest despot. If any one is tempted to draw shallow inferences against Federalism in general from mistaken views of one single example, he may at once correct his error by looking at that nearer Federation which has weathered so many internal and external storms. No part of my task will be more delightful or more instructive than to trace the history of that glorious League, from the day when the Austrian invader first felt the might of freedom at Morgarten to the day when a baser and more treacherous despotism still, in defiance of plighted faith and of the public Law of Europe, planted the vultures of Paris upon the neutral shores of the Lake of Geneva.

CHAP. II.
Constitution.

A. D. 1315.

A. D. 1860.

I have thus gone through the comparison which I designed between the two opposite poles of political being, and that ingenious and nicely balanced system which is

Recapitulation.

CHAP. II. intermediate between the two. I have compared the small City-Commonwealth, the great Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, and the Federal Union, whether of single Cities or of considerable States. I have pointed out the inherent advantages and disadvantages of the three systems, and the circumstances under which each is preferable to the others. I now draw near to my main subject, to show the practical working of the Federal principle as it is exemplified in the history of the Federal Governments of the Ancient, the Mediæval, and the Modern world.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL.

BEFORE entering on that great developement of the Federal principle which marks the last age of independent Greece, it will be well to speak somewhat more briefly of certain less perfect approaches to a Federal system, which may be seen in the earlier days of Grecian history, and of which the noble work of Aratos was doubtless in a great measure a conscious improvement. And, first of all, it will be needful to say a few words as to an error which is now pretty well exploded, but which was of early date and which once had a wide currency. Many philosophical speculators on government have been led into great mistakes by the idea that Greece itself, as a whole, and not merely particular Grecian states, ought to be ranked as an instance of Federal union. CHAP. III.

The body which has been often mistaken for a Federal Council of Greece is the famous Council of the Amphiktyons at Delphi. Probably no one capable of writing upon the subject can have been so wholly ignorant of the whole bearing of Grecian history as to take the Amphiktyonic League for a perfect Federal union after the Achaian or American pattern. But it is easy to understand how such a body as the Amphiktyons may have been mistaken for a Federal Diet of the looser kind. It is certain

The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government.

CHAP. III.

Origin of
the Error.

that Dionysios,¹ pretty clear that Strabo,² not unlikely that Cicero,³ supposed the Amphihtyonic Council to have been invested with far more extensive powers than it ever possessed, at all events during the best days of Greece. The error on their part was natural: the later history of independent Greece was conspicuously a history of Federalism; and it was easy to carry back the political ideas of the times with which they were most familiar into days in which those ideas were most certainly unknown. And indeed there seems some reason to believe that the Amphihtyonic body had, in the age of Strabo, really put on something more like the outward shape of a true Federal body than it had ever worn in the age of Dêmôsthênês. From the later Greek and Latin writers the error naturally spread to modern scholars. In days when all "the classics" were held to be of equal value and authority, and when it was hardly yet discerned that all "the classics" were not contemporary with each other, men did not see how little the descriptions of Strabo and Pausanias, even though backed by an incidental allusion of Cicero, were really worth, when weighed against the emphatic silence of Thucydidês, Aristotle, and Polybios. And in truth modern scholars, writing under the

¹ iv. 25. He goes on, in his usual style, to say how Servius Tullius founded the Latin League in imitation of the Amphihtyons. Now the Latin League, though probably not a perfect Federal Government, has a fair right to be classed among close approaches to the Federal idea.

² ix. 3 (vol. ii. p. 278). Strabo speaks of the League as consisting of πόλεις, Pausanias, (x. 8, 2) more accurately of γένη. Strabo's expressions, *περὶ τῶν κοινῶν βουλευσόμενον* and *δικὰς ἔσσαι πόλεις πρὸς πόλεις εἰσὶ*, go far beyond the facts of the case.

³ The often quoted expression of Cicero, "Amphihtyones, id est, commune Græciæ Concilium"—an expression, by the way, which in a certain sense, is quite defensible—is a mere *obiter dictum* (De Inv. Rhet. ii. 23), and may or may not express Cicero's deliberate judgement. From Cicero's words, Raleigh doubtless got his phrase, "the Council of the Amphyctiones, or the General Estates of Greece." Hist. of the World, Part I. Book 4, Cap. i. § 4.

influence of political and historical theories, have often pressed the words of Strabo, Pausanias, and Cicero, far beyond anything that Strabo, Pausanias, or Cicero ever meant. The writers of the last century seem to have looked upon the Amphiktyonic League as a real political union of the Greek nation, and they sometimes highly extol the political wisdom of the authors of so wise a system.¹ In a like spirit, the accidental and fluctuating supremacy of a single Bretwalda over the several Old-English kingdoms was, by writers of the same age, often supposed to be the deliberate result of calculations no less far-searching than those which are attributed to Amphiktyôn the son of Deukaliôn.² The true nature of the Amphiktyonic League was, as far as I know, first clearly set forth by Sainte Croix, in his, for the time, really valuable work on old Greek Federalism.³ The work of Tittmann on the Amphiktyonic League⁴ is somewhat retrograde after that of Sainte Croix. It is needless to say that in the works of our own great countrymen, in the histories of Thirlwall and of Grote, no traces of the error can be discerned. The old notions as to the nature of the Amphiktyonic Council and the relations of the Greek states to one another may now be set down as an exploded mistake,⁵ a mistake arising partly from ignorance of the

CHAP. III.

Opinions
of Modern
Writers.

¹ Compare the first two Chapters of Montesquieu, *Esprit des Loix*, Book ix. He mentions the Amphiktyons but once, but he clearly has them in his mind throughout. On the other hand see the strictures on the supposed constitution of the League in the "*Federalist*," No. xviii. p. 91.

² Rapin (*Hist. d'Ang.* i. 139) gravely discusses the Bretwaldadom at some length, and compares the Bretwalda to the Dutch Stadtholder.

³ *Des Anciens Gouvernemens Fédératifs*. Paris, an vii.

⁴ *Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen*. Berlin, 1812.

⁵ No scholar of recent times has attempted to revive it, except Colonel Mure, in a pamphlet (*National Criticism* in 1858, p. 22) which that distinguished scholar probably regretted before he died. It is no disrespect to Colonel Mure, whose studies, most valuable in their own line, did not lie in a strictly historical direction, to say that he clearly had no idea what a Federal Government really is. Some of the particular arguments are

CHAP. III. true nature of Federal Government, partly from inability to distinguish between the different degrees of authority to be allowed to different Greek and Latin writers.

The
Council a
Religious,
not a
Political
Body.

The Amphiktyonic Council then, there can be no doubt, was in no wise an instance of Federal Government, even in the very laxest sense of the word. It was not a political, but a religious body. If it had any claim to the title of a General Council¹ of Greece, it was wholly in the sense in which we speak of General Councils in Modern Europe.

very weak, and the Colonel does not seem to have seen how far the silence of Thucydides outweighs the speech of a thousand Plutarchs or Dionysii. He refers us to the description of the Amphiktyons by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 14) as "quís præcipuum fuit rerum omnium iudicium, quâ tempestate Græci, conditis per Asiam urbibus, ore maris potiebantur." Undoubtedly Tacitus, as Colonel Mure says, is "an author not accustomed to speak at random," but his *obiter dictum* is really not decisive as to the mythical ages of Greece. Colonel Mure goes on to say that the Amphiktyons erased the boastful inscription of Pausanias. This is on the authority of an oration attributed to Dêmôsthênês, but generally looked on as spurious (c. Næser. § 128), while Thucydides (i. 132) makes the erasure the act of the Lacedæmonians themselves. That Themistoklês (Plut. Them. 20) opposed the proposal to deprive the medizing Greeks of their Amphiktyonic franchise, is very probable, but it does not go the least way towards showing that the Amphiktyons were, in any sense, a Federal Government.

¹ Æschinês (Ktes. § 58) has the expressions *κοινού συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων* and afterwards *Ἑλληνικοῦ συνεδρίου*. The latter phrase, as it stands in the context, referring to Philip's admission to the Amphiktyonic body, certainly proves nothing. Nor does the former, which is quoted by Tittmann, (p. 62) prove very much. Tittmann also quotes the Amphiktyonic decree in Dêmôsthênês (De Cor. § 198) where the Amphiktyons call themselves *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον*. Of these expressions one comes from Æschinês, who is well disposed to magnify Amphiktyonic rights, and whose language is never imitated by Dêmôsthênês, who so profanely talks of *τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιᾷ*. The other comes from the Amphiktyons themselves, who certainly never had more occasion to magnify their office, than in the decree by which they invited Philip into Greece. Yet even they directly afterwards qualify the strong expression by the words *οἱ Ἕλληνες οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων*. All those expressions, like those of Herodotus to be presently quoted, hardly amount to more than the name *Ἑλληνοτάμναι*, as applied to certain officers, not of a Hellenic Federation, but of the Athenian Confederacy.

The Amphiktyonic Council represented Greece as an Ecclesiastical Synod represented Western Christendom, not as a Swiss Diet or an American Congress represents the Federation of which it is the common legislature.

Its primary business was to regulate the concerns of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. And the Amphiktyonic Council which met at Delphi and at Thermopylæ was in truth only the most famous of several bodies of the same kind. An Amphiktyonic, or, more correctly, an Amphiktionic,¹ body was an Assembly of the tribes who *dwelt around* any famous temple gathered together to manage the affairs of that temple. There were other Amphiktyonic Assemblies in Greece, amongst which that of the isle of Kalaureia,² off the coast of Argolis, was a body of some celebrity. The Amphiktyons of Delphi obtained greater importance than any other Amphiktyons only because of the greater importance of the Delphic sanctuary, and because it incidentally happened that the greater part of the Greek nation had some kind of representation among them. But that body could not be looked upon as a perfect representation of the Greek nation which, to postpone other objections to its constitution, found no place for so large a fraction of the Hellenic body as the Arkadians. Still the Amphiktyons of Delphi undoubtedly came nearer than any other existing body to the character of a general representation of all Greece. It is therefore easy to understand how the religious functions of such a body might incidentally assume a political character. Thus the old Amphiktyonic oath³ forbade certain extreme

The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several.

Incidental Political Functions of the Council.

¹ The derivation from *ἀμφικτύωνες*, quoted by Pausanias (x. 8.), from Androtion, is now generally received. Indeed the spelling AMΦIKTIONΕΣ occurs on the Amphiktyonic coinage at Delphi.

² Strabo, lib. viii. c. 6 (vol. ii. p. 203). Ἦν δὲ καὶ Ἀμφικτυονία τις περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦτο, ἐπὶ πόλεων, αἱ μετείχον τῆς θυσίας, κ.τ.λ. This gives the original idea of an Amphiktyony.

³ Æsch. Fals. Leg. § 121.

CHAP. III. measures of hostility against any city sharing in the common Amphiktyonic worship. Here we get on that mixed ground between spiritual and temporal things on which Ecclesiastical Councils have often appeared with more honour to themselves than in matters more strictly within their own competence. The Amphiktyonic Council forbade any Amphiktyonic city to be razed or its water to be cut off, with as good an intention, and with about as much effect, as Christian Synods instituted the Truce of God, and forbade tournaments¹ and the use of the cross-bow. But, more than this, the Amphiktyonic Council was the only deliberative body in which members from most parts of Greece habitually met together. On the few occasions when it was needed that Greece should speak with a common voice, the Amphiktyonic Council was the natural, indeed the only possible, mouth-piece of the nation. Once or twice then, in the course of Grecian history, we do find the Amphiktyonic body acting with real dignity in the name of United Greece. We naturally find this more distinctly the case immediately after the repulse of the Persians, when a common Greek national feeling existed for the moment in greater strength than either before or afterwards. Then it was that the Amphiktyonic Council, evidently acting in the name of all Greece, set a price upon the head of the Greek who had betrayed the defenders of Thermopylæ to the Barbarians.² But, in setting a price on the head of Ephialtēs, the Amphiktyonic Council, as head of Greece, hardly did more than was done by the Athenian Assembly, if not as the head of Greece, yet as its worthiest representative, when it proscribed

Instances
of Am-
phiktyonic
action.

B.C. 479.

¹ As at the Second Lateran Council. See Roger of Wendover, ii. 400, Eng. Hist. Ed.

² Herod. vii. 214 (so 213). Οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πυλαγόροι ἐπεκέρυξαν. Professor Rawlinson, in his Translation of Herodotus, strangely strengthens the words of the historian into "the deputies of the Greeks, the Pylagoræ."

Arthmios of Zeleia for bringing barbaric bribes into Hellas.¹ Sometimes again we find, naturally enough, this great religious Synod, like religious Synods in later times, preaching Crusades against ungodly and sacrilegious cities, against violators of the holy ground or of the peaceful worshippers of Apollo. And, whatever we may think of the pious zeal of Æschinês against the Lokrians of Amphissa,² we may at least fairly believe that the first Sacred War under Solôn³ was a real Crusade, carried on with as distinct a sense of religious duty as ever sent forth Godfrey or Saint Lewis or our own glorious Edward. At other times the Amphiktyonic Council, just like other religious Councils, does not escape the danger of being perverted to purely temporal purposes. Nothing is easier than to see that the Amphiktyonic Council, in the days of Philip, had sunk into a mere political tool in the hands first of Thebes, then of Macedonia.⁴ And in all cases, whether the sentences of the Council were just or unjust, whether they were dictated by religious faith or by political

CHAP. III.

Amphik-
tyonic
Crusades.

B.C. 840.

B.C. 595.

The
Council
becomes
the tool of
particular
States.No inhe-
rent force
in its
Decrees.

¹ Æsch. Ktes. § 259. It is a favourite common-place with the orators.

² Æsch. Ktes. § 118, et seqq. Thirlwall, vi. 80.

³ Plut. Sol. 11. Æsch. Ktes. § 108. In later times (B.C. 281) we find a Crusade against Ætolia led by the Spartan King Areus (Justin, xxiv. 1) on the same ground as this of Solôn, namely the sacrilegious cultivation of the plain of Kirrha. But I do not see the evidence for asserting, as is done by Droysen (Hellenismus, i. 645) and by Mr. P. Smith (Dict. Biog. art. Areus) that this was in consequence of a formal Amphiktyonic decree. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 53. There is an intermediate Sacred War (B.C. 449. See Thuc. i. 112) in which the Amphiktyons are not spoken of at all.

⁴ There seems however no ground for believing that the Amphiktyons took upon themselves to elect Alexander as chief of Greece against Persia. The statement of Diodôros to that effect (xvii. 4) is, I suspect, a confusion, most characteristic of Diodôros, with Philip's appointment as chief of the Amphiktyonic Crusades. Both Philip and Alexander were chosen, so far as they were chosen at all, by the Congress of the Confederate Greeks at Corinth (Arrian, i. 1. Diod. u. s.). Diodôros is however followed by Mr. Whiston in the Dictionary of Antiquities, p. 81, and even by Mr. Grote (xii. 15). But Droysen seems to me to see the state of the case much more clearly. "Aber so dürftig war diess einzige Analogon einer verfassungsmässigen Nationaleinigung [the Delphic Amphiktyony] dass Philipp

CHAP. III. subserviency, the Amphiktyonic body had no constitutional means at its command for carrying them into execution. The spiritual tribunal had no temporal power; culprits had to be delivered to the secular arm, and the secular arm had to be looked for wherever it might be found. If no pious city like Thebes, no pious prince like Philip, undertook to act as the minister and champion of the Council, an Amphiktyonic judgement had no more inherent force than the judgement of a modern Ecclesiastical Synod. Sparta, the most devout worshipper of Apollo, took no heed to the Amphiktyonic fine which Theban influence procured as the punishment of the treacherous seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas.¹ So did Philomelos and his successors in Phokis resist both anathemas and armies, till the clear eye and strong hand of Philip saw and grasped his opportunity at once to avenge Apollo and to make his kingdom Greek and himself the leader of Greece. Otherwise a bull from Delphi or Thermopylae could have done as little to stay the march of Onomarchos as bulls from the Vatican, unsupported by the arm of the French invader, could do in our own day to stay the march of the first chosen King of Italy.

But though the Amphiktyonic Council was in no sense a Federal Government, its importance in a History of Federal Government is of a high order. The negative bearings of the existence of such a body can hardly be overrated. Nothing proves so completely how dear to the

Indirect
import-
ance of the
Council

selbst die neue Form eines Bundes in Korinth versucht hatte, die Nation oder die nächsten Kreise derselben zu einigen." Hellenismus, ii. 503. Droysen's strong Macedonian bias must however be guarded against, just like the strong anti-Macedonian bias of Mr. Grote.

¹ On this see the remarks of Mr. Grote, x. 275, et seqq. It marks the progress of vagueness and misconception that Diodoros, in recording the Theban accusation of Sparta (xvi. 23, 29), merely uses the words *ἐς Ἀμφικτύονας, ἐν Ἀμφικτυόσσι*, which in Justin (viii. 1) have grown into "commune Græciæ concilium"—the phrase of Cicero without his explanation.

Greek mind was the system of distinct and independent cities; nothing shows more clearly how little the minds of early Greek statesmen turned towards a Federal Union of the whole or of any large portion of Greece; nothing therefore shows more clearly how great was the work which was accomplished by the Greek statesmen of a later age. If the thought of a Federal Union of Greece had ever occurred, if the need of such an Union had ever been felt, the Amphiktyonic Council afforded materials out of which it might readily have been developed. As we find the ancient commonwealths coming to the very edge of a representative system, and yet never really establishing one, so we here find Greece coming to the very edge of a Federal system, and yet never crossing the limit. A body of Greeks, including members from nearly all parts of Greece, habitually met to debate on matters interesting to the whole Greek nation, and to put forth decrees which, within their proper sphere, the whole Greek nation respected. The wonder is that, with such a body existing, the idea of a Federal Union never presented itself; that no one ever thought of investing the Amphiktyonic body with much more extensive powers to be exercised for the common good of Greece. No more speaking witness can be found to the love of town-autonomy inherent in the Greek mind than the fact that no such developement of the Amphiktyonic body was, as far as we know, ever thought of. Perhaps, besides the love of town-autonomy, the constitution of the Council, so eminently unfair as a representation of historical Greece, may have had something to do with the fact that its proper functions were always kept within such narrow limits. But one difficulty which modern parallels may perhaps suggest would not have occurred in this hypothetical transformation of the Delphic Amphiktyony into a real Federal Diet of Greece. The Amphiktyonic

CHAP. III.
in the
History of
Federal-
ism.

Close
approach
of the
Council to
a Federal
System.

Why it
never grew
into a real
Federal
Union.

CHAP. III. Council undoubtedly answers in its functions to the Ecclesiastical Synods of modern times ; but to have made the Amphiktyonic Council the sovereign Assembly of Greece would have been quite a different process from investing the Convocation of Canterbury with the immediate sovereignty of England or an Œcumenical Council of the Church with the Federal sovereignty of Europe. We must always remember that in the ancient world the distinction of Clergy and Laity did not exist. There were spiritual offices and there were temporal offices, but there was no distinct spiritual order of men. The Amphiktyons were a religious body, but they were not a clerical body. The Council, after the manner of Greek Councils, had a larger Assembly attached to it, and this Assembly was of the most popular, not to say the most tumultuous, kind, consisting indiscriminately of all Greeks who might happen to be at Delphi to sacrifice or to consult the Oracle.¹ But even the members of the Council itself, the Hieromnêmones and the Pylagoroi, possessed no permanent spiritual character. They appeared at Delphi and at Pylæ as the servants of Apollo ; elsewhere they appeared as statesmen, soldiers, or private citizens. They were therefore just as competent or incompetent as any other body of Greeks to undertake the management of the general affairs of Greece. Their immediate functions as Amphiktyons were not secular but religious ; but those occasional functions in no way implied that their holders were personally or permanently isolated from common temporal affairs.

The Council an Ecclesiastical, but not a Clerical body.

Special Objections to the development of a Federal System out of the Council.

But besides the general indisposition of the Greek mind to permanent union of any kind, there were some special causes why the Amphiktyonic Council was never developed into a Federal Union. It is true that deputies from most parts of Greece were in the habit of meeting together and

¹ Æsch. Ktes. § 124.

of discussing questions, often perhaps trifling in themselves, but still questions in which the whole of Greece was interested. Here was indeed the raw material for constructing a Federal Union, had any Greek felt the want of one. But the constitution of the Council was such that, before it could have been safely invested with the smallest political power, the most sweeping of Reform Bills would have been needed for its reconstruction. Its composition was of a kind which made it a most unfair representation of historical Greece. Historical Greece was, above all things, a system of Cities. The Amphiktyonic Union was an Union not of Cities but of Tribes. This alone, as Mr. Grote remarks,¹ shows the immense antiquity of the institution. Any League which had arisen, we might almost say from the time of Homer onwards, could hardly fail to have been a League of Cities. Any institution which had arisen since the time of the Dorian Migration could hardly fail in some way to represent the results of that great event. But though the list of members of the Council is given with some slight variations² by different authors, all agree in making the constituent members of the Union Tribes and not Cities. The representatives of the Ionic and Doric races sat and voted as single members, side by side with the representatives of petty peoples like the Magnésians and Phthiôtic Achaïans. When the Council was first founded, Dorians and Ionians were doubtless mere tribes of Northern Greece, of no more account than their fellows, and the prodigious development of the Doric and Ionic races in after times made no difference in its constitution. How the vote of each race

CHAP. III.

Its constitution unsuited to historical Greece.

A Union of Tribes, not of Cities.

¹ Hist. of Greece, vol. ii. p. 325, 7.

² The several lists are discussed at some length by Tittmann (p. 35), whose conclusions are followed by Mr. Grote (ii. 325). They differ chiefly in the enumeration of the insignificant tribes of Northern Greece. The omission by Pausanias of the Boeotians, a people so specially mentioned by Æschinés (Fals. Leg. § 122) must be an error.

CHAP. III. was determined is an obscure point of Greek archæology¹ which hardly bears on our immediate subject. What is important for our present point of view is that Sparta and Athens, as such, were not members of the Amphihtyonic body. They were simply portions respectively of the Doric and Ionic aggregates, and they had legally no more weight than the smallest Doric or Ionic city.² The wish of the whole Doric race, the wish of the whole Ionic race, nay, the common wish, if we can conceive such a thing, of Sparta and Athens and their respective followings of Allies, might be at any moment set aside by the votes of three or four petty tribes, some of which were not even independent political communities. Perrhaibians, Magnêsians, Phthiôtic Achaïans, had ceased to be independent states before the beginning of the historical days of Greece. They had sunk into mere subjects of the Thessalians, and their deputies in the Council must have voted as their Thessalian masters bade them. Viewed as a political representation of historic Greece, the Amphihtyonic Council was something even more anomalous than was the British Parliament in its unreformed state, when viewed as a representation of the British people. The presence of Gatton and Old Sarum, the absence of Manchester and Birmingham, the two votes of Liverpool and the four votes of East and West Looe, all had their perfect precedents in the constitution of the venerable body which met at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Or rather the defects of the Amphihtyonic system must have been practically by far the greater of the two. English rotten boroughs have at least often been the means of introducing into Parliament

Unfair distribution of the Votes.

Analogy of the Unreformed Parliament.

¹ Cf. Grote, u. s. Strabo (ix. 3, vol. ii. p. 279, Tauchnitz) says that Akrisios settled the vote of each city, ψῆφον ἐκάστη δοῦναι, τῇ μὲν κατ' αὐτὴν, τῇ δὲ μεθ' ἐτέρας, ἢ μετὰ πλείωνων. We shall presently come to reasons for thinking that this system of *Contributory Boroughs* belonged only to the latest form of the institution.

² Æsch. Fals. Log. § 122.

some of its most distinguished members, but it could only have been the deputies of these little insignificant tribes who gained for the whole body the contemptuous description given of it by Dêmôsthênês.¹ But in a purely religious Assembly these incongruities were probably not found so intolerable as they assuredly would have been found in an Assembly exercising real political power. The very anomalies were consecrated by the traditional reverence of centuries. The very points in the constitution of the Council which made it so unfit for political action, made it only more venerable when looked at as a holy representative of past ages. What if certain tribes had sunk from independence to bondage? Statesmen might indeed, in their earthly policy, regard such merely political changes, but misfortune, without guilt, could not degrade any faithful worshipper of Apollo in the presence of his patron God. The zeal and piety of Athens and Sparta were not more fervent, doubtless they were far less fervent, than the zeal and piety of the little communities around the Temple, whose whole importance was derived from their share in its management. The God of Delphi was no respecter of persons; he looked with equal favour on the devotion of the weakest and of the most powerful worshipper. A change in the constitution of the Council would probably have been looked upon by the mass of Greeks as a heinous sacrilege. But, while such a constitution existed, the Council was unfit for political power, and, whenever it did meddle with political matters,

CHAP. III.
Incongruities less felt in a Religious body.

¹ Dem. Cor. § 190. Ἀνθρώπους ἀπειρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορῶντας, τοὺς ἱερομνήμονας. Or are we to infer that the Hieromnêmones were an inferior body to the Pylagoroi? As Æschinês was one of the latter, we may infer that the greater members of the Amphiktyony sent deputies, in that capacity at least, who would not deserve the description. But in any case, the majority of both orders would come from the petty tribes, and would doubtless be what Dêmôsthênês describes.

CHAP III. its interference was invariably mischievous. Any power which could command the votes of the little tribes about Mount Oita could procure whatever decisions it chose in the Amphiktyonic body. Philip, the common foe of Greece, was welcomed by the Amphiktyons as a deliverer, a true servant of Apollo, a pious Crusader against the usurping and sacrilegious Phôkian. It is not improbable that¹ many of the smaller Greek cities may really have shared, from shortsighted political motives, in this ill-timed goodwill to the Macedonian. But this only shows the more clearly the utter unfitness of the Council to act in any way as a political mouth-piece of Greece. When Dêmôsthenês had united Thebes and Athens in one common cause, the union of those two great cities did not command a single integral vote in the Amphiktyonic Council.

B. C. 352.

Amphiktyonic
Champion-
ship of
Philip.

It is certainly very remarkable that, long after the Council had ceased to be of any importance whatever, many of the defects in its constitution should have been reformed. Pausanias² describes the Council as it stood in his time, when, under the Roman dominion, the debates of the Amphiktyons must have been of considerably less moment than the debates of an English Convocation. Some at least of the changes which he mentions he attributes to the legislative mind of Augustus Cæsar. The Council, in this its later form, became at last, in a great degree, a representation of Cities, when Greece had no more independent Cities to represent. An attempt too was made, after the happy precedent set by the wise confederation of Lykia,³ to do what in modern political language is called apportioning members to population. In the old state of things the Dolopians, Magnêsians, Ainians, and Phthiôtic Achaïans had formed a large proportion of the

Reforms
under
Augustus.
B. C. 81—
A. D. 14.

¹ Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 319 (April, 1857).

² x. 8, 5.

³ The Lykian League will be described in the next chapter.

Council. Now they lost their separate Amphiktyonic being; the Dolopians indeed had ceased to exist altogether;¹ the other tribes were made what we may call *Contributory Boroughs* to Thessaly. The votes thus saved were divided among several new and several restored members. The Phôkians had, at the end of the Sacred War, lost their Amphiktyonic votes, which were transferred to Macedonia, as the due reward of Philip's Crusade in the cause of Apollo. In the new constitution Augustus found room both for Phôkians and Macedonians, as well as for the inhabitants of his own new city of Nikopolis. Delphi, Athens, Euboia, now appear as substantive members. The two Lokrian votes were divided between the two divisions of the Lokrian nation. The Dorian votes, in like sort, were divided between the original Dorians of the North and the Dorians of Peloponnêsos, that is to say those of Corinth, Sikyôn, Argos, and Megara; for Sparta, which shared in the exclusion of Phôkis, does not seem to have shared in its restoration. The whole number of votes was raised to thirty, and, instead of each constituency, as before, possessing two votes, the votes were now distributed among the members of the League in various proportions ranging from one to six.² Three of the mem-

CHAP. III.
B.C. 346.
New arrangement of votes in the Council.

¹ Paus. u. s. Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν Δολόπων γένος.

² The whole scheme is as follows :—

Nikopolis	6 votes.
Macedonia	6 —
Thessaly (with Malians, Ainians, Magnesians, and Phthiôtic Achaïans	6 —
Boeotia	2 —
Phôkis	2 —
Delphi	2 —
Northern Dôris	1 —
Ozolian Lokrians	1 —
Epiknêmidian Lokrians	1 —
Euboia	1 —
Argos, Sikyôn, Corinth, and Megara	1 —
Athens	1 —

CHAP. III. bers, Nikopolis, Athens, and Delphi, were single cities, and these, it is expressly said,¹ sent representatives to every meeting. The other constituencies were still not cities but races; their Amphiktyonic representatives were to be chosen by the several cities of the race in turn. Thus the vote of the Peloponnesian Dorians would be given in successive years by a Corinthian, a Sikyônian, a Megarian, and an Argive,² while every meeting contained one member for Athens, two for Delphi, and six for Nikopolis. Most of the cities in short were in the same position as the counties of Nairn and Cromarty before the Reform Bill, when they sent a member between them who was elected in alternate Parliaments by Nairn and by Cromarty. This account of Pausanias is well worth studying, as setting before us a very curious piece of amateur constitution-making. Had the Amphiktyonic body in the days of Augustus still retained any practical functions to discharge, its constitution, as settled by the Imperial reformer, would seem to be by no means unhappily put together. The Council was not indeed a representation of the whole of Greece, but neither had it ever been so in earlier times. It still gave an undue advantage to the North over the South; but something might be said for this in the case of a

¹ Paus. u.s. Αἱ μὲν δὴ πόλεις Ἀθῆναι καὶ Δελφοὶ καὶ ἡ Νικόπολις, αὗται μὲν ἀποστέλλουσι συνεδρεύοντας ἐς ἀμφικτυονίαν πᾶσαν· ἀπὸ δὲ ἔθνων τῶν κατειλεγμένων ἐκάστη πόλις ἀνὰ μέρος ἐς Ἀμφικτύονας καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ περιόδῳ συντελεῖν ἐστιν.

² It would seem that disputes sometimes arose among the contributory cities about their Amphiktyonic rights. At least in an inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 1121 (vol. i. p. 578), a certain Archenoos of Argos is praised for having, among his other good deeds, recovered the Amphiktyonic rights of his native city—μετὰ τὸ ἀνασῶσαι αὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Ἀμφικτυονείας τῇ πατρίδι. Another inscription (1124) commemorates an Argeian Amphiktyon named Titus Statilius Timokratēs, the son of Lamprios—a curious illustration of "Greece under the Romans;" Titus being doubtless an Argeian who had obtained Roman citizenship. Another hybrid of the same sort, Caius Curtius Proklos, is commemorated, in another inscription (No. 1058, vol. i. p. 559) as a Megarian Amphiktyon.

confederacy founded to manage the concerns of a Northern temple. We must also remember how completely Athens and Sparta had fallen from the position which they held in the days with which most of us are almost exclusively familiar. The weakest points of the Augustan charter are the enormous number of votes given to the new city of Nikopolis and the very scanty amount of representatives allowed to the Dorians of Peloponnēsos. Still, after all allowances, the new constitution of the Council was certainly a great improvement upon the old one. But possibly it was only because of the utter nullity of the Amphiktyonic body that any such constitution was bestowed upon it. The founder of the Empire could well allow so harmless a safety-valve to carry off the last feeble ebullitions of Hellenic freedom. While the firm grasp of Roman Governors was pressed tight upon the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia, their inhabitants might safely be permitted to play either at Town-Autonomy or at Federal Government beneath the sacred shadow of the Delphian Temple.

It can hardly fail to have been observed that the Amphiktyonic Council, both in its earlier and its later forms, makes a far nearer approach to the forms of Representative Government than anything which we find elsewhere in ancient Greece, whether in the constitutions of Federations or in those of single cities. In every Greek Government, as we cannot too constantly bear in mind, every qualified citizen was entitled to take his personal share and did not delegate his rights to another. No Greek city, no Greek Federation, presents an example of a real Representative Assembly. But the Amphiktyonic Council is strictly a Representative body; in discussing its nature, it is impossible to avoid introducing the language which we familiarly employ in speaking of modern Representative

Approach
to Repre-
sentative
forms
in the
Council.

CHAP. III. bodies. It may indeed be said that, after all, the Amphiktyonic Council was merely a Senate, and that, in conformity with universal Greek precedent, there was an Amphiktyonic Popular Assembly, in which every worshipper of Apollo had a right to appear. But it is clear that the Amphiktyonic Council filled a much more exalted position in relation to the Amphiktyonic Assembly than the Athenian Senate, for instance, did in relation to the Athenian Assembly. In the Amphiktyonic Constitution it is the Council which is really the important body, and the Council is certainly representative. But a really representative Senate would be just as great an anomaly in an ordinary Greek constitution as a representative Assembly. The real reason why we find representative forms in the Amphiktyonic body, while we do not find them in ordinary Greek Governments, is that the Amphiktyonic body was in no sense a Government at all. The Amphiktyonic Council was not exactly a Diplomatic Congress, but it was much more like a Diplomatic Congress than it was like the governing Assembly of any commonwealth, kingdom, or Federation. The Pylagoroi and Hieromnêmones were not exactly Ambassadors, but they were much more like Ambassadors than they were like Members of a British Parliament or even an American Congress. The business of the Council was not to govern or to legislate, either for a single state or for a League of states ; its duty was simply to manage a single class of affairs, in which a number of independent commonwealths were alike interested, but which did not come within the individual competence of any one of their number. It is manifest that this could only be done by deputies from the several states interested, that is by representatives. The nearest approach to the Amphiktyonic Council in modern times would be if the College of Cardinals were to consist of members chosen by the several Roman Catholic nations of Europe and America. Such a

The Council not a Government, but a mere Union for a particular purpose.

body would be entrusted with business in which every Roman Catholic country is interested, but it would not form a Federal or even necessarily a local Government. The Amphiktyons were the guardians of the Delphic Temple, but they no more formed a local Government for the city of Delphi than they formed a Federal Government for the whole of Greece. The Council was representative, just because it was not a Government, though again we may, if we please, wonder that the employment of representative forms in the Council did not suggest the employment of representative forms in the Federal, if not in the City, Governments of Greece. In like manner it would be a very interesting subject of inquiry whether, from a similar set of causes, representative forms, or a close approach to them, did not exist in Ecclesiastical Synods much earlier than they did in Secular Parliaments, and whether the founders of the representative system in modern Europe may not, consciously or unconsciously, have had ideas suggested to them by the constitution of the Assemblies of the Church.

CHAP. III.

The Amphiktyonic body was representative, because it was not a Government.

It belongs rather to a historian of Greece than to a historian of Federal Government to run through the whole evidence which so conspicuously shows the political nullity of the Amphiktyonic body during the best days of Greece. This has been amply done, to say nothing of the earlier work of Sainte Croix, both by Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. The Amphiktyonic Council is of no moment in the world of Thucydides, it is of no moment in the world of Xenophon, it is of no moment in the world of Polybios. Its short and mischievous importance belongs wholly to the days of Demosthenes and Philip. Thucydides never once mentions it, though he has often occasion to mention the Delphian Temple, to record stipulations for its management,

Political Nullity of the Council during the greater part of Grecian History.

CHAP. III. and at least one war for its possession.¹ It is clear that, in his time, the Council so far from holding any Federal authority over the general affairs of Greece, was not even independent in its own proper sphere of religious duty. And if we find it playing an important part in the days of Dêmôsthênes and Philip, the difference is simply because Sparta and Athens, in the previous century, had not thought worthy of any notice at all, while now first Thebes and then Philip found that even the Shadow at Delphi was capable of being made useful as a political tool. The Politics of Aristotle contain no mention of it. Polybios speaks of it twice,² neither time in a way implying any sort of Federal power. The mistake of looking at the Amphiiktyonic body as a Federal union of Greece arose only in times when freedom in all its forms, Federal or otherwise, had utterly passed away from the soil of Greece. Yet the Amphiiktyonic Council is an institution of no small importance in a general history of Federal Government. What it was and what it was not, shows more speakingly than anything else how utterly alien to the Greek mind, in the days before Macedonian domination, was anything like

¹ The Sacred War in B.C. 449. Thuc. i. 112. See above, p. 129.

² The first time (iv. 25) the Amphiiktyons are simply mentioned in their proper character as guardians of the Delphic Temple. In this duty they had been interfered with by the Ætolians, and Macedonia, Achaia, and the other allied powers, agree to effect their restoration. The second passage (xl. 6) is very curious indeed; it seems to set the Amphiiktyons before us, not as a political, but as a literary body, a view which certainly did not occur to Dêmôsthênes. Aulus Postumius wrote a book in Greek, and asked to be excused if, being a foreigner, he made mistakes in language. Cato tells him that if the Amphiiktyonic Council had set him to write in Greek (*εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων συνέδριον συνέταττε γράφειν ἱστορίαν*), his excuse would have been a good one; but as nobody obliged him to write in Greek or to write at all, he had no excuse if he wrote badly. This story is also told by Plutarch, Cato Maj. 12. It reminds one of Jeffrey's criticism on Byron: "If any suit could be brought against Lord Byron, for the purpose of compelling him to put into court a certain quantity of poetry," &c. Edin. Rev. Jan. 1808.

a Federal Union of the whole nation or even the most remote approach to it.¹ CHAP. III.

¹ On this subject of the Amphiktyonic Council, the eighteenth number of the "Federalist" should by all means be read. It is clear that the authors, Madison and Hamilton, had not the least notion of the true nature of the institution, but it is most curious to see the strong political sagacity of the authors struggling with their utter ignorance of facts. They were politicians enough to see the utter political nullity of the Council in Grecian history; they were not scholars enough to see that it never really pretended to any character from which anything but political nullity could be expected. Some of the particular comments and illustrations are most ingenious. I shall have again to refer to this curious paper when I come to speak of the remarks of the same writers on the Federal constitution of Achaia.

M. de Tocqueville also seems to have misunderstood the nature of the Amphiktyonic Council. He compares (i. 266) the position of Philip as executor of the Amphiktyonic decrees with the preponderance of the Province of Holland in the Dutch Confederation. Philip's position was really a great deal more like that of his French namesake when he undertook, by commission from Pope Innocent, to wrest the Kingdom of England from the sacrilegious John. Tocqueville's English translator does not point out the error.

Still more recently an example of the same sort of union of political shrewdness with utter lack of historical knowledge is to be found in Mr. Spence's work on the American Union, a book not indeed to be compared with the writings of Hamilton or Tocqueville, but abounding in keen observation of facts and in sound inferences from those facts. But Mr. Spence's remarks on the Amphiktyonic Council and the Achaian League (p. 7, 8) are merely Hamilton served up again. Of Ætolia, Lykia, and even Switzerland, he seems never to have heard. Mr. Spence too is without Hamilton's excuse; if he could not read Polybios, he might at least have read Thirlwall.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE.

§ 1. *Of the Northern Leagues. Phôkis, Akarnania, Epeiros, Thessaly.*

CHAP. IV. I HAVE already remarked that the greatest and most civilized states of Greece were precisely those which claved most strenuously to the principle of distinct town-autonomy. The approaches to Federal Government which we find in the earlier history of Greece appear only among the more backward portions of the nation; and, as we know but little of the details of their several constitutions, we can derive from them comparatively little knowledge bearing on our general subject. In fact some sort of approach to a Federal Union must have been rather common than otherwise in those parts of Greece in which the city-system was never fully developed.¹ In a considerable portion of Greece the cities seem to have been of comparatively little consequence; particular cities and their citizens are seldom mentioned; we far more commonly hear of the district and its inhabitants as a collective whole. Such seems to have been the case with the Lokrians, the Northern Dorians, and, so far as they can be said to have

An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder portions of the Greek nation.

¹ "The system of federation existed everywhere in the early state of society, and Achaia was ripe for its renewal at a later period, because no one town had so outgrown the others as to aspire to become the capital of the whole country." Arnold's *Life*, i. 273.

had any political existence at all, with those other little tribes of which we scarcely hear except as returning so disproportionate a share of members to the Amphiktyonic Council. The whole tribe is spoken of as if it had some sort of political unity; yet they certainly were not monarchies, and we do not hear of the domination of any single city. There must have been a common power of some kind, and yet it would be hardest of all to believe that whole tribes formed indivisible republics, and that the villages or small towns whose inhabitants made up the tribe had no separate political existence at all. Some rude form of Federalism can hardly fail to have existed among them. Among other tribes, as the Phókians and Akarnanians, we have distinct evidence that some sort of Federal Union really did exist. But of the details of their constitutions we know nothing; we have at best only a few scraps belonging to later times, when the examples of Achaia and Ætolia had given such an impulse to the Federal principle everywhere. Of the Phókian League nearly all our knowledge¹ comes from an incidental mention of Pausanias, who describes the building, the Phókikon, where the Federal body used to assemble.² But the traveller is much more anxious to describe the pillars and statues which adorned the place of meeting than to give us any information as to the constitution of the League itself. We gather however from his account that the Phókikon did not stand in any town; possibly the Phókians

The
PHOKIAN
LEAGUE.

¹ In this chapter I am chiefly concerned with the constitution and the earlier history of the several Minor Leagues. Their history during the great Federal period of Greece I reserve, like that of the Achaian League itself, for my more strictly historical chapters.

² Paus. x. 5, 1. 'Ἐς δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Δελφῶν εὐθείαν ἀναστρέψαντι ἐκ Δαυλίδος, καὶ ἰόντι ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω, ἔστιν οἰκοδόμημα ἐν ἀριστέρῃ τῆς ὁδοῦ καλούμενον Φωκικὸν, ἐς ὃ ἀπὸ ἐκάστης πόλεως συνιᾶσιν οἱ Φωκεῖς. Cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls der Griechischen Staaten, p. 436.

There is a pleasing simplicity in the notion of suddenly coming upon the seat of a Federal Government by the roadside.

CHAP. IV. may have taken warning by the example of their Boeotian neighbours. We also gather that these meetings at the Phókikon, like so many other old Greek institutions, preserved their nominal existence down even to the days of Pausanias. As to the date of the Phókian Union, when we remember the utter destruction of the Phókian towns after the Sacred War, it is clear that the League spoken of by Pausanias must have been an institution of a later age than the time of Philip. Indeed as all Phókis was, for a short time, incorporated with Ætolia, and as all Greek Leagues were for a while dissolved by the Romans,¹ the mimic League of Pausanias' times must have been actually established since the days of Mummius. But it would probably reproduce the forms of the constitution as they stood in the great Federal period of Greece. And this League again, like the Achaian League itself, was probably only a revival of an older union, so that what Pausanias saw may well have been the shadow of the state of things which existed before the ascendancy of Philomêlos. The Phókians are always spoken of as a substantive whole;² we hear of embassies³ being sent, and business in general being transacted, in the name of the whole Phókian body. Philomêlos and his successors were chiefs, tyrants, or whatever we choose to call them, not of this or that city, but of the whole Phókian people.⁴ Yet the Phókians had numerous cities, as more than twenty were destroyed after the Sacred War. It seems necessarily to follow that some sort of Federal Union had always existed in Phókis, and, as we hear of no dominant or presiding City, the Phókian

Probably
a revival
of an
earlier
League.

B.C. 359-
346.

¹ See below, at the end of the next section.

² Dem. Fals. Leg. 92. ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Φωκέων.

³ Xen. Hell. vi. 1, 1. Οἱ Φωκεῖς ἐπρέσβευον εἰς τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα.

⁴ Diod. xvi. 23. Ὁ Φιλόμελος, μέγιστον ἔχων ἐν τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἀξίωμα, διελέχθη τοῖς ὁμοεθέσι. Ib. 24. τῶν δὲ Φωκέων ἐλομένων αὐτὸν [Φιλόμελον] στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα. Cf. Thirlwall, v. 333. Tittmann, Staatsverfassungen, p. 709.

League was probably a better devised political machine than the far more famous League of Bœotia. CHAP. IV.

Of the Akarnanian League, formed by one of the least important, but at the same time one of the most estimable' peoples in Greece, we know a little more than of that of Phókis, but still our knowledge is only fragmentary. The boundaries of Akarnania fluctuated, but we always find the people spoken of as a political whole. We pick up a few details from Thucydides, Xenophôn, Polybios, and Livy, and we know that Aristotle treated of the Akarnanian constitution in that great political collection, the loss of which is one of the greatest of all the losses which the historical student has to mourn. The single fragment however which has been preserved¹ unhappily contains no political information. We gather from the incidental notices in Thucydides that, in his time, Akarnania, or at least the great mass of the Akarnanian towns, already formed a Federal body of some kind. The Akarnanians are constantly spoken of as acting with one will, and forming one political whole. Yet their union, just as we shall find in the earlier days of the Achaian Union, did not always exclude revolutions and changes of policy in particular towns. Thus, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the city of Astakos was governed by a Tyrant whom the Athenians expelled and the Corinthians restored;³ and the city of Oiniadai was hostile to Athens, while the rest of Akarnania was firm in the Athenian alliance.⁴ But these instances were

THE AKAR-
NANIAN
LEAGUE.

Earlier
Notices.

B. C. 431-
429.

¹ Pol. iv. 30. 'Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ γνήσιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐδέποτε περὶ πλείονος οὐθὲν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ καθήκοντος' ὅπερ Ἀκαρῶνες ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καιροῖς οὐδενὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤττον εὐρίσκονται διατηρηκότες, κ.τ.λ. The Akarnanians must have improved since the days of Thucydides, who describes the Akarnanians, along with the Ætolians and Ozolian Lokrians, as retaining the old barbarous habits of robbery and going always armed. Thuc. i. 5.

² Arist. Pol. p. 297, ed. Oxon, 1887.

³ Thuc. ii. 30, 33.

⁴ Ib. 102.

CHAP. IV. clearly interruptions of an established Federal order of things. Thucydides speaks, by implication at least, of the Akarnanian League as an institution of old standing in his time. The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation.¹ Thus the Supreme Court of the Akarnanian Union held its sittings, not in a town, but in a mountain fortress. But in Thucydides' own time Stratos had attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania,² and probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there.³ In the days of Agêsilaos⁴ we find Stratos still more distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting. But in after times Akarnania was exposed to the inroads of the aggressive Ætoliens, who so far betrayed the cause of Greek freedom as to join with Alexander the son of Pyrrhos in an attempt to dismember the Akarnanian Confederacy.⁵ Stratos at length became a permanent Ætolian possession, and, in the later days of Akarnanian freedom, Leukas appears to have taken its place as the ordinary seat of the Federal Government,⁶ till Leukas too was lost after the Third Macedonian War. At the same time, meetings were at least occasionally held at other places, as Polybios' records one held in the city of Thourion or Thyrrion before the separation of Leukas from the League.

Of the constitution of the League we know but little.

¹ Thuc. iii. 105. Ὀλπας, τεῖχος ἐπὶ λόφου ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσῃ, ὃ ποτε Ἀκαρνᾶνες τευχισμένοι κοινῇ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρῶντο. See Tittmann, p. 729.

² Thuc. ii. 80. Ἀφικνοῦνται τε ἐπὶ Στρατὸν, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην λάβοιεν, βρόδιως ἂν σφίσι τὰ ἄλλα προσχωρήσειν.

³ See Dict. Anc. Geog. art. Acarnania.

⁴ Xen. Hell. iv. 6, 4. Πέμψας ἐς Στρατὸν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων.

⁵ Pol. ii. 45.

⁶ Liv. xxxiii. 17. Leucade hæc sunt decreta. Id caput Acarnaniam erat, eoque in concilium omnes populi conveniebant. So xxxvi. 11.

⁷ Pol. xxxviii. 5

Ambassadors were sent by the Federal body,¹ and probably, just as in the Achaian League, it would have been held to be a breach of the Federal tie if any single city had entered on diplomatic intercourse with other powers. As in Achaia too, there stood at the head of the League a General with high authority.² We know not whether this was an ancient Akarnanian institution, or whether it were introduced in later times in imitation of the Achaian or Ætolian system. What little more we know of the constitution of the League is derived from an inscription found at Aktion,³ the subject of which is the honours conferred by the Akarnanian body on two Romans named Publius and Lucius Acilius. This inscription incidentally tells us of the existence of a Senate and Assembly,⁴ according to the common Greek model, of a Priest of the Aktian Apollo, who seems to have been regarded as a Federal magistrate, of a Secretary of State,⁵ and of three other magistrates⁶ whose functions are not explained. The General is not mentioned. Possibly the office may have been abolished under the Roman dominion, or it may have been usual to date the years, not by the Generals, but by the Priests of Apollo. So, at Athens, years were reckoned not by the effective magistracy of the Ten Generals, but by the almost honorary magistracy of the Archon. The existence of coins bearing the name of the whole Akarnanian nation shows that there was unity enough to admit of a Federal coinage, though coins of particular cities also occur.

¹ Pol. ix. 32. παραγενόμεθα μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ἀπεσταλμένοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

² Pol. v. 6. ἦκεν ἔχων Ἀριστόφαντος ἡ στρατηγὸς πανδημεὶ τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας. Liv. xxxvi. 11. Clytumn prætorem, penes quem tunc summa potestas erat.

³ Rose, Inscriptt. Græc. p. 282.

⁴ ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων.

⁵ ἐπὶ γραμματέως τῇ βουλῇ Προΐτου.

⁶ Ἀ προμνῶμων and two συμπρομνῶμονες.

CHAP. IV.

The
EPEIROT
LEAGUE.

B.C. 429.

Early Re-
publican
develop-
ment in
Chaonia
and Thes-
prôtis.

Constitu-
tional
Monarchy
in Mo-
lossis.

B.C. 429.

There seems every reason to believe that these Phôkian and Akarnanian constitutions were fairly entitled to the name of Federal Governments in the stricter sense. The difficulty is to decide how far the strict Federal form really dated from an early period, and how far it was introduced in after-times in imitation of the great Achaian model. We may be also pretty certain that something similar was the constitution of Epeiros in those later times when the old half-barbarian Molossian Kingdom had taken its place as a Greek Republic. As early as the Peloponnesian War the Chaonians and Thesprôtians had adopted republican forms.¹ The Chaonians were in a state of political developement of which both Greece and Italy afford examples in the course of the transition from monarchy to democracy. Two annual magistrates, whose title is unknown, were chosen out of a single ruling family.² So at Athens the Archons were for a long time chosen exclusively out of the old royal house. So, if we believe the conjectures of Niebuhr, the Tarquinii³ at one time and the Fabii⁴ at another had a right, legal or prescriptive, to have one of the Roman Consuls chosen from among them. The Molossians, on the other hand, were governed by Kings, but they were Kings of heroic Greek blood, and constitutional monarchy must have made some advances among them. The hereditary principle was so firmly established that a Regent could be trusted to act for a minor King.⁵ On the other hand, the

¹ Aristotle (Pol. 307) found the constitution of Epeiros, or at any rate of Thesprôtis, worthy of a place in his great collection, no small honour for a half barbarian state.

² Thuc. ii. 80. *Χάονες δὲ χίλιοι ἀβασίλευτοι, ὧν ἡγούντο ἐπ' ἐτησίῃ προστασίᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους Φώττος καὶ Νικάνωρ· ἐστρατεύοντο δὲ μετὰ Χαόνων καὶ Θεσπρωτῶν ἀβασίλευτοι.* The name Phôtyos in these regions reminds one of the Souliot hero Phôtos Tzabellas.

³ Niebuhr, Hist. Rom., i. 509, Eng. Tr.

⁴ Ib. ii. 179 et seqq.

⁵ Thuc. ii. 80. *Μολοσσούς δὲ ἤγε καὶ Ἀτινᾶνας Σαβύλινθος ἐπίτροπος ὧν θαρσύνου τοῦ βασιλέως παιδὸς ὄντος.*

Molossian King met his people in their National Assembly CHAP. IV. at Passarôn, where the King swore to govern according to the Law, and the People swore to preserve his Kingdom to him according to the Law.¹ The temporary greatness of the Molossian Kingdom under Alexander and Pyrrhos is matter of general history. Our immediate business B.C. 350-272. is with the republican government which succeeded on the bloody extinction of royalty and the royal line. B.C. 239-229. Epeiros now became a Republic; of the details of its constitution we know nothing, but its form can hardly fail to have been Federal.² The Epeirots formed one political body; Polybios always speaks of them, like the Achaïans and Akarnanians, as one people acting with one will. Decrees are passed, Ambassadors are sent and received, in the name of the whole Epeïrot people, and Epeiros had, like Akarnania, a federal coinage bearing the common name of the whole nation. Epeiros was, undoubtedly in all its dealings with other nations, one Republic. But it is hard to see how a Republic, unless it assumed the Federal form, could have embraced so large a country, one which included many cities,³ and several tribes which in earlier days had been quite distinct. The Federal form too was then in its full prevalence among the Grecian states, and was that which a newly founded Republic would most naturally adopt.⁴ Of the Epeïrot magistrates we find no distinct

Federal
Republic
in Epeiros.

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 5. *Εἰώθεισαν οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐν Πασσαρόνι, χωρὶς τῆς Μολοττίδος, Ἀρεῖα δὲ θύσαντες ὀρκωμοτεῖν τοὺς Ἠπειρώτας καὶ ὀρκίζειν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἔρξεν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἐκείνους δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν διαφυλάξεν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους.*

² Colonel Leake (Northern Greece, iv. 181) calls it a "loose federacy of republics." I see nothing to lead us to suppose that the Federal tie was looser in Epeiros than in other contemporary Leagues.

³ Seventy were destroyed by L. Æmilius Paullus, B.C. 168. Liv. xlv. 34.

⁴ See Schorn, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, p. 87, and, more at large, Droysen's *Hellenismus*, ii. 432, 3. Cf. Tittmann, 780 et seqq.

- CHAP. IV. mention in Polybios ; one passage in Livy ¹ implies the
 B. C. 204. existence of three Generals, and it has been ingeniously
 suggested ² that they represented the three tribes of
 Molossians, Chaonians, and Thesprôtians. But another
 B. C. 198. passage in the same author ³ seems to imply a single
 General, and a subordinate Commander of Cavalry. Pos-
 sibly between the two transactions referred to, a constitu-
 tional change may have taken place in Epeiros, similar to
 one which we shall have hereafter to consider in the
 Achaian League, and one chief magistrate may have been
 substituted for three.

No real
 Federalism
 in THESS-
 SALY.

Position
 and Power
 of the
 Thessalian
 Tagos.

Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros may thus be set down
 as having enjoyed real Federal Governments. Thessaly,
 on the other hand, though a loose connexion sometimes
 existed among its several cities, cannot be looked upon as
 having at any time attained to the true Federal system.
 There may have been some feeble approaches to it in
 earlier times, ⁴ and after the battle of Kynoskephalai, an
 imitation of the Achaian constitution seems to have been
 set up under Roman auspices. ⁵ But, throughout the time
 of Greek independence, Thessaly was but seldom united
 as one political whole, and whenever it was so united, it
 was always merely through common subjection to a single
 man. The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his
 office was not hereditary or even permanent ; neither was
 he exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of

¹ Liv. xxix. 12. Phœnice urbs est Epiri ; ibi prius collocutus Rex [Philippus] cum Aeropo et Darda et Philippo Epirotarum Prætoribus, postea cum P. Sempronio congreditur. Affuit colloquio et Amynder Athamanum Rex et Magistratus alii Epirotarum et Acarnanum.

These magistrates conclude a peace, so they probably were Plenipotentiaries from the Assembly.

² See Droysen and Schorn, u.s.

³ Liv. xxxii. 10. Pausanias Prætor et Alexander Magister Equitum.

⁴ Niebuhr, Kleine Schriften, i. 248. Tittmann, 713 et seqq.

⁵ Ib. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 361.

legal sanction.¹ But he came much nearer to the character CHAP. IV.
 either of a King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the General of the Achæians. The Tagos, a citizen of one Thessalian city, exercised over all Thessaly a supremacy hardly to be distinguished from kingship,² a supremacy to which other cities submitted with reluctance,³ and to which they were sometimes constrained to yield by force of arms.⁴ Nor do we hear of anything like a Federal Council or of any other check upon the power of the Tagos, when he was once appointed. Jasôn of Pherai acts Monarchy of Jasôn.
 throughout like a King, and his will seems at least as uncontrolled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the Kambounian hills.⁵ Even Jasôn seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant;⁶ possibly, like the Athenian Dêmos, he himself did not refuse the name.⁷ Certain it is that, after Jasôn's death, the office of Tagos became, under his successors Polyphrôn and Alexander, a Tyranny of the worst kind.⁸ Undisguised Tyranny of his Successors.
 In the next century, whatever may have been the nominal form of the constitution, Thessaly was practically a dependency of Macedonia.⁹ The country indeed retained nominal independence enough to enter into treaty-engagements. B.C. 372-0.
 B.C. 370-357.

¹ Xen. Hell. vi. 1, 18. Ταχὺ δὲ ὁ Ἰάσων ὁμολογουμένως ταγὸς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καθιεστήκει. Ib. vi. 4, 28. Μέγας μὲν ἦν καὶ διὰ τὸ τῷ νόμῳ Θεσσαλῶν ταγὸς καθιστάσθαι.

² Niebuhr, Kl. Sch. u.s. Die Würde des Tagus, welche Jason übertragen ward, war eine königliche. Cf. Herod. v. 63, where we find a βασιλεὺς of Thessaly, meaning doubtless the Tagos.

³ See the whole speech of Polydamas, Xen. Hell. vi. 1.

⁴ Ib. vi. 1, 5.

⁵ Ib. vi. 1, 18; 4. 29, 30.

⁶ When Jasôn was murdered, the assassins were received with honour in various Greek cities, on which Xenophôn (vi. 4, 32) adds *ἥ καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι ἰσχυρῶς ἔδεισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες αὐτὸν ὡς τύραννος γένοιτο*.

⁷ Arist. Pol. iii. 4, 9. Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν, ὥστε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι.

⁸ Xen. Hell. vi. 4, 34. Ὁ δ' αὖ Πολύφρων . . . κατεσκευάσατο τὴν ταγείαν τυραννίδα ὁμοίαν. Ib. 35. Ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτὸς [Ἀλέξανδρος] παρέλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν, χαλεπὸς μὲν Θετταλοῖς ταγὸς ἐγένετο, κ.τ.λ. On the tyranny of Alexander, see Plut. Pel. 26 et seqq.

⁹ Pol. ix. 28. Φίλιππος . . . οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης πόλεων ἐγένετο

CHAP. IV.

Thessaly
a depend-
ency of
Mace-
donia.
B.C. 346-
198.

Legisla-
tion of T.
Quinctius
Flami-
ninus,
B.C. 197.

ments, and to be enumerated in lists of allies alongside of Achaia and of Macedonia itself.¹ But it is clear that the will of the Macedonian Kings was practically undisputed, and also that in Thessaly, as elsewhere, their influence was maintained by the worst of means, by fostering disunion and disorder of every kind.² We know that elsewhere an efficient Federal system was the thing which they most sedulously discouraged, and no system of the kind is likely to have existed during the time of their supremacy. Flaminius was a lawgiver of a better sort; he doubtless sincerely desired to give both Thessaly and all parts of Greece as much liberty as was consistent with the dominant interests of Rome. His constitution at least set free the smaller Thessalian towns from their previous bondage to the great cities,³ but the internal constitutions of the towns were, with the natural instinct of a Roman, fixed by him on an oligarchic basis.⁴ But even a freer and better system, if dictated by a foreign deliverer, could be of little value then and of little interest now. There is no sign of anything like real native Federalism in Thessaly, and therefore any minute examination of Thessalian political antiquities would be alien to our subject.

§ 2. *Of the Boeotian League.*

The political history of Boeotia is of far more importance than that of Thessaly; it is, indeed, in an indirect way,

κύριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θετταλοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν ἐποιήσατο διὰ τὸν φόβον. This seems accurately to distinguish between the cities of Chalkidikê, directly incorporated with Macedonia, and those of Thessaly, merely brought under an overwhelming Macedonian influence.

¹ Pol. iv. 9. 'Ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία . . . 'Αχαιοῖς, 'Ἡπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι, Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, 'Ακαρνανῶσι, Θετταλοῖς.

² Liv. xxxiv. 51.

³ Niebuhr, Kl. Sch. i. 248, 9.

⁴ See Thirlwall, viii. 361.

one of the most important portions of the political history of Greece. The Bœotian League was undoubtedly a very ill arranged political contrivance ; but its history gives us, if only by way of warning, some of the lessons which are most needful in a general survey of Federal Government. The fate of the Bœotian Confederacy is a constant commentary on the dangers which may arise to a Federal State from the influence of an overwhelming capital. A great capital, even in a consolidated state, has a strong tendency to be a great evil ; but the existence of such a capital among a League of republics is more perilous still. A single great city, standing out prominently above all the others, is always likely to destroy the true Federal equality, and, instead of remaining a single equal member, to become first the President, and then the Tyrant, of the League. Of course a Federation neither can nor ought, any more than other form of government, to check the growth and prosperity of any of its cities ; but it is highly desirable to take such measures as may secure the League against a disproportionate influence on the part of any single member. A Federal State will do well to fix its Seat of Government anywhere rather than in its greatest city. If a Federal State has a capital, the same dangers at once arise which even in a consolidated state arise from the influence of one preponderating city. But in a Federal State they are likely to assume a yet worse form. In a monarchy the capital has, after all, no different legal position from that of another town ; it is invested with no portion of sovereignty, nor is it commonly in the habit of legal political action. But in a Federal body, the capital is already a sovereign commonwealth, capable of, and accustomed to, distinct political action within its own sphere ; it is therefore far more likely to encroach upon the rights of weaker members than can be done in a monarchy or an indivisible republic. Most of the wisest Confederations have avoided this

CHAP. IV.

History
of the
BŒOTIAN
LEAGUE ;its Warn-
ings ;Dangers
of an over-
whelming
Capital in
a Federal
State.

CHAP. IV.

Most Con-
federal-
tions have
avoided
a pre-
dominant
Capital.

danger, by having no capital at all, none at least in the same sense in which Paris or even London is a capital. We have seen Akarnanian Federal Meetings held on an entrenched hill-top, and Phôkian Federal Meetings in a temple by the wayside. The Achaian Congress, in the best days of the League, met in the insignificant town of Aigion, and afterwards in the several cities in turn. In the Dutch Republic the enormous influence of Amsterdam was somewhat counterbalanced by the arrangement by which both the Provincial States of Holland and the States-General of the United Provinces were held, not at Amsterdam, but at the Hague. So either a wise providence or a most happy accident has fixed the Seat of Government of the American Union in a city which is simply the Seat of Government, and nothing else. One cannot avoid a vague feeling of possible danger, if the gigantic city of New York were the permanent dwelling-place of the Federal President and Congress. Happily New York, like Amsterdam, is not only not the capital of the United States, it is not even the capital of the State to which it gives its name. So in Switzerland, the Federal Government till lately held its sittings in three towns, Bern, Zürich, and Luzern, in turn. It is a grave question whether it was a wise arrangement which has fixed the Seat of Government permanently at Bern. Bern indeed is not the greatest city of Switzerland, but it is the only one which combines an amount of population and a geographical position which could allow it to aspire to the rank of a capital. After these real Confederations, it seems almost ludicrous to speak of the body which calls itself a Confederation in Germany, but even that takes care to hold its Federal Meetings at Frankfort and not at Berlin or Vienna. Now in the Bœotian League we see the evils of a preponderating capital carried to their extreme point. The great city of Thebes became the

mistress, and in the end the tyrant, of the whole League.¹ She at last came to rule with greater severity over kindred cities, members of the same Federal body, than Athens ruled over protected or conquered States. She at last became the object of a relentless hatred on the part of the smaller towns, which surpassed even the ordinary bitterness of hatred between hostile Hellenic cities. In short, the whole internal history of Bœotia is one long record of feuds between Thebes and the other cities, Plataia, Thespia, and Orchomenos. And the lesson is the more striking, because, as far as we can make out from our scanty notices of the Bœotian Constitution, the mere formal position of Thebes does not seem to have been at all extravagant or anomalous. To the great executive college of the Bœotarchs, while the other cities contributed one member each, Thebes contributed two. That is, in the chief magistracy of the Federation, the great city of Thebes legally commanded only two votes out of eleven or thirteen. Yet we find the Bœotian League, throughout two thirds of its history, existing only as an instrument to advance Theban interests, constantly to the disadvantage, sometimes to the utter destruction, of the smaller towns of the Confederation. At last the weaker cities sink into the state of mere subjects; they are spoken of by Isokratês under the very same name which the subject Lakonian towns bear in reference to Sparta.²

CHAP. IV.

Position of Thebes in the Bœotian League.

Difference between its Legal and Practical Position.

It is probable that, in the actual position of Bœotia, a really well ordered Federal Government was impossible.³ The vast superiority of Thebes over every other Bœotian

¹ Boeckh. C. I. vol. 1. p. 727. Aut plurima ex Thebanorum quasi dominorum, gerebantur potentiâ aut ceteri Bœoti a Thebanis segregati alienas sequi partes solebant.

² Isok. de Pac. § 141. Τά μὲν Θηβαίων πράγματα πονηρῶς ἔχει νομίζετε, ὅτι τοὺς περιόικους ἀδικοῦσιν.

³ Drumann (p. 440) says, "Ein Städteverein in Bœotien hätte nach der Beschaffenheit des Landes mehr vermögen müssen, als viele andere." A

CHAP. IV. city was the standing difficulty of the League. In Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros, there was no city which had any such clear superiority over its neighbours; among them, therefore, no obstacle existed to the formation of an equitable Federal system. The wisdom of Bœotia would probably have been to follow the bold precedent of Attica.¹ The smaller Attic towns gave up all sovereign rights, all distinct political being, but their citizens received in exchange the full political franchise of the great city of Athens. Had the smaller Bœotian towns been willing, in the like sort, to merge themselves in the great city of Thebes,—had every Bœotian, like every Attican,² received the full Theban franchise,—each town, as a town, would have lost its rank as an autonomous city, but each of its citizens would have gained far higher and more enduring rights as a citizen of a great and free Theban commonwealth. But the Bœotian towns, even in forming a political union with Thebes, still clung to their separate political being, a political being which could not be practically maintained side by side with so mighty a neighbour. Hence, while the smaller towns of Attica were filled with attached citizens of Athens, the smaller towns of Bœotia were filled only with discontented subjects of Thebes. The result of this peculiar position of Thebes was that it was not till a very late time, and then only for a very few years, that Thebes ever took that position in general Grecian politics to which so great and so ancient a city was otherwise fairly entitled. Athens, with her whole

The circumstances of Bœotia suited to a "Synoikismos," not to a Federal System.

συνοικισμός, had local prejudices once given way, might easily have been formed, and might have obtained much power, but hardly a "Städteverein" of the Achaian sort.

¹ See above, p. 28.

² How completely Attica became merged in Athens is shown by the fact that one has to form some such unusual word as "Attican," to express an inhabitant of Attica other than an Athenian. The difference between *Ἀθηναῖοι* and *Ἀττικοί* was perceptible so late as B.C. 300. See Grote, ii. 307.

territory filled with loyal citizens, Sparta, with her whole territory filled with unresisting subjects,¹ each enjoyed peace at home, and each might aspire to the general supremacy of Greece. Thebes was always too busy in maintaining her local supremacy to aim at any such ambitious schemes, till the two men arose who were to give her for a moment both a local and a general supremacy such as she had never held before.²

CHAP. IV.
Effects on
general
Grecian
History.

The history of the Bœotian League naturally falls into three periods. The first extends from our earliest historical notices of the country to the first dissolution of the League at the peace of Antalkidas. The second includes the short but brilliant period of Theban greatness, down to the conquest of the city by Philip and its destruction by Alexander. The third includes the history of Bœotia from the destruction of Thebes by Alexander and its restoration by Kassander down to the final dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius Philippus.

Three
Periods of
Bœotian
history.
B.C. 776-
387.
B.C. 387-
334.
B.C. 334-
171.

During the first period we find, as early as we can get at any certain information, the Bœotian cities united by both a religious and a political bond. They formed an Amphiktyony, and they also formed a Federal Government. Of these two, one cannot doubt that the religious association existed before the political League and served as its groundwork. The Bœotian Amphiktyony held its

First
Period,
B.C. 776-
387.

Bœotia
both an
Amphik-
tyony and
a Political
League.

¹ The Helots several times revolted, the Perioikoi never, and the Perioikoi had as much interest in suppressing a Helot revolt as the Spartans themselves.

² Drumann, p. 428. Daher konnten Sparta und Athen das Principat über alle Griechen zu erringen streben, während Theben noch dahin bemüht sein musste, die Herrschaft in Bœotien zu erlangen.

Compare, at this moment, the three great despotisms of Europe. Russia has force enough to keep down all internal enemies; France (whatever its ruler may have) has no internal enemies to keep down; Austria is, like Thebes, helpless from internal dissensions.

CHAP. IV solemn festival at the temple of the Itônian Athênê near Korôneia;¹ its title was the Pamboiôtia,² a name formed after the same analogy of so many other religious gatherings of the same kind. How soon this Amphiktyonic connexion grew into a political union it is hard to say, but it is clear that the Bœotian League was looked on as an institution of old standing during the Peloponnêsian War. It must both have existed and have been perverted from its original purpose, before the oppressed Plataians sought for Athenian help. We may fairly believe that the Federal union of Bœotia was as old as Federal institutions in any part of Greece.

B.C. 519
(Clinton),
c. 510
(Grote iv.
222).

Use of
the words
"Bœotian"
and
"Theban"
by Thucy-
didês and
Xenophôn.

The old Bœotian League, as far as its outward forms went, seems to have been fairly entitled to the name of a Federal Government, but in its whole history we trace little more than the gradual advance of Thebes to a practical supremacy over the other cities. This difference between the theory and the practice of the Bœotian constitution is curiously illustrated by the ordinary language both of Thucydidês and of Xenophôn. Whenever there is anything like a formal mention of the whole people, in the description for instance of a battle or a negotiation, the word used is "Bœotian;" but when the historians narrate or comment in their own persons on the policy of the League, the word "Theban" is commonly used instead. Thus the whole argument about the fate of Plataia is put by Thucydidês into the mouths of "Theban," not of "Bœotian," orators,³ just as the first treacherous assault on the town is attributed wholly to Theban heads and to

¹ Paus. ix. 34, 1. Τῆς Ἰτωνίας Ἀθηνᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ ἱερόν καλεῖται δὲ ἀπὸ Ἰτόνου τοῦ Ἀμφικτύονος. This smaller Amphiktyony is ascribed to a son of Amphiktyôn, as the great one at Delphi to Amphiktyôn himself.

² Strabo, vol. ii. p. 265. Cf. Pol. iv. 3; ix. 34, for the *πανάκτυρος* of the Pamboiôtia.

³ Thuc. iii. 60. Οἱ Θηβαῖοι δέισαντες . . . ἐλεγον.

Theban hands.¹ But when he comes to describe the battle of Déliion,² and the negotiations after the Peace of Nikias,³ he gives to the armies, ambassadors, and senators their formal title of "Bœotians." So Xenophon attributes to "Theban" politicians the proposal⁴ to destroy Athens and the receipt of bribes from the Great King,⁵ but in describing the battles in the Corinthian war,⁶ he too falls back upon the technical name "Bœotian." This usage of ordinary language exactly expresses the truth of the case. The League was a Bœotian body animated by a Theban soul; the devices of Theban statesmen were habitually carried out by the hands of Bœotian soldiers.⁷

It is perfectly evident that the Bœotian League had the form of a real Federal Government. It is equally evident that it altogether wanted the true Federal spirit. The common government was carried on in the name of the whole Bœotian nation. Its most important magistrates bore the title of Bœotarchs; their exact number, whether eleven or thirteen,⁸ is a disputed point of Greek archæology, or rather of Bœotian geography. For our purpose the number is indifferent; the important point for us is that Thebes chose two Bœotarchs,⁹ and each of the other cities

Constitu-
tion of the
League.

¹ Thuc. ii. 2. Προϊδόντες οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κ.τ.λ.

² Ib. iv. 91. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ . . . ξυνελέγοντο, κ.τ.λ.

³ v. 36 et seqq. throughout.

⁴ Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19. Ἀντέλεγον Κορίνθιοι μὲν καὶ Θηβαῖοι . . . μὴ σπένδεσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

⁵ Ib. iii. 5, 3. Οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις προστάταις . . . πείθουσι Λοκρούς.

⁶ Ib. iv. 2, 17 et seqq.

⁷ Tittmann (p. 696) seems to me to under-rate throughout the practical supremacy of Thebes during our first period.

⁸ Thuc. iv. 91. Τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, οἱ εἰσιν ἑνδεκα, οὗ ξυνεπαίνοντων μάχεσθαι . . . Παγώνδας δ' Αἰολάδου, βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ' Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου, καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὖσης αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. where see Dr. Arnold's note, and compare Boeckh, vol. i. p. 727, and Mr. Whiston in Dict. of Antt. art. Bœotarches.

⁹ Boeckh (u.s.) explains the second Theban Bœotarch to have been the representative of some town formerly a member of the League, but after-

CHAP. IV.

Subject
Districts
or Sub-
ordinate
Leagues.

Office of
the Bœo-
tarchs.

one.¹ The same narrative from which we learn this fact shows also that, besides the cities which were, in name at least, sovereign states, Bœotia, like Switzerland in the old time, contained districts which did not enjoy direct Federal rights, but which were connected, in some subordinate way, with some one or other of the sovereign cities.² It may however be doubted whether these dependencies were, strictly speaking, subject districts, like the Italian possessions of Uri, or whether Bœotia was not, like the Grisons, a League made up of smaller Leagues. However this may be, the Bœotarchs, as representatives of the several Bœotian cities, were the supreme military commanders of the League,³ and, as it would appear, the general administrators of Federal affairs. This is the ordinary position of the military commanders in a Greek

wards merged in Thebes. This is a highly probable explanation of the origin of the custom; practically the double Theban Bœotarchy, like the four members for the City of London, represented the superiority of Thebes to the other cities.

¹ Mr. Grote (vi. 523) speaks of the Bœotarchs as consisting of "two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportions by the other cities." Certainly Thucydides does not directly say that there was one Bœotarch from each city, but almost every scholar seems to have taken it for granted (see Hermann, Pol. Ant. § 179, Eng. Tr.), and it is hard to imagine any arrangement by which any sovereign city would be left without its Bœotarch. This narrative of Thucydides, and another which will presently be referred to, are, as far as I know, our only authorities for the number and power of the Bœotarchs during this first period of the League. With the Bœotarchs of the days of Epameinondas we have as yet no concern.

² Thuc. iv. 76. *Χαλκιδεῖαν δὲ, ἣ ἐς Ὀρχομένον συνέτελει*, where see Arnold's note. I cannot help thinking that the word *συντελεῖν* implies a greater degree of freedom in these dependent places than Dr. Arnold allows. See also Boeckh. i. 728.

³ It may be doubted whether the words *ἡγεμονίας ὁδοῦς αὐτοῦ*, in the passage of Thucydides (iv. 91) last quoted, imply that the supreme command was always vested in a Theban Bœotarch, or whether it was merely the turn of Pagondas to command that particular day. It is worth notice that the Bœotian army at that time was not drawn up in any uniform order, but the troops of each city followed their own customs. The Thebans were twenty-five deep, the others in different proportions. Thuc. iv. 93.

state, as we see by the authority possessed by the Ten CHAP. IV.
 Generals at Athens, and by the Federal General of the
 Achaian League. The Bœotarchs of course command at
 Dêlion, but they also act as administrative magistrates of B.C. 424.
 the League by hindering Agêsilaos from sacrificing at B.C. 397.
 Aulis.¹ We see something more of their functions in a
 narrative of Thucydides which gives us almost our only
 glimpse of the internal working of the Bœotian Federal
 constitution. During nearly the whole of our first period,
 the Bœotian government was oligarchic. Just as in
 Achaia each city had its local democratic Assembly and
 the League had its Federal democratic Assembly, so in
 Bœotia the Federal Government was oligarchic, and we
 cannot doubt that the government of each particular city
 was oligarchic also.² The supreme power of the League
 was vested in the Four Senates of the Bœotians.³ Of the The Four
Senates.
 constitution of these Senates we know absolutely nothing;
 but it is most probable that the division was a local one,
 and that the Four Senates represented four districts. If
 so, it shows that the Federal bond in Bœotia must have

¹ Xen. Hell. iii. 4. 4. *Οἱ βουόταρχοι, πέμψαντες ἑπτάς, κ.τ.λ.* This has a military sound, but it was doubtless in strictness a measure of police.

² Mr. Whiston (Dict. of Antt.) is doubtless justified by analogy in supposing that each Bœotian city had its own *βουλή* or Senate, and *ἄσμος* or Popular Assembly (see Boeckh, i. 729), but the passage which he quotes from Xenophôn hardly proves it (Hell. v. 2. 29). It merely speaks of a Theban *βουλή* and that during the time (B.C. 382) when the Confederation was in abeyance. I am not clear about the existence of Popular Assemblies in the Bœotian cities during our first period. There is, as might be expected, abundant evidence for their existence in later times, but I doubt whether any of the many inscriptions in Boeckh, which mention a *ἄσμος*, belong to the days of the old oligarchic League.

³ Thuc. v. 38. *ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, ἅπτερ ἕπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχουσιν.* Tittmann (p. 695) assumes their representative, and denies their aristocratic, character. The latter at least is clear enough. A Federal *ἄσμος*, like that of the Achæians, is mentioned in later inscriptions (see Boeckh, i. 728); but one can hardly fancy its having even a nominal existence earlier than the revolution of Pelopidas.

CHAP. IV. been much laxer than it was in Achaia, and the necessity of consulting several Assemblies suggests resemblances between the constitution of Bœotia and the constitution of the United Provinces. Still less do we know how four co-ordinate Senates were kept in harmony together; but the only glimpse which we get of them sets them before us as submissive and tractable bodies, which commonly did little more than register the edicts of the Bœotarchs.¹ Their constitutional powers seem to have been something like those of the American Senate; the Bœotarchs propose to them a scheme of a treaty, which it rests with them to accept or to reject. We may even believe that the Senates were, on such matters at least, only authorized to consider proposals made to them by the Bœotarchs, and that they had no initiative voice of their own.² It is clear that the actual negotiation was carried on wholly by the Bœotarchs, just as it would be by an American President and his Ministry. In this particular case the Bœotarchs fully expected that the Senates would have ratified their proposals without examination or explanation, and they were much surprised at finding the proposed treaty rejected.³ The whole story gives us a very poor impression of the management of the Bœotian Foreign Office.

Diplo-
matic
Action
of the
Senates
and the
Bœotarchs.

Though the Bœotarchs were, like the Athenian Generals, practically the most important officers of the state, yet, like the Athenian Generals, they did not stand formally at its head. The nominal chief of the League was a magistrate called the Archon of the Bœotians,⁴ whose name

Federal
and Local
Archons.

¹ Cf. Grote, vii. 34. They must, as Boeckh (i. 728) remarks, have been assembled in one place.

² See Arnold's note on Thuc. v. 38.

³ Thuc. ib. *Οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κὰν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἂ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν.*

⁴ See the inscription in Boeckh, No. 1594 (vol. i. p. 776). Mr. Whiston infers from this inscription that the Federal Archon "was probably always a Theban." As the inscription specially mentions that the particular

seems to have been used as a date even in purely local CHAP. IV.
 proceedings in the several cities.¹ We also find local
 Archons in the several cities.² Though many of the in-
 scriptions which record the names of these Archons are
 doubtless later than the Peace of Antalkidas, or even than
 Kassander's restoration of Thebes, still the analogy of
 other states would lead us to believe that the Archons,
 both of the League and of its several cities, were magis-
 trates of the highest antiquity. Probably the Bœotian,
 like the Athenian, Archon had once been the real ruler of
 the state, and had been gradually cut down to a routine of
 small duties, sweetened by the honour of giving his name
 to the year. Of the particular Archon of Thebes, Plutarch³ Theban
Archon
a mere
Pageant.
 records an usage, which, though his mention of it belongs
 to a time later than our present date, must surely have
 been handed down from very early times. The Theban
 Archon, at least in the interval between the occupation of
 the Kadmeia by Phoibidas and the delivery of Thebes by B.C. 382-
379.
 Pelopidas, was chosen by lot,⁴ and kept a sacred spear of
 office always by him. These customs are not likely to
 have been of recent introduction; they savour of high
 antiquity, and point to the Archon as a venerable pageant
 rather than as a magistrate possessing real authority. He
 is spoken of, not as a ruler but as a sacred person, and it is Real power
of the Po-
lemarcha.
 clear, from the whole narrative of Xenophôn and Plutarch,
 that the main powers of the state were then in the hands
 of the Polemarcha.⁵

Archon commemorated was a Theban, I should have inferred the contrary.
 This inscription is of a later date than the restoration by Kassander.

¹ See the inscription in Leake's Northern Greece, ii. 132. *Χαρπίνω
ἀρχοντος Βοιωτῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

² See Rose, *Inscriptt. Græc.* 264 et seqq.

³ De Genio Socratis, 30.

⁴ Ib. *ὁ κυδίστος ἀρχων.*

⁵ See especially Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 30. *τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος ἐξεῖναι πολε-
μάρχῳ λαβεῖν, εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄξια θανάτου ποιεῖν*

CHAP. IV.

Power of
Thebes
shown in
the His-
tory of
Plataia.

Plataian
Secession
from the
League,
B.C. 519!

Yet, with all this show of good Federal Government, the true Federal spirit could have had no place in a League where everything was carried on in the selfish interest of a single city. What the position of Thebes in the Bœotian League really was is shown by the whole history of the brave and unfortunate city of Plataia. The Plataians set the first recorded example of Secession from a Federal Union. But it was most certainly not Secession without a cause. The Plataians broke through their Federal obligations, they forsook the ancestral laws of all Bœotia,¹ but it was because those obligations and those laws had been perverted into mere instruments of Theban domination. They found the Theban yoke too hard to bear, and they sought for aid against the oppressor, first at Sparta and then at Athens.² Even thus early, Secession from the Bœotian League was looked on by impartial spectators as a right to be secured against the overwhelming ascendancy of Thebes. The Corinthians, when called in as mediators, determine that Thebes has no right to control any city which does not wish to belong to the Bœotian Confederation.³ It is clear that language like this would never be used of any really equal Confederation in any age. If a mediator were to be called in to settle American differences, the form of his decree would not be that New York should leave the Confederate States undisturbed. That the example of Plataian secession was not followed by other cities may be partly owing to geographical causes. No other Bœotian city, except

¹ Thuc. iii. 66 et al. *Τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια*. I cannot believe in any rivalry between Thebes and Plataia, such as Drumann (437) seems to imply, as if Plataia disputed the first place in the League with Thebes. Drumann also strangely omits all mention of the connexion between Plataia and Athens.

² Herod. vi. 108. *πικρύνενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων*. Thuc. iii. 55. *ὅτε Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο*.

³ Herod. (u. s.) *Ἐάν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους εἰς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν*.

Tanagra, lay so temptingly near to a powerful protector. CHAP. IV.
 And the events of the Peloponnesian War at once tended Ill feeling between Thebes and other Towns.
 to beget a bitter feeling between Athens and the Bœotians
 generally and to show how little real help Athens was able
 to give to a dependency beyond Mount Kithairôn.¹ But
 towards the end of the war, we hear in general terms of B.C. 407.
 strong disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the
 smaller cities,² and in one case, even before the Peace of B.C. 423.
 Nikias, in the very year after the common Bœotian victory
 at Délion, the Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespia, Thespia.
 on the ground of the "Atticism" of the inhabitants.³
 The language of Thucydides would almost imply that this
 was a mere act of high-handed Theban violence, without
 even the form of legitimate Federal action. He adds that
 the Thebans had long wished to destroy Thespia, and now
 found their opportunity. The city could not resist, be-
 cause the flower of its warriors had fallen in the war with
 Athens. Such examples as this and that of Plataia might
 well cause a sullen acquiescence in Theban domination.
 Against Thebes backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless.
 It was not till long after, when Thebes and Sparta were Orcho-
menos, B.C. 395.
 enemies, that, at last, on a favourable opportunity during
 the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded.⁴ The
 event is recorded by Xenophôn in the form commonly used
 to express the revolt of a subject or dependent state. But,
 long before this, in the famous pleadings as to the fate of Plataia, B.C. 427.
 Plataia, though the Thebans put prominently forward the
 general principles of Bœotian Federalism, still the whole

¹ See Grote, iv. 222.

² Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 2. Βοιωτῶν μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπὸ
 Θηβαίων, δυσμενῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν· Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ οὐδὲν ὀρώ τοιοῦτον. The
 date of this dialogue, which I have already had occasion to quote (see
 above, p. 28), between Sôkratês and the younger Periklês, is fixed to the
 year 407 by Periklês being spoken of as a newly elected General. He was
 one of the unfortunate commanders at Arginousai.

³ Thuc. iv. 133. Θηβαῖοι Θεσπιέων τεῖχος περιεῖλον, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 6. Λύσανδρος Ὀρχομενίους ἀπέστησε Θηβαίων.

CHAP. IV. is practically treated as a dispute between Plataia and Thebes. The Plataians ask that they may not be given up to the vengeance of the Thebans; they pray that Plataia may not be destroyed, and its territory not be annexed to that of Thebes.¹ They prayed in vain; the captives were massacred, their city was destroyed, and their territory was confiscated, not to the profit of the Boeotian Union, but to that of the Theban State.²

Theban
claims at
the Peace
of Antalkidas,
B.C. 387.

Thus the power of Thebes went on increasing,³ and no doubt the discontent of the smaller cities went on increasing also, down to the time of the Peace of Antalkidas. Then we first find the Theban claims formally put forth in all their fulness, but only, as it proved, to bring utter dissolution upon the whole Confederacy. In the Plataian conference all that the Thebans had ventured formally to claim was a primacy, expressed by a word⁴ familiar to Greek diplomatic language, and not formally inconsistent with the independence of the smaller towns. Afterwards we have seen the Boeotarchs, themselves Federal magistrates, going through at least the form of consulting the Federal Councils. But now the Thebans openly put themselves forward as the representatives, or rather as the sovereigns, of all Boeotia. Antalkidas comes down with his rescript from the Great King, ordering that all Greek cities should be independent.⁵ It suited the policy of Sparta⁶ to con-

¹ Thuc. iii. 58. *ῥμεις δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιίδα Θεβαῖδα ποιήσετε.*

² Thuc. iii. 68 (the whole chapter).

³ Manso, Sparta, iii. 150. Theben begnügte sich nicht die erste, es verlangte die Hauptstadt im böotischen Lande und es in der Art zu seyn, wie in Lakonien Sparta.

⁴ Thuc. iii. 61. *Ὅκ ῥξίζουσι οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν.*

⁵ Xen. Hell. v. 1. 31. *Τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφείναι.*

⁶ Ib. v. 2. 16. *Εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς [Λακεδαιμονίους] τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἐν εἴῃ.*

strue this independence in the strictest sense everywhere CHAP. IV.
except in Lakonia. When the Peace was to be sworn to, according to the usual Greek custom, by the representatives of every power concerned, Ambassadors from Thebes, not Bœotarchs or Ambassadors from the Four Councils, demanded to take the oaths on behalf of all Bœotia.¹ The Spartan King Agêsilaos refused to receive their oaths, or to admit them to the benefits of the Peace, unless they formally recognized the independence of every Greek city, great and small. The Ambassadors had no such instructions from their Government,² and it required a Lacedæmonian declaration of war to bring Thebes to consent to such terms. They were evidently understood as a formal renunciation of all Theban superiority in Bœotia, and apparently as a formal dissolution of the Bœotian League in any shape. As the Thebans consented to the required recognition of independence,³ we may conclude that every Bœotian city entered into the terms of the treaty as a sovereign commonwealth, and we may thus look upon the old Bœotian Federation as formally dissolved.

Dissolu-
tion of the
Bœotian
League,
B.C. 387.

The second portion of Bœotian history includes the splendid day of Theban greatness under Pelopidas and Epameinôndas. As I am not writing a History of Greece, but a History of Federal Government, all that I have to do is to pick out from the general narrative such points as bear directly upon the Federal relations between Thebes and the other Bœotian towns. By the Peace of Antalkidas all Greek cities, great and small, became independent under the guaranty of Sparta. But Sparta seems, through-

Second
Period,
B.C. 387-
334.

¹ Xen. Hell. v. 1. 32. Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι ἤξiouν ὑπὲρ πάντων Βοιωτῶν δμῦναι.

² Ibid. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεσταλμένα σφίσι ταῦτα εἶη.

³ Ib. v. 1. 33. Θηβαῖοι ἐς τὰς σπονδὰς εἰσελθεῖν ἠναγκάσθησαν, ἀδιονόμους ἀφέντες τὰς Βοιωτίας πόλεις.

- CHAP. IV. out Greece, to have interpreted independence after the same strange fashion as she had interpreted it after the end of the Peloponnesian War. Either at once or, as is more likely, gradually after some interval,¹ the several cities were occupied, like Athens under the Thirty, by narrow local oligarchies, supported by a Spartan harmost and garrison.² In the case of Thebes we know how this state of things was brought about, namely through the treacherous seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas.³ Plataia was restored,⁴ restored as an equal and independent city; its restoration implied not only a loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that portion of the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed the Plataian district. But the independence of Plataia, like that of the other towns, was not thought inconsistent with the presence of a Lacedæmonian harmost. Several entirely new elements were thus introduced into the world of Bœotian politics. Hitherto Bœotia had been less affected than most parts of Greece by the struggles of oligarchic and democratic parties. The Bœotian cities had been, from time immemorial, oligarchically governed. Oligarchic government was doubtless, in Theban eyes, one of the ancestral principles of the Bœotian constitution,⁵ hardly less important than the other great principle of Theban supremacy. Not that a democratic party was altogether wanting in Bœotia, but it was weak, and could do nothing without foreign help. Democracy was introduced by the Athenian victory at Oinophyta, but democracy did not flourish on the uncongenial Bœotian soil,⁶ and oligarchy reappeared when Bœotia was
- The Peace carried out in the interest of Sparta, B.C. 387-2.
- Spartan garrisons in the cities, B.C. 382.
- Restoration of Plataia, B.C. c. 386.
- Oligarchic and Democratic Parties.
- Weakness of the Democratic element in Bœotia.
- B.C. 457.
- B.C. 449.

¹ On this point see Mr. Grote's note, x. 46.

² See Isok. Plat. 20, 21. Cf. Pol. iv. 27.

³ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 25 et seqq.

⁴ On this restoration see Grote, x. 43.

⁵ Τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια. See above, p. 166.

⁶ Arist. Pol. v. 3. 5. Ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

again detached from the Athenian alliance by the first battle of Korôneia. The invasion which led to the battle of Délion was planned by Athens in concert with a democratic party in Bœotia,¹ but the utter failure of the scheme doubtless gave a deep and lasting blow to the democratic interest. The histories of Plataia and Thespia, as already recorded, leave hardly any doubt that this democratic or Athenian party was the party of the independence of the smaller cities against Thebes. But the dissolution of the League, and the Spartan occupation, for such it was, which followed, must have put matters on quite another footing. Oligarchy no longer meant, either in Thebes or elsewhere, the ascendancy of the ancient nobles of the land, whose rule, in a country where it had been so little interrupted, may well have involved no practical oppression.² Oligarchy now meant the domination³ of a small number of citizens, whose power rested entirely on the presence of a foreign force. A powerful democratic spirit was naturally called forth, and, above all, at Thebes, hitherto the centre of oligarchy. A democratic revolution delivered Thebes at once from her traitorous citizens and from her foreign garrison, and the new Theban Democracy entered, under Pelopidas and Epameinôndas, upon its short and glorious career. There is no portion of Grecian history which more thoroughly awakens our sympathies than all that personally concerns those two most illustrious citizens. We hardly know which more to admire, Pelopidas the slayer of the

CHAP. IV.
B.C. 424.
Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy,
becomes, by her Revolution, [B.C. 379,] the centre of Democracy.
Career of Pelopidas [B.C. 379-364] and

¹ Thuc. iv. 76.

² The Platonic Sókrates (Kritôn, c. 15) calls (B.C. 399) Thebes and Megara well governed cities—*εὐνομούμενας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτέτους—εὐνομοῦνται γάρ, κ.τ.λ.* He does not call them *εὐνομοίμενας* simply as being oligarchic, as he goes on to blame the ill government of oligarchic Thessaly—*ἐκεῖ γάρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία.*

³ Xenophôn himself uses the strong word *δυναστεία*, only less strong than *τυραννίς*, meaning in fact a Tyranny in the hands of several persons instead of one only. *ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστείαὶ καθιστήκεισαν ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις.* Hell. v. 4. 46.

CHAP. IV. Tyrants, or Epameinôndas who refuses to stain his hands even with Tyrants' blood. The fight of Leuktra, the invasion of Lakonia, the restoration of Messênê, the foundation of Megalopolis, the deaths of Pelopidas in Thessaly and of Epameinôndas at Mantinea, are all among the most spirit-stirring scenes even in the eventful history of Greece. But it is easy to see that Pelopidas and Epameinôndas were the chiefs of a people utterly unworthy of them; that the momentary greatness of Thebes did but leave Greece yet more disunited,¹ more ready to become the prey of the Macedonian aggressor; and that, looking at the matter with the eyes of a historian of Federalism, this second period of Bœotian history is yet more disastrous than the first period before the Peace of Antalkidas. The League was nominally revived; constitutional Federal language was employed in formal documents,² and Bœotarchs, and not mere local Polemarchs, again appear as the commanders of the Bœotian armies.³ It is also clear that, immediately after the Theban Revolution, the Theban cause was popular in the Bœotian cities.⁴ No doubt the Theban Democracy, like the Athenian Democracy, put itself forward, and that for a while sincerely, as the champion of independence and democratic government everywhere, in opposition alike to native oligarchies and to Lacedæmonian garrisons. But the result soon showed how impossible it

Epamei-
nôndas
[B.C. 379-
362].

Bad re-
sults of
Theban su-
premacy.

Nominal
revival
of the
League.
New Bœo-
tarchs.

B.C. 378.

Liberal
profes-
sion of
Thebes.

¹ Xen. Hell. vii. 5, 27. Ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ παραχῇ ἐτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν [ἐν Μαντινείᾳ] μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Four years afterwards Philip took Amphipolis.

² The κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν Βοιωτῶν (Diod. xv. 80) received complaints from Thessaly against Alexander of Pherai (B.C. 364); and, just before Chairônêia (B.C. 338), Philip sent an embassy ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν (Diod. xvi. 85). Cf. above, p. 163, note 3.

³ The number now was seven (Paus. ix. 13. 6, 7). I do not know of any distinct evidence whether any of these Bœotarchs were really chosen by the smaller towns or not.

⁴ See Grote, x. 215, 263. Xenophon (Hell. v. 4. 46) seems to imply a sort of secession of the Dêmos from the smaller cities, ὁ μόντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν [τῶν πόλεων] εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει.

was that an overweening city like Thebes should ever enter into the true Federal relation with weaker states. Thebes showed more quickly than Athens, or even than Sparta, how easily Presidency may be developed into Empire. It does not indeed prove much that the recovery of the Bœotian cities is spoken of by Xenophôn in terms which are applicable only to a reconquest by force of arms.¹ To a Lakonian partisan like that renegade Athenian, the expulsion by Theban hands of a Spartan harmost and the oligarchy which he maintained, doubtless seemed to be the high-handed extinction of a legal government by the hands of a foreign invader. But though the Bœotian cities willingly entered into a revived Bœotian League, they soon found that a Bœotian League was now only another name for bondage to Thebes. A nominally democratic Bœotian Assembly, instead of four oligarchic Senates, might now sit to register Theban edicts in the name of the League, but the practical nature of the relation between Thebes and the other cities admits of no doubt. It is enough that the language of historians and orators always

CHAP. IV.

Real sub-
jection of
the lesser
cities to
Thebes.

¹ Xen. Hell. v. 4. 63. *Θρόσσεως δὲ ἑστρατεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἐπὶ τὰς περιουκίδας πόλεις* [mark the word *περιουκίδας*] *καὶ πάλιν αὐτὰς ἀνελάμβανον*. vi. 1. 1. *οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπεὶ κατεστρέψαντο τὰς ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις, ἑστράτευσαν καὶ εἰς τὴν Φωκίδα*. This clearly implies actual warfare, but what follows the first of the two passages as clearly implies that it was a warfare in which the *Dêmos* in the cities attacked took the Theban side. Still I cannot understand Mr. Grote's meaning when he says (x. 183, 4) "that the Thebans . . . revived the Bœotian confederacy, is clearly stated by Xenophôn"—in the two passages just quoted. It is clearly stated that "the Thebans again became presidents of all Bœotia" (p. 183), but surely not that they revived a confederacy. Xenophôn speaks not of reviving a confederacy, but of Thebes warring against and conquering certain cities. Considering Xenophôn's prejudices, his language is in no way inconsistent with the fact, otherwise sufficiently established, that the restoration of the Federal system was at least professed. But surely his words do not clearly state it. And considering what happened to Plataia and other cities so soon after, I certainly think that the practical aspect of the case is better set forth in the words "subjugation" and "submitted" used by Bishop Thirlwall (v. 71).

CHAP. IV. implies that Thebes had become practically sovereign. The smaller cities are spoken of in language which implies subjection ;¹ we hear now, not of a Bœotian Confederation, but of a Theban State, into which other cities are compelled to merge themselves against their will.² Finally we hear, during this period, of the utter destruction by Theban hands of no less than four Bœotian towns. Plataia now paid for the crime of having so long been, first an Athenian and then a Spartan outpost.³ Orchomenos, once rescued by the personal interference of Epameinôndas,⁴ at last, during that hero's absence, became the victim⁵ alike of its ancient mythical rivalry,⁶ and of its more recent political opposition. Thespia, disaffected even before the fight of Leuktra,⁷ was destroyed soon after, and Korôneia shared the fate of Orchomenos.⁸ These events, the destruction of so many Hellenic cities, above all of the ancient and renowned Orchomenos, to which Thebes her-

Destruction of Bœotian towns : of Plataia, B.C. 373 or 372 ; of Orchomenos, B.C. 368 or 363 ; of Thespia, B.C. 373 or 371 ; and of Korôneia. B.C. 363 ?

¹ *Περίοικοι, περισκίδεις πόλεις*. I have already mentioned this use of the word.

² See the expressions used in the Plataic Oration of Isokratês, 8, 11, *μη πεισθεΐσαν τὴν Πλαταιέων πόλιν ἀλλὰ βιασθεΐσαν Θηβαίοις* [not *Βοιωτοῖς*] *συντελεῖν—τῆς σφετέρας πολιτείας οὐδὲν δεομένους κοινωνεῖν ἀναγκάζουσι—συντελεῖν ἐς τὰς Θήβας—προσάττειν ἡμῖν—οὐ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρκτέον, κ.τ.λ.* Something is doubtless to be allowed for angry Plataian (or Isokratic) oratory, something doubtless to the old special hatred between Thebes and Plataia ; still the most vehement orator in South Carolina would not use such language with regard to any single Northern State, though he might apply it to the Northern Union in general.

³ The details of the destruction of Plataia are given by Pausanias, ix. 1. 4. et seqq.

⁴ Diod. xv. 57. Paus. ix. 15. 3. Thirlwall, v. 158, 9. Grote, x. 264.

⁵ Diod. xv. 69. The Plataians were only expelled ; the men of Orchomenos were killed and the women and children sold, like the Mélians and Skiónaians by Athens. According to Pausanias (ix. 15, 14) the Thebans slew or branded such Bœotian exiles as they met with in their Peloponnesian campaigns.

⁶ Isok. Plat. 11. *Οὐ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς [Θηβαίοις] ἀρκτέον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μᾶλλον Ὀρχομενίους φόρον ἰστέον* οὕτως γὰρ εἶχε τὸ παλαιόν.

⁷ Paus. ix. 13. 8, 14. 1—4. The date of the destruction of Thespia is doubtful, see Thirlwall, v. 85. Grote, x. 219.

⁸ On the date of the destruction of Korôneia, see Grote, x. 427.

self had once been tributary, raised a feeling of profound indignation throughout Greece.¹ When the genius of Epameinondas no longer guided her counsels, and even during his lifetime whenever he was not at hand to restrain her passions, Thebes stood forth as a city of coarse and brutal upstarts, who had suddenly risen to a place in the Hellenic world for which they were utterly unfit.* No Grecian city seems ever to have been more thoroughly hated than Thebes was between the battle of Mantinea and the battle of Chaironeia. Athens felt for her a repugnance which she never showed towards either her Spartan rival or her Macedonian conqueror. To overcome this loathing, and to range the warriors of Thebes and Athens side by side against Philip, was the most glorious exploit of the glorious life of Dêmosthenês.³

General
dislike of
Thebes
through-
out
Greece,
B. C. 362-
338.

The dates of these acts of Theban violence towards the smaller Boeotian cities are in some cases matters of dispute. Most of them occurred after the battle of Leuktra, but that of Plataia took place before. Certain it is that, just before that battle, the Theban claims had risen to their full height. In the negotiations which preceded it we seem to read over again the negotiations which preceded the peace of Antalkidas.⁴ The Thebans swore to the Peace, or were willing to swear to it, in the name of all Boeotia.⁵ Agêsilaos, as before, demands a

Theban
Claims
before the
battle of
Leuktra,
B. C. 371.

¹ See Grote, x. 427, xi. 285.

² Ephoros, quoted by Strabo, ix. 2. (ii. 248, Tauch.) *Τελευτήσαντος γὰρ ἔκεινον [Ἐπαμεινώνδου] τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους συνέβη, γενομένων αὐτῆς μόνον· αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι, τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγοῦσθαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πολέμον ἀρετῆς.*

³ See a noble passage in Arnold's Rome, ii. 331.

⁴ Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) evidently confounded the two occasions, as he introduces Epameinondas as the Theban orator before the Peace of Antalkidas.

⁵ It is certainly hard at first sight to reconcile the accounts of this event given by Xenophôn (Hell. vi. 3. 19) and by Plutarch (Ages. 28) and Pausanias (see last note). But they do not seem to me quite so contradictory as Mr. Grote thinks them (x. 231, note). In Xenophôn's story, the Theban

CHAP. IV. recognition of the independence of the other Bœotian cities, and the admission of each to swear in its own name¹ as a sovereign commonwealth. The Thebans again refuse; they are again excluded from the treaty, but this time with very different results. Their former refusal and exclusion had been followed by their submission, by the dissolution of the Bœotian League, at last by the occupation of the Theban Kadmeia by a Lacedæmonian garrison. The present refusal and exclusion was indeed followed by

B.C. 371. a Lacedæmonian invasion of Bœotia, but that invasion was crushed at the fight of Leuktra, and soon after repaid by

B.C. 369. the presence of Theban invaders in Sparta itself.

In this negociation, as in the former one, Thebes formally claims to be regarded as the head of Bœotia, the representative of the whole Bœotian body towards other powers. She demands to be looked upon as capable of

Ambassadors first allow Thebes to be set down as having sworn, and on the next day demand (*ἐκέλευον*) to have the name "Thebans" struck out, and "Bœotians" substituted. Mr. Grote asks "why should such a man as Epameinondas (who doubtless was the envoy), consent at first to waive the presidential claims of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day?" Now it strikes me that the proceeding is capable of another explanation, and that there is no "waiving of presidential claims," and no "retracting the next day." It is evident from the language of all the historians and orators, that the supremacy of Thebes was now far more openly avowed than it had been under the old League, and that the word "Theban" was now constantly used where "Bœotian" would have been used in the preceding century. The Thebans might well swear as "Thebans," meaning to carry with them the whole of their confederates; to say "Theban" rather than "Bœotian" might be meant not as any "waiving of presidential claims," but rather as the strongest way of asserting them. But Agésilaios might very well choose to take it in a contrary sense; he would call on the other Bœotian cities to swear separately; the Thebans would then demand to have the doubtful word "Thebans" changed into "Bœotians;" that is, to have their oath taken as the oath of all Bœotia. Then would follow the lively dialogue between Epameinondas and Agésilaios recorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, preceded probably by some such reasoning on the Theban side as Mr. Grote supposes.

¹ This is more clearly brought out by Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) than by any one else.

contracting, by her single act, international obligations binding on all the Bœotian cities. In this negotiation, as in the former one, the Spartan King refuses to recognize Thebes in any such character. He knows Thebes, only as he knows Orchomenos, as one Bœotian city out of several, capable of contracting for herself alone, and whose obligations are binding on no other Bœotian commonwealth. Here is indeed a change on both sides since the Lacedæmonian judges sat to decide between the conflicting arguments of Theban and Plataian orators. Then all that Thebes formally claimed, whatever she practically exercised, was a mere supremacy implying no absolute subjection, and even that she grounded on old Bœotian custom, and on her own rights as the supposed metropolis¹ of the other Bœotian towns. Then, whatever Thebes claimed, Sparta, as her interest then dictated, was ready to allow. Now Thebes employs, even in her formal claims, the language, no longer of a metropolis or of a Federal president, but of a sovereign, or rather of a tyrant, city. Now Sparta, in pursuance of what has now become her interest, denies not only the claims lately advanced by Thebes, but the general principle of any kind of Bœotian unity, a principle certainly as old as any other immemorial fact of Grecian politics. But if the claims of Thebes had grown between the siege of Plataia and the Peace of Antalkidas, they had again grown between the Peace of Antalkidas and the negotiations at Sparta.² Here, on her own ground, Spartan pride received such a home-thrust from the audacious Theban as Spartan pride had never before dreamed of. Epameinôndas ventured on a parallel such as assuredly the most daring imagination had never ventured on before.

CHAP. IV.
Gradual
growth
of the
Theban
claims.

Parallel
between
Thebes in
Bœotia
and Sparta
in Lakonia.

¹ Thuc. iii. 61. 'Ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὑπετερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας, κ.τ.λ.

² See Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 2.

CHAP. IV. Thebes will recognize the independence of the Bœotian towns when Sparta recognizes the independence of the Lakonian towns. Thebes will allow Orchomenos to swear as a separate commonwealth, when Sparta allows Amyklai to swear as a separate commonwealth. Here the claims of Thebes stand plainly before us in the naked form of unalloyed tyranny. We have already more than once seen the Bœotian cities described, in relation to Thebes, by the same name of subjection by which the Lakonian cities¹ are described in relation to Sparta. We now see this parallel in all its fulness formally avowed as a principle of Theban politics. The Bœotian towns are to be mere *Perioikoi* of Thebes, no longer sovereign members of a Bœotian League, of which Thebes was at most a constitutional President. The comparison was equally daring in the claims which it made on behalf of Thebes and in the threat which it implied against Sparta. No such revolutionary words had ever before been heard in any Grecian congress. No

¹ Isok. Panath. 195. *Ὀνόμασι μὲν προσαγορευομένων ὡς πόλεις οἰκούντας, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντας ἐλάττω τῶν δῆμων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν.* The whole passage is a curious picture of the position of the *perioikoi*. Of course an Attic *δῆμος*, as such, was politically nothing, but its inhabitants severally were Athenian citizens; a Lakonian *πόλις* was also politically nothing, while its inhabitants severally were mere helpless subjects of Sparta.

The Lakonian *πόλεις* are mentioned in rather a different way in a curious passage of Herodotus (vii. 234) where Dêmaratos tells Xerxes of the many Lacedæmonian cities, among which he merely speaks of Sparta as the greatest, and inhabited by the bravest among the brave Lacedæmonians. Herodotus was not a politician like Thucydides or Polybios, still less was he a pamphleteer like Isokratês; such a description was quite enough for his conception of a picturesque dialogue between Xerxes and Dêmaratos, without bringing in political distinctions which Xerxes would not have understood. But a mere "English reader" might be led seriously astray as to the political condition of Lakonia by reading this single passage of Herodotus by itself. Yet strange to say, Professor Rawlinson, who discusses at large the population of the city of Sparta, and who adds to the Book a learned dissertation about Alarodians and Orthocorybantes, does not vouchsafe the "English reader" the least information as to the real political condition of Amyklai and Epidauros Limæra.

On these *Perioikic πόλεις* see Grote, ii. 484 et seqq.

Greek had ever yet questioned the absolute rights of Sparta over the Lakonian towns. No Spartan, probably no Greek, had ever before imagined that treaties requiring that every Greek city should be independent might be so construed as to make Amyklai independent of Sparta as well as to make Orchomenos independent of Thebes. Epameinondas now put forth a principle which at once loosened the very foundations of Spartan dominion, and he lived to carry out his principle in the most practical shape. Before his work was over, he had rent away from Sparta half her territory, and had set up an independent Messênê in opposition to Sparta, as Sparta had set up an independent Plataia in opposition to Thebes. It is impossible not to rejoice even at the mere humiliation of Sparta, and still more so at the restoration of the heroic commonwealth of Messênê.¹ But it is clear that the words of Epameinondas contained a sentence of death against Bœotian Federalism or Bœotian freedom in any shape;² it is clear that, though he held back his unworthy countrymen from the grosser acts of oppression, yet his life was devoted to the mere aggrandizement of

CHAP. IV.

B.C. 369.

The claims of Thebes exclude all true Federalism in Bœotia.

¹ The restoration of Messênê however, except as a mere blow to Sparta, proved a failure. The career of the restored Messênians is inglorious, quite unworthy of the countrymen of the half-mythic Aristomenês, or of the gallant exiles of Naupaktos. The glory of Epameinondas as a founder is to have been the creator of Megalopolis.

² Mr. Grote thinks that the words of Epameinondas do not imply that he claimed that "Thebes was entitled to *as much power* in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia," (x. 231. 234) but only that the Federal union of Bœotia under the presidency of Thebes should be looked on as being "an integral political aggregate" as much as Lakonia "under Sparta," or as Attica—he does not venture to say "under Athens." Surely there is no analogy between a Federal head of several independent cities, a despot city ruling over several subject cities, and a country where the whole is, so to speak, one city, while the smaller towns are mere parishes. Unless Epameinondas meant his parallel between Thebes in Bœotia and Sparta in Lakonia to be exact in all points, it has no force at all, and it is open to an obvious retort. And certainly the position of Sparta in Lakonia was utterly inconsistent with Federalism or with freedom of any kind.

CHAP. IV. the one city of Thebes, and not to the general good of Bœotia or of Hellas.

Different as was the general character of our first and our second period of Bœotian history, the terminations of the two were strikingly alike. After the defeat of Chairōneia, Thebes had to receive a Macedonian garrison into the Kadmeia, as she had before had to receive a Spartan garrison. Plataia, Thespia, Orchomenos, and Korōneia now arose again,¹ surrounding Thebes with allies of Macedonia even more zealous and hostile than they had been in their former character as allies of Sparta. The troops of these cities served heartily with Alexander in his campaign against Thebes,² and it was by their voices³ that the tyrant city was devoted to the destruction which she had so often inflicted upon others. As Thebes had enriched herself with the territory of four of her Bœotian sisters, so, now that her own day was come, the Macedonian conqueror divided the whole Theban territory among his Bœotian allies. Thebes now vanishes for a while from among the cities of the earth. As one of the bulwarks of independent Greece against Macedonia we may lament her fate; but the special historian of Bœotian Federalism cannot weep for her.

B.C. 338.
Restoration of the destroyed Towns.

Destruction of Thebes by Alexander, B.C. 335.
Zealous co-operation of the Bœotian Towns.

The third period of Bœotian history may be more briefly gone through. The part played by Bœotia in the later history of Greece is almost always contemptible; and

Third Period, B.C. 335—172.

¹ Paus. iv. 27. 10. ix. 37. 8. He assigns the restoration to Philip, Arrian (i. 9. 19) to Alexander.

² Arrian, i. 8. 14. Diod. xvii. 13. Arrian mentions also the Phōkiāns.

³ ΑΙΓ. i. 9. 16. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις (οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι) τὴν μὲν Καδμείαν φρουρὰν κατέχειν ἔδοξε τὴν πόλιν δὲ κατασκάψαι εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ τὴν χώραν διανεῖμαι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. Cf. Diod. xviii. 11. Diodōros (xvii. 14), with much less probability, makes Alexander assemble and consult τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον; that is, probably, the Corinthian Synod, or possibly, in so blundering a writer, the Delphic Amphiktyons.

of the few important events in which she was concerned CHAP. IV.
 I shall speak elsewhere. Thebes did not long remain a
 ruin or a sheep-walk, an example of the fate to which she
 had herself once wished to reduce Athens.¹ As she had B.C. 405.
 found a Macedonian destroyer, she now found a Macedo-
 nian restorer. Thebes was restored by Kassander;² it Restora-
tion of
Thebes by
Kassander
B.C. 316.
 would seem with some sort of formal consent³ on the part
 of the other Bœotian towns. They of course were deeply
 interested in a proceeding which might possibly threaten
 them with a mistress, and which, in any case, involved an
 immediate surrender of territory. On the other hand, to
 say nothing of the power of Kassander and of the general
 feeling of Greece in favour of Theban restoration, it is
 quite possible that the Bœotian cities found that they had
 really not gained by the destruction of the greatest of their
 number. Elsewhere the step was highly popular; Athens,
 the partaker in the later struggles of Thebes, gave zealous
 help towards her restoration; gratitude towards the city of
 Epameinôndas prompted help no less zealous on the part
 of Messênê and Megalopolis; contributions came in from
 various parts of Greece, and even from the Greek colonies
 in Italy and Sicily.⁴ Thebes thus rose again, and before
 long she again became the head of a Bœotian League,⁵ but Restora-
tion of the
League
with a
modified
Headship
in Thebes.
 with powers very inferior to what she had possessed in the
 days of her might. The date of the reconstitution of the
 League does not seem certain, but, through the whole
 range of the history of Polybios, Bœotia is always spoken
 of as a political whole, just like Phôkis or Akarnania. But

¹ Isok. Plat. 34. *Ἔθεοντο οἱ [Θηβαῖοι] τὴν ψῆφον ὡς χρὴ τὴν τε πόλιν
 ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνεῖναι μηλοβότον ὥσπερ τὸ Κρισαῖον πεδῖον.*
 Cf. Suidas in *μηλοβότος*. See above, p. 161.

² Paus. iv. 27. 10. Bœot. vi. 7.

³ Diod. xix. 54. *Κάσσανδρος . . . πείσας τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς, ἀνέστησε τὴν
 πόλιν.*

⁴ Paus. ix. 6. 7. Diod. xix. 54.

⁵ Bœotiae caput, Liv. xxxi. 1. xlii. 44.

CHAP. IV. the revived Bœotian League cuts a very poor figure beside the Achaia of Aratos or the Sparta of Kleomenês. The Bœotians once ventured to join with the Achaians against the Ætolian brigands, but after a single defeat, they gave up all share in general Grecian politics.¹ They seem even to have entered into some relation to the aggressors, inconsistent with perfect independence,² a relation presently to be exchanged for a yet more servile submission to Macedonia.³ Nor did they atone for external insignificance by a vigorous and orderly government at home. The account of the internal state of the country given by Polybios is ridiculous beyond conception. The Bœotians did nothing but eat and drink; they ate more dinners in a month than there were days in it;⁴ they let the administration of justice sleep throughout the land for twenty-five years.⁵ Yet these Bœotian swine⁶ seem to have possessed a Federal constitution to which the models afforded by neighbouring states had given a better form than it had possessed in the days of Ismênias or of Epameinôndas. Thebes was the head of the League, the place of meeting for the Federal Assembly,⁷ but she no longer enjoyed the same tyrannical power as of old. At

Insignifi-
cance of
Bœotia in
later
Greece.

B.C. 201—
186 or
222—197.

Constitu-
tion of the
League.

¹ Pol. xx. 4. Plut. Ar. 16.

² Pol. xx. 5. 'Εγκαταλίποντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσέειμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος. Droysen (ii. 370) takes this to imply actual *συμπολιτεία* with the Ætolians, and undoubtedly the same word, in a slightly different construction, is used to express the annexation of Sikyôn to the Achaian League. ii. 43. 'Αρατος . . . τὴν πατρίδα . . . προσέειμε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν. But this would seem to prove too much, and the words need not imply more than close alliance and slavish subserviency to Ætolia.

³ Pol. xx. 5. Ἐπέταξαν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁλοσχερῶς Μακεδόσιν.

⁴ Pol. xx. 6. Ὡστε πολλοὺς εἶναι Βοιωτῶν οἷς ὑπῆρχε δεῖπνα τοῦ μηνὸς πλεῖω τῶν εἰς τὸν μῆνα διατεταγμένων ἡμερῶν.

⁵ Ibid. Also xxiii. 2. Drumann (439) seems rather to misconceive this period. Surely Polybios describes a time of carelessness and corruption, rather than one of violence (Faustrecht).

⁶ Pind. Ol. vi. 153. Ἀρχαίων ἐνείδος . . . Βοιωτίαν ὄν.

⁷ Liv. xxxiii. 1.

the head of the League, as at the head of other Leagues, there was a single General,¹ who probably stepped into the position originally held by the ancient Federal Archon. There were also Bœotarchs,² whose office now would answer pretty well to that of the Achaian Dêmiourgoi or Ministers; and, as in Achaia, there was a Commander of Cavalry.³ There was a Federal Assembly in which we may gather from an expression of Livy,⁴ that each of the confederate cities had a distinct vote. We hear nothing of any oppression on the part of Thebes,⁵ nor very much of dissensions between the several cities. Not that Bœotia, any more than other Greek states, was free from party disputes, but they seem to have arisen almost wholly from questions of foreign policy. There was, in the war of Philip and Flamininus, a Roman and a Macedonian party, and Thebes was the stronghold of the Macedonian interest.⁶ A stratagem of Flamininus' compelled the Bœotian League to embrace the Roman side. The factions and crimes by which this change of policy was followed are hardly worth recording. But at least the dissolution of the League was not the work of internal dissensions, but wholly of the insidious policy of Rome. To break up Federations and alliances among Grecian cities was always one of the main objects of any power, native or foreign, which aspired to supremacy or illegitimate influence in Greece. Thebes indeed for a moment, while Epameinôndas

B.C. 198-7.

¹ Pol. xx. 6. *ἕνιοι τῶν στρατηγῶν*. xxiii. 2. *στρατηγοῦντος ἱππέου*. So Livy xlii. 43 talks of the Bœotian "Prætor," his regular translation of *στρατηγός*.

² Pol. xviii. 26. Liv. xxxiii. 27. Plut. Arat. 16.

³ Pol. xx. 5.

⁴ Liv. xxxiii. 2. *Omnium Bœotiæ civitatum suffragiis accipitur*.

⁵ The only expression which looks like it, (Pol. xxvii. 5) *Θηβαίους βαρεῖς ὄντας ἐπικεῖσθαι*, refers to the dissensions between the Roman and Macedonian parties just before the dissolution of the League.

⁶ See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 335 et seqq.

⁷ Liv. xxxiii. 1. Thirlwall, viii. 336.

CHAP. IV. directed her counsels, pursued a nobler policy in Arkadia, but the isolation of the separate cities was an end usually aimed at by all who sought to bring Greece under the yoke. We have seen how successfully this policy was carried on by Sparta; it was continued by the Macedonian Kings; it was finally carried out in its fullest extent by the subtle machinations of Roman diplomacy. The course of the war with Perseus gave the Roman Ambassador Quintus Marcius an opportunity of bringing about the dissolution of the League of Bœotia, which I shall describe more at large in a future chapter. His combined intrigues and violence gradually induced the several cities to desert their Federal Union, and to place themselves, one by one, under Roman protection.¹ Thus did the Bœotian League fall asunder,² and I see no reason to infer from a casual expression of a single writer, that the political union between the Bœotian towns was restored at any later time.³

Dissolu-
tion of the
League by
Quintus
Marcius,
B.C. 171.

¹ Pol. xxvii. 1. 2. Liv. xlii. 43. 4. Thirlwall, viii. 437.

² Pol. xxvii. 2. Τὸ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἔθνος ἐπὶ πολλὸν χρόνον συνετηρηκὸς τὴν κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν, καὶ πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους καιροὺς διαφευγὼς παραδόξως, τότε προπετῶς καὶ ἀλογίστως ἐλόμενον τὰ παρὰ Περσέως, εἰκῇ καὶ παιδαριωδῶς πτοηθὲν κατελύθη καὶ διεσκορπίσθη κατὰ πόλεις. The difference between ἔθνος and πόλις, in the political language of Polybios, is that between a Federal State and a single city. See xx. 3, and many other passages. Livy habitually represents the words by "gens" and "civitas." He also often uses "populus" in the sense of *State* or *Canton* as a member of a League.

Mommsen (i. 582) holds that the formal dissolution of the League did not take place till B.C. 146. I do not see how this can be reconciled with the words of Polybios and Livy. A Bœotarch is spoken of in the interval, but he is apparently a purely Theban magistrate—*βουλευταρχῶν τῆν καὶ αὐτὰ ἐν Θήβαις*. Paus. vii. 14. 6.

³ Pausanias (vii. 16. 9—10), describing the results of the victory of Mummius (B.C. 146.) adds, *συνέδριά τε κατὰ ἔθνος τὰ ἐκάστων, Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὸ ἐν Φωκεύσιν ἢ Βοιωτοῖς ἢ ἐτέρωθί που τῆς Ἑλλάδος, κατελέλυτο ὁμοίως πάντα. ἔτεσι δὲ οὐ πολλοῖς ὕστερον ἐτρέποντο ἐς ἑλεον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ συνέδρια κατὰ ἔθνος ἀποδίδασιν ἐκάστοις τὰ ἀρχαῖα.*

From the former part of this passage Mr. Whiston (Dict. of Ant. art. Bœotarches), following Boeckh (i. 727), infers that Mummius found a

§ 3. *Of various attempts at Federal Systems—Ionia, Olynthos, Arkadia, &c.*

Besides these Federations of Phôkis, Akarnania, Epeiros, and Bœotia, all of which actually existed and flourished, we must not pass by some less successful attempts at the establishment of Federal Governments in ancient Greece. Several such efforts were made at various times, which bore no permanent fruit. Still they are important facts in Grecian history, and, as they serve to illustrate the history and the growth of the Federal idea, they form a natural portion of our subject.

Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Governments.

It may be doubtful how far we are entitled to reckon among such attempts the advice which, according to Herodotus,¹ was given to the Ionian Greeks by the philosopher Thalês when they were first threatened with Persian invasion. Some degree of union had always existed among the

Advice of Thalês to the Ionians.
B.C. 545.

Bœotian League to dissolve in B.C. 146, and therefore that the League must have been "partially revived" after its dissolution by Marcius in B.C. 171. But surely Pausanias, especially when using the pluperfect tense, may just as well refer to the dissolution under Marcius, or, as the pious antiquary is not the most infallible authority in strictly historical matters, Pausanias may even have forgotten that the dissolution of the Bœotian League was the work of Marcius and not of Mummius. It seems hardly worth while to extemporize a revival and a second dissolution without better authority. The latter portion of the passage, as referring to a nominal restoration later than B.C. 146, does not bear on the point. On the restoration there spoken of, see Thirlwall, viii. 502; Finlay, Greece under the Romans, 25. All these imaginary Confederations continued to exist, with their whole staff of Generals, Archons, Bœotarchs, Senates, &c. down to a surprisingly late period of the Roman Empire. This is abundantly shown by the inscriptions in Boeckh. But it is hardly worth enlarging on such mock constitutions in a History of Federalism, except when they either illustrate the institutions of earlier times, or when one gets such curious details as Pausanias gives (see above p. 136) of the Amphiktyonic Council after the Augustan Reform Bill.

¹ Herod. i. 170. 'Ἐκέλευε ἐν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν τέλει· Τέων γὰρ εἶναι μίσην τῆς Ἰωνίης· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλεις οἰκισμένους μὴδὲν ἥσσαν νομίζεσθαι, κατὰ περ εἰ δὲ μοι εἰεν.

CHAP. IV. Ionian colonies in Asia, but there is no ground for believing that their union was of a kind which at all amounted to a real Federal Government.¹ They had indeed general meetings at the Panionion,² but those meetings were primarily of a religious kind, though undoubtedly they were often taken advantage of for political deliberations among the several cities. Their connexion in short seems to have been rather closer than that of a mere Amphiktyony, but it is clear that it came nearer to an Amphiktyony than to a true Federal union. It is a relation of a peculiar kind, a sort of developement of the old Amphiktyonic relation, of which we find some other instances, especially among the Greeks of the Asiatic colonies. It is a species of union which might naturally arise among settlers in a foreign land, mindful of their old home and of their common origin, but still in no way disposed to sacrifice any portion of their separate political being. Unions like those of the Asiatic Ionians and Æolians³ were in fact Amphiktyonies instituted for a special, and that partly a political, end. They differed from the Amphiktyonies of Old Greece in this. In an Amphiktyony of the elder kind, the union between the members simply exists for the sake of the temple. The common temple gives its name to a body which, except in reference to that temple, has no common being at all. In these unions among the Asiatic Greeks, this relation is reversed. The union is much more religious than political, still it is something more than the mere

Former
Connexion
between
the
Ionian
Cities.

Their
relation
essentially
Amphi-
ktyonic.

Its differ-
ence from
the elder
Amphi-
ktyonies.

¹ Mr. Blakesley, in his edition of Herodotus, (vi. 7 et al.) seems to me greatly to exaggerate the amount of true Federal ideas in Ionia. A much truer picture is given by Bishop Thirlwall, (ii. 115. 191) and still more clearly by Mr. Grote, (iii. 345).

² See Herod. i. 142. 8.

³ The Bœotian Amphiktyony of Korôneia would be a union of very much the same kind as these unions among the Asiatic Greeks, if we could conceive it existing independently of the political Bœotian union which had its centre at Thebes.

spiritual brotherhood of fellow-worshippers in a common temple. The union does not exist merely to protect the temple, but the temple, the Panionion or the like, is itself built as the binding and consecrating symbol of an union already recognized as existing. Greeks of the same tribe, settled among barbarian neighbours or subjects, wished to recognize one another as kinsmen, and often stood in need of one another's help as allies. They founded a religious union as the badge of their mutual recognition, and as a means of promoting general harmony and good feeling among them. But they had no idea of carrying either national or religious brotherhood so far as to infringe on the inherent separate sovereignty of every Hellenic city. Indeed, the very isolation of the Ionian cities, and the greatness to which they speedily rose, would tend to make the feeling of town-autonomy, if possible, stronger than it was among the cities of Old Greece. Certain it is, if only from this very advice of Thalês, that the Ionian Greeks had no permanent union, cemented, as in the real Leagues, by a common Senate and Assembly. Thalês proposed to establish a closer union than already existed, but it may be doubted exactly how close he meant that union to be. The words of Herodotus may be construed in two ways,¹ and in any case his political language is not to be so strictly pressed as the political language of Thucydides or Polybios. And indeed one can hardly suppose that Thalês himself, notwithstanding the evident wisdom of his advice, had attained to the clearness of political vision which distinguishes the two great political historians of Greece.

No true
Federal
Union.

Advice of
Thalês; its
meaning.

¹ See Blakesley, Herod. i. 170. Professor Rawlinson, in his notes, passes by this most important passage without notice. In his translation he makes Thalês say: "Their other cities might still *continue to enjoy their own laws*, just as if they were *independent states* (*κατάπερ εἰ θεῖμοι εἴεν*)." This is probably historically true, but it is hard to see what process of construing can get it out of the words of Herodotus.

CHAP. IV. The language of Herodotus, taken strictly, might imply that Thalês meant to recommend such an union as that which had fused all the Attic towns into the one commonwealth of Athens.¹ Yet when we think of the greatness of some of the Ionian cities, and their distance from one another, it is hardly possible to believe that Thalês wished to merge them so completely into one commonwealth as had been done with the old Attic cities. No one could think of reducing Ephesos, Milêtos, and Kolophôn to the level of Marathôn and Eleusis. No one could think of asking Ephesians, Milêsians, and Kolophônians to cease to be Ephesians, Milêsians, and Kolophônians, and to become Teians instead. It is far more probable that Thalês designed each city to retain its separate being as an independent city, and only wished to form a Federal Council for common consultation and defence against the barbarians. If so, this advice of Thalês would be the earliest instance of a Federal Union being deliberately recommended to a group of separate states by a single political thinker. But it does not appear that the advice of Thalês produced the least practical effect. The Ionian Federation remained the mere vision of one philosophical Milêsian; in the mind of every other Ionian the Greek instinct of autonomous city-government was too strong for any such scheme even to obtain a hearing. We have here in short a striking comment on what has been already said as to the important bearing on our subject of the history of the Delphic Amphiktyony. The Delphic Amphiktyony is important in a history of Federal Government, just because it was not a Federal Government. So the advice of Thalês

He probably intended a true Federal Union.

¹ But for the marvellous translation of Professor Rawlinson, one would hardly have stopped to notice anything so obvious as that the word used by Herodotus is *δημοί*, or that *δημοί* here means (not "independent states," but) the local divisions of Attica. Even the antiquated translation of Beloe shows that its author understood at least thus much.

is important in the same history, just because it remained
 advice and was never carried out into action. The Delphic
 Amphiktyony came near enough to a Federal Union of all
 Greece to have suggested such a Federal Union, had the
 Greek mind in general felt any need of any union of the
 kind. That no such Union ever arose out of it is the surest
 proof how little such an Union was in harmony with Greek
 political feeling. Still more easily might the Ionic Am-
 phiktyony have grown into an Ionic League, had the
 Ionians in general felt any need of an Ionic League. That
 they rejected the scheme when it was proposed to them
 shows more clearly than anything else how little progress
 true Federal ideas had made among them. To the philo-
 sophic mind of Thalès the transition from an Ionic
 Amphiktyony to an Ionic League doubtless seemed easy
 enough. His countrymen from the various cities were in
 the habit of assembling for periodical religious meetings,
 and even of using these religious meetings, when occasion
 served, for real political conferences.¹ To improve these
 irregular conferences into a permanent Congress, with
 authority in all foreign affairs, would seem to him to be
 only a natural developement of a state of things to which
 every Ionian was already fully accustomed. But Thalès
 seems to have been the only Ionian to whom any such idea
 occurred. When he proposed to fix the seat of his Central
 Government at Teôs, he doubtless thought that he was
 providing for the liberties of his proposed League, that he
 was guarding against the very evils which had doubtless
 already begun to show themselves in Bœotia.² But Milê-

CHAP. IV.
 His advice
 not taken ;
 its rejection
 a striking
 illustration
 of
 Greek political ideas.

¹ As, for instance, when the common revolt against Persia obliged an unusual amount of common action. Then we find (Herod. vi. 7) *πρόβουλοι* from the different cities meeting at Teôs, and we even find the words (ib. v. 109) *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰόνων*. We may well doubt whether such a formula was commonly used.

² Blakealey on Herod. vi. 7. "He would have selected Teos somewhat on the principle on which the site of Washington was selected for the

CHAP. IV. sian and Ephesian pride would not consent to surrender an atom of Milésian or Ephesian Sovereignty to a Federal Council sitting at Teós. This advice of Thalês, and its fate, also illustrates another remark which I have already made. It was precisely the greatest and most illustrious cities of Greece which clung the most pertinaciously to their separate town-autonomy. Sparta, Athens, and we may fairly add Thebes, were willing enough to bear rule over other cities; they were willing enough to be the chiefs of a body of allies more or less dependent upon them; Athens at least was once willing to incorporate other cities as it were into her own person; but neither Sparta, Athens, nor Thebes ever consented to unite with other cities in a free and equal Federal bond. It was only among the ruder and less advanced tribes of Greece that the true Federal principle had, in the days of Thalês, made any visible progress. We cannot doubt that necessity had already drawn the towns of Phôkis and Akarnania into those Federal unions which we find existing among them throughout the whole duration of Grecian history. But the Ionic cities were, in the days of Thalês, among the foremost cities of the Hellenic name. They were as little likely as Sparta or Athens to follow Phôkian or Akarnanian precedents of union; they were rather as fully disposed as Sparta or Athens could be to cleave to the full possession of all those sovereign rights which the Hellenic mind held to be inherent in every sovereign Hellenic commonwealth.

Projected
league of
OLYNTOS,
[B.C. 382]

Far more important in Grecian history is the attempt made by Olynthos, shortly after the Peace of Antalkidas, to organize a general confederacy of the Greek and Macedonian cities in her own neighbourhood. Sparta, as the interpreter and executor of the Peace, made it her business

capital of the United States of America. Teos could never become formidable to the independence of the members of the Confederation."

to hinder any union, whether it took the form of Federation CHAP. IV.
 or of subjection, no less among the Chalkidic, than among dissolved
 the Bœotian, towns. A Spartan army was sent to Chalki- by Sparta,
 dikê; Olynthos was besieged and compelled to surrender, B.C. 379.
 and the Olynthian union was dissolved. The last great
 English historian of Greece has given to this Olynthian
 confederacy an interest which it certainly never possessed
 before.¹ There can be no doubt that, seen from a general Fatal
 Hellenic point of view, the dissolution of the Olynthian results to
 confederacy was one of the most calamitous events in Greece of
 Grecian history, An Olynthian League, or even an Olyn- its Disso-
 thian Empire, would have given Greece a strong bulwark lution.
 at the very point where a bulwark was most needed. An
 Olynthian League, or even a liberally administered Olyn-
 thian Empire, would have united all the purely Greek
 cities of the Macedonian border, together with the most
 civilized and most Hellenized portions of Macedonia itself.
 Such an united body might well have formed an effectual
 barrier against the advance even of Philip and Alexander.
 Sparta in truth, by her conquest of Olynthos, betrayed the
 Greeks of Thrace to the Macedonian King,² just as she had
 already, by the Peace of Antalkidas, betrayed the Greeks
 of Asia to the Persian King. It may indeed well be
 doubted whether, in a general view of the world's history,
 it would have been a gain to mankind to have cut off the
 energies of Alexander from any wider field than that of
 Illyrian and Scythian warfare. But, from a purely Greek
 point of view, there can be no doubt that the overthrow of
 the Olynthian power was a most unfortunate event for the
 whole of Greece. And there can be no more doubt as to
 the character of the Spartan intervention in Chalkidikê
 than as to the character of the Spartan intervention in
 Bœotia. All our sympathies lie with Olynthos as against

¹ Grote x. 67. seqq.² Ib. x. 94.

CHAP. IV. Sparta and as against Macedonia, just as all our sympathies lie with the Sacred Band of Thebes alike when it marched forth to victory at Leuktra and when it marched forth to defeat at Chairônēia. But it is another question whether we may not at the same time be called upon to sympathize with Akanthos and Apollônia against Olynthos, just as we sympathize with Plataia and Orchomenos even against the Thebes of Pelopidas and Epameinôndas.

Views of
Mr. Grote,
too favour-
able to the
designs of
Olynthos.

It certainly strikes me that Mr. Grote has drawn far too favourable a picture of the terms on which the Olynthian League, if League we are to call it, was designed to be formed. I cannot help suspecting that the great historian of Athenian Democracy has been a little carried away by admiration for a city which was at once a bulwark against Macedonia and a victim of Sparta. The facts of the case, the nature of the union which Olynthos sought to form, are known only from the speech made by the Akanthian envoy Kleigenês, when asking for Lacedæmonian help against Olynthos.¹ The whole circumstances of the story cannot fail to remind us of the later story of Polydamas of Pharsalos coming to ask—this time to ask in vain—for Lacedæmonian help against Jasôn of Pherai.² In the one case indeed it is a threatening City and in the other it is a threatening Prince; but Akanthian patriotism seems at least as much alarmed by the claims of Olynthos as Pharsalian patriotism was alarmed by the claims of Jasôn. Kleigenês, in the speech which Xenophôn puts into his mouth, describes the advances which Olynthos was making among all the cities in her own neighbourhood, both Greek and Macedonian.³ She was drawing them all into close

Proceed-
ings of
Olynthos
as de-
scribed by
Kleigenês.

¹ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 11—19.

² Ib. vi. 1. 2. See above p. 153.

³ The extension of the Olynthian Union to Macedonian cities, and even to Pella, the greatest of Macedonian cities (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 18) must show either, 1st, That there was, as Mr. Grote (x. 70) suggests, a

connexion with herself, some, it would seem, with their own consent, but others without it.¹ The nature of this connexion is described by the Akanthian orator in terms nearly the same as those in which the Plataian orator describes the connexion which Thebes attempted to force upon his own city.² The inhabitants of the allied towns were to be admitted to some kind of citizenship at Olynthos, they were to live according to the Olynthian laws,³ and they were to possess common rights of inter-marriage and of holding landed property in each other's territories.⁴ Under many circumstances such terms as these would have been, as Mr. Grote calls them, highly liberal and generous. If they had been offered to conquered enemies, they would have been a wonderful improvement upon the Spartan, the Athenian, or the Theban way of dealing with conquered enemies. To Greek subjects of the Macedonian King, or to Macedonians striving

CHAP. IV.

Terms of
union
offered by
Olynthos.

Greek population in these cities; or 2nd, That the Macedonian population of these cities, even of the inland Pella, must already have been largely Hellenized; or 3rd, That the Macedonians in general must have been by no means so far removed from Hellenic nationality as some writers think. The relation between Olynthos and her Macedonian neighbours is expressed in quite different language from her relations towards her Thracian neighbours. The Macedonian cities were to be set free from the Macedonian King, (*ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου τοῦ Μακεδόνων βασιλέως*. Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12,) but the Thracians are spoken of as the merest subjects or tools, (*ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ γέιτονές εἰσιν αὐτοῖς Θρᾷκες οἱ ἀβασίλευτοι, οἱ θεραπεύουσι μὲν καὶ νῦν ἤδη τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους· εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἔσονται*, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 17.) That is to say, the Macedonian allies were worthy of whatever measure of freedom Olynthos thought good to leave to her Greek allies; but Thracians, even though advanced enough to do without a King, were fit only for that subjection which was the natural lot of the barbarian.

¹ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 18. *Αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων τῆς πολιτείας κοινωροῦσαι*, κ.τ.λ.

² See the Plataian Oration of Isokratēs (9—11) quoted above, p. 174.

³ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12. *Ἐφ' ᾧ τε χρῆσθαι νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ συμπολιτεύειν*.

⁴ Ib. v. 2. 19. *Εἰ μέντοι συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ' ἀλλήλοις, ὡς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσι*.

CHAP. IV. after Hellenic civilization, it was clear political promotion
 Acceptable to the Macedonian towns, to obtain the franchise of any Greek city on any terms.
 We are therefore in no way surprised to learn that the Macedonian towns thankfully accepted the offers of Olynthos. We are just as little surprised to learn that Akanthos and Apollônia, and seemingly the Chalkidian

but rejected by the Greeks of Chalkidike.

cities generally, altogether rejected them. Nor is it necessary to suppose, with Mr. Grote, that their refusal arose from a mere blind attachment to town-autonomy. It would be at worst a pardonable blindness to cleave to that innate political instinct of the Greek mind to which Greece in truth owed her whole greatness and glory. To expect a Greek city willingly to exchange its town-autonomy even for a free and equal Federal relation with other cities, would have been to expect all its citizens to be, like Thalês, wise beyond their age and country. But it does not appear that any really free and equal Federal relation with Olynthos was offered to Akanthos and Apollônia. Undoubtedly we have before us only one side of the case, and it would be well if we could compare the statements of the Akanthian Kleigenês with those of an Olynthian orator in reply. But one thing is plain; Olynthos offered her terms, liberal or illiberal, at the point of the sword.¹ If Akanthos willingly consented, well; if not, Olynthos would make war upon her. And what, after all, did Olynthos offer? Unless the misrepresentations of the Akanthian orator are most impudently flagrant, she offered, not equal union in a common Chalkidian League, but mere absorption into the particular commonwealth of Olynthos. What form this absorption would have taken may be doubted. A single expression of Dêmosthenês looks, so far as it is worth anything at all, as if Olynthos was intended to be the only

Real nature of the terms offered, not Federal Union, but absorption into Olynthos.

¹ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 13. Πέμπαντες δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς Ἀπολλωνιάτας οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι προεῖπον ἡμῖν ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρυσόμεθα συστρατεύσμενοι, ἐκεῖνο ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἴσκειν.

City strictly speaking. The word which he employs¹ is that which denotes, not a League like Phôkis or even like Boeotia, but the union of the Attic cities with Athens. But even if, as in the case of Attica, the full Olynthian franchise was to be communicated to all the allied cities, still such a franchise must have proved a mere delusion. Mere distance, and the greatness of some of the cities concerned, would have effectually hindered an union after the Attic pattern. A Federal union was doubtless just what was wanted; such an union would have provided the needful bulwark against Macedonia without violating the independence of any Grecian city. But there is nothing that shows that any real Federal Council or Assembly was proposed. Akanthos is required to accept the laws and citizenship of Olynthos. The Akanthians naturally answer that they wish to retain their own laws and their own citizenship.* A Federal union would in no way have implied the surrender of either. In truth, the aspect of the whole case looks very much as if what Olynthos really wished was to reduce the Chalkidian towns to the condition familiar in Roman political language as the *Civitas sine*

¹ Dem. Fala. Leg. 298. *ὅπως Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συσφικισμένων*. Pausanias indeed (viii. 27. 2) uses the same word, and its cognate *συνοικισμός*, of the foundation of Megalopolis, which was designed to be the capital of a real Federal state, and Polybios (iv. 33) uses it of the foundation alike of Megalopolis and of Messênê. But, both at Megalopolis and at Messênê, there was a literal and physical *συνοικισμός*. The inhabitants of several Arkadian towns migrated to the newly founded Great City; and the scattered remnants of the Messênian people were gathered together from various quarters to fill the new Messênê. So Olynthos itself owed its first origin to another literal *συνοικισμός* (see Thuc. i. 58); but it is hardly possible that anything of the sort could now be contemplated; Akanthos and Pella were not to be destroyed, and their inhabitants transported to Olynthos. But, if the literal sense is excluded, the *συνοικισμός* can hardly mean anything except the merging of the political existence of all the other cities in the one commonwealth of Olynthos.

² Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12—14. *Ἐφ' ὅτε χρῆσθαι νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ συμπολιτεύειν . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοπολίται εἶναι*.

CHAP. IV. *Suffragio*.¹ They were to cease to be independent commonwealths, which, in a true Federal union, they would not cease to be ; they were to accept the laws of Olynthos, and to receive the private rights of Olynthian citizens ; but they were to have no political franchise, or at most one which was sure to prove quite illusory.² It is hard to see anything in the whole scheme but a design to promote Olynthian aggrandizement, by means, if need were, of Olynthian conquest. The Olynthian mode of conquest was certainly, as a mode of conquest, singularly mild and liberal ; and all Greece, could it have seen the future, might

¹ Thirlwall, v. 12. "They were admitted to that kind of political connection which the Greeks described by the word *sympolity*. Their citizens enjoyed all the civil rights of citizens of the sovereign city. They were capable of acquiring property in land in the Olynthian territory, and of allying themselves with Olynthian families ; *but they were excluded from all the privileges which were exercised in the Olynthian assembly*, and were compelled to submit to the laws, and, it seems also, to adopt the constitution of the ruling state."

Without quite pledging myself to the words in Italics (for some illusory sort of Olynthian franchise seems quite conceivable), I certainly think that Bishop Thirlwall's picture of the Olynthian design is, as a whole, far truer than Mr. Grote's. So Drumann, though his exact view is somewhat different ; "Wie die Thebaner in Böotien, so suchten die Olynthier in Chalkidice gewaltsam einen Städteverein zu gründen . . . ganz Chalcidice zu einem Städtevereine zu verbinden, dessen Haupt es wurde."—Verfall, 440. 1.

² Mr. Grote relies much on the saying of Kleigenês that the cities were then indeed unwilling to be incorporated with Olynthos, but that it would be difficult to separate them from the Olynthian connexion when they had once tasted its advantages. Very true, but what were the main advantages spoken of ? Not the private or public rights of Olynthian citizens, but unlimited plunder under Olynthian banners. After mentioning the expected influence of the *ἐπιγαμίαι* and *ἐγκτήσεις*, he continues (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 19), εἰ . . . γνώσονται ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἔπρεσθαι κερδαλέον ὄσθιν, ὥσπερ Ἀρκάδες, ὅταν μεθ' ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τὰ τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀρπάζουσιν, ἴσως οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως εἴλυτα ἔσται. Of course the *ἐπιγαμίαι* and *ἐγκτήσεις*, even without any political franchise, would do something, but the main attraction is the prospect of gain through the contemplated conquests of Olynthos, just as the Arkadian allies of Sparta gained by service in the Spartan armies. This is hardly the notion of Federal union entertained either by Aratos or by Washington.

well have rejoiced, to see a powerful Greek state, whether CHAP. IV.
 an Olynthian Empire or a Chalkidian League, fixed as a
 boundary against Macedonian aggression. But certainly
 the Olynthian scheme, as described in the only extant
 contemporary account of it,¹ does not seem to answer the
 description of a true Federal connexion nearly so closely
 as some much more obscure unions of Grecian cities which
 already existed.

Shortly after this attempt at Federal union—if Federal
 union we are to consider it—in Northern Greece—a far
 more promising attempt was made to establish a Federal
 state in Arkadia. The decline of the Lacedæmonian
 power after the battle of Leuktra opened the way for
 political changes and new combinations in all parts of
 Greece. The Arkadian race, though one of the most
 ancient and most numerous divisions of the Grecian name,
 had hitherto been little heard of in Grecian history. Since
 the predominance of Sparta in Peloponnêsos had been
 firmly established, the Arkadians had chiefly appeared
 in the character in which they are described in the
 speech of Kleigenês of Akanthos, that namely of
 submissive allies of Sparta, following her banners for
 the sake of the plunder to be derived from Spartan
 conquests. The city of Mantinea alone had, on several
 occasions, taken a more prominent and independent part

Federal
 Union of
 ARKADIA,
 B.C. 370.

Little pre-
 vious im-
 portance of
 Arkadia.

History of
 Mantinea;

¹ We can hardly set against the contemporary description of Kleigenês such vague expressions as we find in the speech of Chlaineas in Polybios (ix. 28), *ἦν τι σύστημα τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης Ἑλλήνων, οὓς ἀπέκισαν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδαῖς, ὧν μέγιστον εἶχε πρὸς ὄχλημα καὶ δύναμιν ἢ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων πόλεως*. Here, though the preeminent position of Olynthos is clearly set forth, we do find the word *σύστημα*, the technical name for true Federations like those of Achaia and Lykia, used to denote the relation between the Chalkidian cities and Olynthos. But a casual expression used so long after does not prove much, and moreover Chlaineas seems to be speaking of the times immediately before Philip, to which his language would be still less appropriate.

CHAP. IV. in Grecian affairs. In the interval between the Peace of
 B.C. 420. Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, Mantinea appears,
 together with Argos and Elis, as a leader of anti-Spartan
 her de- movements within Peloponnēsos.¹ In the second period
 struction by Sparta, of Spartan supremacy, after the Peace of Antalkidas,
 B.C. 386. Mantinea incurred the wrath of Sparta to that degree
 that she, a Hellenic city, enrolled in the Homeric cata-
 logue,² was degraded from the rank of a city, and her
 inhabitants were distributed among the four villages whose
 union, at some ante-historic and even ante-mythic period,
 was said to have been the first origin of the Mantineian
 state.³ It may be that, as the Lacedæmonian partisan
 Xenophôn tells us, there were Mantineian oligarchs base
 enough to find a selfish satisfaction in this degradation of
 their native city.⁴ It is more certain that, as soon as the
 Spartan power was broken at Leuktra, the members thus
 violently separated were again united. Mantinea appeared
 once more as a city, and again began to take an important
 Its restora- part in the affairs of Arkadia and of Hellas.⁵ Mantineian
 tion, B.C. patriotism now took a bolder flight than it had ever taken
 370. before. The reunion of Mantinea was only to be the pre-
 cursor of the union of all Arkadia. Up to this time there
 Plan of an had been no real political connexion between the different
 Arkadian branches of the Arkadian name. The different cities and
 Federa- districts had retained some vague notions of national
 tion. kindred, and some degree of unity, as in Ionia and else-
 where, had been kept up by common religious rites.⁶

¹ See Thuc. v. 45 et seqq.

² Il. β'. 607. *Καὶ Τεγέην εἶχον καὶ Μαντινέην ἑρατειήν.*

³ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 1—7. *καθηρέθη μὲν τὸ τεῖχος, διέκλισθη δ' ἡ Μαντινεῖα τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον φέκουν.* Cf. Pol. iv. 27.

⁴ Xen. Hell. v. 2. 7.

⁵ Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 3. *Ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ οἱ Μαντινεῖς, ὡς ἤδη αὐτόνομοι παντά- πασι ὄντες, συνήλθον τε πάντες καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο μίαν πόλιν τὴν Μαντινεῖαν ποιεῖν, καὶ τειχίζειν τὴν πόλιν.* This shows that Mantineian satisfaction at the *διοικισμός* must have been confined to a few oligarchs.

⁶ See Grote, x. 284.

Arkadia, in short, formed an Amphiktyony of its own, an institution perhaps the more needful for a people who had no share in the general Delphic Amphiktyony. But hitherto the connexion had been purely Amphiktyonic; we find no trace of any real political union between the several Arkadian towns. Mantinea and Tegea, the two chief among them, were frequently hostile to one another. At this very time we find them in marked opposition; Tegea adhered to the interest of Sparta, while Mantinea naturally attached herself to the rising power of Thebes. Under such circumstances, the formation of a general Arkadian Federation was at once a noble conception and a most difficult undertaking. Its author appears to have been Lykomédês of Mantinea,¹ who certainly merits thereby a high place among the statesmen of Greece. His design for an Arkadian union embraced a plan for a real Federal Government, and it gave the Federal principle a much wider scope than had ever before been opened to it in Grecian affairs. The scheme of Lykomédês was a noble and generous one, and, though it bore but little immediate fruit, yet its memory, no doubt, contributed hints to the great Federal statesmen of later Greece. It also served the cause of Federalism in another way; its one great result, the foundation of Megalopolis, gave Federal Greece some of the noblest of her leaders. Lykomédês designed a Federal Government in the strictest sense; he did not, like the politicians of Thebes and Olynthos, seek for any invidious supremacy for his own city; his plans contemplated a free and equal union of the whole Arkadian name. The union was to be strictly

CHAP. IV.

Arkadian
union
hitherto
merely
Amphi-
ktyonic.Plans of
Lykomé-
dês.Arkadian
union to be
strictly
Federal.

¹ Diodôros (xv. 59) attributes the first idea of the Arkadian union to a Lykomédês of Tegea. This is probably merely one of his characteristic blunders, though it is curious that a misconstruction of a passage of Pausanias (viii. 27. 2.) has led some scholars to a belief in a Lykomédês of Tegea on quite independent grounds. See Thirlwall, v. 110.

CHAP. IV. Federal ; the several cities were not to lose their existence as free Hellenic commonwealths, but Arkadia, as towards all other states, was to be one ;¹ the united Arkadian body was to have a Federal Assembly, Federal magistrates, and a Federal army. To avoid all jealousies between existing cities, to cut off all rivalry between Tegea and Mantinea, all fear of the new constitution proving a mere cloak for a supremacy on the part of either, a new Federal Capital was to be founded as the seat of the Central Government of the Arkadian people. And all this was no mere vision ; the success of the scheme was indeed but temporary, but it did succeed for a while, and it was no fault of Lykomédês if more selfish politicians undid his noble work. For a few brilliant years Arkadia was really one ; Mantinea did not envy Tegea, and Tegea did not vex Mantinea. Megalopolis, the Great City, arose as the Washington of the new Federation, and there the general Arkadian Assembly met to transact the general Federal affairs of the Arkadian nation. And if this great and wholesome change was not brought about absolutely without violence, it certainly was brought about with much less violence than any other change of equal moment in recorded Grecian history. A local revolution at the right moment² took away all danger from the Lacedæmonian

Temporary success of the Federal scheme.

Foundation of Megalopolis, B.C. 370.

¹ Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 6. *Συνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνίεμαι τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὅτι νικῆν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων.* The Lacedæmonian partisan is of course disposed to exaggerate the degree in which the Federal power trench on the independence of the several cities. But in every Federal Government worthy of the name the central power is *κύριος καὶ τῶν πόλεων* in all matters coming within its own competence, and it is clear that the Arcadian *κοινόν* did not destroy the separate existence of the Arkadian cities as States or Cantons. It would have been well if Xenophôn had told us how the process of *νικῆν ἐν τῇ κοινῇ* was effected, whether the majority of the Ten Thousand was ascertained by counting heads, or whether each city had a distinct vote. The latter is more consonant with Greek Federal practice.

² See the account of the Tegean revolution in Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 7 et seqq. Cf. Grote, x. 285.

tendencies of Tegea. Tegea joined the League; nearly all Arkadia, and a few towns whose Arkadian character was doubtful,¹ entered into it with delight. Orchomenos indeed, and a few other towns,² still clung to their complete separate autonomy. That they were compelled by force³ to share the common destinies of the nation was doubtless not abstractedly justifiable, but we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. There are no signs of general compulsion on one side and general unwillingness on the other, such as we have seen in the cases of Thebes and Olynthos. With what zeal the scheme was adopted in most parts of Arkadia, we learn from an incidental notice in the hostile Xenophôn.⁴ Agêsilaos reached the Arkadian town of Eutaia, and found in it only old men, women, and children. Every male of the military age had gone to attend the Arkadian Constituent Assembly, and to take his share in the formation of the Arkadian Federal Constitution.⁵

CHAP. IV.
General
adhesion of
Arkadia to
the League.

For the details of the Arkadian constitution we are, as usual, left to incidental notices. Here we have again to deplore the loss of the great political work of Aristotle. All that is preserved of his account of Arkadian matters amounts to the fact that he mentioned the Assembly of the Ten Thousand; not a detail survives.⁶ Xenophôn, the bitter Lacedæmonian partisan, could have told us everything if he had chosen, but he does not even record the foundation of Megalopolis. The existence of the

Constitu-
tion of the
League.

¹ Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 26. So vii. 4. 12. (B.C. 365). καταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ἡλείοι Λασιόνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι συντελοῦντα ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν.

² Xen. Hell, vi. 5. 10. 11.

³ Ib. 13. 22.

⁴ Ib. 12.

⁵ Ib. Τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῳ ἡλικίᾳ οἰχομένους ἐς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν. See Grote, x. 287. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117, note) seems to take another view, but is not this Assembly at Asea the same as the meeting which he himself describes in p. 110?

⁶ See Arist. Pol. (ed. Oxon. 1837) p. 300.

CHAP. IV. Great City, like that of its sister Messênê, was so glorious for Epameinôndas, so disgraceful and calamitous for Sparta, that the renegade Athenian had not the heart to insert their names in his history. Yet it is from Xenophôn's occasional notices that we have to glean most of the little which we do know of the details of the Arkadian Federal system. The League had a Federal Assembly which met at Megalopolis, and was known as the Ten Thousand.¹ As to the constitution of this Assembly there has been some doubt, but the most probable opinion is that which represents it as being, like the Achaian Assembly of later times, open to every citizen of every Arkadian city who chose to attend.² That it was a representative Assembly, in the sense of being composed of chosen delegates, seems unlikely, both from the greatness of the number, and because there is no parallel for such an Assembly of Delegates in any known Grecian commonwealth. The Assembly, especially during the enthusiasm of the first days of the League, would doubtless be largely attended, and ten thousand is a large attendance, when we remember that five thousand citizens was above the average attendance in the Athenian Assembly.³ There is no need to infer from the name Ten Thousand that there really was any fixed number. The name was undoubtedly in familiar use, but it need not have been a formal title;⁴ it is most likely only a vague,

The
Assembly
of Ten
Thousand ;

its Consti-
tution.

¹ *Οι μύριοι*. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 38 et pass. Dem. F. L. 220, &c. The name constantly occurs.

² This is the view of Mr. Grote (x. 317), and it seems more in accordance with general Greek notions on such matters. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117) discusses several other views. I can hardly persuade myself either that the Assembly was an army, or that it consisted wholly of Megalopolitans. This last notion seems opposed to the whole nature of the League.

³ Thuc. viii. 72.

⁴ The common formula for a Greek Confederation, *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων*, is used as equivalent to *οἱ μύριοι*. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 35. 38.

and probably an exaggerated, way of expressing the vast numbers of the Arkadian Assembly. The functions of the Ten Thousand were those which were commonly vested in the sovereign Assembly of a Grecian commonwealth. The Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name of all Arkadia,¹ they received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states;² they regulated and paid the standing army of the Federation;³ they sat in judgement on political offenders against the collective majesty of the Arkadian League.⁴ That they were assisted in their deliberations by a smaller Senate is not distinctly asserted; but we might fairly infer it from the analogy of other Greek states, and the results of antiquarian research have made it almost certain that the Arkadian Assembly did not depart from the usual pattern.⁵ There were Federal Magistrates, whose titles are not recorded;⁶ and at the

CHAP. IV.
Powers of
the Ten
Thousand.

Probable
existence
of a
Senate.

¹ Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 2. *Λυκομήδης . . . παλθαι τοὺς μυρούς πρῶττειν περὶ συμμαχίας πρὸς αὐτούς.* Cf. vii. 1. 38, and Diod. xv. 59.

² Dem. F. L. 220.

³ The *ἐπάρχοι* or *ἐπίλεκτοι*. Diod. xv. 62. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 22. 33.

⁴ See the trial of the Mantineian *πρόσταται* (were these Magistrates, or merely popular leaders?) in the passage of Xenophôn last quoted.

⁵ Pausanias (viii. 32. 1) speaks of the *Θερσίλιον* at Megalopolis, which he defines as *τὸ βουλευτήριον δὲ τοῖς μυροῖς ἐπεποιήτο Ἀρκάδων*. Colonel Leake finds its ruins in the position, near the Theatre, pointed out by Pausanias, and concludes that, "though it may have been subservient to the uses of the Council of Ten Thousand, it could hardly have been employed for its actual assembly, as such a multitude could only have been seated in a theatre-shaped edifice." (Morea, ii. 39.) Bishop Thirlwall (v. 116) infers from this, with great probability, that there was a Senate, and that this *Θερσίλιον* was its place of meeting. This view is also confirmed by the use of the word *βουλευτήριον* by Pausanias. The Ten Thousand were not a *βουλή*, nor would they meet in a *βουλευτήριον*. The Ten Thousand themselves doubtless met, as Colonel Leake suggests, in the Theatre; but hard by their own place of meeting was the smaller *βουλευτήριον*, for the use of the *βουλή*, the Committee chosen, by lot or otherwise, from among the Ten Thousand, to discharge the usual functions of a Greek Senate.

⁶ *Ἀρχοντες* are mentioned, Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 24; 4. 33. Their formal title may or may not have been Archon.

CHAP. IV. head of the whole League there seems to have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal General.¹ These Federal officers, we cannot doubt, were elected by the Assembly of the Ten Thousand.

The Federal capital of Megalopolis was formed by the union of several villages or small towns, the inhabitants of which were gathered together as citizens of the Great City. In a few instances we regret to hear that compulsion was employed,² but in most cases the inhabitants of the small Arkadian townships gladly accepted their offered promotion to the rank of citizens of the national capital.³ It may perhaps be doubted whether the choice of any city as the place of Federal meeting was perfectly wise; a better place might perhaps have been found, as in the case of the Phœkian League,⁴ under the shadow of some great national sanctuary, such as the great temple of the Arkadian Zeus. But if Federal Arkadia was to have a capital at all, there can be no doubt as to the wisdom of the choice actually made. Here we may, with Pausanias,⁵ discern the guiding genius of Epameinōndas. To have chosen Mantinea, Tegea, or any other of the ancient cities, as the Federal capital, would have opened the way to innumerable jealousies, and might even have led to the same evils of which the Arkadians

Advantageous position of the Federal Capital.

¹ This seems implied in such expressions as (Xen. Hell. vii. 3. 1) *Αλέας Στυμφάλιος, στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀρκάδων γεγενημένος*; (Diod. xv. 62) *Λυκομήδης ὁ Μαντινεύς, στρατηγὸς ὢν τῶν Ἀρκάδων*.

² Paus. viii. 27. 5, 6. *Οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκοντες ἀνάγκη κατήγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.*

³ Paus. viii. 27. 3—5. *Ἐπὶ τε προθυμίᾳ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων πατρίδας σφίσιν οὕσας ἐκλειπεῖν ἐπείθοντο . . . συνέλεγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν σπουδῇ, κ.τ.λ.*

⁴ See above, p. 145.

⁵ Pausanias distinctly recognizes Epameinōndas as the true founder of Megalopolis. Paus. viii. 27. 2. *γνώμη μὲν τοιαύτη συνεκίχοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδες, τῆς πόλεως δὲ οἰκιστὴς Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος σὺν δικαίῳ καλοῖτο ἂν, τοὺς τε γὰρ Ἀρκάδας οὕτως ἦν ὁ ἐπεγείρας ἐς τὸν συνοικισμὸν, κ.τ.λ.*

had such a living example before their eyes among their own Boeotian allies. And Epameinôndas himself, when acting as the counsellor of the Arkadians, would doubtless see the danger as clearly as any Arkadian; in Arkadia he would advise for the good of all Arkadia, and not be warped by that narrow local patriotism which led even him to sacrifice the general welfare of Boeotia to the selfish interests of Thebes. Had the Ten Thousand met at Mantinea or Tegea, the noble scheme of Lykomêdês might only have led to the destruction of that which he had most at heart; he might have become the founder, not of a really equal Arkadian Confederation, but of a mere Mantinian or Tegean Empire over Arkadia. Such a danger was much less to be dreaded from a new city called into being at the will, and for the purposes, of the Confederation itself. And, besides this, the Great City, as its later history shows, occupied a most important military position. It commanded one of the main passes by which Sparta used to pour her troops into Arkadia. Some such bulwark as was supplied by Megalopolis was imperatively required for the safety of the country. And it was the more needed, because the other chief city of southern Arkadia, and that which commanded the other approach, was Tegea, so lately gained over from subserviency to Spartan interests, and still probably containing a party unfavourable to the national cause. These considerations might reconcile even distant members to the position of the Federal capital, not in the centre of the Confederation, but on its most exposed border. With Epameinôndas no doubt the chief object was effectually to shut Sparta in, Megalopolis keeping her in check from the north, and the other new city of Messênê from the west.

The Arkadian League, as an important Greek power, did not last long. We are not well informed as to the steps of its decline; but, before the death of Epamei-

Decline
of the
Arkadian
League.

CH AP. IV. nōndas, Mantinea and Tegea were again hostile cities.
 B.C. 362. Their positions, during the last stage of his warfare, are singularly reversed from what they had been eight years before. Mantinea is now the ally of Lacedæmōn, and Tegea is the stronghold of the Theban interest in Pelopon-
 History of
 Megalo-
 polis.
 nēsos. Megalopolis always remained a considerable city, though it did not wholly answer the intentions of its founders, either in its extent or in its political importance. At a later period we find it a zealous ally of Macedonia; later still it appears in the more honourable character of an important member of the Achaian League, illustrious as the birthplace of Lydiadas, Philopoimēn, and Polybios. The Assembly of the Ten Thousand survived the loss of Lykomēdēs and of Epameinōndas;
 B.C. 347. /Æschinēs and Dēmostenēs pleaded before it;¹ and Dēmostenēs uses language which implies that it still at least professed to act in the name of the whole Arkadian people.² Dēmostenēs himself pleaded the cause of Megalopolitan independence before the Athenian Assembly,³ when the Arkadian city was again threatened by Sparta and defended by Thebes,⁴ and when a faction in Megalopolis itself, as before in Mantinea, desired the dissolution of the Great City and the restoration of their own influence over its former petty townships.⁵ Later again,
 B.C. 330. in the war between Agis and Antipater, all Arkadia except Megalopolis took the patriotic side; Megalopolis stood a siege in the interest of Macedonia,⁶ and its losses were repaid by a pecuniary compensation levied on the vanquished cities.⁷ Opposition to Sparta would naturally drive Megalopolis into alliance with Macedonia, and it may well be believed that, in the days of Macedonian

¹ Dem. F. L. 220.² See ib. 10. 11.³ In the oration *ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν*.⁴ See Thirlwall, v. 367—70.⁵ Thirlwall, v. 368.⁶ Æsch. Ktes. 165.⁷ Q. Curt. vi. 1. 21.

domination, selfish interests may have made the position of a powerful city in close alliance with Macedonia appear preferable to that of a Federal capital of Arkadia. Certain it is that, from this time forward, the Macedonian interest was very strong in Megalopolis, and equally certain that no general Arkadian League existed when the Achaian League began to be organized. The great scheme of Lykomêdês, the most promising that any Grecian statesman had yet designed, had altogether fallen asunder. And yet his labours were far from being wholly fruitless. He had given a model for the statesmen of later generations to follow, and he had founded the city which was to give birth to the most illustrious Greeks of the last age of Grecian independence.

After this Arkadian Confederacy, which, if it had a poor ending, at all events had a grand beginning, it may seem almost ludicrous to quote a mere abortive scheme, or pretence at a scheme, our whole knowledge of which is contained in a single sentence of a hostile orator. Kallias, the Tyrant of Chalkis, he who was defeated by Phôkiôn at Tamynai, veiled, if we may believe Æschinês, his schemes of ambition under the pretext of founding a general Euboian Council or Assembly in his own city.¹ Not a detail is given us, but the words employed seem to show that a pretence at true Federalism was the bait. A Federal scheme proceeding from such a source would probably have borne more likeness to the abortive scheme of an Italian League put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, than to the noble works of Aratos and Washington. But in either case the bait of a Federal

Pretended
scheme of
Federal
Union in
EUBOIA.
B.C. 351.

Schemes of
Kallias of
Chalkis.

A.D. 1859.

¹ Æsch. Ktes. 89. Καλλίας ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, μικρὸν διαλειπὼν χρόνον, πάλιν ἦκε φερόμενος εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, Εὐβοικὸν μὲν τῷ λόγῳ συνέδριον ἐς Χαλκίδα συνάγων, ἐξαίρετον δ' αὐτῷ τυραννίδα προσποιούμενος, ἰσχυρὰν δὲ τὴν Εὐβοίαν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ παρασκευάζων. Cf. Dict. Biog. art. Callias.

CHAP. IV. Constitution was an instance of the homage which vice pays to virtue. When a Greek Tyrant hit upon such a device to cover his schemes of aggrandizement, it is clear that the Federal principle was now gradually working its way to that influence over the Greek mind which it certainly did not possess in the preceding century, and which it emphatically did possess in the century which followed.

Evidence
of the
growth of
Federal
ideas in
Greece.

§ 4. *Of the Lykian League.*

The
LYKIAN
League ;
its excel-
lent Con-
stitution.

I will end this chapter with a notice of one Federation more, one not within the limits of Greece, and whose citizens were not Greek by race, but which was so clearly formed after Greek models that it may, in a political history, fairly claim a place in the list of Greek Federal Governments. I mean the wise and well-balanced Confederation of Lykia, whose constitution has won the highest praise from Montesquieu¹ in the last century, and from Bishop Thirlwall² in the present. The antiquities and the language of Lykia have lately attracted the attention of scholars in no small measure. To the political inquirer the country is no less interesting, as possessing what was probably the best constructed Federal Government that the ancient world beheld. The account given by Strabo, our sole authority, is so full, clear, and brief, that I cannot do better than translate it. The "ancestral constitution of the Lykian League,"³ is described by the great geographer in these words :—

¹ *Esprit des Loix*, ix. 3. "S'il falloit donner un modèle d'une belle république fédérative, je prendrois la république de Lycie."

² ii. 116. "The Lycians set an example of the manner in which the advantages of a close federal union might be combined with mutual independence . . . Had the Greeks on the western coast of Asia adopted similar institutions, their history, and even that of the mother country, might have been very different from what it became."

³ Strabo, xiv. 3 (vol. iii. p. 214. Tauchnitz). *Ἡ πατρὶς διοίκησις τοῦ Λυκιακοῦ συστήματος.*

"There are three and twenty cities which have a share in the suffrage, and they come together from each city in the common Federal Assembly,¹ choosing for their place of meeting any city which they think best. And, among the cities, the greatest are possessed² of three votes apiece, the middle ones of two, and the rest of one; and in the same proportion they pay taxes,³ and take their share of other public burthens. And the six greatest cities,⁴ according to Artemidôros, are Xanthos, Patara, Pinara, Olympos, Myra, Tlôs, which lies in the direction of Kibyra. And, in the Federal Assembly,⁵ first the Lykiarch is chosen and then the other Magistrates of the League,⁶ and bodies of Federal Judges are appointed;⁷ and formerly they used to consult about war, and peace, and alliance; this now of course, they cannot do, but these things must needs rest with the Romans, unless such action be allowed by them, or be found useful on their behalf; and in like manner also judges and magistrates⁸ are appointed from each city, in proportion to the number of its votes."

CHAP. IV.
Strabo's
account of
the Lykian
Constitu-
tion.

On the practical working of this constitution Strabo bestows the highest praise. Lykia was, in his day, a Roman dependency, but it retained its own laws and

His testi-
mony to its
practical
working.

Σύστημα (Pol. ii. 41) is one of the technical names for a Federation. The Lykians also used the more formal designation *Λυκίων τὸ κοινὸν* (C. I. 4279) and the equally familiar *ἔθνος* (C. I. 4239 et al.).

¹ Strabo, xiv. 8. *Συνέρχονται δ' ἐξ ἐκάστης πόλεως εἰς κοινὸν συνέδριον.*

² Ib. *Τριῶν ψήφων ἐστὶν ἐκάστη κυρία.*

³ Ib. *Τὰς εἰσφοράς εἰσφέρουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας λειτουργίας.*

⁴ It would be worth inquiring whether all of these six great cities rejoiced in the title of *λαμπροτάτη μητρόπολις τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους*. It was certainly borne by Tlôs, Xanthos, and Patara. See C. I. 4240c, 4276, 4280, et al.

⁵ Strabo, u.s. *Ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ.*

⁶ Ib. *Ἄλλαι ἀρχαὶ αἱ τοῦ συστήματος.*

⁷ Ib. *Δικαστήριά τε ἀποδείκνυται κοινῇ.*

⁸ Ib. *Δικασταὶ καὶ ἀρχοντες.* This of course means Federal Judges and Federal Magistrates, the *ἀρχαί* and *δικαστήρια* mentioned just before. Montesquieu perverts this into "les juges et les magistrats des villes." He has also misled Hamilton in the "Federalist," No. ix. (p. 48).

CHAP. IV. internal government, which he himself beheld in as high
 B.C. 29— a state of efficiency as was consistent with the dependent
 A.D. 18. condition of the commonwealth in its external relations.

Merits of The merits of this Lykian Constitution are obvious.
 the Lykian It avoids nearly every error into which other Confede-
 Constitu- rations had fallen. There is no capital, no Thebes, not
 tion ; even a Megalopolis : the Federal Assembly meets where-
 NoCapital; ever it finds it convenient to do so. At the same time, it
 avoids the opposite evil, from which we shall find that
 even the Achaian League was not free, that of giving the
 greatest city no more weight in the Federal Assembly
 than the smallest. A League of cities must always find it
 very difficult to steer clear of both these opposite dangers.
 The Lykians seem to have done so very successfully.

The As- There can, I think, be no doubt that the Lykian As-
 sembly sembly, like the Achaian and other Assemblies of the
 Primary kind, was a primary and not a representative body. I
 not Repre- cannot believe that it was composed merely of deputies
 sentative. from the several cities.¹ The words of Strabo seem to
 me to imply, not that each city sent one, two, or three
 representatives, but that each city had one, two, or three
 votes. According to the general analogy of the Greek
 and Italian commonwealths, every Lykian citizen² would
 have a right to attend, speak, and vote, but the citizens
 of each town would vote separately. Thus, in a govern-
 ment not Federal, the Roman Tribes voted separately ;
 thus the Nations in the Scotch Universities do to this day.
 The vote of each City, Tribe, or Nation, is determined by
 a majority within itself, and the final vote is determined

¹ Dr. Schmitz (Dict. Geog. art. Lycia), and Kortüm (Geschichte Griechen-
 lands, iii. 313), seem to maintain this view.

² The democratic character of the League is clear both from the demo-
 cratic character of the several cities, the local δήμοι of which are constantly
 mentioned in the Inscriptions, and from the distinct testimony of one in-
 scription at Tlós (C. I. 4239) where an anonymous worthy is praised as
 εὐεργέτην τοῦ δήμου and διατηρήσαντα τοὺς τε νόμους καὶ τὴν πατριὸν
 δημοκρατίαν.

by the majority, not of heads, but of Tribes or Cities. In the Primary Assembly of a large district some such arrangement as this is absolutely necessary, in order to put distant Tribes or Cities on an equality with those which are near the place of meeting. If the votes in the Roman Assembly had been taken by heads, the mob of the Forum could always have outvoted the genuine agricultural plebeians. But, in most of the ancient constitutions, each member, each Tribe or City, whether great or small, had only a single vote. This was manifestly unfair, and might easily lead to discontents. Thus the Italian Allies of Rome bitterly complained when they were, after the Social War, admitted indeed to the Roman citizenship, but distributed among eight tribes only among the thirty-five.¹ They were equal in number to the former citizens, but, by this arrangement, they could, at the utmost, command only eight votes, less than one-fourth of the whole number. Thus, on any questions which concerned their special interests, they were left in a perpetual and hopeless minority. The Lykians avoided this danger by giving to their cities a greater or less number of votes according to their size, being the first recorded instance of an attempt to apportion votes to population. Those Xanthians who might be present in any Assembly determined the vote of Xanthos by a majority among themselves; that vote counted as three in reckoning up the decisive vote of the Assembly. The vote of a smaller city, ascertained in the same way, counted as two or as one.² But though such a system

Appor-
tion-
ment of
Votes to
Numbers.

B.C. 88.

¹ Vell. Pat. ii. 20. 2.

² A small confederation, (*σύνθημα*) consisting of Kibyra and three other towns, in which Kibyra had two votes and the other towns one each, was probably a humble imitation of the Lykian League. Strabo, xiii. 4 (vol. iii. p. 160). As Kibyra was always under Tyrants, though well disposed Tyrants (*ἐντυραννέτω δ' αὖτ' σωφρόνους δ' ἄνους*), one would like to know how the Monarchic and the Federal elements were reconciled. The mere use of the word *Tyrant*, and not *King*, implies republican forms.

CHAP. IV. was not really representative, it was a very near approach to the representative principle.¹ No doubt, alike in Lykia, Achaia, and Rome, the vote of a distant Tribe or City was often canvassed at home, and perhaps practically decided, before the general Assembly met. At any rate those citizens of any city who were present would know and express the wishes of their fellow-citizens who remained at home. It would have been a comparatively small change, if each city had formally elected as many of its citizens as it had votes, and had sent them with authority to speak in its name in the Federal body. But the change does not seem ever to have actually been made. In this, as in so many other cases, the ancient world trembled on the very verge of representative government without ever actually crossing the boundary.²

Approach
to Repre-
sentative
Govern-
ment.

A Senate
not men-
tioned, but
its exist-
ence to be
inferred
from
analogy.

The description of Strabo does not mention a Federal Senate. But the universal practice of the Greek commonwealths may make us feel certain that there was a Senate, of some sort or other, in Lykia no less than in Arkadia. The several cities of Lykia had each their local Senates,³ and we may be sure that the Federal Constitution followed the same universal model. It need not surprise us that a thing almost certain to be taken for granted is not directly mentioned. The Athenian Senate is not very often spoken of; it is never so prominent as at the

Even the Gauls in Asia (Strabo, xii. 5. vol. iii. p. 55) seem to have made some rude approach to Federal ideas; but these utterly obscure constitutions are really matters of archæology rather than of politics.

¹ See Niebuhr, *Hist. Rom.* ii. 29. 30. Eng. Tr.

² See Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*, ii. 347.

³ The style of each city is commonly the familiar one *ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος*. C. I. 4270, 4303*h*, et al. At Tlōs we find a formula which seems to imply two distinct Councils, *τλῳέων ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ἡ γερουσία καὶ ὁ δῆμος*. C. I. 4236, 4237, 4240. *Γερουσία* is a word once used by Polybios (xxxviii. 5) in speaking of Achaian affairs, meaning, as it would appear, the Council of Ministers. See Bachofen, *Das Lykische Volk* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862), p. 24.

moment of its destruction by the Four Hundred.¹ The very existence of the Arkadian Senate has, as we have seen, mainly to be inferred from the dimensions of an architectural monument. We may therefore be sure that the Lykian Assembly, like other Greek Assemblies, was assisted by a preconsidering Senate, but we cannot tell what the exact constitution of that Senate was.

As for the Federal Magistrates mentioned by Strabo, their titles are not mentioned, except that of Lykiarch, borne by the President of the Union.² The magistrates of the several cities may have borne the title of General; at least Diôn Cassius speaks of the General of a particular city,³ as well as of the common army of the whole League.⁴

The exact antiquity and origin of the Lykian League it might be difficult to discover. Bishop Thirlwall⁵ hints that Federal Government may have been of very early introduction into Lykia. Yet we must remember that the Lykians were not Greeks, and that they seem not even to have had that degree of ethnical affinity to the Greeks which it is easy to recognize in Macedonians and Epeirots. We need not suppose a people who proved themselves so capable of receiving Hellenic culture to have been wholly of an alien stock; but till philologers are better agreed as to the nature of the Lykian language, it is hardly the part of a political historian to hazard vague conjectures about them. It is clear that the early Lykians were, in the Greek sense of the word, Barbarians;

Federal
Magis-
trates.

Date and
Origin of
Federal
Govern-
ment in
Lykia.

Relation of
the Ly-
kians to
the Greeks.

¹ Thuc. viii. 69.

² The Lykiarch seems to have borne the formal title of *ἀξιολογώτατος* (C. I. 4198, 4274), something like our "Right Honourable." This is a sort of orientalism of which we find no trace in proper Greece.

³ Dion. xlvii. 34. *Καὶ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ Μυρεῖς ἐποίησαν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν . . . ἀπέλυσε [ν ὁ Βροῦτος].*

⁴ Ib. *Τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων στράτευμα.*

⁵ ii. 116. Cf. Drumann, p. 432.

CHAP. IV. that is, that they spoke a language unintelligible to the Greeks, and that they were not then distinguished in any special way from the other Asiatic races which passed under the dominion of Persia. It is equally clear that they must have possessed latent powers of assimilating themselves to Greek models in a degree beyond all other Asiatic races. The later Lykians clearly adopted the Greek language, Greek art, and general Greek civilization. They doubtless followed and improved upon Greek models, in the development of their admirable political constitution. Its details, as described by Strabo, probably belong only to the last period of Lykian history. But some germs of a Federal system must have existed earlier. Aristotle found the constitution of Lykia, no less than that of Thesprôtia, worthy of a place in his collection.¹ This seems to imply a Republic, and, in so large a country, most probably a Federal Republic. But the Lykian monuments help us to no information on the subject. Our real knowledge begins later. After the defeat of Antiochos, the Romans, in their division of the spoil, assigned Lykia and Karia to their Rhodian allies.² Rhodes was governed by a prudent and moderate aristocracy, which one is surprised to find seeking after continental dominions. But it would seem that Theaitêtos and Philophrôn, who begged for the Lykians as a gift,³ acted as little for the true interest of their island commonwealth, as Francesco Foscari did for the interest of his, when he made Venice a continental power. Perpetual disputes arose between Rhodes and Lykia; perpetual appeals were brought before the supreme power at Rome. The nature of the gift was disputed; the

Traces of
Federalism
before the
subjection
to Rhodes.

B.C. 188.

Lykia sub-
ject to
Rhodes.
B.C. 188—

¹ Phôtios, Bibl. 104, 5. Ed. Bekker.

² Pol. xxiii. 3. Liv. xxxviii. 39.

³ Ib. Ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοῖς δοθῆναι τὰ κατὰ Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίαν . . . φέ-
σκοντες Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίαν τὰ μέχρι τοῦ Μαιάνδρου δεδωσθαι Ῥοδίοις ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων
ἐν δωρεᾷ.

Rhodians looked on the Lykians as mere subjects; the Lykians maintained that they were at most dependent allies.¹ It is certain that the gift did not hinder the existence of some sort of Federal union. The Lykians, even while subject to Rhodes, retained the ordinary style of a Greek Confederation;² much more then must they have employed it during the earlier days of their independence. Polybios too, in his whole narrative of these times, constantly speaks of Lykia as a national whole. Ambassadors appear at Rhodes, Rome, and Achaia, speaking in the name of the whole Lykian people,³ in a way which implies a commission from some central power. But the Federal Union could not as yet have been quite perfect, as we also hear of Ambassadors being sent by the single city of Xanthos,⁴ which would have been quite contrary to the principles of the constitution described by Strabo. At last, after the war with Perseus, the Rhodians were no longer in favour at Rome; they were deprived of their lately acquired continental dominions, and Lykia and Karia were declared free.⁵ Now it was, doubtless, that some unknown Lykian Lykomêdês, some statesman who had carefully studied the working of all the existing Federal Governments of Greece, devised the constitution which so happily avoided all their errors. The Lykian

Lykia independent,
B.C. 168.

Origin of
the Constitution
described
by Strabo.

¹ Pol. xxvi. 7. Εδρηται Λύκιοι δεδομένοι Ῥοδίοις οὐκ ἐν δωρεᾷ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ὡς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι.

² τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων. See Boeckh, C. I. 4677 (vol. iii. 326) where the words occur in an inscription found in Egypt, the date of which comes between B.C. 188 and 181. So, immediately after the recovery of their freedom, the same *Commune Luciorum* dedicated its thank-offering at Rome. See Bachofen, p. 23.

³ Pol. xxiii. 3. Οἱ μὲν Λύκιοι πρεσβεύοντες ἦκον. Pol. xxvi. 7. Ἡ σύγκλητος ἐχρημάτισε τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Λυκίων ἡκουσι πρεσβευταῖς, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ Ib. Οἱ Εἰάνθιοι ἐπεμψαν πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τε τὴν Ἀχαΐαν καὶ τὴν Ῥώμην. These seem to be the same with the παρὰ τῶν Λυκίων ἡκοντες πρεσβευταί. Possibly Xanthos acted, by tacit consent, in the name of the whole nation.

⁵ Pol. xxx. 5. Ἡ σύγκλητος ἐξέβαλε δόγμα διότι δεῖ Κάρας καὶ Λυκίους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι πάντας.

CHAP. IV. Confederation steered its course with admirable prudence through the Mithridatic and Piratic Wars. Its opposition to Brutus, and the consequent destruction of Xanthos,¹ was indeed a terrible calamity; but a calamity endured in such a cause was a special claim upon the favour of the Julian Emperors, and we find Lykia, as we have seen, in the days of Strabo, prosperous, well-governed, and enjoying full local independence.² But these happy days were not to last for ever. In the reign of Claudius internal dissensions,³ seemingly of great violence, arose, of which that Emperor took advantage to destroy this remaining vestige of ancient freedom, and to reduce Lykia, like her neighbours, to the dead level of a Roman province. Such an ending, and for such a cause, is especially sad after so bright a picture of days so very little earlier. The last Greek Federation was now no more, and many centuries were to pass by before the world was again to see so perfect a Federal system, or indeed anything worthy to be called a Federal system at all. Liberty was gone from the earth, or lingered on, in an obscure and precarious form, on the Northern shores of the Inhospitable Sea.⁴ But it is a pleasing thought that, as the Achaians and the Lykians are the nations who stand forth, in our first Homeric picture,⁵ as the worthiest races of Europe and of Asia, so it was the Achaians and the Lykians who were

Destruction of the League by Claudius, A.D. 41-54.

¹ See Dion Cassius, xlvii. 34.

² Strabo, u.s. ὁδῶν δ' εὐνομιουμένοις αὐτοῖς συνέβη παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἐλευθέροις διατέλεσαι, τὰ πάτρια νέμονται.

³ Dion Cassius, ix. 17. Τοὺς τε Λυκίους στασιδασάρτας, ὥστε καὶ Ῥωμαίους τινὰς ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐδουλώσατό τε καὶ ἐς τὸν τῆς Παμφυλίας νόμον ἐτέγραψεν. Suet. Claud. 25. Lyciis ob exitiabiles inter se discordias libertatem ademit. One would like to hear the Lykian version of these troubles. Disturbances are easily produced in a small state which a great neighbour wishes to annex.

⁴ On the Republic of Cherson, see Finlay, Byz. Emp. i. 415.

⁵ On the Lykians of Homer, see Gladstone's Homer, i. 181. If the Homeric Lykians (see Strabo, xii. 8, vol. iii. p. 65) do not occupy the

the last to maintain, in Europe and in Asia, the true CHAP. IV.
Federal form of freedom in the face of the advances of
all-devouring Rome.

same geographical position as the historical Lykians, so neither do (except quite incidentally) the Homeric and the historical Achaïans. But it is hardly possible that the recurrence of the two names, Lykian and Achaïan, in this way can be purely accidental.

CHAPTER V.

ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE.

CHAP. V. IT is no easy task to write the history of Greek Federalism with due regard at once to chronology and to geography. In my last chapter I have been obliged to carry on parts of my narrative down to a time even later than the suppression of the two great Federal Governments of Greece. It seemed, on the whole, the better plan to clear off both the earlier and the minor instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any examination of the great Leagues of Achaia and Ætolia. But there is no reason to doubt that the Federal principle was as old in Achaia and Ætolia as in any part of Greece whatsoever. The history of the Achaian League, like the history of the Bœotian League, extends over the whole period during which we have any knowledge of Grecian affairs. But there is this important difference between the two, that by far the greater interest attaches to the earlier days of the Bœotian, and to the later days of the Achaian, League. We are led to trace the history of Bœotia to its dishonoured close only because of the borrowed interest reflected from the earlier days of Bœotian glory. We are led to examine into the obscure and scattered notices of the earlier days of Achaia only because of the surpassing interest which attaches to the full developement of the great Achaian Confederation. It is natural then to

deal with the Bœotian Confederation as a whole before entering at all on the history of the Achaian and Ætolian Confederations. Again, the Arkadian and Olynthian Leagues were neither of them permanent; those of Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros were always of minor importance; of Lykia, as a Federal state, we should never have heard at all, save from a single notice, and that left us, not by a historian, but by a geographer. On the whole therefore it seemed the best arrangement, though at some sacrifice of chronological exactness, to deal first with all these comparatively imperfect instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any description of Achaian or Ætolian politics. Having now cleared off these minor examples, we are in a position to enter upon the first of the great divisions of our subject, the first great developement of the Federal principle which the world ever beheld, and which forms the main centre of the last hundred and fifty years of Old Greek independence.

CHAP. V.

§ 1. *General Character of the History of Federal Greece.*

The later history of Greece has been, as it seems to me at least, unduly depreciated by most English scholars. The great work of Polybios lies almost untouched in our Universities. The mythical books of Livy are attentively studied, while those which record the struggle between Rome and Macedonia are hardly ever opened. The last great English historian of Greece¹ deliberately declines entering on the Federal period of Grecian history as forming no part of his subject. In Germany the case is widely different. The student who undertakes to master this period with the help of German guides will certainly

Common neglect in England of the History of Federal Greece.

¹ Grote, xii. 529.

CHAP. V. not have to complain of any lack in point of number. He will rather be puzzled at the difficulty of choice between many candidates, and at the diversity of the paths through which they will severally offer to guide him. The importance of this period was strongly set forth by Niebuhr,¹ and few portions of history have ever met with a more enthusiastic and vivid narrator than the days of Alexander and his Successors have found in the eloquent pages of Droysen.² Every state, Macedonia, Achaia, Ætolia, Boeotia, has found in Germany its special historian. Of so vast a literature I am far from professing myself to be completely master; but, from such acquaintance with it as I can pretend to, I may say without doubt that the English scholar will find the best portions of the best writers carefully weighed in the balance by the unfailing accuracy and unswerving judgement of a countryman of his own. Bishop Thirlwall has continued his great task to its conclusion with unflinching powers. With him Aratos and Kleomenés are as essential a part of Hellenic story as Themistoklès and Periklès. His last volume must always lie before the historian of Grecian Federalism as the best of comments on the work of the illustrious Greek who has handed down to us the tale, too often fragmentary, of the last days of his country's freedom.

The truth is that, in reading the earlier history of Greece, we are, for the most part, really reading little more than the history of Athens. We read events as chronicled by Athenian historians; we turn for their illustration to the works of Athenian philosophers, orators, and poets. We look at everything from an Athenian point of view; we identify ourselves throughout with that great Democracy which was the true mother of right and

Abundance
of German
writers
on the
subject.

Narrative
of Bishop
Thirlwall.

Earlier
Grecian
history
mainly the
history of
Athens.

¹ Lectures on Ancient History, iii. 352 (Eng. Tr.) et al.

² Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen; Hamburg. Geschichte des Hellenismus, 2 vols. Hamburg: 1836.

liberty, of art and wisdom. We trace her fortunes as if they were the fortunes of our own land; when we condemn her acts, we do it with that sort of reluctant feeling with which we acknowledge that our own country is in the wrong. Sparta comes before us as the rival of Athens, Macedonia as the destroyer of her greatness; of other states we barely think from time to time as their fortunes become connected with those of the school¹ and ornament of Greece. In turning to "the Greece of Polybios"² we feel a kind of shock at finding ourselves in what is in truth another world. It is still Greece; it is still living Greece; but it is no longer the Greece of Thucydides and Aristophanés. The sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills; Athênê still stands, spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city; Dêmos still sits in his Pnyx; he still chooses Archons by the lot and Generals by the uplifted hand; but the fierce Democracy has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless and dishonoured old age; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings;³ its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People which once received tribute from a thousand cities.⁴ Philosophers still babble in her schools about truth and wisdom and virtue and valour; but truth and wisdom and virtue

Nullity of
Athens in
the Federal
Period.

¹ Thuc. ii. 41. *Ἐννελὸν τε λέγω τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ δευσιον εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.*

² Grote, xii. 528.

³ Pol. v. 107. *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ . . . τῶν μὲν ἄλλων Ἑλληνικῶν πράξεων οὐδ' ὅποιας μετείχον, ἀκολουθοῦντες δὲ τῇ τῶν προεστώτων ἀφρέσει καὶ ταῖς τοῦτων ὁρμαῖς εἰς πάντας τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐξεκένοντο, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτων εἰς Πτολεμαῖον, καὶ πᾶν γένος ὑπέμενον ψηφισμάτων καὶ κηρυγμάτων, βραχὺν τινα λόγον ποιούμενοι τοῦ καθήκοντος διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ἀκρισίαν.*

This is in B.C. 217. Compare, for a time seventy or eighty years earlier, Grote, xii. 529—30.

⁴ Arist. Wasps, 707. *Εἰσὶν γε πόλεις χίλιαι, αἱ νῦν τὸν φόρον ἡμῶν ἀπέχουσιν.*

CHAP. V. and valour have, not indeed fled from the earth, not indeed fled from the soil of Hellas, but they have passed from the birthplace of Solôn, of Aristeidês, and of Periklês to cities which they would have scorned to acknowledge as rivals, even to cities which had no place on earth when the warriors of Athens marched forth to victory at Marathôn and to defeat at Dêlion. A Greece in which Athens has ceased to be the first power, or rather in which Athens has sunk to be the most contemptible of all the cities of the Grecian name, seems, at first sight, to be unworthy to bear the name of Greece at all. We have to encounter unfamiliar names and to thread our way through unfamiliar boundaries and divisions. The first place among Grecian states is disputed between the obscure, if respectable, cities of Achaia, and the barely Hellenic¹ robbers of Ætolia. States known only as sending some small contingent to swell Athenian or Spartan armies, cities which had themselves sprung into being since the glory of Athens sank at Aigospotamos, now appear as powers of greater weight than the Athenian commonwealth. Feeble Akarnania, new-born Megalopolis, liberated Messênê, count for more in Grecian politics than the city of Thêseus. The circle of Hellas is enlarged to take in lands which Thucydides and Dêmosthenês despised as barbarous; Chaonians, Molossians, Thesprôtians, take their place as members of an acknowledged Hellenic state; the Macedonian himself is indeed still dreaded as a King, but is no longer despised as a stranger of foreign blood and speech.² The very

¹ Liv. xxxii. 34. *Ætolos, tanquam Romanos, decedi Græciâ jubere, qui, quibus finibus Græcia sit, dicere non possint. Ipsius enim Ætolie Agræos, Apodotosque et Amphilocho, quæ permagna eorum pars sit, Græciam non esse.*

² Liv. xxxi. 29. *Ætolos, Acarnanas, Macedonas, ejusdem linguae homines, leves ad tempus ortæ causæ disjungunt conjunguntque; cum alienigenis, cum barbaris, æternum omnibus Græcis bellum est eritque.*

language itself has changed ; fastidious scholars, fresh from the master-pieces of Attic purity, look down with contempt on the pages in which the deeds of Spartan and Sikyônian heroes are recorded by historians brought up in no politer schools than could be found at Megalopolis and Chairôneia.

It may at once be freely admitted that the later history of Greece, "the Greece of Polybios," has nothing like the life and richness and freshness of that earlier state of things which we may call the Greece of Thucydides. The one still enjoyed the native freedom of youth ; the other at best clung to the recovered freedom of old age. The fervent lover of the earlier and fresher developement of Hellenic life is thus tempted to despise the records of a time which seems to him feeble and decrepit. Yet the recovered liberties of Achaia were a true shoot from the old stem ;¹ they were the reward of struggles which would not have disgraced the victors of Marathôn or the victors of Leuktra ; and the very circumstances which make the later fortunes of Greece less interesting in the eyes of a purely Hellenic enthusiast make them really more instructive in the eyes of a general student of the world's history. The early history of Greece is the history of a time when Greece was its own world, and when town-autonomy was the only form of political life known within that world. Beyond the limits of Hellas,² all mankind were Barbarians ; they were to be ruled over or to be used as instruments, they were to be flattered or to be oppressed, but they were never to be admitted as the real political equals of the meanest man of Hellenic blood.

Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece.

Pol. vii. 9. Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα . . . Μακεδόνες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων οἱ σύμμαχοι, κ.τ.λ.

¹ Paus. vii. 17. 1. "Ἀτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαικόν.

² Hellas, it should be remembered, is wherever Greeks dwell, not merely Greece—ἡ συνεχὴς Ἑλλάς—in the geographical sense.

CHAP. V. Within the bounds of Hellas, the political struggle lay between single cities oligarchically governed and single cities democratically governed. In either case the independent city-commonwealth was the one ruling political idea. Monarchy was unknown or abhorred; Federalism was as yet obscure and undeveloped. The Greece of Polybios opens to us a much wider and more varied scene. Greece is no longer the whole world; Greece proper, Greece in the geographical sense, is no longer the world's most important portion. Rome and Carthage dispute the empire of the West; Syria and Egypt dispute the empire of the East; Greece and Macedonia stand on the edge of the two worlds, to be swept in their turn, along with all other combatants and spectators, into the common gulf of Roman dominion. But if Greece had lost her political preeminence, she had won for herself a wider and a more abiding empire. The Greek language, Greek art, general Greek civilization, were spread over the whole East, and were before long to make a conquest only less complete of her Italian conquerors themselves. Philip, Alexander, and their Successors, the destroyers of Greek political greatness, had been everywhere the apostles of Greek intellectual life. The age of Polybios is, in fact, the age when the world's destiny was fixed for ever, when the decree of fate was finally pronounced that for all time Rome should be the political, and Greece the intellectual, mistress of mankind. It is, in its true place in universal history, a period of the very deepest and most varied interest. And to the historian of the Greek race and language, as distinguished from the historian of the soil of Hellas, no period in the whole range of Grecian history assumes a deeper importance. The age of Polybios is the age which connects the Greece of Mr. Grote with the Greece of Mr. Finlay. Philip and Alexander were in truth the founders of that Modern Greek nation which

Character
of the later
period.

Wide
spread of
Hellenic
culture.

Import-
ance of
this age
in univer-
sal history,

and in the
history of
the Greek
Race.

has lasted down to our own time. If they destroyed the liberties of Athens, they laid the foundation of the general intellectual dominion of Greece. By spreading the Greek language over lands into which Greek colonization could never have carried it, they did more than any other single cause to open the way for the preaching of Christianity. In founding Alexandria, Alexander indirectly founded the intellectual life of Constantinople. By permanently Hellenizing Western Asia, he conferred on the Empire of Constantinople its great mission as the champion of the West against the East, of Christendom against the Fire-Worshipper and the Moslem.¹ It is one of the many evil results of the shallow distinction popularly drawn between "ancient" and "modern" history that the whole later life of the Greek people, from Philip to our own day, is so utterly neglected. My present subject brings me only upon a very small portion of so vast a field. To the historian of Federalism the Polybian age is important mainly as the age of republican reaction in Greece itself against the Macedonian monarchy. And it is surely something, to put it on no other ground, to see what was the state of Greece herself in an age in which, though the freshness of her glory was gone, she was still important—no longer politically dominant, but intellectually more supreme than ever. The Greek history of this time is more like the history of modern times; it is less fresh than that of earlier days, but it is also less uniform, and for that very reason it is more politically instructive. It is no longer merely the history of single cities; it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities, monarchies, and Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the European history of later times. It is a time

CHAP. V.
Effects of
Alexander's
Conquests.

Character
of the age
of Poly-
bios.

¹ See the Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 340, Art. Alexander the Great. History and Conquests of the Saracens, Chap. I. The World at the coming of Mahomet.

CHAP. V. of deeper policy, of more complicated intrigues; an age when men had lost the vigour and simplicity of youth, but had almost made up for the loss by the gain of a far more enlarged experience. Compare, for instance, the two great historians of the several periods. Thucydides never went out of the immediate Greek world; but for his fortunate exile, he might never have gone out of the dominions of Athens; his reading was necessarily small; he spoke only one language; he knew only one form of political and civilized life. But an inborn genius, an intuitive wisdom, a life spent amid the full youth and freshness of the first of nations, sets him at once above all who have come after him in ages of greater experience. Polybios,¹ on the other hand, is like a writer of our own times; with far less of inborn genius, he possessed a mass of acquired knowledge of which Thucydides could never have dreamed. He had, like a modern historian, read many books and seen many lands; one language at least beside his own must have been perfectly familiar to him; he had conversed with men of various nations, living in various states of society, and under various forms of government. He had himself personally a wider political experience than fell to the lot of any historian before or after him. The son of a statesman of Megalopolis, he could remember² Achaia a powerful Federation, Macedonia a powerful monarchy, Carthage still free, Syria still

Comparison of
Thucydides and
Polybios.

B.C. 222 or
204.

¹ On the character of Polybios as a historian, see Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, ii. 427.

² Whether Polybios could, strictly speaking, remember all this, depends partly on the disputed question of the year of his birth. (See Dict. of Biog. art. Polybius.) B.C. 222 certainly seems too early, but there is no need to fix it so late as B.C. 204. The requirements on both sides would be met by such a date as B.C. 210. But even the reckoning which places his birth latest would bring all within his life, and the intermediate one would bring all within the compass of his possible memory. The intelligent child of a distinguished statesman would surely have some understanding of such an event as the battle of Zama at the age of eight years.

threatening ; he lived to see them all subject provinces or CHAP. V.
 trembling allies of the great municipality of Rome. In
 his youth he bore to the grave the ashes of Philopoimên, B.C. 183.
 a Grecian hero slain in purely Grecian warfare ; he lived
 to secure some little fragments of Grecian freedom as B.C. 145.
 contemptuous alms from the Roman conqueror. A man
 must have lived through a millennium in any other portion
 of the world's history, to have gained with his own eyes
 and his own ears such a mass of varied political know-
 ledge as the historian of the Decline and Fall of Ancient
 Greece acquired within the limits of an ordinary life.¹

This revived life, this after-growth of Hellenic freedom, Begin-
 dates from about the year B.C. 280, a date marked out by nings of

¹ It is curious to see how Mr. Grote, in his depreciation of "the Greece of Polybios," looks at everything from a purely Athenian point of view. (See the close of his xxvith chapter, vol. xii. p. 527—80.) He sometimes almost reminds one of a remarkable passage of Polybios himself, which, to be sure, goes almost as much too far the other way. *Εἰ δὲ τηροῦντες τὰ πρὸς τὰς πατρίδας δίκαια κρίσει πραγμάτων διεφέροντο, νομίζοντες οὐ ταῦτ' ἀντιστρέφον Ἀθηναίους εἶναι καὶ ταῖς αὐτῶν πόλεσιν, οὐ δὴ πού διὰ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι προδότας ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους· ὁ δὲ πάντα μετρῶν πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος συμφέρον καὶ πάντας ἡγούμενος δεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀποβλέπειν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, εἰ δὲ μὴ, προδότας ἀποκαλεῖν, ἀγροεῖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πολλὰ παραπαλεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας.* (xvii. 14.) In Mr. Grote's view, Athens has become contemptible ; Greece is no longer the whole world ; the autonomous city is no longer the single type of Grecian government. Therefore Grecian history has come to an end ; or at all events Mr. Grote has no heart to continue it. The very passages in which Polybios (i. 3, 4. ii. 37) sets forth the greatness of his own subject, the connexion of the local history of his own land with the general history of the world, are quoted to prove that Polybios himself looked on later Greece as having "no history of its own." Mr. Grote, in earlier volumes, has pointed out with delight the beginnings of a Federal system in Arkadia and at Olynthos. One might have expected him to have gone on with equal delight to trace out its full development in Achaia. But in Mr. Grote's eyes the whole charm of Grecian history passes away with the greatness of Athens. Mr. Grote's defence of the Athenian democracy has won him such everlasting gratitude from every true student of Grecian history, that it is much to be mourned that he should be so enamoured of that one object as to see the whole history of monarchic and Federal Greece from a distorted point of view.

CHAP. V.
the Federal
Revival,
B.C. 280.

B.C. 284-0.

Gaulish
Invasion,
B.C. 280-
279.

B.C. 322.

Recon-
struction

Polybios himself¹ as signalized by the nearly contemporaneous deaths of some of the greatest Princes of the age. The elder form of Hellenic freedom and the universal empire of Macedonia were now alike things of the past. Those only who belonged to a generation already passing away could remember either the oratory of Dêmôsthenês or the conquests of Alexander. The dominions of the great conqueror were divided for ever, and the first generation of his Successors had passed away. Antigonos and Kassander had long been dead; Dêmétrios Poliorkêtês, Seleukos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy the son of Lagos and Ptolemy the Thunderbolt,² all died, mostly by violence, within three or four years of each other. Alexander's own line had long been extinct; his realm was left without an heir; usurper after usurper had seized upon the Macedonian throne; and a scourge more fearful than even the old Median invasion was bursting upon Macedonia and Greece alike. The storm of the Gaulish inroad swept all before it in Macedonia, but the arm of the Delphian Apollo³ checked its progress, like that of the Persians of old, when it presumed to threaten the most venerated shrine of Greece. The fierce Ætolians, turbulent brigands as they too often showed themselves, stood forth, as before in the Lamian War, as the true champions of Hellas. The whole barbaric host was destroyed or took refuge in Asia, there, strangely enough, to learn some measure of Grecian civilization, and to be thought worthy, by strangers at least, of some approximation to the Grecian name.⁴ After this deluge a new state of things arose. Its natural developement was, it

¹ Pol. ii. 41.

² 'Ο Κεραυρός, like Hamilcar Barcas and Bayezid Yildirim. See Thirlwall, viii. 45.

³ Paus. i. 8. 6. viii. 10. 2. et al. Cf. Herod. viii. 35 et seqq.

⁴ Gallogræci. Liv. xxxvii. 8. See above, p. 212.

may be, checked for a while by the splendid and erratic career of the one prince who seemed to have been preserved from the earlier period. Pyrrhos the Molossian, after threatening alike Rome and Sparta, died before Argos by an ignoble death. The removal of the Epeirot knight-errant left the field open for the growth of two opposing powers. Monarchic Macedonia began again to reconstruct herself, and again to aspire to dominion, under the able and ambitious prince who founded her last dynasty.¹ Antigonos Gonatas, son of Dêmétrios Poliorkêtês, and grandson of Antigonos who fell at Ipsos, secured the Macedonian throne. He kept it, with one short interval, till his death; he carried out the Macedonian policy during a long reign, and transmitted his crown and his Hellenic position to four successors of his house, three of them the natural heirs of his body. In the meanwhile the scattered members of the Achaian Confederation began to draw together again, and to form the centre of the revived political life of republican Greece. It is the varying relations between the great Greek monarchy and the great Greek Confederation, diversified by the strange phænomenon of Ætolia, at once a Democratic Confederation and an aggressive tyranny, and by the brief but splendid revival of Spartan greatness, which form the staple of the history of Federal Greece.

OHAP. V.
of Macedonia and Greece.

B.C. 289-272.

The Antigons in Macedonia.
B.C. 278-168.

B.C. 278-239.

Revival of the Achaian League,
B.C. 281.

¹ On the position of Macedonia in this age see Droysen's *Hellenismus*, ii. 553. Allowance must of course be made for the writer's ultra-Macedonian bias, just as for Mr. Grote's ultra-Athenian bias. When Droysen however goes on to compare the progress of Macedonia in Greece with the progress of Prussia in Germany, he forgets or despises the difference between small principalities and small republics. A German County or Bishoprick loses nothing, but rather gains, by being incorporated with a great German Kingdom; a Greek city lost everything by being incorporated with Macedonia. The sympathy which would attend the King of Italy in any attempt to recover Rome and Venice—I might add Dalmatia and the Italian Tyrol—would not extend to an attempt to annex a Swiss Canton, even of Italian speech, or to an attempt to overthrow the immortal liberties of San Marino.

CHAP. V. The objects of these two rival powers, the Achaian nation and the Macedonian house,¹ were exactly opposite to each other. The aim of the Antigonid Kings was to reduce as large a portion of Greece as possible under either their immediate sovereignty or their indirect influence. The aim of the Achaian Federation was to unite the greatest possible number of Greek cities in the bonds of a free and equal League. In these later Macedonian Kings, though some of them were far from insignificant men, we must not look either for the personal greatness or for the political position of the old monarchs of the line of Hêraklê. Philip and Alexander made it their chief boast to be the chosen leaders of a Greek Confederacy. And, though Athens, Sparta, and Thebes were naturally of another mind, there can be no doubt that many of the smaller cities willingly accepted their supremacy.² It is true that neither Philip nor Alexander shrank from any act of severity which suited their purposes. Philip destroyed Olynthos; Alexander destroyed Thebes; if he expelled Tyrants from some cities, he established Tyrants in others. But during the reigns of the two great Kings there was no systematic interference with the internal independence of the Grecian cities. One or two fortresses only were held by Macedonian garrisons. The two great Athenian orators, during Alexander's lifetime, discussed the whole policy of Athens and Macedonia in a way which would have been offensive alike to Kassander the oppressor and to Dêmêtrios the deliverer. The darkest times for Greece began when Alexander was

Opposite
aims of
Macedonia
and
Achaia.

Position
of the
Antigonid
Kings.

B. C. 348.
B. C. 335.
Condition
of Greece
under
Philip and
Alexander.

¹ Polybios draws this distinction very forcibly (ii. 37); *περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθρους, καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν Μακεδόνων οἰκίας.*

² See the passage from Polybios (xvii. 14) quoted in p. 227. The Megalopolitan historian, the hereditary friend of Macedonia, of course carries matters too far, but we are so apt to look at everything with Athenian eyes that it is well to stop sometimes to consider how things seemed to Greeks of other cities.

gone. The unsuccessful, though truly glorious, struggle of the Lamian War laid Greece far more hopelessly prostrate at the feet of inferior masters. During the wars of the Successors, Greece became one of the chief battle-fields of the contending princes. The various cities were indeed often flattered and cajoled. First Polysperchôn and then Dêmétrios—Dêmétrios, it may be, for a while, in all sincerity—gave himself out as the liberator of Greece; but Polysperchôn and Dêmétrios alike liberated cities only to become masters of them themselves. Generally speaking, each Greek town became a fortress to be struggled for, to be taken and retaken, by one or other of the selfish upstarts who were laying waste Europe and Asia in quarrels purely personal. At last, as we have just seen, about forty years after the death of Alexander, nearly sixty after Philip's crowning victory at Chairôneia, a more settled order began to arise out of the chaos. The field was now cleared for a second struggle between Macedonia and Greece, but between Macedonia under a new dynasty of Kings, and Greece represented by new champions of her freedom. Macedonia, lately a prize for every soldier of fortune to struggle for, became, if no longer mistress of East and West, yet at least a powerful Kingdom under a settled dynasty. Greece was no longer the battle-field of many contending rivals; she had one definite enemy to struggle with in the single King of Macedonia. The interests of Macedonian princes elsewhere, especially of the Egyptian Ptolemies, were rather linked with those of Grecian freedom. The Antigonid Kings were rivals whose power it suited them to depress, while the wise rulers of Alexandria were far too clear-sighted to attempt the acquisition of any supremacy in Greece for themselves. The history, then, of the growth of the Achaian League is the history, not only of a political struggle between Federalism and Monarchy, but of a national struggle of Greece

CHAP. V.

B.C. 323, 2.

Greece
under the
Successors.

B.C. 323

-281.

B.C. 280.

Position of
revived
Macedonia
and
Greece.B.C. 281-
223.

ONAP. V. against Macedonia. It is a struggle which at once recalls to mind the most glorious event of our own day. The Macedonian power in Greece in some respects resembled the Austrian power in Italy;¹ but, allowing for the difference of times and manners, it was by far the less hateful of the two. The Macedonian in Greece, like the Austrian in Italy, held part of the land in direct sovereignty, as an integral portion of his kingdom. Amphipolis and the Chalkidian peninsula were irrevocably annexed to the monarchy of Pella, and Thessaly, though nominally a distinct state, was held in a condition of dependence not easily to be distinguished from subjection.² Besides this extent of continuous territory, many strong detached points in various parts of Greece were held by Macedonian garrisons. In other cities the Macedonian King ruled indirectly through local Tyrants who held their power only through Macedonian protection.³ Where no opportunity presented itself for any of these forms of more complete absorption, it was enough to do all that might be to prevent the growth of confederations and alliances, and to ensure that those states which still retained some degree of independence should at least remain weak and

Comparison of Macedonia in Greece with Austria in Italy.

¹ No historical parallel is ever completely exact. Macedonia, for our present purpose, has strong points of analogy to Austria; I have elsewhere pointed out resemblances between the position of Macedonia in Greece and that of Naples in Italy—some even between Macedonia and Piedmont itself. *Oxford Essays*, 1857, p. 154.

² See above, p. 154. See Dem. Phil. iii. 42. Cf. Arr. vii. 12. 7. Κρατερῷ δὲ . . . ἐκέλευεν [Ἀλέξανδρος] . . . Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θράκης καὶ Θετταλῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Thessaly is here clearly reckoned as an integral part of Alexander's dominions, not as part of the Hellenic Confederacy of which he was the elective head.

³ Pol. ix. 29. Τὰ γε μὴν Κασσάνδρῳ καὶ Δημητρίῳ πεπραγμένα, σὺν δὲ τοῦτοις Ἀντιγόῃ τῷ Γονατῇ, τίς οὐκ οἶδεν; . . . ὃν οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς εἰσάγοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις, οἱ δὲ τυράννοις ἱμνυτέοντες οὐδεμίαν πόλιν ἄμοιρον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τῆς δουλείας ὀνόματος. The whole speech of the Ætolian Chlaineas, where these words occur, should be studied as a powerful summing up of the anti-Macedonian case.

disunited.¹ This had been of old the policy of Sparta; it was the policy of all the Macedonian Kings; it is equally the policy of tyrants in our own time, when we see the despots alike of Paris and Vienna gnashing their teeth at every accession of strength to the free Italian Kingdom. The establishment of the Antigonid dynasty seems to have been accompanied by a special impulse given to the worst of all these forms of oppression; Antigonos Gonatas is described as relying more than any of his predecessors on the indirect way of ruling through local Tyrants.²

We can well believe that this last condition was far worse than incorporation with the Macedonian Kingdom, worse even than the presence of a Macedonian garrison. So in our own times, the Austrian annexation of Venice, the French occupation of Rome, have not involved the same permanent horrors as the local tyrannies of Parma and Naples. But the rule of Macedonia, sharp as the scourge doubtless was, was certainly in some respects less irksome than the rule of Austria. It was not so completely a rule of strangers. The Macedonian Kings, and doubtless their subjects too, at least studiously claimed to be Greeks; whatever the merits of the claim, it was prominently put forward on all occasions.³ If not Greek

¹ All this will be found drawn out at length by Polybios (ii. 41). The words of the historian speaking in his own person quite bear out the rhetorical expressions of the Ætolian orator just quoted.

² Pol. ii. 41. Πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος [Ἀντίγονος] ἐμψυτεύσας δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. To "plant a Tyrant" (ἐμψυτεῦν τύραννον) seems to be a sort of technical term.

³ See above, p. 223. So Alexander, in his letter to Darius, talks of *Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα* (Arr. ii. 14. 7) and continues *ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμὼν κατασταθεὶς, κ.τ.λ.* So the style of the Confederacy of which Alexander was chief seems to have been *Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες*. Arr. ii. 2. 4, 5. i. 16. 11. cf. 10. Isokratēs fully recognizes Philip as a Greek (Phil. 10), but a Greek reigning over foreigners, (οὐχ ὁμοφύλου γένους. § 126)—foreigners, so far un-Greek as to need kingship (§ 125), but still carefully distinguished from mere barbarians—*φημὶ γὰρ χρῆναι σε*

CHAP. V. by blood—and Philip and Alexander at least were Greek by blood—they were rapidly becoming Greek in language and intellectual culture. Doubtless it was a poor substitute for the true independence of old times for the Greek to be able to say that his master was half a countryman ; but it at least makes a wide difference between the lot of Greece under the half-Greek Macedonian, and the lot of Italy under the wholly foreign Austrian.¹ Greece indeed soon found that Macedonia was far from being her worst enemy. During the whole of this period, ever since the Gaulish invasion, Macedonia at least efficiently discharged the functions of a bulwark of Greece against the restless barbarians on her northern frontier. And the time at last came when the Macedonian King was felt to be the champion of Greece in a truer sense than when Alexander marched forth to avenge Hellenic wrongs upon the Persian. Every patriotic Greek must have sympathized with the Macedonian nation, if not with its contemptible King, in the final struggle between Perseus and Rome. Through the whole history our feelings lie, naturally and rightly, against Macedonia and for republican Greece. But there is no reason for looking upon Macedonia with any special abhorrence, or for representing her Kings as

τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετῆν, Μακ. Ἰόνων δὲ βασιλεῦν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλείστον ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ. (§ 178). He was to conquer barbarians to give them the advantages of a Greek master. Cf. also Isok. Archid. 51. Arr. ii. 7. 7—9.

¹ I am of course speaking here solely of the modern sway of the so-called "Emperors of Austria," not of the old Teutonic Cæsars, whose Imperial title and bearings they venture to assume. Otto, Henry, and the Fredericks were Emperors of the Romans and Kings of Italy, recognized by all Italians, zealously supported by many. Frederick the Second, the greatest of them all, was himself an Italian by birth, language, and temperament ; his Italian home was ever the dwelling-place of his choice. The Imperial claims doubtless gradually dried up into a mere legal fiction, but even a legal fiction is something different from the high-handed usurpation of modern Austria.

perfect monsters, or even as barbarian invaders. The Great Alexander, with all his faults, still stands forth, alongside of the Great Charles, among the heroes of whom human nature is proud. And, taking the common standard of royal virtue,¹ the merits of Antigonos Gonatas and Antigonos Dôsôn will assuredly not fall below the average. In extending their dominions and their influence they did but follow the natural instinct of their class, and Antigonos Dôsôn at least sinned far less deeply in accepting Akrokorinthos than Aratos and the Achaian Congress sinned in offering it.

The object of the Achaian League, on the other hand, was the union of all Peloponnêsos, or, it may be, of all Greece, into a free and equal Democratic Confederation. Such at least was the wide scope which it assumed in the days of its fullest developement, under Aratos, Philopimên, and Lykortas. And surely no nobler vision ever presented itself to a Hellenic statesman. We shall soon see but too clearly the defects in the general constitution of the League, and the still greater defects in the personal character of its great leader. But the general objects of both were as wise, generous, and patriotic as any state or any man ever laboured to effect. Other Greek statesmen had worked mainly for the mere aggrandizement of their own cities; Periklês lived for Athens, Agêsilaos for Sparta, Epameinôndas for Thebes; but the worthies of Sikyôn and Megalopolis spent and were spent in the still nobler cause of Hellas. And they came at the right time. From one point of view we may be tempted to regret that their lot had not been cast in an earlier day, and that an effective Federal System had not been long before established

CHAP. V.
Generous
aims of the
Achaian
League.

An earlier
establish-
ment of
Federalism
in Greece
not
desirable.

¹ "The station of kings is, in a moral sense, so unfavourable, that those who are least prone to servile admiration should be on their guard against the opposite error of an uncandid severity." Hallam's Constitutional History, ch. x. vol. i. p. 647, ed. 1846.

CHAP. V. in Greece. The establishment of such a system might indeed have saved Greece from many evils ; but it was at once utterly impossible and, in the general interests of the world, utterly undesirable. How impossible it was we see by the whole tenor of Grecian history, by the nullity of the Amphiktyonic Council, by the failure of attempts, like that of Lykomédês, to establish even partial Federal Unions, by the little which, after all, Aratos and his successors were able actually to effect. And, if it had been possible, it was no less clearly undesirable. A Federal system in the days of Athenian and Spartan greatness might have spared Greece the miseries of Athenian and Spartan warfare ; it might have saved her from Macedonian conquest ;¹ it might even have warded off, or at least delayed, her ultimate subjection to Rome. But Greece united in a Federal bond could never have become the Greece which has challenged the love and admiration of all succeeding ages. The brilliant development of Hellenic greatness, alike in war, in politics, in art, in eloquence, and in poetry, was inseparably linked to the system of independent city-commonwealths. The dissensions and the wars of Greece are the price which she paid for becoming the world's teacher for all time. Again, had Greece never sunk beneath the armed force of Macedonia and Rome, she would never have won the Macedonian and the Roman as the permanent apostles of her civilization and intellectual life. It was well that Greece was disunited ; it was well that Greece was conquered ; but it was well also that she should revive, if only for a moment, to give the world the first great example of a political teaching of yet another kind. Greece had already done her work as the land of autonomous

Effects of
the League.

¹ Droysen, *Hellenismus*, ii. 503. Hätte sich die delphische Amphiktyonie zu einer nationalen Verfassung auszubilden vermocht, so würde Philipp nicht bei Chaironeia gekämpft haben.

cities; she was now to give mankind a less brilliant, but more practical, lesson in the way of free government on a more extended scale. Positively indeed but little was done; all Greece was never united even in a nominal bond; even all Peloponnêsos was at best only nominally united after the true glory of the League had passed away. Yet it was something, even in its own day, to restore freedom to a considerable portion of Greece, to give the liberated cities some generations of free and orderly government, to render the inevitable fall of Greece at once more gradual and less disgraceful; and it was yet more, in the history of the world, to give to the political thinkers of after times one of the most valuable subjects for reflection which all ancient history affords.

CHAP. V.

B.C. 191.

§ 2. *Origin and Early Growth of the League.*

In the last chapter we have seen the growth of Federal ideas in many parts of Greece during the fourth century before Christ. The evils caused by the disunion of the great cities made the smaller ones at last understand the need of a closer union among themselves. We have therefore seen several attempts, unsuccessful indeed, but still marking the direction in which men's thoughts were tending, at establishing Federations in several parts of Greece. Then came the days of Macedonian conquest and Macedonian influence. The policy of the Macedonian Kings set itself against all Federations, against all unions of any kind. Even Philip and Alexander, chosen Captains of all Greece as they boasted of being, would have hindered any union among Grecian states which could in the slightest degree have interfered with their supremacy. Their Successors, the usurpers who rose and fell, even the more lasting and high-minded dynasty of the Antigonids, could afford

Growth of
Federal
ideas in
Greece in
the fourth
century,
B.C.

CHAP. V. still less consideration for Grecian freedom. They never ventured to put themselves forth as the chosen leaders of Greece, called to that rank by something which at least pretended to the character of a national vote. How they maintained their influence we have already seen, by fostering local divisions and by supporting local tyrannies. But this state of things naturally gave the Federal principle an influence which it had never before possessed. Modern Europeans, accustomed to the compact monarchies of modern Europe, are apt to look on the Federal system as a system of weakness and disunion; to a Greek of the third century before Christ, accustomed only to a choice between town-autonomy, local tyranny, and foreign bondage, it presented itself as a happy combination, by which freedom could be made to coexist with union, and therefore with strength. The Federal form of government henceforth became predominant, and at last almost universal, in the independent portion of Greece. Every city which achieved its own independence sought, by a natural instinct, to maintain that independence by an union with other cities. And that union was now freely made upon terms from which, a century before, nearly every Greek commonwealth would have shrunk as an unworthy surrender of its separate dignity and separate freedom.

Further
Federal
reaction
against
Macedo-
nian
influence.

Early
History of
Achaia.

Among the cities which had thus become disunited through Macedonian influence were the cities of the Peloponnesian Achaia. If we may trust the half mythical history of the Dorian migration, the Achaians of Peloponnesos were the only independent remnant of that mighty race which, under the Pelopid Kings of Mykênê, had ruled over many islands and all Argos.¹ The Achaians fill the most prominent place in the Greece of Homer and in the

¹ *Iliad*, B. 108. Πολλῆσι νῆσοις καὶ Ἀργεὶ πάντι ἀνάσσειν.

Greece of Polybios, but in the Greece of Thucydides they are utterly insignificant. Polybios, with a commendable national pride, collects several instances¹ to show that, if they were insignificant in power, they were at least highly respected for upright and honourable dealing. No people in Greece bore a higher character either for discretion or for good faith, and they were more than once called upon to act as mediators in the dissensions of more powerful states. We are, however, more concerned with the degree of union which may have existed among their several cities in times before the growth of the Macedonian power. That Achaia then contained twelve cities, democratically governed,² and united by some sort of Federal tie, admits of no doubt. But, as in the case of most of these early Greek Federations, we have no details of the old Achaian constitution. There is however no reason for the supposition that it was a religious rather than a political union, a mere Amphiktyony to the temple of Poseidôn at Helikê.³ The whole history shows that a real Federal union existed among them, and that, even then, the League sometimes extended itself to take in cities beyond the strict limits of Achaia. Early in the fourth century before Christ we find the Ætolian town of Kalydôn not only an Achaian possession, but admitted to the rights of Achaian citizenship.⁴ Naupaktos also appears as held by the Achaians, but on what terms is not so clear.⁵ In every

Early
Union
among the
Cities.

B.C. 391.

¹ Pol. ii. 39.

² Pol. ii. 41. Μετέστησαν εἰς δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολιτείαν. λοιπὸν ἤδη τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους μέχρι τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυναστείας ἄλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἐχώρει τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολιτεύμα, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ συνέχειν λειπώοντο. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων.

³ Dict. Antiq. art. Achaicum Fœdus.

⁴ Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ ἔχοντες Καλυδῶνα, ἣ τὸ παλαιὸν Αἰτωλίας ἦν, καὶ πολίτας πεποιημένοι τοὺς Καλυδωνίους, φρουρεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο ἐν αὐτῇ.

⁵ Dēmōsthenēs says (Phil. iii. 44) that Philip promised to take

- CHAP. V. account of these transactions we find the Achaian people spoken of as one whole, acting with one will both in diplomatic and military affairs. They placed Federal garrisons in cities endangered by the enemy,¹ and commissioned Federal ambassadors to foreign powers.² At the same time it is easy to believe that the Federal tie may have been much less closely drawn than it was in the revived Confederation of after-times. Still that Confederation, as we shall presently see, was looked on as a mere revival of a past state of things interrupted for a while by foreign interference. We are hardly entitled to judge whether it was from any laxity in the formal constitution, or only from the fluctuations of parties so common in all Greek states, that the Achaian League did not, any more than that of Akarnania, invariably act as an united body throughout the Peloponnesian War. When that war broke out, all the Achaian cities remained neutral, except Pellênê, which took the side of Sparta;³ but at a later stage all twelve were enrolled as members of the Lacedæmonian alliance.⁴ Yet, in an intermediate stage, we find Patrai at least on the side of Athens, and, under Athenian influence, extending herself by Long Walls to the sea.⁵ During the wars of Epameinôndas,
- Probable greater laxity of the bond during the Old League.
- Achaia during the Peloponnesian War, B.C. 431.
- B.C. 413.
- B.C. 419.

Naupaktos from the Achaians and to give it to the Ætolians; οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπακτον δώμοκεν Αἰτωλοῖς παραδόνειν; Naupaktos, therefore, in B.C. 341, was an Achaian possession. But we read in Diodôros (xv. 75) that Epameinôndas, in B.C. 367, Δόμην καὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ Καλυδῶνα φρουρομένην ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν ἡλευθέρωσεν. If then we trust Diodôros, as Mr. Grote (x. 366) seems to do, we must suppose that the Achaians recovered Naupaktos between B.C. 367 and B.C. 341. But can we trust a writer who seems to think that Dymê needed deliverance from Achaian oppression?

¹ Xen. iv. 6. 1. Φρουρεῖν ἡναγκάζοντο.

² Ib. Οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ πρεσβεῖς πέμπονσιν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.

³ Thuc. ii. 9. cf. v. 58, where we find Pellênê supporting Sparta against Argos after the Peace of Nikias.

⁴ Thuc. ii. 9. Cf. Arnold's note, and vii. 34, where the Achaians are incidentally mentioned as Lacedæmonian allies.

⁵ Thuc. v. 52.

Pellênê adhered firmly to her Spartan policy, at a time when the other cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause.¹ At the same time we also get some glimpses of the internal state of the several cities. We read of local oligarchies,² which Epameinôndas found and left in possession, but which the home Government of Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan partisanship than before.³ But these oligarchies, probably introduced by Spartan influence, seem to have formed a mere temporary interruption to that general democratic character of the Achaian polity to which Polybios bears witness. Certain it is that Achaia was democratic at the accession of Alexander. He established as Tyrant in Pellênê one of her own citizens named Chairôn.⁴ This Chairôn was famous as a wrestler; he was also a Platonic philosopher, which leads Athênaios sarcastically to say that, in some of the worst features of his tyranny, he did but carry out his master's doctrines as

CHAP. V.
History of
Pellênê.
B.C. 368.

Tyranny of
Chairôn at
Pellênê,
before
B.C. 335.

¹ Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 15, 18. Afterwards Pellênê is found on the Theban side. 2. 11.

² Ib. vii. 1. 42. Στρατεύουσι πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐπ' Ἀχαιῶν, ἡγουμένου Ἐπαμεινώνδου. προσπεσόντων δ' αὐτῷ τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαιῆς, ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεύσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μήτε πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, &c.

³ Ib. vii. 1. 41—3. Grote, x. 365. Helwing, Geschichte des Ach-Bundes, p. 225.

⁴ Pseudo-Dem. π.τ.π. Ἀλεξ. 12. Ἀχαιοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ δῆμοκρατοῦντο, τούτων δ' ἐν Πελλήνῃ νῦν καταλέλυκε τὸν δῆμον ὁ Μακεδὼν ἐκβαλὼν τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς πλείστους, τὰ δ' ἐκείνων τοῖς οἰκέταις δίδωκε, Χαίρωνά δὲ τὸν παλαιστὴν τύραννον ἐγκατέστησεν. Paus. vii. 27. 7. Κατέλυσε [Χαίρων] πολιτείας, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τὴν ἐν Πελλήνῃ, δῶρον τὸ ἐπιφθονώτατον παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φιλίππου λαβὼν, τύραννος πατρίδος τῆς αὐτοῦ καταστήναι. This Chairôn could not therefore be, as Dr. Elder (Dict. Biog. art. Chæron) thinks, the same as the Chairôn who is mentioned by Plutarch (Alex. 3), for the latter was a citizen of Megalopolis, while both Pausanias and Athênaios distinctly mark Chairôn the Tyrant as a citizen of Pellênê.

CHAP. V. to the community of goods and women.¹ How Pellênê had offended the Macedonian King we know not, but it appears that the establishment of the tyranny was accompanied by the expulsion of a large proportion of the citizens.² This seems to mark some special ground of quarrel with the particular city of Pellênê; for Alexander would hardly have thus punished a single town for the share which all Achaia had taken in the resistance to his father at Chairôneia.³ The presence of this domestic Tyrant prevented Pellênê from joining with the other Achaian cities in the movement against the Macedonian dominion set on foot by Agis, King of Sparta.⁴ After the disastrous battle in which Agis fell, the Achaians and Eleians are said to have been condemned, by the anomalous body which then issued decrees in the name of Greece, to pay a hundred talents as indemnity to Megalopolis, which had embraced the Macedonian cause and had stood a siege at the hands of the allies.⁵ The establishment of Chairôn by Alexander was the beginning of the system which was more fully carried out by the succeeding Macedonian Kings. Kassander held several of the cities with his garrisons, which were driven out by Aristodêmos the

B.C. 380.

¹ Athen. xi. 119. Χαίρων ὁ Πελληνεύς, ὃς οὐ μόνον Πλάτωνι ἐσχόλακεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοκράτει, καὶ οὗτος οὖν τῆς πατρίδος πικρῶς τυραννήσας οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξήλασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς τούτων δούλοις τὰ κτήματα τῶν δεσποτῶν χαρισάμενος, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων γυναῖκας συνέκτισε πρὸς γάμου κοινωνίαν ταυτ' ὠφελήθεις ἐκ τῆς καλῆς Πολιτείας καὶ τῶν παρανόμων Νόμων.

² Pseudo-Dem. u.s.

³ Paus. vii. 6. 5. Τοῦ μὲν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ Φιλίππου τ' ἐνάντια καὶ Μακεδόνων [πολέμου] οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ μέτεσχον.

⁴ Æsch. Ktes. 165. Ἡλεῖοι δ' αὐτοῖς [Λακεδαιμονίοις] συμμετεβάλοντο καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ πάντες πλὴν Πελληναιῶν καὶ Ἀρκαδία πᾶσα πλὴν Μεγάλης πόλεως, αὕτη δὲ ἐπολιορκεῖτο, κ.τ.λ.

⁵ Q. Curt. vi. 1. 19, 20. They were condemned by the "Concilium Græcorum." So Diodōros (xvii. 73) speaks of τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον. That is to say, Alexander's synod at Corinth. See above, p. 129. Yet it is possible that Diodōros may here too have been dreaming of the Amphiktyons.

general of Antigonos from Patrai, Aigion, and Dyme.¹ In the case of Patrai and Aigion, this expulsion is spoken of by our informant as a liberation,² but the Dymaiares resisted the liberators in the cause of what the same historian calls their independence.³ Whatever we make of this language, it at least points to a difference of political feeling in the different cities. Dêmêtrios also, in the days when the son of the King of Asia gave himself out as the champion of Grecian freedom, expelled Kassander's garrison from Boura, and gave to that city also something which is spoken of as independence.⁴ But when Dêmêtrios became King of Macedonia, he seems to have walked in the way of his predecessors, and both he and his son Antigonos are mentioned among the princes under whom some of the cities were occupied by Macedonian garrisons and others by local Tyrants.⁵ At what moment the League definitely fell asunder it is hard to say: the process, doubtless, was gradual; but as Antigonos Gonatas⁶ is mentioned among the Kings who had a hand in the evil work; and, as it was at no very advanced stage of his

CHAP. V.

B.C. 314.

Achaia
under the
Successors;

B.C. 303.

B.C. 294.

under
Antigonos
Gonatas,
circa
B.C. 288.

¹ Diod. xix. 66.

² Ib. Πάτρας μὲν ἡλευθέρωσε . . . τοῖς Αἰγίευσιν κατὰ δόγμα τὴν ἡλευθερίαν βουλόμενος ἀποκαταστήσαι.

³ Ib. Παρακαλέσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς αὐτονομίας.

⁴ Ib. xx. 103. Δημήτριος . . . Βούραν μὲν κατὰ κράτος εἶλε, καὶ τοῖς πολίταις ἀπέδωκε τὴν αὐτονομίαν.

⁵ Pol. ii. 41. Pausanias (vii. 7. 1) strangely says that no Achaian city but Pellênê was ever under a Tyrant, seemingly confounding the time of Alexander with that of the Antigonids; *τυράννων τε γὰρ πλὴν Πελληνῆς αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα ἀπείρως ἐσχέκασαν.*

⁶ Antigonos Gonatas first began to play a prominent part during his father's lifetime, about B.C. 288, when he was left in command of Dêmêtrios' garrisons in Greece. This was probably the time when Antigonos completed the dissolution of the League. Its complete dissolution is expressed by Polybios (ii. 40, 41) in the words *κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων.* The formula *ἐκ Μακεδονίας* may well express Dêmêtrios and Antigonos when they were not in actual possession of the Macedonian throne. Cf. Niebuhr, *Lect. on Anc. Hist.* iii. 259, Eng. Tr. Strabo, viii. c. 7. (vol. ii. p. 220).

CHAP. V. reign that the cities began again to draw together, it would seem that the period of complete isolation cannot have been very long, and that the work of reunion must have been found proportionably easy.

Twelve original cities.

Loss of Helikê, [B.C. 373,] and of Olenos.

The twelve cities of the original League, as enumerated by Polybios,¹ were Helikê, Olenos, Patrai, Dymê, Pharai, Tritaia, Leontion, Aigeira, Pellênê, Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia. Of these Helikê seems to have been originally the chief; its great temple of Poseidôn² was the seat of the religious meetings of the Achaian people, and the city was probably also the seat of the Federal Government.³ But Helikê was swallowed up by an earthquake, and its site covered by the sea, long before the dissolution of the old League.⁴ Olenos also was deserted by its inhabitants⁵ at some time before the revival of the League, so that ten cities only were left. Of these, since the loss of Helikê, Aigion was the greatest.⁶ It was the seat of the Federal Government under the revived League in the very latest times,⁷ as

¹ Pol. ii. 41.

² See Strabo, l. viii. c. 7. p. 220. Paus. vii. 24. 5.

³ Not necessarily, for Korôneia was the religious centre of Bœotia, while Thebes was the political head.

⁴ Paus. vii. 24. 6, et seqq. Strabo, u.s. Pol. ii. 41. This destruction is by Pausanias ascribed to the wrath of Poseidôn at some suppliants being dragged away from his altar. In this, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 88) says, "we perceive a symptom of some violent political agitation."

⁵ See Leake, Morea, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 90. The expression of Strabo, οὐ συνεληθόσης, might, by itself, have inclined one to Colonel Leake's view that Olenos survived till the Roman times, and refused to join the revived Achaian League. But there can be no doubt that Bishop Thirlwall is, as usual, right. Had Olenos remained as a considerable city during the time of the second League, we could hardly fail to have come across some mention of it in the history of Polybios. And Polybios himself distinctly implies that Olenos had perished before his day. ii. 41. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν συμβαίνει διαμένειν, πλὴν Ὀλέου καὶ Ἐλίκης τῆς πρὸ τῶν Λευκτρικῶν ὑπὸ Θαλάσσης καταποθείσης. It is an important point in the Federal history that the revived League was joined by all the Achaian cities which still existed.

⁶ Paus. vii. 7. 2.

⁷ Ib. vii. 24. 4.

it most probably had been during the later days of the earlier one. Of the exact nature of the Federal union under the old system, of the titles and duties of the Federal magistrates, we know absolutely nothing. In a curious story told by Strabo when recording the destruction of Helikê, we find a distinct mention of the Federal Assembly as something appealed to and passing a vote; but we also find the vote as distinctly disobeyed by the contumacious canton of Helikê.¹

CHAP. V.
Traces of
Federal
action
under
the Old
League.

Thus, at the time of the Gaulish invasion, ten Achaian cities existed, but there was no Achaian League. The ten cities were ten distinct political units; some of them too were held by Macedonian garrisons, others by local Tyrants. It was the interest of every Macedonian prince to prolong this state of things; it was the interest of every Achaian, and indeed of every Greek, to put the speediest possible end to it. At last the favourable moment came. Several of the Kings were dead; Pyrrhos was absent in Italy; Macedonia was in utter confusion. The cities of Patrai and Dymê, which, since the desertion of Olenos, were the two most western cities of the Achaian shore, took the first steps towards the revival of the old confederacy.² The inland cities of Tritaia and Pharai soon joined them, and these four became the nucleus of the great Federal republic of Peloponnêsos. Their union was looked on so completely as a mere revival of a past lawful state of things that its terms were not publicly recorded on a pillar, as was usually done with treaties between separate

Begin-
nings of
the revived
League.
Union of
Patrai and
Dymê,
[B.C. 280.]

of Tritaia
and
Pharai.

¹ The "Ionians expelled from Helikê;" that is, probably their descendants in Asia, ask either for the actual image of Poseidôn, or at least for leave to make a model of it. The people of Helikê refuse, the Ionians appeal to the Federal body (Strabo, p. 221), οὐ δόντων δὲ, πέμψαι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τῶν δὲ ψηφισαμένων, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπακούσαι. If one can trust the details of such a story, the word πέμψαι might imply that the Federal Assembly was in session, and not at Helikê.

² Pol. ii. 41. See Clinton, Fast. Hell. ii. 204.

CHAP. V. Grecian states, and as was done in after times on the accession of fresh cities to the League.¹ Of the circumstances of their union we know nothing; Polybios does not mention the presence either of garrisons or of Tyrants in these particular cities; his words might seem rather to imply that they were free from either scourge, but only that the circumstances of the time had led to an opposition of feelings and interests among them.² As to the next stages of the process the historian is more explicit. Aigion had a garrison, Boura and Keryneia were ruled by Tyrants. Five years after the union of Patrai and Dymê, the people of Aigion themselves expelled their garrison and joined the Union. Boura was freed, and its Tyrant slain, by the people of the city, aided by their already liberated brethren.³ Iseas, the Tyrant of Keryneia, watching the course of events and seeing that he would probably be the next attacked, voluntarily surrendered his power, and, having obtained security for his own safety, he annexed his city to what Polybios, now for the first time, calls by the proud title of the Achaian League.⁴

Union of
Aigion,
[B.C. 275,]
Boura,

and Kery-
neia.

Extension
of the
League to
all Achaia.

Seven cities were now in strict union; we know not the steps by which the two eastern towns of Aigeira and Pellenê were recovered, but their annexation could not

¹ Pol. ii. 41. οὐδὲ στήλην ὑπάρχει συμβάλει τῶν πόλεων τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας. Cf. xxv. 1. xxvi. 1. τοὺς ὄρκους, τοὺς νόμους, τὰς στήλας, & συνέχει τὴν κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν ἡμῶν.

² Pol. u.s. Πατρεῖς ἤρξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ Δυμαῖοι . . . ἤρξαντο μετανοήσαντες συμφρονεῖν. His general description does not imply that every city had either a garrison or a Tyrant. συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις χωρισθείσας ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐναντίας τὸ συμφέρον ἀγειν ἀλλήλαις· ἐξ οὗ συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἐμφορούρους γένεσθαι . . . τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι.

³ The words ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις Βούριοι τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες (Pol. ii. 41) followed presently by ἀπολωλὸτα δὲ τὸν ἐν τῇ Βούρᾳ τύραννον διὰ Μάρκου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν show the combined action of the Bourians themselves and of the confederate cities.

⁴ Ib. Προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύστημα.

have been long delayed ; and the inland city of Leontion, already hemmed in by the territory of the liberated towns, must have been recovered even sooner. The ten cities of Achaia Proper thus formed the revived League in its first estate, and for about thirty years they grew up in peace and obscurity. Their very insignificance was no doubt among their advantages, as sheltering them from the notice of enemies. A germ of freedom was thus allowed to grow steadily up in a corner of Greece, which, if it had appeared at Athens or Corinth, would have been at once crushed in the bud. One city indeed, immediately after the reconstruction of the League, suffered a blow which forms almost the whole of the external history of Achaia during this period. The people of Patrai crossed over to help the Ætolians, with whom they were then on friendly terms, in their struggle with the Gaulish invaders. The Patrian contingent suffered so severely that this loss, combined with the general poverty of the time, led most of the inhabitants to leave the city of Patrai, and to found smaller towns in the adjoining territory.¹ It does not however appear that this process at all affected the political position of Patrai as an Achaian city ; the inhabitants of Argyra, Bolimê, and the other country towns, doubtless retained their Patrian franchise, just like Athenian citizens living in an Attic Dêmos. And indeed the Gaulish invasion itself, by its temporary overthrow of the Macedonian power, must have conferred indirect benefits on the League in general which far more than counterbalanced any losses sustained by the single city of Patrai. Unobserved, apparently, and uncared for, the ten Achaian

Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War, B.C. 279.

¹ Paus. vii. 18. 6. κατὰ χώραν ὑπὸ φιλεργίας ἐσκεδδάσθησαν. He goes on to say that these small townships were all reunited to Patrai by Augustus Cæsar, and the restored city raised to the rank of a Roman colony. These townships must be the Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο συντελικόν in Pol. xl. 3. Cf. v. 94, for a similar phrase about another town. Strabo (vol. iii. p. 224) says that each of the original twelve cities consisted of eighteen δῆμοι.

CHAP. V. cities had time to strengthen their habits of freedom and good government, to develop their political constitution, and gradually to prepare themselves for the day when their League was to step forward as the general champion of Grecian freedom and as one of the great political lights of Greece and the world.

Quiet and peaceful growth of the League, B.C. 280-251.

Names of individuals.

Markos of Keryneia.

B.C. 255.

B.C. 229.

Markos probably the true Founder of the League.

During this time there are only two names of individuals which we can connect with the course of our history ; these are two citizens of the small town of Keryneia, Iseas and Markos. Of neither of them is much recorded, but quite enough to make us wish that we knew more. Of Markos we shall hear again, and always honourably ; Polybios gives his whole career the highest praise ;¹ twenty years after his first appearance he was chosen the first sole General of the League ;² twenty-six years later still, the noble old man, still in the active service of his country, perished in a sea-fight against the pirates of Illyria.³ But it is the earlier exploits of Markos which we desire to know more in detail. He would almost appear to have been the Washington of the original League, though his fame has been obscured by the later and more brilliant services of Aratos. A day came when the deliverance of Boura seemed a small matter compared to the deliverance of Sikyôn and Akrokorinthos ; but, in the day of the deliverance of Boura, that small success was of greater moment than the greatest successes of later and more prosperous times. The very name of the hero, Italian rather than Greek,⁴ raises curiosity as to his origin and history. He was a citizen of Keryneia, but we find

¹ Pol. ii. 10. *Μάρκος ὁ Κερυνεύς, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῇ κοινῇ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματι πεποιηκὼς μέχρι τῆς καταστροφῆς.*

² Pol. ii. 43.

³ Pol. ii. 10.

⁴ Brandstätter (*Geschichte Ätoliens*, 202) makes the true form *Μάργος* and not *Μάρκος*. But would not *Μάργος* be a name quite as strange on other grounds ? I follow Thirlwall and Bekker's Polybios.

him acting in the interests of the League, and apparently as the leader of its councils, at a time when Keryneia itself was still under the sway of its Tyrant. Markos was the chief leader¹ in the movement, of whatever nature it was, by which the liberated cities were able to extend their help to the patriots of Boura. It is impossible to believe that Markos can have been at this time an inhabitant of his native town; it can hardly be doubted that he was an exile in the cause of freedom, who offered his services to the infant League, and was most likely admitted to the citizenship of one of its members. Iseas again, the Tyrant of Markos' own city, is a man of whom we should gladly know more. He was the first of several Tyrants who had the wisdom and magnanimity to give up their ill-gotten and dangerous power, and to confine their ambition within the bounds of such honours as a free state can confer upon its citizens. If Markos was the precursor, in some respects the nobler precursor, of Aratos, Iseas may well have been the worthy precursor of Lydiadas. We must always remember what a Greek Tyranny was. It was royal, or more than royal, power possessed by one man in a state where monarchy was not the lawful constitution. It therefore necessarily implied the internal political bondage of the city. At this period of Grecian history a Tyranny also commonly implied, what in earlier times it did not, a state of external dependence on a foreign power. The Tyrant ruled under Macedonian protection, often by the help of Macedonian troops. The Tyrannies of this age were therefore, for the most part, something far worse than the earlier Tyrannies of Peisistratos or even of Periander. Two widely different periods, in both of which Tyrannies were common, are divided by a long interval. During the fifth century before Christ and the greater part of the fourth, Tyranny was rare

CHAP. V.

Iseas of
Keryneia
abdicates
the Ty-
ranny.

Nature of
the Greek
Tyrannies.

Difference
between
the earlier
and later
Tyrannies.

¹ Pol. ii. 41. Διδὲ Μάρκου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.

CHAP. V. in Greece proper, and almost unknown in the chief cities.¹ The Tyrant of the old times, Peisistratos of Athens or Kleisthenês of Sikyôn, was a party leader, who commonly reigned with the good will of at least a part of the citizens; at all events nothing hindered him from seeking either the external greatness or the internal splendour of his city. Corinth was never so great as under Periander, or Samos so great as under Polykratês. But the Tyrant of the Macedonian age commonly obtained his power by sheer violence, and ruled simply by the spears of foreign mercenaries. Still it must be remembered that the mere word Tyrant, in its Greek use,² expresses only the illegal nature of the Tyrant's power, and does not necessarily imply any oppressive exercise of it. The Tyrant's position indeed offered every opportunity of oppression and every temptation to oppress, but the position itself does not necessarily convict a man of cruelty or rapacity. When the Tyrant came to his power by hereditary succession, the son would often be, like the younger Dionysios, if weaker, at all events less oppressive than his father. In the later period Tyrannies were less commonly transmitted from father to the son than in the earlier, but on the other hand it is easy to understand that absolute power may now, from another set of causes, have sometimes fallen into better hands, and have been employed for better purposes. Tyranny was now quite common

B. C. 625-
585.
B. C. 530-
522.

¹ Tyrants were common enough at this time in Sicily and elsewhere among the colonial Greeks, but there were very few in Old Greece between the fall of the Peisistratids and the age of the Successors. Euphrôn at Sikyôn and Timophanês at Corinth are the most famous exceptions. The Thessalian Tyrants have perhaps more in common with the Tyrannies of the later period, of which they may be looked upon as the beginning.

² See above, p. 22. I do not see the gain of substituting, with Mr. Grote, the word "Despot" for "Tyrant" as the translation of the Greek *τύραννος*. Whichever we use must be used in a fixed technical sense, differing somewhat from its usual modern meaning. Europe now contains several Despots, but only one *τύραννος*.

and familiar; though hereditary dynasties were seldom founded, yet many cities were under the government of several Tyrants in uninterrupted succession; republican government may often have been unknown to two or three generations of citizens.¹ In such an age, a man ambitious of power, and to whom no nobler way of obtaining it presented itself, may have grasped at the Tyranny as his only path to greatness, without the least intention of inflicting any wanton oppression upon his countrymen.² It is clear that there were the same sort of differences among the Greek instruments of Macedonia as we have seen in our own times among the Italian instruments of Austria.³ No fair person would confound the government of the deposed ruler of Tuscany with the government of the deposed ruler of Naples. But Greece saw, what Italy has not seen, Tyrants prudent and noble-minded enough to lay down the Tyranny of their own will, and honestly to adapt themselves to a change which they could not, and may not have wished to, avert. Such was the noble Lydiadas of Megalopolis, whom we shall soon meet with as one of the brightest glories of the League. Such may

¹ When Aratos delivered Corinth in B.C. 243, the Corinthians had not had the keys of their own city since the time of Philip—ninety-five years. Plut. Arat. 23.

² "The Tyrants consisting of his [Antigonos Gonatas'] partisans were men of very different characters: some were moderate and bearable persons, while others were extremely cruel." Niebuhr, Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259.

³ An objection may be brought against a parallel between the Greek Tyrants and "legitimate" rulers like the deposed Italian Princes. But all the dynasties lately reigning in Italy reigned only by virtue of treaties contracted by foreign powers, to which those who alone were concerned were no parties. The Princes of Lorraine, though one of them was probably the best despot that ever reigned in Europe, had really less right in Tuscany than the old Visconti had in Milan. This sort of legitimacy was something quite unknown in old Greece, and I cannot help thinking that if a specimen had appeared, whether in the form of an individual ruler or a whole dynasty, Greek political thinkers would have set it down as a case of *τυραννίς* rather than of lawful *βασίλεια*.

CHAP. V. well have been Iseas of Keryneia in its earlier days. And it must have required yet greater vigour in Iseas to set such an example¹ than it required in Lydiadas, a generation later, to follow it. For Iseas, when alarmed for the security of his power, did not fly, as many a meaner tyrant has done, and leave his city to its fate; he did not ask his royal patron for support against the encroaching spirit of freedom; he laid down his power, and, trusting to the faith of the Confederate cities, he himself annexed Keryneia to the League.² Of his subsequent career we know nothing; Polybios does not tell us whether Iseas, like Lydiadas and Aristomachos, lived to know how much really greater is the position of the republican magistrate than that of the despotic prince. But the conduct of Iseas shows a prudence or a magnanimity, or rather an union of the two, which at once stamps him as no common man. And it is honourable to the otherwise insignificant town of Keryneia to have produced the only two men whose names we know during this first period of the League's history, and both of them men of whom the little that we know makes us anxious for a more intimate knowledge.

¹ I know of only one clear example of a Greek Tyrant in the earlier period willingly surrendering his power. This is Kadmos, Tyrant of Kōs, contemporary with the Persian War, who gave up his Tyranny—*ἐκὼν τε εἶναι καὶ θεοῦ ἐπιόντος οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ἐς μέσον Κήφοισι καταθεὶς τὴν ἀρχήν* (Herod. vii. 164). He did not however, like Lydiadas, remain as a private citizen in the city where he had ruled.

There is also the story of the contemplated abdication of Maiandrios of Samos. Herod. iii. 142.

² The article Iseas in the Dictionary of Biography hardly does justice to our Keryneian Tyrant. Mr. Bunbury says that Iseas "judged it prudent to provide for his personal safety by voluntarily abdicating the sovereign power, whereupon Ceryneia immediately joined the Achaians," as if Iseas had no hand in uniting Keryneia with the League. Now the words of Polybios (ii. 41) are *ἀποθέμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν τὰ πιστὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύστημα*. This surely implies that Iseas, just like Lydiadas, was himself the chief promoter of the union.

§ 3. *Of the Achaian Federal Constitution.*

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It must have been in the course of these years, during which the League was growing up in peaceful obscurity, that that Federal Constitution was formed which was afterwards extended over so large a portion of Greece. As usual, however, we have to frame our account of it from incidental notices, from general panegyrics, and from records of particular changes in detail. We cannot lay our hands on any one document, on any Declaration of Independence, on any formally enacted Federal Constitution, to act as a decisive authority in our inquiries. We may console ourselves with the thought that an inquirer at any equal distance of time will have to frame his picture of the British Constitution from information of exactly the same kind. Certainly he will not find any one authoritative document clearly setting forth the powers of King, Lords, and Commons, or exactly defining the Prerogative of the Crown, the Privilege of Parliament, and the Liberty of the Subject. Still less will he find any such document setting forth such hardly less important points as the nature of Government and of Opposition, or explaining the exact constitution of the Cabinet and the functions of the Leader of the House of Commons. But, though no such document has survived to our time, we have every reason to believe that the Achaian Constitution, unlike the British Constitution, was enacted and recorded by public authority. The first union of the four towns was looked on as a mere revival of the old League, probably on the laxer terms of union on which that old League seems to have been formed. We have seen that it did not hinder Patrai from acting independently of his confederates in the Gaulish War¹ just as we saw Pellênê,

¹ See above, p. 247.

CHAP. V. under the old League, acting independently of its confederates in the Peloponnésian War.¹ Such a course would have been contrary to every principle of the Federal Constitution in the days of its maturity. Most probably, when all the surviving Achaian towns were reunited, the union was intentionally made more intimate, and its terms were enacted and recorded by common consent.² No such

Probable enactment of the Federal Constitution, B.C. circa 274.

Sources of Information.

document however is preserved to us; and we have to form our ideas of the Achaian Constitution chiefly from the incidental notices and general comments of Polybios, and from such further incidental notices as are to be found in writers like Plutarch, Pausanias, and Strabo. Polybios unfortunately does not begin his detailed narrative till a later period, when in truth the most interesting portion of the League's history had passed by. Of its foundation and its earlier fortunes he gives a mere sketch, but it is a sketch for which we may well be thankful, a sketch clear and masterly as might be looked for from such a hand.

The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only.

We have abundant evidence to show that the Federal Constitution was formed while the League still embraced only the small towns of the original Achaia. The greater cities which afterwards joined the Union were admitted into a body the relations and duties of whose members were already fixed and well understood. This will plainly appear, if only from one or two points in the constitution which were suited only to the circumstances of the original Achaian towns, and which were found to be a source of inconvenience, and even of unfairness, when the Union was extended over a wider territory.

Democratic Constitution of the League.

The whole constitution of the League was Democratic. Polybios constantly praises it as the truest and purest of all Democracies.³ Yet we shall soon see that Democracy

¹ See above, p. 240.

² Thirlwall, viii. 89, 90.

³ Pol. ii. 38. Ἰσχυροῦς καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς

in Achaia was practically a very different thing from Democracy at Athens. It is possible that Polybios might have looked upon the constitution of Athens as an Ochlocracy as opposed to the true Democracy of his own land. But the fact rather is that in theory Achaia was as strictly democratic as Athens, but that the circumstances of the League unavoidably tempered the Achaian Democracy in practice in a way in which nothing occurred to temper the Athenian Democracy. In both alike the sovereign power was vested in a Popular Assembly, in which every free citizen had an equal right to attend, speak, and vote. In both alike the People, and the People alone, enacted laws, elected magistrates, contracted alliances, declared war and peace. But in Achaia conditions which never arose at Athens modified this popular sovereignty in many ways. Far greater legal power was placed in the hands of particular magistrates. Far greater power of an indirect, though not an illegal, kind was thrown into the hands both of magistrates and other leading men. The Assembly indeed always remained the supreme and undisputed authority, but the powers even of that sovereign body would have appeared sadly curtailed in the eyes of a democrat whose ideas were formed solely on Athenian models.

Differences
between
Achaian
and
Athenian
Demo-
cracy.

The constitution of the League was strictly Federal. The Federal form of government now appears in its fullest and purest shape. Every city remained a distinct State, sovereign for all purposes not inconsistent with the higher sovereignty of the Federation, retaining its local Assemblies and local Magistrates, and ordering all exclusively local affairs without any interference from the central power. There is no evidence that the Federal Government, in its best days, ever directly interfered with

*σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εἶροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς
ὑπαρχούσης.*

CHAP. V.
Inde-
pendence
of the
several
Cities,
B.C. 221-
218.

B.C. 223.

Districts
subject to
particular
Cities.

the internal laws, or even with the political constitutions, of the several cities.¹ We read, as elsewhere in Greece, of local parties and local dissensions, and, in one case at least, at Megalopolis after the fall of Kleomenês, of a purely local lawgiver.² Kynaitha, after her union with the League, retained her local Polemarchs,³ and Aratos himself was once chosen General of the State of Argos,⁴ as an office quite distinct from that of General of the League. So little indeed did the Federal power meddle with the internal affairs of the several cities that it tolerated distinctions within their territories which seem hardly in accordance with the principles of universal equality on which the League itself was founded. That the League did not interfere with the peculiar relations between Patrai and her townships is not wonderful; they probably did not interfere with the full Patrian citizenship of their inhabitants.⁵ But Megalopolis certainly,⁶ and Corinth probably,⁷ had subject districts, whose

¹ On this subject see the excellent remarks of Schorn, p. 74, et seqq.

² Antigonos Dôson is said by Polybios (v. 93) to have given one Prytanis to the Megalopolitans as a lawgiver (*ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς νομοθέτην*). It was however by no means the policy of Antigonos to break through constitutional forms, and we may fairly conclude that Prytanis was named by the King at the request of the Megalopolitans themselves. His legislation however only gave rise to fresh disputes, and at last Aratos was sent by decree of the Federal Assembly (*κατὰ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δόγμα*) to reconcile the contending parties, which he effectually did. Here again there was no breach of the cantonal rights of Megalopolis. Aratos acted simply as a mediator. The two parties agreed on certain conditions, which the City of Megalopolis, not the Federal Government, caused to be engraved on a pillar in one of its temples. (*ἐφ' οἷς ἔληξαν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορᾶς, γράψαντες εἰς στήλην ἀνέθεσαν*.)

³ Pol. iv. 18.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 44. Ἄρατος δὲ στρατηγὸς αἰρεθεὶς ὑπ' Ἀργείων ἐπεισεν αὐτούς. κ.τ.λ.

⁵ See above, p. 247.

⁶ Plut. Phil. 13. Φιλοπομένην ἀπέστησε πολλὰς τῶν περιουκίδων κωμῶν. See Droysen ii. 464. Thirlwall, viii. 364. We shall come to this measure of Philopoimên's again in the course of the History.

⁷ Strabo's account of Tenea in the Corinthian territory sounds very

inhabitants appear to have had no direct share in the general Federal citizenship. We have seen this sort of relation among the aristocracies of Bœotia ; we shall meet with it again among the Swiss Cantons, aristocratic and democratic alike. But one would hardly have expected to find it amid the Equality and Fraternity of the Achaian League. But the toleration of such inequalities is really a necessary deduction from the doctrine of the sovereignty of each State within its own limits, just like the toleration of the "domestic institution" of the Southern States of America by a Federation which scrupulously excludes the word Slave from its own Constitution. But, though the several cities remained internally independent, we cannot doubt that their close union for all external purposes strongly tended to assimilate them to one another in their internal constitution and laws. It can hardly be supposed that the political constitution of any member of the League was other than democratic. We see the same phænomenon in the United States. The Federal Constitution merely provides that each State shall have a republican government¹ and shall not grant titles of nobility;² within these limits it may be as oligarchic or as democratic as it pleases. Any State that chose might transact all its affairs in a primary Assembly like those of Athens or Schwytz, and might give its chief magistrate no higher powers than those of an Athenian Archon. Or it might, as far as appears, make as near an approach to monarchy as would be implied in the creation of a Polish King or a Venetian Doge. For the existence of those Princes was never held to destroy the claim of Venice

Tendencies to assimilation among the Members of League, both in Achaia and America.

much as if it had been a *κῶμη περιουκίς* of Corinth. b. viii. c. 6 (vol. ii. p. 214). τὰ δ' ὕστατα καὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς πολιτεύεσθαι· προσθέσθαι τε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀποστάντας Κορινθίους. Cf. the Messénian districts mentioned by Polybios, xxv. 1.

¹ Art. 4. § 4.

² Art. 1. § 10. 1.

CHAP. V. and Poland to the title of Republics, and if any State chose to elect its Governor for life, he would certainly fill a position of greater power than either of them. Or, to come to differences which have really existed, the elective franchise in different States has at different times varied from universal suffrage and no property qualification to the requirement of a considerable freehold both in the elector and in the representative.¹ And the Federal Constitution respects all systems alike; the Federal franchise belongs to those, few or many, who possess the franchise in their own State.² But the different States have, since the establishment of the Federal Union, moved with remarkable unanimity in two directions. Nearly all have advanced in a democratic path by abolishing property qualifications, and all have advanced in what was once thought to be an aristocratic path by establishing two Legislative Chambers. So in Achaia a local oligarchy in any particular city could not possibly have kept its ground, while the constitution of the League itself and the local constitutions of the other cities were all of them democratic. It seems certain also that a citizen of any Achaian city was admitted to at least the private rights of citizenship, those of intermarriage and possession of landed property, in the other cities of the League.³ But it is hardly likely that an Achaian citizen could, as a citizen of the United States can, exchange at

¹ Smith's Comparative View of the Constitutions of the Several States, &c. (Philadelphia, 1796). Tables i. & ii.

² Art. i. § 2. 1. Cf. § 4. 1.

³ Thus much at least seems implied in the words *πολιτεία* and *συμπολιτεία*, which are so often used. Accordingly we find that Aratos, a citizen of Sikyon, had a house at Corinth. (Plut. Ar. 41. Kleom. 19.) So, when the League was broken up by the Romans, this intercommunion of property between different cities was forbidden. (Paus. vii. 16. 9.) It may be remembered that in the Olynthian Confederacy (see above, p. 198) these private rights were promised to the annexed cities.

will, or after a short time of residence, the franchise of his native State for that of another.¹ But the tendency to assimilation among the several cities was very strong. In the later days of the League it seems to have developed with increased force, till at last Polybios could say² that all Peloponnésos differed from a single city only in not being surrounded by a single wall. The whole peninsula employed the same coinage, weights, and measures, and was governed by the same laws, administered by the same magistrates, senators, and judges.

But while the Achaian Constitution strictly respected the local rights of the several cities, it in no wise allowed their local sovereignty to trench upon the higher sovereignty of the League. The Achaian League was, in German technical language, a *Bundesstaat* and not a mere *Staatenbund*.³ There was an Achaian nation,⁴ with a national Assembly, a national Government, and national Tribunals, to which every Achaian citizen owed a direct allegiance. The whole language of Polybios shows that every Achaian citizen stood in a direct relation to the Federal authority, and was in full strictness a citizen of the League itself, and not merely of one of the cities which composed it. The Achaian cities were not mere municipalities, but sovereign commonwealths.⁵ But in all external matters, in everything which concerned the whole Achaian body and its relations to other powers, the

The
League
really a
National
Govern-
ment.

¹ Aratos, as we have seen (p. 256), was once elected chief magistrate of Argos, but this was in a moment of great political excitement, and the fact hardly proves that a less distinguished Sikyonian could have held the office in an ordinary year.

² See the famous passage, ii. 37. The identity there spoken of seems to me merely to express the result of the assimilation spoken of in the text. It need not imply any compulsory introduction of uniformity, still less any extension of the powers of the Federal body in later times.

³ Helwing, p. 237. See above, p. 11. Cf. Tittmann, p. 675.

⁴ Ἔθνος. See above, pp. 13, 184.

⁵ In Greek phrase, πόλεις and not δῆμοι.

CHAP. V. Federal Government reserved to itself full supremacy.

No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities. Comparison with America.

No single city could, of its own authority, make peace or war, or commission Ambassadors to foreign powers. But it would appear that the separate action of the several cities was not quite so rigidly limited in the last respect as it is in the American Union. The cause of the difference is obvious. The American States, before their union into a Federal Republic, had been mere Colonies, mere dependencies of a distant Kingdom. Independent diplomatic action was something to which they had not been accustomed, and which they could cheerfully do without. It was a great advance in their condition when the right of acting on their behalf in dealings with other nations was transferred from a King over whom they had no control to a Federal President in whose appointment they themselves had a share. But the cities of the Achaian League, those at all events which lay beyond the limits of the original Achaia, had been, before their union, absolutely independent powers, accustomed to carry on wars and negotiations in their own names without reference to any superior authority. Even the rule of a Tyrant did not destroy this sort of independence; a single citizen indeed usurped powers which belonged of right to the whole body of citizens, but they were not transferred to any individual or any Assembly beyond the limits of the city. When the Tyrant was overthrown, this power, with the other powers which he had seized on, at once reverted to the people of the city. The right of direct intercourse with foreign powers is one of the last which an independent city or canton is willing to surrender to any central power, as we may see by the history of both the Swiss and the Dutch Confederations. For Sikyon, or Mantinea, or Megalopolis to forego this high attribute of sovereignty, and to entrust powers which it had once exercised without restraint to an Assembly in

which it had only one voice among many, was really no small sacrifice for the public good. It is rather to be wondered at that it was so easily surrendered by so many Peloponnesian cities, and that the loss was for the most part so peaceably acquiesced in. But while an Ambassador sent to or from New York or South Carolina is a thing unheard of, an Ambassador sent to or from Corinth or Megalopolis was a thing rare indeed, and perhaps irregular, but not absolutely without precedent. The Corinthians, after their union with the League, received separate Ambassadors from Rome,¹ before Rome was dangerous. They came indeed on a purely honorary errand; another embassy had transacted the political business between Rome and the League; still, whether of right or of special permission, the single city of Corinth did give audience to the Ambassadors of a foreign power. It is quite possible that for a single city to receive an embassy was not so strictly forbidden by the Federal Constitution as it was for a single city to commission an embassy. This last, it is clear, was forbidden by the general law of the League, just as it is forbidden² by the Constitution of the United States. Cases however occur in the course of Achaian history alike of the law being dispensed with and of the law being violated.³ We have a full account⁴ of one very curious instance of a single city entering into diplomatic

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Restriction
less strict
in Achaia.

B.C. 228.

Particular
Embassies
by licence
of the
Federal
body.

¹ Pol. ii. 12. We shall come across this embassy again in the course of the history.

² The Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) absolutely forbids all diplomatic action on the part of the several States, and the Confederate Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) repeats the prohibition. The looser Confederation of 1778 only forbade the receiving or sending Ambassadors "without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled." Art. vi. § 1. Cf. § 5.

³ Tittmann (678) mistakes these exceptions for the rule.

⁴ Pol. ii. 48-50.

- CHAP. V. relations with a foreign power by special permission of the national Congress. The fact of such a permission being asked shows that, without it, the proceeding would have been unlawful, but the fact of the permission being granted equally shows that the request was not looked upon as altogether unreasonable and monstrous. The occasion was no other than the fatal application to Macedonia for aid against Sparta, which was first made by an embassy sent from the single city of Megalopolis, but with the full permission of the Federal body.¹ This is perhaps the only recorded case of a breach of the rule during the good times of the League; and this took place in a season of extreme danger, and was the result of a deeply laid scheme of the all-powerful Aratos. In later times, when unwilling cities were annexed to the League by force, and when Roman intrigue was constantly sowing dissension among its members, we shall find not unfrequent instances of embassies sent from particular cities to what was practically the suzerain power. The old law
- B.C. 224. now needed special confirmation. It was agreed, in the first treaty between Achaia and Rome, that no embassy should be sent to Rome by any particular Achaian city, but only by the general Achaian body.² But this agreement was of course broken whenever its violation suited Roman interests. Sparta especially, and Messênê, cities joined to the League against their will, were constantly laying their real or supposed grievances at the feet of the Roman Senate. Here again we may learn the lesson
- Later ex-
ceptions
under
Roman
influence.
- B.C. 198.

¹ I shall narrate this curious proceeding in detail at the proper point of the history.

² Paus. vii. 9. 4. 'Αχαιῶν μὲν γὰρ εἴρητο ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ παρὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων βουλὴν ἀπέναι πρέσβεις, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἀπείρητο μὴ πρεσβεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις δοῦναι συνέδριον τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν μετείχον. See Thirlwall, viii. 90 (note). That this prohibition was an exception, and not simply the confirmation of an ancient rule rendered more needful on entering into relation with so powerful an ally, seems quite inconceivable.

that a Federal body can derive no strength from the in- CHAP. V.
corporation or retention of unwilling members.

The supreme power of the League was vested in the sovereign Popular Assembly. This was the Congress of the Union, differing from the Congress of the American Union mainly in this, that, according to the common political instinct of the Greek mind, it was a primary and not a representative Assembly.¹ The latter notion has indeed been maintained by two German scholars,² but no sound arguments are brought in support of their opinions, and it does not seem to have met with favour in any other quarter. There can be no doubt that every citizen of every city in the League, at all events every citizen who had attained the age of thirty years,³ had

The Assembly of the League.

The Democratic Constitution.

¹ It is spoken of as Ἀχαιοί, ἔθνος, σύνοδος, πλῆθος (Pol. iv. 9, 10, 14. v. 1. xxxviii. 2), οἱ πολλοί (xxviii. 4. xl. 4, ἀπορισθέντες εἰς ἐκκλησίαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, xxi. 7), ἐκκλησία (Pol. xxviii. 3), ὄχλος (xxviii. 7), ἀγορά (xxviii. 7. xxix. 9). These expressions explain those like συνέδροι (Plut. Ar. 35) and συνέδριον (Paus. u.s.) which might at first sight convey another idea, and which probably arose out of the practice of later times. See Niebuhr's Hist. Rome, ii. 30, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. p. 91, note. Tittmann, 680. The formal title of the body, as usual, is τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Pol. xxviii. 7. Boeckh, C. I. no. 1542. Paus. u.s.

² Helwing, p. 229. Drumann, p. 463. The chief argument adduced in behalf of this opinion is a single place of Polybios, where he remarks that a particular Assembly, in the very last days of the League, was attended by a greater number of people, and those of a lower class, than usual (Pol. xxxix. 4): καὶ γὰρ συνηθροίσθη πλῆθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον οὐδέποτε. This is merely the sort of language which a Tory historian would use in describing the first Reformed Parliament. It evidently implies that these people had a right to be there, but that so many of them had never before been known to come. Helwing argues that their presence was "gegen Gewohnheit und Gesetz." It was doubtless "gegen Gewohnheit," but not "gegen Gesetz." Droysen, who is generally disposed to make the constitution of the League more aristocratic than it really was, fully admits the popular character of the general Congress (ii. 462). Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186. n. 5. Eng. Tr. and the important note of Schorn, 371.

³ So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 91) infers from Polybios, xxix. 9, where he speaks of a σύγκλητος, ἐν ᾗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.

CHAP. V. a right to attend, speak, and vote. Every free Achaian, no less than every free Athenian, could give a direct voice in the election of the magistrates by whom he was to be governed, in the enactment of the laws which he was to obey, and in the declaration of the wars in which he might be called on to bear a part. The Achaian Constitution therefore is rightly called a Democratic Constitution. And yet nothing is plainer than that the practical working of Democracy in Achaia was something altogether different from the practical working of Democracy at Athens.¹ At the first glance we might almost be tempted to call the Achaian Constitution practically aristocratic rather than democratic. It is evident that birth, wealth, and official position carried with them an influence in Achaia which they did not carry with them at Athens. The Athenian Assembly was sovereign in the very highest sense; *Dēmos* was Tyrant, and he did not shrink from the name;² the Assembled People were not only a Parliament, but also a Government;³ an eloquent speaker might wield the fierce Democracy at pleasure, but a private citizen could do so just as easily as the highest Magistrate. The Assembly, in short, was really a master, and Magistrates were its mere servants to carry out its bidding. But in the Achaian Democracy we find a wholly different state of things. We find a President of the Union with large personal powers,

Aristocratic Element in Achaia.

Contrast with Athens.

¹ Kortüm (iii. 158) gives the Achaian system the appropriate name of "die gemässigte Demokratie."

² Thuc. ii. 63. *Τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρχήν].* Ib. iii. 37. *τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν.* Aristoph. Knights, 1110. *ὦ Δῆμε, καλὴν γ' ἔχεις Ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄνθρωποι δεδίασι σ' ὡς-Περ ἄνδρα τύραννον.* Ib. 1827. *δεῖξατε τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆςδε μόναρχον.* Ib. 1830. *χαῖρ', ὦ βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων.* Isok. Areop. 29. *δεῖ τὸν μὲν δῆμον ὥσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, τοὺς δὲ σχολὴν ἀγειν δυναμένους καὶ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν ὥσπερ οἰκέτας.* Aristot. Pol. ii. 12. 4. *ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαρίζομενοι.* Ib. iv. 4. 26. *μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν.*

³ See above, p. 42.

a Cabinet Council acting as the President's advisers, and a Senate invested with far higher functions than the mere Committee of the Assembly which bore the same title at Athens. In short, at Athens the People really governed; in Achaia they did little more than elect their governors and say Aye or No to their proposals. CHAP. V.

It will be at once seen that these differences all tend to make the Achaian Constitution approach, far more nearly than that of Athens, to the state of things to which we are accustomed in modern Republics and Constitutional Kingdoms. And they all spring from the different position of Democracy as applied to the single City of Athens and Democracy as applied to a Federal State embracing a large portion of Greece. The Athenian Assembly was held at a man's own door; the Achaian Assembly was held in a distant city.¹ It follows at once that the Athenian Assembly was held much oftener than the Achaian Assembly and was much more largely attended by citizens of all classes. The Athenian Assembly was held thrice in each month; the Achaian Assembly was held of right only twice in each year. The poorest citizen could regularly attend at Athens, where a small fee recompensed his loss of time; the poor Achaian must have been unusually patriotic if he habitually took two journeys in the

Achaian Constitution a nearer approach to modern systems.

Causes of the Difference, arising mainly from the greater extent of Territory.

¹ Some of the Attic Dêmoi are undoubtedly further from Athens than some of the old Achaian towns are from Aigion; but no point of Attica is so distant from Athens as Dymê, for instance, is from Aigion, so that, on the whole, the rural Athenians were nearer to the capital than the Achaians, even of the older towns, were to the seat of the Federal Government. Also the city of Athens and its ports must always have contained a very large proportion of the citizen population, while Aigion was merely one town out of ten or twelve. Still the old Achaia is not very much larger than Attica—in superficial extent it is probably smaller—and it might perhaps have been possible to have united it by a *συνουκισμός* instead of by a merely Federal tie. The essential differences between Athens and Achaia begin to show themselves most clearly when the League began to extend itself over much more distant cities, which no tie but a Federal one could, according to Greek notions, ever have connected.

CHAP. V. year at his own cost to attend the Assembly at Aigion. For the Athenian Treasury could easily bear the small fee paid to the citizens for attendance in the Assembly, but no amount of wealth in the Federal Treasury of Achaia could have endured such a charge as the payment of travelling expenses and recompense for loss of time to the whole free population of Argos and Megalopolis. The poor Athenian then was both legally and practically the political equal of his richer neighbour; the poor Achaian, though he laboured under no legal disqualification, laboured under a practical disqualification almost bordering on disfranchisement. The Achaian Assembly practically consisted of those among the inhabitants of each city who were at once wealthy men and eager politicians. Those citizens came together who were at once wealthy enough to bear the cost of the journey and zealous enough to bear the trouble of it. It was, in fact, practically an aristocratic body, and it is sometimes spoken of as such.¹ Its aristocratic character may have been slightly modified by the possible presence of the whole citizen population of the town where the Assembly met. But we may doubt whether even they would, on ordinary occasions, be so eager to attend an Assembly of such a character as they might have been if the democratic spirit had been more predominant in it. But, if they did, though some effect is always produced by the presence and the voices of any

The Assembly chiefly attended by rich men.

The Assembly practically Aristocratic.

¹ In Livy (xxxii. 21) the Achaian General Aristainos addresses the Assembly as *Principes Achaeorum*. But, especially as it comes in a speech, we cannot be quite certain that this expression really answers to anything in Polybios or any other Greek author. But it would fairly enough express the class of persons of whom the Assembly was mainly composed, for *Principes* (see Livy, xxxiii. 14) does not always mean magistrates, but leading men, whether in office or not. Polybios (iv. 9) has the phrase *προεδράτες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν*, but this evidently means the *Δαμοφροί* as Presidents of the Assembly, not any aristocratic class. It is just possible that the words in Livy may be a formal address to the *Δαμοφροί* as Presidents, like our "Mr. Speaker."

considerable body of men, still, as they could at most control a single vote, their presence would be of but little strictly constitutional importance. The Congress, democratic in theory, was aristocratic in practice. This contrast of theory and practice, which Aristotle¹ had fully understood long before the days of the League, runs through the whole of the Achaian institutions. By Continental scholars, less used to the working of free governments than those of our own land, it seems not to have been thoroughly understood. They have often imagined the existence of legal restrictions, when the restriction was in fact one which simply made itself. They see that the Assembly was mainly filled by members of an aristocratic class, and they infer that it must have been limited by law to a fixed body of representatives. They see that offices were mainly confined to the rich and noble, and they infer that the rich and noble must have

Not understood by Continental Scholars.

¹ Arist. Pol. iv. 5. 3. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλὰ τοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὅστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πόλιν παρ' ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ' ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον.

So again, in a passage which almost reads like a prophetic description of the League, and which indeed may have been true of the small Achaia of his times (Pol. v. 8. 17); *μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν . . . τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἀρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν*. He goes on to say that this happens when offices are unpaid, as they were in Achaia.

Compare Hamilton's remarks in the "Federalist," No. lviii. (p. 318). "The people can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will for ever admonish them, that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine may be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed."

The Achaian Government however never deserved the name of an Oligarchy. It was an Aristocracy in the literal sense of the word.

CHAP. V. had a legal monopoly of office. To an Englishman both Analogies in Eng- phænomena are perfectly simple. What happened in land. Achaia is merely what happens daily before our own eyes in England. Every Achaian citizen had a right to a seat in the Assembly, but practically few besides the high-born and wealthy exercised that right. Every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to the highest offices, but practically the choice of the nation seldom fell upon poor men. So the poorest British subject is legally eligible to the House of Commons equally with the richest, but we know that it is only under exceptional circumstances that any but a rich man is likely to be elected. Even while the property qualification lasted, it was not the legal requirement which kept out poor men, but the practical necessity which imposed, and still imposes, a standard of wealth much higher than that fixed by the old law.¹ And moreover, it is in the most purely democratic constituencies, in the "metropolitan" boroughs for instance, that a poor man has even less chance of election than elsewhere.

The As- But though the Democratic Constitution of Achaia pro- sembly aristo- duced what was practically an Aristocratic Assembly, it cratic but not olig- must not be thought that Achaian democratic institutions archic. were mere shadows. The working of the Federal Constitution was aristocratic, but it was not oligarchic. The leading men of Achaia were not a close and oppressive body, fenced in by distinct and odious legal privileges; their predominance rested merely on sufferance and conventionality, and the mass of the people had it legally in their power to act for themselves whenever they thought good. The members of the Assembly, meeting but rarely,

¹ The original form of the property qualification had at least an intelligible object. The requirement of real property was meant to serve a class interest. It included the landowner, even of moderate estate, while it excluded the merely monied man, however wealthy. But the property qualification, in its later form, when real property was not required, seems to have been absolutely meaningless.

and gathered from distant cities, could have had none of that close corporate feeling, that community of interest and habitual action, which is characteristic of the oligarchy of a single town. An Achaian who was led astray from his duty to the national interests, was much more likely to be led astray by regard to the local interests of his own city than by any care for the promotion of aristocracy or democracy among the cities in general. And, of whatever class it was composed, every description of the Assembly sets it before us as essentially a popular Assembly, numerous enough to share all the passions, good and bad, which distinguish popular Assemblies. It had all the generous emotions, all the life, heartiness, and energy, and all the rash impetuosity and occasional short-sightedness, of a really popular body. So our own House of Commons may, if we look solely to the class of persons of whom it is still mainly composed, be called an aristocratic body; but, when it comes together, it shows all the passions of a really democratic Assembly. Contrast it with a Spartan or Venetian Senate; contrast it even with our own House of Lords. So the Achaian Congress, though the mass of those present at any particular meeting might be men of aristocratic position, was still in spirit, as it was in name, an Assembly of the Achaian People. Its members could not venture on any oppressive or exclusive legislation against men who were legally their equals, and who had a perfect right, if they chose to encounter the cost and trouble, to take their places in the same Sovereign Assembly as themselves. We cannot doubt, and we find it distinctly affirmed of one occasion,¹ that, in times of great excitement, many citizens appeared in the Assembly who were not habitual frequenters of its sittings. Extraordinary Meetings, sum-

Practical
Demo-
cratical
elements.

¹ Pol. xxxix. 4. See above, p. 263. Compare the description of the tumultuous Assembly in Livy, xxxii. 22.

CHAP. V. moned by the Government to discuss special and urgent business, would, as a rule, be far more largely attended than the half-yearly Meetings in which the ordinary affairs of the Commonwealth were transacted.¹ And we must always remember that each city retained its independent democratic government, its Assembly sovereign in all local affairs, and in which Federal questions, though they could not be decided, were no doubt often discussed.² In the Assembly of the State, if not in the Federal Congress, rich and poor really met on equal terms, and many opportunities must have arisen for calling in question the conduct of those citizens who took an active part in Federal business. A Federal politician whose votes at Aigion were obnoxious to his fellow-citizens at home might be made to suffer for his delinquency in many ways. Thus the people at large held many checks upon those who were practically their rulers, and it was legally open to them to undertake at any time the post of rulers themselves. One can hardly doubt but that those citizens of any particular town who attended the Federal Congress practically acted as the representatives of the sentiments of that town. Thus, though the mass of Achaian citizens rarely took any part in the final decision of national affairs, yet the vote of the national Assembly could hardly ever be in opposition to the wishes of the nation at large.

Votes
taken by
Cities, not
by heads.



The votes in the Assembly were taken, not by heads, but by cities.³ On this mode of voting I have already had occasion to make some remarks.⁴ It was one common in the ancient republics, and it has become familiar to us

¹ See Pol. xxix. 9.

² Liv. xxxii. 19. Neque solum quid in senatu quisque civitatis suae aut in communibus conciliis gentis pro sententiâ dicerent ignorabant, &c.

³ See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, ii. 29, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. 92. Körtüm (iii. 160) maintains the contrary; but it is impossible to believe that passages like Liv. xxxii. 22, 3 and xxxviii. 32 merely mean that the citizens of the same town sat together in the theatre.

⁴ See above, p. 211.

by its employment in the famous Assembly of the Roman Tribes. Nor is it at all unknown in the modern world. It was the rule of the American Confederation of 1778,¹ and the present Constitution of the Union retains it in those cases where the election of a President falls to the House of Representatives.² In a Representative Constitution this mode of voting must be defended, if it be defended at all, upon other grounds ; in a Primary Assembly, like that of Achaia, it was the only way by which the rights of distant cities could be preserved. Had the votes been taken by heads, the people of the town where the Meeting was held could always have outvoted all the rest of the League. This might have been the case even while the Assembly was held at Aigion, and the danger would have been greater still when, in after times, Assemblies were held in great cities like Corinth and Argos. The plan of voting by cities at once obviated this evil. It involves in truth the same principle which led the Patrician Fabius and the Plebeian Decius to join in confining the city-populace to a few tribes, and which has led our own House of Commons steadily to reject all proposals for an increase in the number of "metropolitan" members. The representative system would of course have effectually secured the League against all fear of citizens from a distance being swamped by the multitude of one particular town. But the representative system had not been revealed to the statesmen of Achaia, any more than to those of other parts of Greece. As matters stood, the only remedy was to put neighbouring and distant cities on an equality by ordering that the mere number of citizens present from each town should have

Evils
against
which this
system
guarded.

¹ Articles of Confederation, Art. v. § 4.

² Art. ii. § 1. 3, and the 12th Amendment. The Confederate Constitution preserves the same rule, and introduces it in another case, namely the voting of the Senate on the admission of new States. Art. iv. § 3. 1.

CHAP. V. no effect on the division. And of course the most obvious form which such a regulation could take was to give a single vote to each city. And probably, while the League was confined to the ten towns of the old Achaia, no bad consequences arose from this arrangement. Some of the towns were doubtless larger than the others, but there could have been no very marked disparity among them. But it was quite another matter when the League took in great and distant cities like Sikyôn, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, at last even Sparta and Messênê. It was clearly unjust that such cities as these should have no greater weight in the national Congress than the petty towns of the old Achaia. It was the more unjust, because we can easily conceive that questions might arise on which the old ten towns would always stick close together, and so habitually outvote five or six of the greatest cities of Greece.¹ While the personal influence of Aratos lasted, questions of this sort seem to have remained pretty much in abeyance, but to provide a counterpoise to this undue weight of the old towns was one great object of the administration of Philopoimên. The most effectual remedy would of course have been to let the vote of each town count, as in the Lykian League,² for one, two, three, or more, according to their several sizes. But this was a political refinement which was reserved for a later generation, and it was one specially unlikely to occur to the mind of an Achaian legislator under the actual circumstances of the League. The cities external to the old Achaia were admitted, one by one, into an Achaian League, already regularly formed and practically working. In the earlier stages of its extension,

Evils
of the
Achaian
arrange-
ment of
votes.

¹ Schorn p. 61. In dieser Hinsicht strebte der Bund nach völlig demokratischer Freiheit und Gleichheit, was zwar späterhin einer Aenderung bedurft hätte, damit nicht die Herrschaft und Gesetzgebung bei den Schwachen gewesen wäre.

² See above, p. 210.

above all when the first step was taken by the union of CHAP. V. Sikyôn, the admission of new towns into the League was doubtless looked upon as a favour; in more degenerate times they were sometimes compelled to enter into the League by force. In neither of these cases was it at all likely that a city newly entering into the League should receive any advantage over those cities which already belonged to it. To have given Sikyôn two votes and Corinth three, while the small Achaian towns retained only one each, would have been no more than just in itself —if indeed it would have reached the strict justice of the case—but it would have been a political developement for which there was as yet no precedent, and which we can have no right to expect at the hands of Aratos or of any other statesman.¹ It was a great step in advance of anything that Greece had seen, when new cities were admitted into the League at all on terms of such equality as the Achaians offered. Greece had already seen petty Leagues among kindred towns or districts; she had seen great Confederacies gathered around a presiding, or it may be a tyrant, city; but she had never before seen any state or cluster of states offer perfect equality of political rights to all Greeks who would join them. The League offered to its newest members an equal voice in its Assemblies with the oldest; it made the citizens of all alike equally eligible to direct its counsels and to command its armies. It is hardly fair to blame a state which advanced so far beyond all earlier precedent merely because it did not devise a further improvement still. Had that improvement been proposed, anterior to the experience which proved its necessity, it would have appeared, to all but the deepest political thinkers, to contradict that equality among the

No fair
ground
of blame
against the
League.

¹ See Schorn, 67, 68. His strictures are perfectly just in themselves, but they are rather hard on Aratos and the Achaians merely for not possessing premature wisdom.

CHAP. V. several members which was the first principle of the Federal Constitution. Had any patriotic Corinthian claimed a double vote as due to the superior size and glory of his native city, he would have seemed to threaten Dymê and Tritaia with the fate which Thespia and Orchomenos had met with at the hands of Thebes. Lykia made exactly the improvement which was needed, because her legislators had the past experience of Achaia to profit by. The Achaian principle was revived in all cases under the first American Confederation, and it is retained in one very important case in the actual Constitution of the United States. Nor is it in all cases an error; the principle of equality of votes for every State, great and small, has always been adhered to in one branch of the Federal Legislature, and it has always been rightly defended as a necessary check on the supremacy of mere numbers. In short, though the Achaian Constitution failed, in this respect, to attain to the full theoretical perfection of the Lykian constitution, yet the League fully merits the enthusiastic praises of its own historian as the body which, without retaining selfish privileges or selfish advantages, first freely offered Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity to every inhabitant of Peloponnêsos.¹

General
merits
of the
Achaian
Constitu-
tion.

Short and
unfrequent
Meetings
of the
Assembly.

The same causes which made the Achaian Assembly practically an aristocratic body served also to make its sittings short and unfrequent. The League had no capital and no court; there was nothing to tempt men to stay at the place of meeting any longer than the affairs of the nation absolutely required. Every man's heart was with his hearth and home in his own city: he went up to do his duty in the Federal Assembly, and to offer sacrifice to the Federal God; but to tarry half the

¹ Pol. ii. 39, 42.

year away from his own house and his own fields was an idea which never entered the head of an Achaian politician. The Assembly met of right twice yearly,¹ in Spring and Autumn. The Magistrates were originally elected at the Spring Meeting, afterwards most probably in the Autumn.² The Session was limited to three days.³ Besides the two yearly Meetings, it rested with the Government to summon extraordinary Meetings, on occasions of special urgency.⁴ From the shortness of the Assembly's Sessions naturally followed certain restrictions on its powers, certain augmentations of the powers of the executive Government, which to an Athenian would have seemed the utter destruction of all democratic freedom.

From
R.C. 217.

Conse-
quent Re-
striction
on its
Powers.

¹ The two yearly Meetings are clearly implied in Pol. xxxviii. 2, 3. The Roman Ambassadors come to the Autumn Meeting at Aigion (*διαλεγόμενοι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν Αἰγίων πόλει*, c. 2). It is agreed that, instead of the Assembly coming to a decisive vote, the Ambassadors should meet some of the Achaian leaders in a diplomatic conference at Tegea. Kritolaos meets them there, and tells them that he can do nothing without the authority of the next Assembly, to be held six months after (*εἰς τὴν ἐξῆς σύνοδον, ἥτις ἐμελλε γενέσθαι μετὰ μῆνας ἕξ*). This was, of course, mere mockery, as a special Assembly could have been called, or special powers might have been obtained from the Meeting at Aigion, but the pretext shows the regular course of things.

The Autumn Meeting appears in Pol. ii. 54, iv. 14, xxiv. 12; the Spring Meeting in iv. 6, 7, 26, 27, 37. v. 1. So seemingly in xxviii. 7, by the name of *ἡ πρώτη ἀγορά*.

² See Schorn, p. 210. Thirlwall, viii. 295. Cf. Clinton, Fast. Hell. A. 146.

³ Pol. xxix. 9. Liv. xxxii. 22. Both of these are cases of an extraordinary Meeting (*σύγκλητος*). If this rule prevailed on such occasions, much more would it in the common half-yearly Meetings.

⁴ Pol. v. 1. *Συνήγαν [ὁ στρατηγὸς] τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν*. The words *κατὰ νόμους* in the next sentence show that this was a perfectly regular proceeding. Cf. Pol. xxiii. 10. 12. xxiv. 5.

In one case (Pol. iv. 7) we meet with a strange phenomenon of a Military Assembly, an idea Ætolian or Macedonian rather than Achaian. The ordinary Meeting votes that the General shall summon the whole force of the League in arms, and that the army thus assembled shall debate and determine (*συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ὃ δ' ἐν τοῖς συνελθοῦσι βουλευομένοις δόξῃ τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον*). This looks like an unusually small attendance at the regular Assembly. Cf. Livy, xxxviii. 33.

CHAP. V. It has been thought, on the highest of all authorities,¹ that, in an extraordinary Assembly at least—and an extraordinary Assembly would, almost by the nature of the case, have to deal with more important business than an ordinary one—a majority of the Executive Cabinet could legally refuse to allow any question to be put to the vote.

The Initiative practically in the Government.

This seems at least doubtful;² but it is evident that, in a Session of three days, the right of private members to bring in bills, or even to move amendments, must have been practically very much curtailed. No doubt the initiative always practically remained in the hands of the Government. In an extraordinary Assembly it was so in the strictest sense, as such an Assembly could only entertain the particular business on which it was summoned to decide.³ And in all cases, what the Assembly really had to do was to accept or reject the Ministerial proposals, or, it may be, to accept the counter-proposals of the leaders of Opposition.

Place of Meeting; first Aigion,

The ordinary Assemblies were, at least during the first period of the League, always held at Aigion; but it seems

¹ Thirlwall, viii. §1, 92.

² The passage referred to is Liv. xxxii. 22. See Schorn, 242. Here the *δαιμονιοί* are equally divided whether to put a certain question to the vote or not; but this does not prove that they had the power to refuse to put any question, because the objectors ground their refusal on the illegal nature of the particular motion. The case seems rather to be like the famous refusal of Sôkratês, when presiding in the Athenian Assembly, to put an illegal motion to the vote. See Xen. Hell. i. 7. 15. Cf. Grote, viii. 271.

³ Liv. xxxi. 25. Non licere legibus Achæorum de aliis rebus referre, quam propter quas convocati essent.

It does not however follow from this that private members could not propose amendments, or even substantial motions, relating to that business, and it seems clear from a passage in Polybios (xxix. 9) that they might. (*τῇ δὲ δευτέρᾳ τῶν ἡμερῶν, ἐν ᾗ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἔδει τὰ ψηφίσματα προσφέρειν τοὺς βουλευμένους, κ.τ.λ.*) In the Assembly which he describes two quite different motions are made and discussed. Most probably the Government proposals were made on the first day, those of private members on the second, and the vote taken on the third.

to have been in the power of the Government to summon the extraordinary Assemblies, as at any time, so in any place, which might be convenient.¹ Aigion had been chosen as the place of meeting for the original League, as being the most important of the old Achaian towns after the destruction of Helikê. In after times it was at least as well adapted for the purpose for an opposite reason. It might be the greatest member of the original League, but it was insignificant compared with the powerful cities which were afterwards enrolled in the Union. Aigion was a better place for the Federal Government than Corinth or Megalopolis, for the same reason that Washington is a better place for the American Federal Government than New York. There was not the least fear of Aigion ever being to the League of Achaia what Thebes had, in times past, been to the League of Boeotia. Still, however, a certain dignity, and some material advantage, must have accrued to Aigion from the holding of the Federal Assemblies, and from the probable frequent presence of the Federal Magistrates at other times. This may well have aroused a certain degree of jealousy among the other towns, and we shall see that, at a later time, Philopoimên carried a measure which left the League without even the shadow of a capital, and obliged the Federal Assemblies to be held in every city of the League in turn.²

CHAP. V.

afterwards
other
Cities.Advantages of
Aigion.

B.C. 189.

I have several times, in discussing Achaian affairs, used the words Government, Ministers, Cabinet, and such like. I have done so of set purpose, in order to mark the most important of all the differences between the city-Democracy of Athens and the Federal Democracy of Achaia. In

¹ See Helwing, p. 227.

² See Helwing, 227, 228. Thirlwall, viii. 393. That it was actually carried, though Tittmann (682) thinks otherwise, appears from Pol. xxiv. 12, where an ordinary meeting is held at Megalopolis.

CHAP. V.
Greater
power of
Magis-
trates in
Achaia
than at
Athens.

The
Achaian
Magis-
trates
form a
"Govern-
ment."

speaking of Athenian politics no words could be more utterly inappropriate; Dêmos was at once King and Parliament; the Magistrates whom he elected were simply agents to carry out his orders. This was perfectly natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met once in ten days. Another course was equally natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met only twice in each year. It was absolutely necessary in such a case to invest the Magistrates of the Republic with far greater official powers than any Magistrates possessed at Athens from the days of Kleisthenês onwards. It was, in short, necessary to give them the character of what we, in modern phrase, understand by a Government, and to confine the Assembly to the functions of a Parliament. We must of course make one exception, required by the universal political instinct of Greece; the final vote on matters of Peace, War, and Alliance rested with the Assembly. This follows at once from the difference between a republican Assembly, sovereign in name as well as in fact, and the Parliament of a Monarchy, which in theory is the humble and dutiful Council of a personal Sovereign. All the differences between Athens and Achaia naturally flow from the differences between the position and extent of the two commonwealths. In the single City of Athens the democratic theory could be strictly carried out; in the large Federal territory of Achaia it could be carried out only in a very modified form. The extent of territory led to the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly; the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly led to the increased authority of the Magistrates; for a ruling power must be lodged somewhere during the three hundred and fifty-nine days when the Sovereign Assembly was not in being. We therefore find the Federal Magistrates of Achaia acting with almost as little restraint as the Ministers of a modern constitutional state. They are the actual movers and doers of

everything; the functions of the Assembly are nearly reduced to hearing their proposals and saying Aye or No to them. And, as the Magistrates were themselves elected by the Assembly, we should naturally expect, what the history at every step shows us to have been the case, that the vote of the Assembly would be much oftener Aye than No. The Achaian Assembly was addressed by Ministers whom its own vote had placed in office six months before; it would, under all ordinary circumstances, give them a very favourable hearing, and would not feel that sort of jealousy which often exists between the American Congress and the American President. In fact, the relations between an Achaian Government and an Achaian Assembly were in some respects more like those between an English Government and an English House of Commons than the relations between an American President and an American Congress. The Achaian Magistrates, being Achaian citizens, were necessarily members of the Achaian Assembly; so in England the Ministers are, by imperative custom, members of one or other House of Parliament. In Achaia therefore, just as in England, the members of the Government could appear personally before the Assembly to make their proposals and to defend their policy. But in America the Ministers of the President are strictly excluded from seats in Congress,¹ and the President communicates with that body only by a written Message. Again, as Congress does not elect,² so neither can it remove, either

CHAP. V.
Comparison with
America
and Eng-
land.

Points of
greater
likeness
to Eng-
land.

¹ Constitution, Art. i. § 6. 2. This restriction is modified in the Confederate Constitution.

² Congress never elects the President freely; under certain circumstances (see Amendment 12) the House of Representatives have to choose a President from among three candidates already named. The President again may be (Art. i. § 3. 6. ii. § 4) deposed by a judicial sentence of the Senate on an impeachment by the House of Representatives. But this of course requires proof of some definite crime; there is no constitutional way of removing him simply because his policy is disapproved.

CHAP. V. the President or his Ministers ; it therefore follows that the Legislative and Executive branches may remain, during a whole Presidency, in complete opposition to one another. In England the House of Commons does not either formally appoint or formally depose the Ministry, for the simple reason that the Ministry has no legal existence ; but it does both in a way which, if indirect, is still highly effectual. In Achaia, the Government was, not indirectly but directly, chosen by the Assembly. There was not, any more than in America, any constitutional means of removing them before the end of their term of office ; a Government which had ceased to enjoy the confidence of the House had therefore to be constitutionally borne with for a season. But, as their term of office was only one year instead of four, such a season of endurance would be much shorter than it sometimes is in America. Even in England, a Government must be weak indeed which, when once in office, cannot, by the power of Dissolution or otherwise, contrive to retain power for as long a time as an unpopular Achaian Government could ever have had to be borne with. Altogether the general practical working of the Achaian system was a remarkable advance in the direction of modern constitutional government. And it especially resembles our own system in leaving to usage, to the discretion of particular persons and Assemblies, and to the natural working of circumstances, much which nations of a more theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by positive law.

Federal
Offices.

The Achaian Government then, when its details were finally settled, consisted of Ten Ministers, who formed a Cabinet Council for the General of the Achaians, or, in modern language, the President of the Union. Besides these great officers, there was also a Secretary of

State,¹ an Under-General,² and a General of Cavalry.³ CHAP. V.
 It is probable that the latter two functionaries were General of Cavalry.
 merely military officers, and did not fill any important political position. It is clear, for instance, that the Under-General was, in civil matters at least, a less important person than the Vice-President of the American Union. The American Vice-President is 'ex-officio President of the Senate, and, in case of any accidental vacancy in the Presidentship, he succeeds to the office for the remainder of the term. But of the Achaian Under-General we hear nothing in civil affairs, and if the General died in office, his place for the remainder of the year was taken, not by the Under-General, but by the person who had been General the year before.⁴ The active officers of the League in civil matters were clearly the General, the Secretary, and the Ten Ministers. The exact functions of the Secretary are not described, but it is easy to guess at them. He was doubtless, as Secretary of State.
 Secretaries of State are now, the immediate author of all public despatches, and in minor matters he may often have been entitled, as Secretaries of State are now, to act on his own responsibility. It is evident from the way

¹ Γραμματεὺς. Pol. ii. 43. Strabo, viii. 7 (vol. ii. p. 221). The office was as old as the League.

² Ὑποστράτηγος. Pol. iv. 59. xl. 5. In v. 94 one Lykos of Pharai is called ὑποστράτηγος τῆς συντελείας τῆς πατρικῆς. This I take to mean a local magistrate of some little confederacy formed by Pharian townships like those of Patrai. See above, p. 247. Or, in the particular place where the phrase occurs, it may refer to the temporary union of Dymē, Pharai, and Tritaia in B.C. 219. See below, Chapter viii. Either of these views seems more likely than that he was "commander of the pure Achaian forces, as distinguished from those of the whole League." K. F. Hermann, 186. 9. Such a distinction is quite alien to the whole spirit of the constitution.

³ Ἱππάρχης. Pol. v. 95. x. 22. xxviii. 6. Schorn (p. 62) supposes that this officer took the place of the second General, when the number was reduced to two. This may well be true in his military, but hardly in his civil, capacity.

⁴ Pol. xl. 2.

CHAP. V. in which both Polybios and Strabo speak of it, that the office was one of high dignity and importance.

The Ten
Ministers.

The Ten Ministers, the Cabinet Council of the President, are called by various names.¹ They seem to have been the Federal Magistrates of the League in its earlier and looser state. Their number ten, as several writers have observed,² evidently points to the reduced number of the old Achaian towns after the loss of Helikê and Olenos. This at once suggests a question as to the position of these Magistrates when new cities were added to the League. The number remained unaltered,³ and it has hence been inferred that the Cabinet Council always continued to be filled by citizens of the old Achaian towns.⁴ Yet it would be of itself almost impossible to believe that this important office was confined to citizens of the old Achaia, and that an Argive, a Corinthian, or a Megalopolitan would have been ineligible. Had such been the case, we should hardly have found Polybios, himself a citizen of a non-Achaian town, using such strong language as he does as to the liberality of the League in extending full equality of rights to every city which joined it, and reserving no exclusive privileges to the

¹ Their formal title was *δημιουργοί, δαμιουργοί, Damiurgi*. Pol. xxiv. 5. Plut. Ar. 43. Liv. xxxii. 22. xxxviii. 30. Boeckh, C. I. 1542 (vol. i. p. 711, cf. p. 11). There were also local *δαμιουργοί* as Magistrates of particular cities. They are also more vaguely called *ἀρχοντες, ἀρχαί* (Pol. v. 1. xxiii. 10, 12. xxiv. 5. xxix. 9, 10. xxxviii. 4), and—with evident reference to their joint action with the General—*συνάρχοντες, συναρχαί* (Pol. xxiv. 12. xxvii. 2. xxxviii. 5); also *προεστώτες* (Pol. ii. 46. iv. 9), *πρόβουλοι* (?) (Plut. Phil. 21), and, apparently, *οἱ τῆς γερουσίας* (Pol. xxxviii. 5). See Thirlwall, viii. 92, 491. Neither Tittman (683, 6) nor Kortüm (iii. 161) is perfectly clear about this last unusual title.

Polybios uses the verb *συνεδρῶν* to express a meeting of the Cabinet. xl. 4.

² Schorn, 62, 63. Thirlwall, viii. 91.

³ Livy, xxxii. 22.

⁴ I take this to be Bishop Thirlwall's meaning (viii. 111) when he says, "Strange as it appears, we are led to conclude that the places in both these boards continued to be filled by Achæans."

elder members.¹ In conformity with these professions, the General, as we know, was freely chosen from any of the towns enrolled in the League, and indeed he seems to have been, oftener than not, a citizen of a non-Achaian canton. These arguments alone would almost lead us to believe that, when the League had attained its full developement, the old number Ten, though still retained, ceased to bear any practical reference to the ancient number of towns, and that the office of Minister, as well as the Presidency, was open to every citizen of the League. It not uncommonly happens, in the growth of constitutions, that numbers of this sort are retained long after they have ceased to bear any practical meaning. So the Ten Achaian Ministers may have once really represented the Ten Achaian Towns, and yet, at all events after the accession of Sikyón, they may have been chosen indiscriminately from any of the confederate cities.² But we are hardly left to argue the point from probabilities. There is a full description in Polybios of the proceedings in an Achaian Cabinet Council,³ with the names of several of the members. Four of the Ministers are mentioned, and, of these, three, besides the General, are citizens of Megalopolis;⁴ the fourth is a citizen of Aigeira, one of the old Achaian towns.

The exact relations of the Ten Ministers and of the

¹ Pol. ii. 38. Οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπολειπομένη πλεονέκτημα τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἴσα δὲ πάντα ποιῶσα τοῖς δὲ προσλαμβανομένοις, κ.τ.λ. Cf. c. 42 throughout. Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186. n. 10.

² The only expression which looks the other way, is that of *Damiurgi civitatum*. Liv. xxxviii. 30. On the other hand, in xxxii. 22 he calls them *Magistratus gentis*, which tells at least as much for their strictly Federal character.

³ Pol. xxiii. 10, 12. These ἀρχαί, ἀρχοντες, summoned by the General, must be the council of Ministers. Indeed we find nearly the same story over again in Pol. xxiv. 5, where the formal word δημιουργοί is used, clearly as synonymous with ἀρχοντες.

⁴ Aristainos the General, Diophanês, Philopimên, and Lykortas, all from Megalopolis; Archôn from Aigeira. The General himself takes no part in the debate, but his party is outvoted.

CHAP. V. Secretary to the executive Chief of the State are not very clearly marked. It must have been essential to the good government of the League that they should be able to work together in tolerable harmony, and that their differences, if they had any, should not go beyond a debate and a division among themselves. For Achaian statesmen had certainly not reached that pitch of refinement by which a division in the Cabinet is held to be a thing not to be thought of. They had not discovered that all differences of opinion must be compromised or concealed, or that, if this is impossible, the minority must resign office. This is a political refinement which can exist only where, as among ourselves, the whole constitution of the Ministry is something wholly conventional, where the Cabinet has no legal existence, and where the rights and duties of its members are regulated purely by usage. But the Achaian Cabinet was directly elected to a definite office to be held for a definite time; if differences of opinion arose among its members, they were simply to be settled by a majority, like differences of opinion in the Senate or in the Assembly itself. In the United States the President chooses his own Ministers, and that with a much greater freedom of choice than is allowed to any Constitutional King. The Achaian President had his Ministers chosen for him; but then they were chosen along with himself, at the same time and by the same electors; the majority which carried the election of the President himself would probably seldom give him colleagues who were altogether displeasing to him. If, on some occasions,¹ we find the General and his Cabinet disagreeing, the special mention of the fact seems to show that it was something exceptional. Altogether the science of electioneering seems to have obtained a very fair developement in the League.

The
Ministers
probably
generally
united
among
them-
selves.

¹ See Pol. xxiii. 10. xl. 4. But in the first case, the disagreement does not go beyond a division in the Cabinet itself.

Polybios in one place gives us a vivid description of an Achaian "Caucus,"¹ where several leading men of a particular party met to discuss the general affairs of that party, and especially to settle their "ticket" for the next election. They agreed upon a President and upon a General of Cavalry. It is not expressly said that they agreed upon other Magistrates as well, but we may reasonably infer that they did. At least we cannot infer the contrary from the sole mention of an officer who does not commonly appear in connexion with politics. One cannot help suspecting that the President alone would have been mentioned, if his subordinate officer had not chanced to be the historian himself.

CHAP. V.
An
Achaian
"Caucus."

In comparing the constitution of the Achaian League with the constitutions of modern free states, it is difficult to avoid speaking of its Chief Magistrate by the modern name of President. But we must remember that his real official title was Stratêgos or General. In all the democratic states of Greece there was a strong tendency to strengthen the hands of the military commanders, and to invest them with the functions of political magistrates. Thus, at Athens, the Archons remained the nominal chiefs of the state, but their once kingly powers gradually



The Pre-
sident or
General.

¹ Pol. xxviii. 6. Nothing can be plainer than that this was simply what the Americans call a "Caucus." Yet two distinguished German scholars, Schorn (p. 64) and Droysen (ii. 463), have built upon this passage a theory that the *δαμογροί*, (who are not mentioned,) had the sole right of proposing candidates for the Presidency. Bishop Thirlwall of course sets them right (viii. 91). Indeed Schorn himself, by the time that he reached the event itself in his actual narrative (p. 354), seems to have better understood the state of the case. What Polybios here describes is simply the preliminary process which must go before every public election. This is one of the many cases in which a citizen of a free country has a wonderful advantage in studying the history of the ancient commonwealths. Many things which the subject of a continental monarchy can only spell out from his books are to an Englishman or an American matters of daily life.

CHAP. V. dwindled away into the merest routine. The Ten Generals, Powers of officers seemingly not known before Kleisthenês,¹ became really the most important persons in the commonwealth, entrusted with as large a share of authority as Dêmos would entrust to anybody but himself. The transition between the two systems is clearly seen at the battle of Marathôn, where Kallimachos the Polemarch, one of the Archons, is joined in command with the Ten Generals. Earlier, he would have been the sole commander; later, he would have had no part or lot in the matter. In most of the later Grecian states, especially in the Federal states, we find the highest magistrates bearing the title of General. The number of Generals differed in different Leagues, but it was always much smaller than the Athenian Ten. The Epeirots had at one time as many as three,² but the Arkadians under Lykomêdês,³ the Akarnanians,⁴ and the Ætoli- Different numbers in different states. ans⁵ had each a sole General. The Achaians, for the first five-and-twenty years of their renewed Confederacy, elected two Generals. Then an important change was made in the constitution by reducing the number to one. In the emphatic words of Polybios,⁶ "they trusted one man with all their affairs." "Now," he continues, "the first man

B.C. 490.

Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One. B.C. 255.

¹ Grote, iv. 181.² See above, p. 152.³ See above, p. 204.⁴ See above, p. 149.⁵ See next Chapter.

⁶ Pol. ii. 43. Εἰκοσι μὲν οὖν ἦν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πάντε συνεπολιτεύσαντο μεθ' ἰαντῶν αἱ προειρημέναι πόλεις, γραμματεῖα κοινὸν ἐκ περιόδου προχειρίζομεναι καὶ δύο στρατηγούς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἓνα καθιστάνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπιστεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων, καὶ πρῶτος ἔτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης Μάρκος ὁ Κερυνεύς. After reading this passage, and after considering the tendency in Federal Greece, in America, and in Switzerland, to give to every Federal body a single President, it is curious to find Calhoun (Works, i. 393) arguing against a single President, saying that no commonwealth ever retained freedom under a single President, wishing to bring the United States to a double Presidency, like that before Markos, and fortifying his position by the examples of the Roman Consuls and the Spartan Kings. It is curious to find all these American writers—Mr. Motley, indeed, is an exception—so thoroughly anxious to find classical precedents, and so constantly missing those which really bear upon their case.

who obtained this dignity was Markos of Keryneia." CHAP. V.

Markos, it will be remembered, was the gallant deliverer of Boura, and probably, more than any other one man, the true founder of the revived League. He obtained, like Washington, his due reward, to be chosen as the first chief of the land which he had delivered. The practical extent of the General's powers are here plainly set forth.

Everything was entrusted to him; he was not indeed to rule, like a Tyrant, with unlimited powers, or even, like Extensive powers of the Office.

a lawful King, for an unlimited time; he was to govern for a single year with a commission limited by Law; but, while his term of office lasted, he was to be the Chief of the State in a sense in which no man, or body of men, had been chief under the elder Democracy of Athens. His will was indeed limited by the necessity of consulting his colleagues in the Government and of bringing all great questions to the decision of the Sovereign Assembly. The will of the most powerful Minister of modern days is limited by the same conditions. No Minister in a free state can legislate at his own pleasure, in his own name or in the name of his Sovereign; he can impose no tax, he can touch no man's life or estate: he may indeed, in his Sovereign's name, make war or peace without formally consulting Parliament, but he cannot venture to declare war or to conclude peace on terms which he knows will be offensive to the majority of the House. Yet it is not the less true that such a Minister may be practically all-powerful; that his colleagues in the Cabinet, and his fellow-members in the House, may accept all his proposals; that he alone may be the real mover in everything, possessed of a practical initiative in all matters, and leaving to other powers in the state a mere right to say No, which they probably never think good to exercise. Such is a powerful European Minister in our own time; such too was the General of the Achaians. The

Comparison with a modern First Minister.

✓ B. H. 1111 = 2

CHAP. V. Republic trusted him with all its affairs; the Assembly of course reserved to itself the final power of saying Aye or No; but every earlier stage of every affair—the beginning of all legislation, the beginning of every negotiation,¹ the bringing of all measures up to the point at which they could be brought forward as motions in the Assembly—everything, in short, which a modern nation looks for at the hands of a strong Government—all was left to the discretion of the General, in concert with a body of colleagues who commonly looked up to him as their natural leader. Now all this is utterly contrary to the practice of the earlier democratic states. Periklēs exercised as great a power as Aratos; Periklēs, like Aratos, was practically prince;² but Periklēs ruled purely by the force of personal character and personal eloquence; Aratos ruled by virtue of a high official position. It is true that the official position of Aratos was the result of his personal character; it is true that Periklēs, like Aratos, held the most important office in his own commonwealth; the difference is that the official position was necessary to the influence of Aratos and that it was not necessary to the influence of Periklēs. Periklēs was General of the Athenians, one General out of Ten; he was General, both because of his personal inclination and capacity, and because, in that stage of the republic, a man who pretended to advise measures was expected to be ready to carry them out himself. But the position of Perikles in the Athenian Assembly was not the result of his office; it was a position wholly personal; it was a position which was not shared by other Generals; it was a position which it was

Comparison of
Aratos and
Periklēs.

¹ The process of negotiation is clearly set forth in Pol. xxviii. 7. A diplomatic communication is first made to the General, who is favourable to it; he then brings the Ambassadors personally before the Assembly.

² Thuc. ii. 65. Ἐγίνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. The words ὁ πρῶτος ἀνὴρ are not an official title.

soon found that a man might hold without being General. CHAP. V.
 The Assembly listened to Kleôn as obediently as it listened Influence of men without Office at Athens.
 to Periklês; Kleôn became, no less than Periklês had been, the leader of the People, the originator of all its policy; but Kleôn was simply a private citizen with no official character whatever; it was only towards the end of his days that he foolishly¹ took upon him an office for which he was unfit, and which had not been needed to support an influence which ended only with his life. Dêmôsthênês again, without any official position, if he did not rule as effectually as Kleôn, yet contended on at least equal terms with the official chief Phôkiôn, and often succeeded in carrying measures of which Phôkiôn utterly disapproved. Now the power of Aratos undoubtedly rested on his personal character; the League trusted him officially because it trusted him personally; indeed it trusted him in a way in which it trusted no one else; other Generals, with the same legal powers, could never exercise anything like the same practical authority.² This is simply the difference, with which we are all familiar, between a weak Government and a strong one. But the influence of Aratos was Greater importance of Office in Achaia. nevertheless of a kind which could not be exercised without a high official position; he could not have ruled the League, as Kleôn ruled Athens, as a private citizen in the Assembly, any more than the greatest of statesmen and orators could govern England from the cross benches. During the whole history of Athens, we find the counsels of the Republic directed by eloquent speakers in the Assembly, who hold office or not as it happens to suit them

¹ I do not refer to the expedition to Sphaktêria, for which Mr. Grote makes out at least a plausible case, but to his last expedition to Thrace. Probably his success at Sphaktêria had turned his head, and made him seek for an office which he had never before thought of.

² See the account given by Polybios (v. 30) of the contemptible administration of Epêratos. Everybody despised him, nobody obeyed him, nothing was ready, &c.

CHAP. V. personally. During the whole history of the Achaian League, we find its counsels constantly directed by those citizens whom it chose to its high magistracies. It is clear that an Athenian statesman could dispense with office if he pleased; it is equally clear that an Achaian statesman sought office as naturally as an English statesman; without it, he might indeed win fame as an opposition speaker, but he could not hope to be the real guiding spirit of the commonwealth. It is clear also that an Athenian General, though warfare and diplomacy formed his immediate department of the public business, was by no means the necessary originator of military and diplomatic measures. An Athenian General might, as Nikias and Phôkiôn were, be sent, without any loss of official dignity, to carry out plans against which he had, as a citizen in the Assembly, argued with all his force. It is equally clear that an Achaian General was the very soul of the League, the prime deviser of everything. Aratos did not often see his proposals rejected, though that might happen now and then. But it certainly never happened that he was ordered, like Nikias, to carry out the opposite proposals of anybody else.

Comparison of the Achaian General, the American President, and the English First Minister.

The whole history then shows that the Achaian General really stood at the head of the League, in a way in which no one stood at the head of any of the earlier Greek republics, but in a way very like that in which a powerful Minister stands at the head of a modern constitutional state. He resembled the American President in being formally elected for a definite time, while the position of an English Minister is at once conventional and precarious. But in many respects his duties came nearer to those of an English First Minister than to those of an American President. The main difference is one which has been already hinted at, namely that the Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, of Congress

itself, while the American President is something external to Congress. The Achaian President did not communicate his sentiments by a Message, but by a speech from the Treasury Bench.¹ It follows therefore that he formally made motions on which the House voted, while in America the Houses vote first and send their conclusions to the President.² An Achaian Federal Law was a motion of the General passed by the Assembly; an American Federal Law is an Act of Congress confirmed by the President. In America, in short, there is no Ministry in our sense, because there is no King. Or, perhaps more truly, the President is a four-years' King, a King with very limited powers, but who, within the extent of those powers, really governs as well as reigns. Being a King then, he cannot be a member of his own Parliament; all he can do is to recommend measures from outside, and, when they are passed, either confirm them or send them back for reconsideration.³ Our monarchical forms really come nearer to the Parliamentary relations which existed in the Achaian Republic than is done by the Republic of the United States. An English Minister, being himself a Member of Parliament, retains his power of making direct motions, and, as Minister, he practically acquires

CHAP. V.

Closely approach to the English system, owing to the General being himself a member of the Assembly.

¹ The first two Presidents, Washington and Adams, made speeches to Congress: Jefferson introduced the practice of sending written messages. But such speeches were "King's speeches," proceeding from an external power, not "ministerial statements," proceeding from a Member of the House.

² The President may recommend measures to Congress (Constitution, Art. ii. § 3), just as a King does, but he cannot make a motion in Congress, like the Achaian General. Congress passes bills, and sends them to the President, for approval (Art. i. § 7. 2), as to a King. On the other hand, the Senate (Art. ii. § 2. 2) can confirm or reject many official acts of the President; but here the Senate is not acting in a strictly legislative character, and the House of Representatives is not consulted.

³ The President has no absolute veto, but a measure sent back by him cannot be passed again except by a majority of two-thirds of both Houses (Art. i. § 7. 2). This is practically a more valuable power.

CHAP. V. the sole right of making important motions with any chance of success. And, as the Royal Veto is never used, the decision of the Houses is practically as final as that of the Achaian Assembly.

Greater
power
in the
General
necessary
in a Federal
than in
a City
Democ-
cracy.

This lofty position of the Achaian General, as compared with that of any Athenian Magistrate, is the crowning example of those tendencies which naturally arise from the different position of a City Democracy and of a Federal Democracy. In either case the Republic needs some centre, some visible head. At Athens the Ten Generals were really that head; some of them were always on the spot; but if any unforeseen emergency took place, there was no need for them to act on their own responsibility; an ordinary Assembly of the People could not be many days distant, and an extraordinary one might, if need be, be summoned even sooner. In such a state of things there was really no occasion to give the Magistrates any large powers. But turn to Achaia; if an unforeseen emergency arose;—if a foreign Ambassador, for instance, arrived with important proposals; if King Kleomenês threatened or King Ptolemy made friendly advances—where was he to look for the Achaian League? The Athenian Dêmos was never very far from his Pnyx, but the League was, for three hundred and fifty-nine days in the year, scattered to and fro over all Peloponnêsos. In such a state of things there must be some one to represent the nation; some one who can be found at once; some one who can enter into negotiations, who has authority to give a provisional answer, and who can summon the Assembly to give a final one. Such a representative of the nation the constitution of the League provided in its General. Every application was first made to him; he consulted his Ministers; in concert with them, he either brought the matter before the next ordinary Assembly, or, if the business was specially urgent,

met 2
times 189?

he called an extraordinary Assembly specially to consider it. In that Assembly his proposals were not merely those of an eloquent citizen, they carried with them all the weight of a modern Government measure. On any weighty matter, it was his business to come forward and declare¹ his mind, exactly as it is the business of the Leader of the House in our own Parliament. The main difference is that, if by any ill luck his proposals were rejected, the General on the one hand could not dissolve the Assembly, and on the other he was not expected to resign his own office.

The same chain of reasoning, which shows the necessity of the large powers which were vested in the Achaian Government, leads also irresistibly to the conclusion that the members of that Government were always men of wealth and high social position. As every Achaian citizen was a member of the Achaian Assembly, so, in the absence of the slightest proof to the contrary, we cannot doubt that every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to every office in the Achaian commonwealth. But if only well-to-do citizens could habitually attend the Assembly, it is clear that only very wealthy citizens could be commonly chosen to the high offices of the State. There is commonly, even under the most democratic forms, a tendency in the people themselves to give a preference to birth and wealth. It is only in days of strong reaction against oligarchic oppression that this tendency utterly dies away. In most ages and countries the aristocrat of liberal politics is the most popular of all characters. Even in the Athenian Democracy, though low-born Demagogues² might guide the counsels

Members
of the
Govern-
ment
necessarily
wealthy
men.

¹ Pol. xxviii. 7. *ἐκάλει γὰρ τὰ πράγματα τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ γνώμην.*

² I use this word in its original neutral sense, a Leader of the People, whether for good or for evil. An Athenian *δημαγωγός* in later times is a citizen, be he Hyperbolos or be he Dêmostenês, who is influential in the Assembly without holding office. But Isokratês (*περὶ* Elp. 152) applies the word to Periklês himself.

CHAP. V. of the Assembly, the office of General was almost always conferred on members of the old nobility. In the Achaian League this natural tendency must have become a practical necessity. There is no evidence that any public officer of the League was paid; there is distinct evidence that some important public officers were not paid;¹ and the office of General is distinctly spoken of as one which involved great expense.² Now none but men who were at once rich, ambitious, and zealous, would or could accept offices which involved onerous duties and large expenses, and which carried with them only honorary rewards. We are ourselves familiar with an unpaid Magistracy, an unpaid Parliament, a Government not unpaid indeed, but whose highest members receive salaries barely covering their expenses, and therefore do not seek for office as a source of personal gain. We therefore can fully understand the working of a similar system in Achaia. We can understand how the system might be safely left to its own practical working, how an unpaid Magistracy would necessarily be an aristocratic Magistracy, without the requirement of any property qualification. Here again, we see how great an advantage a student of ancient history derives from familiarity with the usages of a free state. One of the very best of German scholars,³ finding that in practice the men who held the high magistracies and who filled the

Offices
in the
League
apparently
unpaid.

No pro-
perty
qualifica-
tion.

¹ This is clear in the case of the Senators. See Pol. xxiii. 7 and Thirlwall, viii. 92. Of course I suppose only the great magistracies to have been unpaid. In Achaia, as everywhere else, there must have been plenty of paid subordinates.

² Polybios (xxviii. 7) incidentally mentions the expensiveness of the General's office; *διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἱκανὸν χρημάτων εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν δεδωπηκέναι* [*Ἀρχαῖα*]. This passage alone would be enough to prove the unpaid nature of public office in Achaia.

³ Droysen, ii. 461, 2. I am quite at a loss to guess what the use of the word *κρηματοί* in one of the passages of Polybios (v. 93) which Droysen quotes has to do with the matter. The historian is speaking of a local quarrel between rich and poor at Megalopolis.

Federal Tribunals¹ were always rich men, has supposed the existence of a property qualification for office, of whose existence no proof or likelihood whatever is found in our authorities. Had such a qualification been enforced by law, Polybios could never have spoken as he does of the strictly democratic character of the Achaian constitution. Our own great historian of this period,² as usual, instinctively sees the truth of the case. Every Englishman knows that no law forbids the poorest man to become a Member of Parliament, or even a Cabinet Minister. Yet, though no law forbids him, the poor man is so far from being likely to be elected a member himself, that he has small chance of being listened to even as the proposer of a candidate. Even where there is a qualification, as in the case of Justices of Peace, a man is seldom appointed who does not possess much more—or at least who does not belong to a class whose members commonly possess much more—than the legal qualification for the office. In Achaia, as in England, these things doubtless settled themselves. There is everywhere a certain natural influence about birth and wealth, which does not spring from legal enactments, and which no legal enactments can take away. All that Democracy—legal and regular Democracy³—can

Natural
effect of
unpaid
offices.

¹ One cannot doubt either that there were Federal Courts or that their members were commonly wealthy men. Poor men could not often appear in an unpaid court sitting at a distance. But I am not quite sure that the passage commonly cited in proof of the fact really bears on the matter. According to Plutarch (Phil. 7), the Knights (*ἰππεῖς*) were *μάλιστα κύριοι τιμῆς καὶ κολάσεως*. This is generally taken to mean that the judges or jurors—the Greek *δικασταί* are something between the two—in the Federal Courts were commonly men of the equestrian census. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 93. But I do not feel quite certain whether the *κόλασις* here spoken of may not be parliamentary rather than judicial, as the *τιμὴ* clearly refers to the influence of the equestrian class in disposing of the great Federal magistracies. See the parallel passage of Polybios, x. 22.

² Thirlwall, viii. p. 93.

³ A constitution which by legal enactments excludes any class, be that class the rich or the poor, the patrician or the plebeian, has no right to the name of Democracy—it is essentially Oligarchic.

CHAP. V. do is to deprive birth and wealth of all legal advantage, and to let birth, wealth, talent, happy accident, all start fair and all find their level. This the Democracy of Athens and the Democracy of Achaia both did; only circumstances, not laws, fixed the practical standard of eligibility at a much higher point in the Democracy of Achaia than in the Democracy of Athens.

Power of
summon-
ing Assem-
blies vested
in the
General in
Council.

The
Ministers
act as
Speakers
of the
Assembly.

We will now attempt to gather what information we can from our authorities as to the exact legal powers of the Achaian General and his Councillors. It has been doubted¹ whether the power of summoning extraordinary Assemblies rested with the General or with the Ten Ministers. One can hardly doubt that it was vested in the General acting with the concurrence of his Ministers.² This union of a Governor and a Council is not unknown either in American States or in English Colonies. But the formal presidency of the Assembly, and the duty of putting questions to the vote, clearly rested with the Ten Ministers and not with the General.³ The reason is obvious. The General was necessarily an important speaker; he had to explain and to defend his policy;

¹ K. F. Hermann, § 186, p. 392, Eng. Tr.

² Pol. v. 1. *Συνήγεν* [*Ἀρατος ὁ νεώτερος*] τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. Compare xxiii. 10 throughout. The General and ἀρχοντες meet the Roman Ambassador and decline to call an Assembly.

³ See the passage in Livy (xxxii. 22) quoted already. If Bishop Thirlwall be right, as he clearly is, in thinking that οἱ τῆς γερουσίας in Pol. xxxviii. 5, mean the δαμογγοί (viii. 92, 491), we find them distinctly acting as Speakers of the Assembly. They seem to be the ἀρχοντες mentioned just before, and ἀρχοντες in Polybios means the δαμογγοί. They call the President of the Union, Kritolaos, to order for unparliamentary language. This was in very late, bad, and violent times; one cannot fancy Aratos or Philopoimên receiving or needing such an interruption, though doubtless they were legally open to it, just as an English First Minister may be called to order by the Speaker.

Drumann (p. 462) seems to confound this γερουσία with the βουλή or Senate. Tittmann (683) accurately distinguishes them, though he is not quite clear about their identity with the δαμογγοί.

he would have been as unfit to act as President of the Assembly as the Leader of the House of Commons is to be at the same time its Speaker. Theoretically the same objection might seem to apply to his ten colleagues ; they were as responsible as he was for the measures on which they had to take the votes of the Assembly. But they were not so personally bound as he was to be active speakers on their behalf. Our own House of Lords presents a close analogy. The Lord Chancellor is Speaker of the House ; he presides, and puts the question. But, unlike the Speaker of the Commons, he is also a member of the Government, an active member of the House ; he can vote, speak, bring in bills of his own, just as much as any other Peer ; one class of bills indeed it is his special duty to bring in rather than any other Peer. Still it is felt that the Speaker of the House cannot fittingly be the Government Leader in the House ; some other Peer is always looked upon as the special representative of the Cabinet in the House of Lords. This division of parliamentary duty exactly answers to what I conceive to have been the division of duties in the Assembly between the Achaian Ministers and the Achaian General. Out of the House, the General and his Ministers doubtless acted in concert in all important civil business. On some great occasions we distinctly see the whole Government acting together. For instance, Aratos and his Ten Coun- cillors¹ all went to meet King Antigonos, and to make arrangements with him for his coming into Peloponnêsos. In short, in all civil and diplomatic business the General acted together with the other members of the Government. He was chief of a Cabinet, and we know what powers the chief of a Cabinet has. He could not indeed get rid of a refractory colleague, as a modern First Minister can ;

Joint
action in
diplomatic
matters.

B.C. 223.

¹ Plut. Ar. 43. Ἀπὸ τὰ μετὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὁ Ἀρατος αὐτῷ.

CHAP. V. but we may be sure that, in the good times of the League—the days of Kritolaos are another matter—a General who was in the least fit for his place could always command a majority among his colleagues, and a majority was all that was needed.

Unre-
strained
power
of the
General in
War.

In military affairs the case was different. The Ten were a purely civil magistracy; the General, besides being the political chief of the state, was also, as his title implies, its military chief, and that with far more unrestrained power than he exercised in civil affairs. The Sovereign People declared war and concluded peace; but while war lasted, the General had the undivided command of the Achaian armies. The Achaians, as Polybios says, trusted their General in everything: they did not hamper his operations in the field in the same way as was too often done by the Venetian, Spartan, and Dutch Republics. There was not the same reason or temptation for doing so. The hereditary Kings of Sparta were naturally looked upon with jealousy by the Ephors, who represented another principle in politics. And Venice, in her land campaigns, had commonly to do with mercenary leaders, whose fidelity might not always be absolutely trusted. But if an Achaian General, a citizen chosen for a year by the free voices of his fellow-citizens, cannot be fully trusted by them, no man can ever be trusted at all. In fact he commonly was both fully and generously trusted. He was allowed to act for himself, subject only to the after-judgement of the Assembly, in which his proceedings might be discussed after the fact.¹ But it is in this union of the chief military and the chief political power in the same person that we see the main point of difference between the Achaian system and that

Union of
military
and poli-
tical func-
tions

¹ Thirlwall, viii. 102. "He wielded the military force of the League in the field with absolute, though not irresponsible authority."

of all modern states, republican or monarchic.¹ No First Minister of a constitutional monarchy thinks of commanding its armies; it is felt that his duties lie in quite another sphere. The American President is indeed, by the Constitution,² Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces by sea and land; that is to say, they are necessarily at his disposal as the chief executive Magistrate; but it is not implied that the President shall always be the man personally to lead the armies of the Republic to battle. But in the Achaian League the General was really a General; his command in the field was as much a matter of course as his chief influence in the Assembly; his only official title³ was a military one; though it should be noticed that the outward symbol of his office was one purely civil. We have seen a Theban Archon with nothing military about him, but whose badge of office was a spear;⁴ we now find, in curious contrast, that the badge of office of the Achaian General was the purely civil symbol, a seal. The General kept the Great Seal of the League; and his admission to or resignation of office is sometimes spoken of as accepting or laying down the Seal,⁵ much as we speak, not indeed of a Commander-in-chief, but of a Lord Chancellor. This union of civil and military duties, which was usual in the later Greek Republics, looks at first sight like a retrograde movement, after the experience of the

CHAP. V.

unlike
modern
states.His title
military,
but his
badge of
office
civil.

¹ I speak of the civilized states of Europe and America; I do not answer for Mexican or South American Republics.

² Art. ii. § 2. 1.

³ Polybios is singularly fluctuating in the various titles which he gives to the Assembly and to the Ministers, but I do not remember that the General is ever called anything but *στρατηγός*, or, perhaps, its equivalent *ηγεμών* (see iv. 11. v. 1); *προεστώς* (ii. 45) is hardly meant as a formal title.

⁴ See above, p. 165.

⁵ Plut. Ar. 38. Ἐβουλεύσατο μὲν εὐθὺς [δ' Ἀρατος] ἀποθέσθαι τὴν σφραγίδα καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἀφείναι. Pol. iv. 7. παραλαβὼν [δ' Ἀρατος] παρὰ τοῦ Τιμοξένου τὴν δημοσίαν σφραγίδα.

CHAP. V. Athenian commonwealth on the subject. At one time it was held at Athens that the functions of statesman and General should go together. In Miltiadês, Themistoklês, Aristeidês, we see the union in its fulness. In the next generation we discern the first signs of separation between the two. Periklês and Kimôn indeed still unite both functions; Periklês could fight and Kimôn could speak. But it is clear that, though the functions were united, they were not united in equal proportions in the two men. Periklês was primarily a statesman and secondarily a general; Kimôn was primarily a general and secondarily a statesman. The military abilities of Periklês were considerable, but they were a mere appendage to his preeminent civil genius; and most certainly Kimôn was far more at home when warring with the barbarians than when contending with Periklês in the Assembly. It showed the good sense of both the rivals, when they agreed upon the compromise that Periklês should direct the counsels, and Kimôn command the armies, of the commonwealth.¹ In the next stage of things the schism between the two callings becomes wider and wider. The versatile genius of Alkibiadês indeed united both characters, or rather all characters; but Nikias was a professional soldier, whose position as a statesman is quite incidental, while the elder Dêmostenês, an admirable soldier, does not appear as a statesman at all. On the other hand Kleôn and his brother Demagogues are mere politicians, who do not in any way profess to be military commanders.² In the next century the

Gradual separation of civil and military functions.

¹ See Grote, v. 450.

² Kleôn's command at Amphipolis is, as we have seen, something quite exceptional. But of course a Demagogue, like another citizen, might be called upon to serve in war. Hence the point of Phôkiôn's retort to a troublesome orator—*πολέμου μὲν ὅντος ἐγὼ σοῦ, εἰρήνης δὲ γενομένης σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄρξεις*. Plut. Phôk. 16. Compare also the story of Phôkiôn and

callings were utterly separated. Phôkiôn is the only man in whom there is the least approach to an union of them. Iphikratês and Chabrias were strictly professional soldiers, who eschewed politics altogether. Dêmosthenês, Æschinês, Hyperidês, never thought of commanding armies. Indeed in their days it was but seldom that the armies of Athens were formed of her own citizens and commanded by her own Generals; they were too commonly mere mercenary bands commanded by faithless soldiers of fortune. It may have been the remembrance of the evils inflicted on Greece by these hireling banditti, which induced both the Achaian League and the other later Greek commonwealths to fall back upon the old system, and to insist upon the union of military and civil powers in the chief of the state. The arrangement doubtless gave greater unity and energy to Federal action; but it undoubtedly had a bad side. It by no means followed either that the wisest statesman would be also the bravest and most skilful captain, or that the bravest and most skilful captain would be also the wisest statesman. Aratos was unrivalled as a diplomatist and parliamentary leader, but his military career contains many more failures than successes. Could he and Lydiadas have divided duties, as Periklês and Kimôn did, the League might perhaps never have been driven to become a suppliant for Macedonian protection. It is also clear that the union aggravated one difficulty which perhaps can never be entirely avoided in any government where magistrates are elected for a definite time. Once a year, or once in four years, what we call a Ministerial Crisis comes round as a matter of course. It is felt to be a

CHAP. V.

Employment of mercenaries.

The Achaian System a reaction.

Disadvantages of the system.

The Presidential interregnum aggravated

Archibiadês in the same life, c. 10. Dêmosthenês and Æschinês both served in the army, and Æschinês gained some credit for personal gallantry, just as Sôkratês did, but no one ever thought of choosing any one of the three to the office of General.

CHAP. V. practical fault in the American system that the President
 by the is chosen so long before he actually enters on his office.¹
 union of A practical interregnum of some months takes place; the
 powers. incoming Government are still private men; the outgoing
 Government, though still invested with legal powers, cannot venture to use them with any effect in the face of their designated successors. A circumstance recorded by Polybios² shows that this difficulty was felt in Achaia also. The Ætolians chose for an inroad the time when the official year was drawing to its close, as a time when the Achaian counsels were sure to be weak. Aratos, the General-elect, was not yet actually in office; the outgoing General Timoxenos shrank from energetic action so late in his year, and at last yielded up his office to Aratos before the legal time. We know not exactly how long the Achaian interregnum lasted, but it is evident that we here find the American difficulty, and that aggravated by the fact that the President had himself personally to take the field. At Rome the change of Consuls seems to have sometimes had the same effect; but, in the best days of Rome, the danger was tempered in two ways. It was lessened by that habitual devotion of every Roman to the public interest, to which neither Achaia nor America nor any other state can supply a parallel. And the custom, by which a Consul whose services were really needed was commonly continued in his command as Proconsul, prevented the occurrence of any interregnum at all in the cases where it would have been most hurtful.

It may perhaps be doubted whether, in another point,

¹ In the United States this evil is aggravated by the utter failure of the constitutional provisions for the double election of the President. The President not only does not enter on office immediately on his legal election, but, long before the legal election takes place, it is already practically decided who will be elected, and the interregnum at once begins.

² iv. 6, 7.

the practice of the League diminished or aggravated an evil which has often been pointed out in the American system. The power given by the Constitution, and, at one time, often exercised in practice, of reelecting the President, at least for one additional term of office,¹ has often been made the subject of grave complaint. It places, it is argued, the Chief Magistrate of the Union in the somewhat lowering position of a candidate for the suffrages of the citizens; it causes him too often to adopt a policy, which may not be in itself the best, but which may be the most likely to lead to reelection; and it causes the latter part at least of a Presidency to be often spent in canvassing rather than in governing.² The Achaian President held office for a year only; he was incapable of immediate reelection, but he might be chosen again the year after.³ In conformity with this law, Aratos, during his long ascendancy, was commonly elected, seemingly quite as a matter of course, in the alternate years. In those years when he was not himself in office, he was often able to procure the election of

CHAP. V.

Question of reelection of the President

Achaian General incapable of immediate reelection.

¹ The Constitution puts no restriction upon reelection; in practice no President has ever remained in office for more than two terms.

² On the other side see the ingenious arguments in the "Federalist," No. lxxii. p. 390. Doubtless, as in most political questions, there is something to be said on both sides, but practically the disadvantages of reelection seem decidedly to predominate. This view is strongly taken by Tocqueville, i. 228, et seqq. The new Southern Confederation has made the President incapable of reelection, but has given him a longer term of office, namely, for six years. Art. ii. § 1.

³ Plut. Ar. 24. "Ἐπεὶ μὲν κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξῆν, παρ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπελθεῖν στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν [τὸν Ἀρατὸν], ἔργῳ δὲ καὶ γνώμῃ διὰ παντὸς ἀρχεῖν. So 30. 38. Kleom. 15. Three of these passages are strangely quoted in the Dictionary of Antiquities (p. 5. art. Achaicum Foedus) to show that "persons of great merit and distinction were sometimes reelected for several successive years." So Kortüm, iii. 162. The law may sometimes have been broken—it certainly was once in the case of Philopoimén (Liv. xxxviii. 33)—but Plutarch clearly means that the law forbade immediate reelection. (See Thirlwall, viii. 191. Droysen, ii. 438.) παρ' ἐνιαυτὸν, to make any sense, can only mean "every other year."

CHAP. V. some partisan¹ or kinsman,² whose policy he practically guided. We may well believe that, when he was not General, he often filled some other high office, and indeed it is not clear whether he was not sometimes, in defiance of the law, himself reelected in consecutive years.³ It is certain that he was once, and that while another citizen was in office, elected by a thin Assembly to the anomalous post of General with Absolute Power,⁴ and that, in that character, he was, for a while at least, attended by a body-guard like a Tyrant. A man at once so fond of power, and so fully trusted as Aratos was, may probably have now and then ventured on violations of the letter of the law, especially when they took the form of illegal motions passed by the Sovereign Assembly. The question as to the working of the law against reelection was probably of more importance before the rise, and after the death, of Aratos. Where office is held for so short a time as a year, there is only one way which will absolutely prevent a Magistrate from shaping his conduct with a view to reelection. This is the extreme measure of forbidding the same man to hold office more than once in his life. An election in the next year but one is near enough to come pretty closely before his eyes and

¹ Timoxenos (Pol. iv. 6, 7. 82. *Τιμόξερον τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀρατον εἰσ-αγόμενον*), Hyperbatas, &c. seem mere nominees and instruments of Aratos. Even with Lydiadas and Aristomachos he interferes in a strange way.

² As his son the younger Aratos. Pol. iv. 37. v. 1.

³ See Droysen, ii. 438. I shall examine this question in a note at the end of Chapter viii.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 41. *Τῶ δ' Ἀράτῳ συνήλθον εἰς Σικυῶνα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν οὐ πολλοί, καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἤρεθῃ στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, καὶ περιστήσατο φρουρὰν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν.* See Thirlwall, viii. 194. The title was one familiar at Athens (see Thuc. vi. 26), but an Athenian *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* had no larger powers than an ordinary Achaian *στρατηγός*. It meant merely that exemption from the interference of colleagues and that absence of all instructions in detail which distinguish an Achaian from an Athenian General. On the other hand this title was the first step of Dionysios of Syracuse to the Tyranny. But the guard of Aratos was at least a guard of citizens, not of mercenaries.

practically to influence his conduct in office. But the prohibition of reelection at any time, however distant, may lead to still worse evils. It was tried at Rome in the case of the Consulship,¹ but it was afterwards given up. Such a rule, it is obvious, might often deprive the State of the services of its best citizens at the very time when they were most wanted. But the Achaian system of forbidding immediate reelection, though it could not entirely remove, probably did a good deal to lessen, the evil complained of in America. And it effectually stopped what was really the danger in Greece, that of the same man being elected, year after year, till he contrived to convert a permanent Presidency into a Tyranny. Aratos indeed, even when not in the highest office, was the practical ruler of the League; still the alternation of official and non-official years at least marked the distinction which separates the republican leader, however great his official power and personal influence, from the Tyrant reigning by force. If his government once, for a moment, assumed something like the outward form of Tyranny, even that extreme measure had some shadow of constitutional sanction, and it was ventured on only in a moment of extreme danger to the Union and its chief. The laws of the Achaian commonwealth allowed an able and eloquent statesman to exercise an almost unbounded influence, but they supplied an easy means of checking him if he displayed the least tendency to abuse his power. Every alternate year at least he had to descend to the legal rank of a private citizen, and it rested wholly with his fellow-citizens whether he should ever rise above it again. It is clear that the Achaian League did not, as Republics are sometimes charged with doing, exhibit any jealousy of distinguished men. The whole career of Aratos shows the contrary. After his death no one inherited his full influence; but

Special
position of
Aratos.

¹ Liv. Epit. lvi.

CHAP. V. we always find the Federal President a person high in both personal and official position. Unless it were during the few wretched years before the final Roman Conquest, the best men in the country never shrank from public affairs or stood aloof from the great offices of the State. Achaia, like all other countries, was not free from personal jealousies and party divisions ; but the several parties seem commonly to have fairly striven to place their best men in the chief office of the Commonwealth. It is only twice or thrice, and that, in one case at least, through an overwhelming foreign influence, that we find a confessedly incapable President set at the head of the League.¹ It is a great problem in government to secure power enough in the rulers without trenching on the rights of the whole body. This problem the Achaian League seems very satisfactorily to have solved.

The
Senate.

Between the Government and the Popular Assembly there stood, as in all other Greek commonwealths, a Senate. Of this Senate we have less knowledge than we could wish. Its mention in our authorities is not so frequent as one might have expected, and in some passages it is hard to distinguish its action from that of the Popular Assembly.² There are however other passages which make it clear that the Senate was a distinct body.³ The

¹ As in the case of Epératos. Pol. iv. 82, v. 1, 30, 91. Cf. xi. 8.

² Pol. iv. 26, xxviii. 3 (a passage which I shall deal with hereafter), where βουλή might almost be taken for one of the many synonyms of the Assembly. So in xxiii. 9, βουλευτήριον seems to be used for the place of Meeting of the Assembly, which elsewhere is a theatre. xxix. 10, xxxviii. 4. Cf. Tittmann, Staatsverfassung, 684.

³ In Pol. ii. 37, the βουλευταί are clearly mentioned as distinct Federal officers, just like the ἀρχοντες and δικασταί, with whom they are joined. So in ii. 46, xxiii. 7, 8, xxix. 9, the βουλή seems to be a distinct body. In xxiii. 7, 8, indeed, the βουλή of Polybios answers to the σύνδοτος of Diodōros (Exc. Leg. 13), but it is dangerous to make constitutional inferences from Diodōros. Cf. Tittmann, 685.

apparent confusion between the two may arise from the fact that the Senate was essentially a Committee of the Assembly, and that a meeting of the larger body probably always involved a previous meeting of the smaller. But we know not the exact nature of its constitution, nor do we know anything of its times of meeting, except so far as they were determined by those of the Assembly. But we do know, from a most curious incidental notice,¹ that it consisted of one hundred and twenty unpaid members. If this number points to the original ten or twelve Achaian towns, we must believe that the Senate also, as well as the inner Cabinet, was afterwards opened to all citizens of the Union. This Senate discharged the usual functions of a Greek Senate. The Government brought their proposals before it, to be discussed, and perhaps amended, by this smaller body, before they were submitted to the final decision of the Assembly.² Ambassadors were introduced to it before their audience of the assembled Nation, and perhaps in some cases they transacted business with the Senate alone.³ In other cases again the Senate might be invested by the Assembly with delegated powers to act in its name. And it is really not unlikely, especially in the latter times of the League, when Assemblies were being constantly summoned at the caprice of Roman officers, that a summons to a Public Assembly may often have been answered by few beside those citizens who happened to be Senators.⁴ These last two considerations may

¹ Pol. xxiii. 7, 8. See above, p. 294.

² The joint action of the three bodies, Ministers, Senate, and Assembly, seems clearly marked in Pol. ii. 46. *οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος συναθροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς.*

³ In Pol. iv. 26, the ordinary Meeting—*ἡ καθήκουσα σύνοδος*—is held; King Philip attends it, but he seems only to have addressed the Senate (*προσελθόντος τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἐν Αἰγίῳ*).

⁴ In Pol. xxix. 8, a body meets which is called *σύνοδος* and *ἀγορά*, and we hear of *τὸ πλῆθος* and *οἱ πολλοί*. Presently another special Meeting (*σύγκλητος*) is held, at which Polybios remarks, as if it were something

CHAP. V. help to explain the cases where the Senate and the Public Assembly seem to be confounded. In either case, the Senate would practically discharge the functions of the Assembly, and the body so acting might be roughly called by either name. The Achaian Senate was no doubt legally possessed of higher and more independent powers than the Senate of Athens; still we may doubt whether it exercised any very formidable check on the will of an able and popular General. For the analogy of other Achaian institutions would lead us to believe that the Senators were appointed together with the Magistrates at the ordinary Spring Meeting, and that they were really elected by the Assembly, and not left to the lot, as at Athens. If so, the party in the Assembly which carried the election of a General and his Ten Councillors would doubtless be able to carry also the election of Senators of whom a large majority would be of the same way of thinking.

unusual, that not only the Senate, but everybody, attended; *ἐν ᾗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάνοντα ἐτών.* (See above, p. 263.) The former meeting can hardly have been anything except a Public Assembly, summoned as such, but at which few or none but Senators had actually attended.

By the present Constitution of the University of Oxford, Convocation and Congregation are two distinct bodies, Congregation consisting of a certain class of the Members of Convocation. On exciting occasions a large body of Members of Convocation is drawn together, but it often happens that a meeting of Convocation is attended by none but Members of Congregation.

So, in Cathedral Chapters, the smaller body of Residentiaries, by constantly acting in the name of the whole body of Canons, has gradually drawn into its own hands nearly all the powers of the Chapter.

So again, in England, when a Privy Council is held, it is not attended by all the Privy Councillors, but by those only who are immediately connected with the Government.

In these last two cases the attendance of the whole body is so unusual that it would doubtless be resisted as something irregular. At Oxford, the whole body is contented to leave many matters in the hands of one class of its members, but it reserves to itself the undoubted power of assembling in full force whenever it pleases. The relations between the Achaian Senate and Assembly seem to have been very similar.

On the financial and military systems of the Achaians it is hardly my business to enlarge. But a few points must be mentioned which have a direct bearing on the Federal Constitution. That the Achaian League was essentially a national Government, that its laws and decrees were directly binding upon Achaian citizens, can admit of no reasonable doubt. But it is not equally clear that it had in all cases advanced beyond that system of requisitions from the particular members, instead of direct agency on the part of the Federal power, which, in modern politics, is held, more than anything else, to distinguish an Imperfect from a Perfect Federation.¹ It would hardly have been in harmony with the common instincts of the Greek mind to have scattered an army of Federal officers, in no way responsible to the local Governments, over all the cities of Peloponnêsos. And, in truth, questions of taxation by no means held that important place in an ancient Greek commonwealth which is attached to them in every modern state. Probably, under the circumstances of the League, the requisition system was the more convenient of the two; but it is perfectly plain that the Federal Assembly and the Federal Magistracy were powers to which every citizen owed a direct obedience, and not merely an indirect one through the Government of his own city. We once get a glimpse of the Federal system of taxation, when we find certain cities, and those too cities of the original Achaia, refusing to pay the contributions which were due from them to the Federal Treasury.² This seems to show that the Federal Assembly, or the Government acting by its authority, assessed each city at a cer-

CHAP. V.
Financial
and Military
Policy
of the
League.

System of
Requisition-
systems prob-
ably more
conve-
nient.

¹ See above, p. 11.

² Pol. iv. 60. *Συνεφρόνησαν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ τὰς μὲν κοινὰς εἰσφοράς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς μὴ τελεῖν*. Cf. v. 30, 91. In v. 1, we see the Federal Congress distinctly voting supplies, but we have no hint as to the way in which they were to be levied.

CHAP. V. tain sum, which the city had to raise by whatever form of local taxation it thought best. And really, though the United States prefer a system of more strictly Federal taxation, there seems nothing in the other method necessarily inconsistent with the strictest Federal unity.¹ In military matters, we find the Assembly sometimes requiring particular cities to furnish particular contingents,² and sometimes investing the General with power to summon the whole military force of the League.³ Beside these citizen soldiers, the League, according to the custom of the age, made large use of mercenaries, whose pay must have come out of the Federal Treasury. But they seem to have been kept strictly under the orders of the Federal General and his subordinate officers; we never see Achaia, like Florence and other Italian states, at the mercy of a hired Captain. Out of these two classes of citizen and mercenary soldiers, the League kept up a small standing army, enough at least to supply a few important places with Federal garrisons. The immeasurable importance of Akrokorinthos caused a Federal garrison to be kept there, after the deliverance of the city,⁴ as regularly as a Macedonian garrison had been kept during the days of its bondage. We also read of garrisons being kept in one or two cities, like Kynaitha⁵ and Mantinea,⁶ whose loyalty to the League was doubtful, or whose local Governments required Federal help against a discontented party.⁷ But, beside what was necessary for these purposes, the League

Military
Contingents
ordered
by the
Assembly.

Merce-
naries.

Federal
Garrisons.

B. C. 243-
223.

¹ See above, p. 14.

² Pol. v. 91.

³ Pol. iv. 7. Ἐψηφίσαντο . . . συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. See above, p. 275.

⁴ Four hundred heavy-armed foot, fifty hounds, and fifty huntsmen. Plut. Ar. 24.

⁵ Pol. iv. 17. φυλακὴν ἔχοντας τῶν τειχῶν καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ Ἀχαιῶν.

⁶ Four hundred Achaian citizens and two hundred mercenaries. Pol. ii. 58.

⁷ A similar power is given by the Constitution of the United States. Art. iv. § 4.

is not likely to have kept any force, whether of citizens or mercenaries, constantly under arms. But the extensive military reforms of Philopoi^mên¹ show that the citizens must have been in the habit of frequent military training, or he would hardly have had the opportunity of introducing such considerable changes as he did into both the cavalry and the infantry of the League.

CHAP. V.
B.C. 210,
207.

In considering the constitution of the Achaian League, it is impossible to avoid comparing it, almost at every step, with the constitution of the United States. If I have pointed out some points of diversity, it is because the general likeness is so close that the slightest unlikeness at once makes itself felt. The two constitutions are as like one another as, under their respective circumstances, they could be. They arose in different quarters of the globe, among men of different races and languages, and with an interval of two thousand years between the two. The elder Union was a Confederation of single Cities, which had once been strictly sovereign Republics, invested with all the rights of independent powers. The younger Union was a Confederation of large States, which had hitherto been mere colonies of a distant Monarchy, and which, before the War of Independence, never thought of pretending to sovereign rights. Even the New England colonies, though the circumstances of their foundation gave to their early days much greater independence than European colonies commonly possess, were still colonies, and fully recognized their allegiance to the mother country. With this difference of position to start from, it is much more remarkable that there should be any considerable degree of likeness between the two constitutions than that there should be some considerable degree of unlikeness.

General Comparison between the Achaian League and the United States.

Close general resemblance between the two.

¹ Plut. Phil. 7, 9.

CHAP. V.
Differences
arising
from the
difference
between a
Confede-
ration of
Cities and
a Confede-
ration of
States.

The chief differences between them are the natural results of the difference between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of large States. From this distinction at once follows the main difference of all, that the Achaian Congress was a Primary Assembly, while the American Congress is a Representative Assembly. From this again follow certain differences of detail ; the American Congress could be, and is, bi-cameral, which the Achaian Congress could not be ; the Achaian President was chosen by Congress, or by the nation, as we choose to put it, while the American President is legally chosen by special electors ; the Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, of Congress, while the American President is a power external to Congress. On this latter very important point we have seen that the practical working of our own Constitutional Monarchy makes a nearer approach to the Constitution of Achaia than is made by the Constitution of the United States.

Analogies
and diver-
sities in
the posi-
tion of the
President.

From a Primary Assembly, where every citizen has a right to appear, it is obviously impossible to exclude the Chief Magistrate of the State. So the forms of a modern Constitutional Monarchy require the actual, though not the avowed, wielder of the royal power to be himself a member of one or other House of the Legislature. But such a position would be hardly consistent with the office of a President whose kingly functions are conferred on him by Law and not by an unwritten conventionality. Still the general position of the Chief Magistrate in the two constitutions is strikingly alike, and the more so when we remember that the historical origin of the two offices was wholly different. The American President, like the Athenian Archon or the Roman Consul, inherited, under the necessary limitations of a republican system, the powers of which the King was deprived by the Revolution. He answers very exactly to the Athenian Archon

Different
origin of
the office
in the two
Systems.

in his second stage, when a single Chief Magistrate was chosen for ten years. The powers of the President are essentially kingly; he lacks indeed the power of declaring war, but it is his function to negotiate treaties of peace; he has the command of the national forces; he has the mass of the national patronage; and he possesses a legislative veto, which is the more practical because it is only suspensive. All these powers are strictly royal; only, when put into the hands of a republican magistrate, they are necessarily limited in various ways. In some cases the confirmation of the Senate is legally required for the validity of the President's acts; he is, like the Consul, the sole mover and doer, but another power in the State possesses the Tribunitian function of forbidding.¹ In all cases his power is practically limited by the temporary tenure of his office, and by his personal responsibility² for any illegal act. Still, limited as they are in

Kingly
powers
of the
American
President.

¹ This analogy is not quite perfect. The President's acts have to be formally confirmed by the Senate; the Consul's acts needed no formal confirmation from the Tribunes. All that the Tribune did was to step in with his Veto when he thought good. But the right of confirmation, in the hands of a body which can originate nothing, is practically reduced to a right of rejection.

² I mean responsibility in the old Greek and in the *legal* English sense, not in that in which we often speak of Ministers being "responsible to Parliament." This last phrase simply means that the House of Commons may discuss their acts, and that, if it disapproves of them, it can easily drive them to resignation. But a Greek Magistrate was, and an American President is, liable to legal trial and punishment for his official acts. So is an English Minister, but not as a Minister. If it can be proved that the First Lord of the Treasury has been guilty of malversation at the Treasury, if it can be proved that he has, as a Privy Councillor, given the Sovereign illegal advice, the Law can in either case touch him, by impeachment or otherwise. But as "Prime Minister," with a good or a bad "policy," the Law cannot touch him, because it knows nothing of his existence. In our system, Parliamentary responsibility has become so effective as to make strictly legal responsibility nearly a dead letter. But in the American system, there is no such thing as Parliamentary responsibility; ten thousand votes of censure cannot displace the President, but an impeachment can.

CHAP. V. their exercise, the powers are in themselves kingly ;¹ the President stepped into the King's place ; he has really more power than a Constitutional King has personally, though less than belongs to a powerful First Minister acting in a Constitutional King's name. But the Achaian General did not succeed any King ; if there ever was one King over all the Old Achaian cities it was in a long past and mythical time ; the single General succeeded to the functions of the two Generals whom the League originally elected. There was therefore nothing kingly about his origin ; the Achaians deliberately decided that one Chief Magistrate was better than two, and that it was well to clothe that Chief Magistrate with powers unknown to earlier Democracies.² But the general resemblance between the Heads of the two Unions is obvious ; whatever may be the differences in detail, we see, in both cases, that a highly democratic constitution can afford to invest a single chief with nearly the whole executive power, and we see, in both cases, that so great an extent of legal power may be sufficient to gratify the ambition of the citizens

Nothing
royal
about the
Achaian
General.

General
resem-
blance of
the two
Presidents.

¹ Hamilton, in the "Federalist" (No. lxix. p. 371), labours hard, as his argument requires, to show the points of difference between the elective and responsible President and the hereditary and irresponsible King. That is, he brings forward the republican limitations of the President's powers more strongly than the kingly nature of the powers themselves. He then compares the President with the Governors of particular States, showing that the President's powers do not, on the whole, exceed theirs. But the powers of a State Governor are no less kingly within their own range, and they are also kingly in their origin. The Governor of the independent State succeeded the Governor of the dependent Colony, and he, whether elected or nominated, was essentially a reflected image of Kingship. The Governor of the State retained the position of the Governor of the Colony, with such changes as a republican system necessarily required. It may be doubted whether republics which had had no sort of experience of monarchical institutions would have invested any single magistrate with the large powers possessed by the American Governors.

² The days when Athens had a single Archon were of course long before she became a Democracy. In fact the gradual advances of Democracy were largely made at the expense of the Archonship.

who are successively raised to it. Neither Union hesitated to create something like a temporary King, and neither Union ever fell under the sway of anything like a permanent Tyrant.¹ In both these respects the Achaian and American Democracies stand together, and are distinguished alike from the earlier Democracies of Greece and from the Democracies of mediæval Italy. Florence indeed, and other Italian cities, invested their magistrates with far greater powers than those of either the Achaian General or the American President. But those powers could be safely vested only in a Board or College; a single chief came in only as a temporary Dictator,² and the temporary Dictator often contrived to convert himself into a Tyrant. The Achaian and the American Confederation stand together as the two Democracies which have entrusted a single Chief Magistrate with the greatest amount of power, and those in which that power has been less abused than anywhere else.

The American Senate is an institution to which there is no exact parallel in the Achaian system. The founders of the American Constitution adopted the general principle of a Second Chamber from the constitution of the mother country. They adapted it to republican ideas by making its seats elective instead of hereditary, and they invested it with some powers which the British House of Lords does not possess. It is the constitutional check on the power of the President, and it is the special

No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate.

¹ The doubtful stretches of authority on the part of the President during the present struggle can hardly fail to remind us of the irregular proceedings of Aratos in the crisis of the Kleomenic war. See below, Chapter vii. But I see as little reason to suspect Mr. Lincoln, as there was to suspect Aratos, of any real intention to establish a Tyranny.

² The Podestà of so many cities, the Roman Senator, and so forth, were originally Dictators required by special emergencies, though those emergencies sometimes lasted so long as to convert the Dictatorship into a permanent Magistracy. I do not remember any magistrate in a democratic city really analogous to the American President.

CHAP. V. guardian of the rights of the several States. Each State, great and small, has its two Senators, while in the House of Representatives members are carefully apportioned to population. Where the Assembly is primary, a Second Chamber, in the same sense as the British House of Lords or the American Senate, cannot exist. It is of the essence of such a Chamber that its members should not be at the same time members of the Lower House. But in a constitution like that of Achaia, no citizen, whatever office he may hold, can cease to be a member of an Assembly whose very essence is that it consists of all the citizens. A Senate is necessary for many purposes ; sometimes it prepares measures for discussion in the Assembly, sometimes it acts independently by commission from the Assembly ; but in either case it is a mere Committee of the sovereign body, a portion of its members acting on the behalf, and by the authority, of the whole. The special duties of the American Senate were, in Achaia, part of the duties of the Sovereign Assembly itself. The Assembly finally confirmed the treaties which the General negotiated ; the Assembly, in which each city had an equal voice, was itself the natural guardian of State independence. The principle of State equality which America confines, in most cases, to one branch of her Legislature, was applied in Achaia, in a more rigid form,¹ to her single Assembly. The Achaian Senate is more analogous to the Norwegian Lagthing than to anything in the constitution either of England or of America. The Norwegian Storting is, like most other European Assemblies, Representative and not Primary ; it is indeed doubly

A Second Chamber impossible in a Primary Assembly.

Analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing.

¹ In the Achaian Assembly, each city, great or small, had one vote. In the American Senate each State, great or small, sends an equal number of Senators, but the votes are not taken by States ; the two Senators of a State may vote on opposite sides of the question, like the two members for an English county or borough.

representative, being chosen by indirect election. But it so far approaches to the nature of a Primary Assembly that there is no distinct Second Chamber. The Storthing chooses a Lagthing from among its own members, and the body thus chosen discharges several of the functions of a Senate or House of Lords.¹ But even here the analogy is very imperfect; for the Lagthing, being a mere portion of the Storthing, exists only while the Storthing is sitting, while it is of the essence of a Greek Senate to act when the Public Assembly is not sitting. A less important difference between the Achaian and American Constitutions may be seen in the far higher legal position of the Ministers or Councillors of the Achaian General, as compared with the Cabinet of the American President. But, even here, we have seen that, in all probability, the Achaian Ministers were practically almost as much the General's chosen Councillors as if they had been of his own nomination. Here again the difference arises from the different origin of the two offices. The Achaian Ministers were a Magistracy more ancient than the General, by whose powers they must have been thrown somewhat into the background. But of the President's Cabinet the American Constitution makes no distinct mention at all. The different departments of administration were arranged by an Act of the first Congress.²

Higher
position
of the
Achaian
Ministers
[Δαμογροί].

Such are the chief points of likeness and of unlikeness between the two great Federal Democracies of the ancient and the modern world. It is singular that that which was practically the less democratic of the two should be that which had theoretically the more democratic constitution.³ Every Achaian citizen was himself a permanent Member of Congress, with a voice in all Federal legisla-

¹ Constitution of Norway, § 74-6 (Latham's Norway, ii. 87).

² Marshall's Life of Washington, v. 228, et seqq.

³ See above, p. 267.

tion, in declaring peace and war, and in electing the Magistrates of the Union. The American citizen, on the other hand, has only a vote in electing the Representatives of his State, in electing electors of the President, in electing the State Legislature which again elects the Senators of his State. Yet nothing is clearer than that the tone and feeling of government and policy is far more democratic in the United States than it was in ancient Achaia. Here again comes in the difference between the Primary and the Representative system. The Primary system, theoretically the most democratic system possible, that which invests every citizen with a personal share in the Federal Government, becomes, in a large territory, practically the less democratic of the two. The franchise which it confers can be exercised only under circumstances which act on the mass of the people as a practical property qualification.¹ The franchise which the American Union confers on every citizen is far more restricted in its powers, but it is one which every citizen can exercise without cost or trouble. The real power of the mass of the people is therefore far greater; the franchise is universally exercised, or abstained from only by the very class by which the Achaian franchise was almost solely exercised. Two constitutions, framed two thousand years and seven thousand miles apart, naturally present no small diversity. Yet, after all, the diversity is trifling compared with the likeness. Probably no two constitutions, produced at such a distance of time and place from one another, ever presented so close a resemblance to each other, as that which exists between the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Achaian League.

The
American
Constitu-

The question then naturally arises, Was the younger of these two Constitutions, so like in their provisions, so

¹ See Federalist, lviii. (p. 318) quoted above, p. 267.

distant in time and place, in any degree a conscious imitation of the elder? I am inclined to think that it was not. The founders of the American Union were not scholars, but practical politicians. They were fully disposed to listen to the teaching of history, but they had small opportunity of knowing what the true and uncorrupted teaching of Grecian history really was. Those chapters of the "Federalist"¹ which are devoted to the consideration of earlier instances of Federal Government show every disposition to make a practical use of ancient precedents, but they show very little knowledge as to what those precedents really were. It is clear that Hamilton and Madison knew hardly anything more of Grecian history than what they had picked up from the "Observations" of the Abbé Mably. But it is no less clear that they were incomparably better qualified than their French guide to understand and apply what they did know. Mably's account of the Achaian League,² like his account of the Amphiktyonic³ Council, is in the style of the French scholarship of the last century. How that looks by the light of English and German scholarship of the present century, hardly needs to be told. Of course the Amphiktyonic Council appears as the "States-General" of a regular Confederation, which is paralleled with the Confederation of Switzerland. In treating of the Achaian League, Mably confounds the Assembly with the Senate;⁴ he has hardly

CHAP. V.

tion not a conscious imitation of the Achaian.

Remarkable treatment of the Achaian history in the "Federalist."

you should talk!

¹ Federalist, No. xviii. p. 91.

² Observations sur l'Histoire de Grèce. Œuvres de Mably, iv. 186, ed. 1792.

³ Ib. iv. 10. See above, p. 143.

⁴ "On créa un sénat commun de la nation; il s'assembloit deux fois l'an à Egium, au commencement du printemps et de l'automne, et il étoit composé des députés de chaque république en nombre égal. Cette assemblée ordonnoit la guerre ou la paix," &c. p. 187. The confusion is the more curious, because in matters of mere detail, like the two yearly meetings, Mably is accurate enough. He had evidently read his books with care, but without the least power of understanding them.

CHAP. V.
Mably's
account
of the
League,
followed
by the
American
writers.

any notion of the remarkable powers vested in the General, or, as he calls him, the Prætor ;¹ finally, he loads Aratos with praises for that act of his life which Plutarch so emphatically condemns, which Polybios has so much ado to defend, his undoing his own work and laying Greece once more prostrate at the feet of a Macedonian master.² The comments of the American statesmen on such a text are curious, and more than curious ; they are really instructive. Their vigorous intellects seized on, and practically applied, the few facts which they had got hold of, and even from the fictions they drew conclusions which would be perfectly sound, if one only admitted the premisses. They instinctively saw the intrinsic interest and the practical importance of the history of Federal Greece, and they made what use they could of the little light which they enjoyed on the subject. One is at first tempted to wish that, instead of such a blind guide as Mably, such apt scholars had had the advantage of the teaching of a Thirlwall, or that they had been able to draw for themselves from the fountain head of Polybios himself.³ Had they known that, in the Achaian Assembly, Keryneia had an equal vote with Megalopolis, how dexterously would they have grappled with the good and

¹ He does indeed say (p. 190), "*Elle fit la faute heureuse de ne confier qu'à un seul préteur l'administration de toutes ses affaires.*" This is of course a translation of those famous words of Polybios to which I have so often referred ; but no words ever stood more in need of a comment.

² "On ne peut, je crois, donner trop de louanges à Aratus pour avoir recouru à la protection de la Macédoine même, dans une conjoncture fâcheuse où il s'agissoit du salut des Achéens. Plutarque ne pense pas ainsi," &c. p. 197. This very curious argument goes on for several pages. Polybios had praised Aratos a little ; Mably was determined to praise him much.

³ The elder President Adams seems to have gone to Polybios, at least in a translation. He gives a long extract on the Achaian history. *Defence of the Constitution*, &c. i. 298. But he is far from entering into its practical value like the authors of the "*Federalist*."

evil sides of such a precedent. How they would have shown that the principle of State equality which the Achæians thus affirmed was amply secured by the constitution of the Senate,¹ while the unfairness which could not fail to attend this part of the Achæian system was carefully guarded against by the opposite constitution of the House of Representatives.² Had they fully realized the prominent position of the Achæian General, so different from anything in earlier Democracies, what an example they would have had before them to justify those large powers in the President for which they so strenuously contend.³ But it was really better for mankind, better for historical study, that the latter of these two great experiments was made in practical ignorance of the former. A living reproduction, the natural result of the recurrence of like circumstances, is worth immeasurably more than any conscious imitation. It is far more glorious that the wisdom and patriotism of Washington and his coadjutors should have led them to walk unwittingly in the steps of Markos and Aratos, than that any intentional copying of their institutions should have detracted *ought* from the freshness and singleness of their own noble course. Had it been otherwise, the later generation of patriots might have shone only with a borrowed light; as it is, the lawgivers of Achæia and the lawgivers of America are entitled to equal honour. In truth the world has not grown old; the stuff of which heroes are made has not perished from among men; when need demands them, they still step forth in forms which Plutarch himself might have portrayed and worshipped. The dim outline of Markos of Keryneia grows into full life in the venerable form of Washington; a Timoleôn, unstained even by Tyrants'

An unconscious likeness to the ancient parallel more valuable than a conscious one.

¹ See Federalist, No. lxii. (p. 334).

² Ib. liv. (p. 298).

³ Ib. lxix. (p. 371, et seqq.)

CHAP. V. blood, still lives among us under the name of Garibaldi; it remains for us to see whether the modern world can attain to another no less honourable form of greatness, whether, among the rulers of later days, one will ever be found who shall dare to enter upon the glorious path of Lydiadas.

CHAPTER VI.

ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ÆTOLIAN LEAGUE.

THE Achaian Confederation is an object of such sur-
passing interest, both in Grecian history and in the
general history of Federal Government, that I have dwelt
upon its smallest beginnings and its minutest constitu-
tional details at a length which seemed no more than
their due. But, alongside of the League of Achaia, there
existed, during nearly the whole time of its being, a rival
Union, differing from it but slightly in constitutional
forms, equal or superior to it in military power, but whose
general reputation in the eyes of the contemporary world
was widely different. The League of Ætolia preceded
that of Achaia in assuming the character of a champion
of Greece against foreign invaders. But, in that period
of Grecian history with which we are most concerned, the
League of Ætolia most commonly appears as an assem-
blage of robbers and pirates, the common enemies of
Greece and of mankind. The Achaian and the Ætolian
Leagues, had their constitutions been written down in the
shape of a formal document, would have presented but
few varieties of importance. The same general form of
Government prevailed in both; each was Federal, each
was Democratic; each had its Popular Assembly, its
smaller Senate, its General with large powers at the head
of all. The differences between the two are merely those

CHAP. VI.

General
Resem-
blances
and Dif-
ferences
between
the
Leagues of
Achaia and
Ætolia.

CHAP. VI. differences of detail which will always arise between any two political systems of which neither is slavishly copied from the other. Both are essentially Governments of the same class. If therefore any general propositions as to the moral effect of particular forms of Government had any truth in them, we might fairly expect to find Achaia and Ætolia running exactly parallel careers. Both Achaia and Ætolia were alike Federal states; both were alike Democracies in theory; both were alike tempered in their practical working by an element of liberal Aristocracy. If therefore Federal states, or Democratic states, or Aristocratic states, were necessarily weak or strong, peaceful or aggressive, honest or dishonest, we should see Achaia and Ætolia both exhibiting the same moral characteristics. But history tells us another tale. The political conduct of the Achaian League, with some mistakes and some faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct of the Ætolian League is, throughout the century in which we know it best, almost always simply infamous. The counsels of the Achaian League were not invariably enlightened; they were now and then perverted by passion or personal feeling; but their general aim was a noble one, and the means selected were commonly worthy of the end. But the counsels of the Ætolian League were throughout directed to mere plunder, or, at most, to selfish political aggrandizement. Some politicians might tell us that this was the natural result of the inherent recklessness and brutality of democratic governments. If so, the same evil results should have appeared in the history of the Democracy of Achaia. If it be said that Achaia was saved from such crimes by the presence of an aristocratic element, Ætolia should have been saved in the like manner. For the tempering of democratic forms by aristocratic practice is as visible in the history of Ætolia as in the history of Achaia. If, on

Illustrations which they give of the emptiness of general propositions in politics.

the other hand, it is argued that a Federal Union is CHAP. VI. necessarily weak, and that even Achaian history contains instances of such weakness, it is easy to answer that no Monarchy, no indivisible Republic, ever showed greater vigour and unity than the original Ætolian Confederation. There are absolutely no signs of disunion, no tendency to separation, visible among any of its members. If Ætolia fell, and fell before Achaia, it fell through causes wholly unconnected with its Federal constitution, through war with an irresistible foreign foe, through grievous errors of its own committing, but errors to which Consolidated and Federal states, Monarchies and Republics, Oligarchies and Democracies, are all alike equally liable. The history of Ætolia indeed shows that the Federal form of government is no panacea for all human ills; it shows that a well-planned constitution at home is no guarantee for wise or honourable conduct in foreign affairs; but these propositions are so self-evident that we need hardly go to Ætolia for the proof of them. But the combined history of the two great Greek Confederations certainly does show the utter fallacy of all general propositions as to the good or evil moral effect of political forms. It proves, above all, the utter fallacy of the declamations in which it is fashionable to indulge against Republican, and especially against Federal, Governments. National character, national circumstances, no doubt both influence the political constitution and are influenced by it. But the two things are essentially distinct from one another. The Achaians, an upright and highly civilized people, capable of noble and patriotic designs, but somewhat deficient both in moral and military vigour, lived under nearly the same political constitution as the Ætolians, an assemblage of mountain hordes, brave, united among themselves, and patriotic in a narrow sense, but rude, boastful, rapacious, and utterly reckless of the rights of others. The forms of

CHAP. VI. a Democratic Federation did not hinder, among either people, the developement of its characteristic virtues and vices. Neither have we any reason to suppose that their developement would have been hindered by the forms of a pure Democracy, of an Oligarchy of birth or of wealth, or of a Monarchy either despotic or constitutional.

Early History of Ætolia.

B. C. 426.

The early history of the Ætoli-ans is very obscure, and it is hard to say at what time a Federal system was first organized among them. Our chief knowledge of them in ante-Macedonian times comes from the account which Thucydides gives of the unlucky campaign of the Athenian Demosthenes in their country.¹ They there appear as the most backward portion of the Hellenic race; their language was difficult to understand, and their greatest tribe, the Eurytanes, were said to retain the barbarous habit of eating raw meat.² Above all, they still lived in detached and unfortified villages.³ Indeed at no time do the Ætoli-ans seem to have attained to the full perfection of Greek city-life. When their League was at the height of its power, we still find but small mention of Ætoli-an towns; indeed we may distinguish the Ætoli-an League, as an union of districts or cantons, from the Achaian League, which was so essentially an union of cities.⁴ Some sort of union would seem to have existed among them even in

Probable early union among the Ætoli-an tribes.

¹ Thuc. iii. 94, et seqq.

² Ib. Ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλώσσαν καὶ ὁμοφάγοι, ὡς λέγονται. See Niebuhr's Anc. Hist. iii. 270.

³ Ib. Οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κόμας ἀτειχίστους καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ.

⁴ Strabo (vol. ii. p. 294) seems to make the opposite remark as the Homeric Ætoli-ans. Αἰτωλοὺς δ' Ὀμηρὸς μὲν διὰ ἐνὶ ὀνόματι λέγει, πόλεις, οὐκ ἔθνη τῶντων ὑπ' αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ. This is one of several signs that the historical Ætoli-ans had gone backward, at all events comparatively, from their position in the heroic ages. The distinction between the Achaian Federation of Cities and the Ætoli-an Federation of Districts—the *Städtebund* and the *Bauernbund*—is well put by Kortüm, Geschichte Griechenlands, ii. 146. Cf. 149, 166.

the fifth century before Christ. Thucydidēs speaks of the Ætoli-
 ans as a nation,¹ and his whole narrative shows that they were quite capable of combining for common defence against an invader. The historian however gives no description of their form of government, except that he incidentally mentions one Salynthios as King over one of their tribes, namely the Agraïans.² The Ætoli-
 ans of this age certainly do not seem at all in advance of their Epeirotic neighbours; yet Thucydidēs fully accepts them as Greeks; at least he never applies to them the name Barbarian, which he freely bestows on the Chaonians and Thesprōtians. In after times indeed we find the Hellenic character of a large portion of the nation called in question,³ and that, strange to say, by the last Philip, who, unlike his earlier namesake, would certainly have had great difficulty in tracing up his own pedigree to any Hellenic stock.⁴ In the period dealt with by Xenophōn we hear but little of Ætolia. He mentions the occupation of Kalydōn by the Achaians,⁵ and he tells us that the Ætoli-
 ans were anxious to obtain possession of Naupaktos, which also was then in Achaian hands. This they hoped to gain through the agency of Agēsilaos,⁶ but it does not appear that it ever came permanently into their possession, till it was given them by Philip after the battle of Chairōneia.⁷ The language employed in speaking of this cession shows that the Ætoli-
 ans already formed one body, capable

Kingahip
not extinct
in the fifth
century,
B.C.

B.C. 391.

Ætolian
acquisition
of Nau-
paktos,
B.C. 338.

¹ Thuc. iii. 94. Τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον.

² Thuc. iii. 111.

³ Pol. xvii. 5.

⁴ Pol. v. 10. Ὁ δὲ [Φίλιππος] ἵνα μὲν καὶ συγγενῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου φαίνηται, μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον σπουδὴν, ἵνα δὲ (ἡλωτῆς, οὐδὲ τὸν ἐλάχιστον λόγον.

⁵ Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. See above, p. 239.

⁶ Ib. 14.

⁷ Dem. Phil. iii. 44. Οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπακτον δωρόμεκεν [ὁ Φίλιππος] Αἰτωλοῖς παραδόσειν; Strabo, l. ix. c. 4 (vol. ii. p. 290). ἔστι δὲ [Ναύπακτος] νῦν Αἰτωλῶν, Φιλίππου προσκρίναντος. See Thirlwall, vi. 20.

CHAP. VI. of receiving and holding a common possession. So, before that time, there were public monuments at Thermon, dedicated in the common name of the Ætolian nation.¹ On the other hand, Arrian speaks of Ætolian embassies to Alexander in a way which has been supposed to imply that no Ætolian Confederation then existed.² But the passage may be explained in other ways, and it is clear that, if the League did not exist at the beginning of the reign of Alexander, it had acquired a good deal of consistency before his death. The acquisition of Naupaktos was only the beginning of a long series of Ætolian annexations, which stand out prominently in the later history of Greece. While Alexander was conquering Persia, the Ætolians had compelled Oiniadai and some other portions of Akarnania to unite themselves, on some terms or other, with the Ætolian body.³ Vengeance for this aggression was strongly de-

The
League
in the
Reign of
Alexander,
B.C. 336-
323.

¹ See the inscription which Strabo (vol. ii. p. 350) quotes from Ephoros, a writer contemporary with Philip;

Ἐνδυμίωνος παῖδ' Αἰτωλὸν τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν
Αἰτωλοὶ σφετέρως μνημ' ἀρετῆς ἑσορᾶν.

See Thirlwall, viii. 226.

² Arrian, 1. 10. 3. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ πρεσβείας, σφῶν κατὰ ἔθνη, πέμψαντες ἐγγυρώμεν τυχεῖν ἐδέοντο. [Arrian's κατὰ ἔθνη is the exact opposite of Strabo's remark about πόλεις.] On this Schorn (p. 25) says, "In der ersten Zeit der Regierung desselben [Alexanders] fand diese [die Conföderation] noch nicht Statt; denn als sie sich ihm unterwarfen, schickte jeder Stamm für sich Gesandte zu dem Könige." So Manso, Sparta, iii. 292. But considering the evidence the other way, one might rather be tempted to suppose that the Ambassadors were sent on behalf of the whole Ætolian nation, but that it was thought desirable that there should be an Ambassador from each tribe. Kortüm (iii. 149) takes the ἔθνη to be the three chief tribes, which he holds to have themselves formed separate Leagues (Sonderbünde). This would agree with a common use of the word ἔθνος, and would make the League of Ætolia, at this time at least, something like that of the Grisons. Cf. above, p. 162, on the constitution of the Boeotian League.

³ Plutarch (Alex. 49) speaks of τὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ἀνάστασιν, and Diodoros (xviii. 8) of Αἰτωλοὶ τοὺς Οἰνιάδας ἐκβαληκότες ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος. But Pausanias, in enumerating the Greeks who took part in the Lamian War,

nounced against the offenders by Alexander himself,¹ and either he, or Antipater and Krateros after him, formed the scheme of transporting the whole Ætolian nation into some distant part of Asia.² Certain it is that either dread of Macedonian vengeance, or, as we may hope, some nobler feelings of Hellenic patriotism, led the Ætoli-Share of the Ætoli-ans in the Lamian War, B.C. 323-2.

By the result of that war, Athens was, for the first time since the days of the Thirty, deprived of freedom as well as of greatness; she had to surrender her orators, to restrict her franchise, to receive a foreign garrison, humiliations which Philip and Alexander had never inflicted on her. The Ætoli-ans were more fortunate; when the course of the war had turned utterly against them, they were delivered by the necessity under which Antipater and Krateros found themselves of resisting Eumenēs in Asia. They were left wholly untouched, partly, it would seem, because it was still hoped, some day or other, to carry out the sentence of deportation against them.³ In the later wars of the Successors, the Ætoli-ans play a considerable part, and they are always spoken of as a single people, acting with a common purpose. But the glimpses Ætolia during the Wars of the Successors.

speaks of *Ἀκαρνανες ἐς τὸ Αἰτωλικὸν συντελοῦντες* (i. 25. 4). This would seem to show that some at least of the conquered Akarnanians had been incorporated (on whatever terms) rather than expelled or extirpated.

¹ Diod. u.s. *Καὶ γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἠπειληκὸς ἦν ὡς οὐκ Οἰνιάδων παῖδες ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐπιθήσει τὴν ἐκκὴν αὐτοῖς.* So Plut. u.s.

² This was agreed upon by Antipater and Krateros in the Lamian War (Diod. xviii. 25), but Bishop Thirlwall (vii. 218) hints, with every look of probability, that such may have been the mind of Alexander himself. Such a scheme was quite in the spirit of Alexander's other plans (Diod. xviii. 4. Thirlwall, vii. 141); but it hardly suits either the position or the character of Antipater or Krateros to devise it, though they might be quite ready to carry it out, if already conceived by Alexander.

³ Diod. xviii. 25. *Διεγγκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμήσαι καὶ μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἄπαντας εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.*

CHAP. VI.

Glimpses
of the
Ætolian
Constitu-
tion at
this time.

Share
of the
Ætolians
in the
Gaulish
War,
B.C. 280-
279.

Annexa-
tion of
Hērakleia.

afforded us of their internal state and constitution are few and feeble. On one occasion we find an Ætolian army leaving the field for a while to go home and discharge the duties of citizens in the National Assembly.¹ In another passage we find our first personal mention of an Ætolian General;² in others we see the Ætolian Federal Assembly discharging its proper function of commissioning Ambassadors in the name of the whole nation,³ and of listening to the representatives of foreign powers.⁴ In the defence of Greece against the Gauls we again find the Ætolians honourably prominent. Here also we obtain one or two more glimpses of their internal condition and their foreign policy. The year before the invasion they had compelled the Trachinian Hērakleia to enter into their Confederacy, and they now, says our informant, fought for it as for a possession of their own.⁵ We also come across the names⁶ of several Ætolian officers, and apparently of at

¹ There can hardly be any doubt that this is the true meaning, as argued by Droysen (i. 73) and Thirlwall (vii. 197), of the expression *διὰ τῶν ἐθνικῶν χρεῖας*, in Diod. xviii. 13. "Ἔθνος is the set formula, in Polybios at least, for a Federation, and *ἐθνικαὶ χρεῖαι* cannot be so well translated as by the words "Federal purposes." But it would be a strange phrase indeed to describe an Akarnanian inroad, as Schorn (3) and Kortüm (iii. 150) suppose.

² Diod. xviii. 38. *Ὦν ἦν στρατηγὸς Ἀλέξανδρος Αἰτωλός*. This need not imply a General of the League; but, as we find a single General soon afterwards, it seems most natural so to interpret it.

³ Diod. xx. 99. *Τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἀποστείλαντος πρεσβευτὰς περὶ διαλύσεων*.

⁴ Diod. xix. 66. *Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀριστοδῆμος . . . ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δικαιολογησάμενος προετρέψατο τὰ πλῆθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιφάνου πράγμασιν*.

⁵ Paus. x. 20. 9. *Ἐπει γὰρ πρότερον τούτων οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ συντελεῖν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας ἠνέγκασαν ἐς τὸ Αἰτωλικὸν· τότε οὖν ἡμύοντο ὡς περὶ πόλεως οὐδὲν τι Ἡρακλεώταις μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ αὐτοῖς προσηκούσης*.

⁶ Ib. 4. *Αἰτωλοὺς δὲ ἦγον Πολύαρχος καὶ Πολύφρων τε καὶ Λακράτης*. Polyarchos was probably the General of the League, and Polyphrôn and Lakratês his subordinates. Another General, Eurydamos, is more distinctly mentioned by the same writer. Ib. x. 16. 4. *Εὐρύδαμον δὲ στρατηγὸν τε Αἰτωλῶν καὶ στρατοῦ τοῦ Γαλατῶν ἐνάντια ἡγησαμένου ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ*.

least one General of the League. Every mention of the people gives the strongest impression of national unity. CHAP. VI.

It appears then that, if we looked only at the Federal period of Grecian history, we might be inclined to give the palm of antiquity to the Ætolian rather than to the Achaian League. The Federal system of Ætolia was clearly in full working before the first four cities of the original Achaia had begun to draw together. The whole Ætolian nation was united, as one body under one head, for years before the ten Achaian cities invested Markos of Keryneia with the Presidency of the whole Achaian nation. But this was merely the natural result of the violent separation of the Achaian cities by the Macedonian power. The Achaian League was the revival of an ancient union after a season of forced disunion. No such blow ever fell upon Ætolia, though, as we have seen, a heavier blow still was threatened. The Ætolians were thus enabled to improve and to enlarge, at a time when the Achaians were driven to rebuild from the foundation. It is not wonderful then if some steps in the developement of Federalism were taken in Ætolia earlier than they were in Achaia. It is certain that Ætolia was united earlier than Achaia under the presidency of a single General, but it appears, on the other hand, that the legal powers of the Ætolian Chief Magistrate were more restricted than those of his Achaian brother. It should be remembered that the precedent of a single General at the head of a Federal State had been long before set by the Arkadians in the days of Lykomédês.¹

Earlier Developement of Ætolia in some points.

Its causes.

There can be no doubt that the union among the members of the Ætolian League was still closer than the union among the members of the Achaian League. This

Closer union among the Ætolians.

¹ See above, p. 204.

CHAP. VI. is clearly true of all the original Ætolians, whatever may have been the case with the non-Ætolian states which were afterwards admitted or forced into the Confederacy. This is the natural result of the difference between an Union of Tribes and an Union of Cities.¹ It has been already more than once remarked that Federalism took root earliest among those portions of the Greek race which were in every way the least advanced, and which were furthest removed from the ideal perfection of Greek city-life. When several closely allied tribes occupy a continuous territory, the feeling of political independence in each will be weaker, and the feeling of national unity in the whole body will be stronger, than it can be in the case of several cities, each capable of, and accustomed to, the exercise of the fullest rights of sovereignty. To unite cities which have once tasted of full autonomy is far more difficult than to unite districts where either there are no cities or else the cities are quite secondary. Thus, in England, the distinctions between the old Anglian, Saxon, and Jutish Kingdoms were soon and easily effaced; but it has required many more centuries, and the teaching of a long and bitter experience, to bring the great cities of Italy to act as members of one united nation. Hence, though the union of the Achaian Cities was never so close as the union of the Ætolian Tribes, yet it was a far greater triumph of the Federal principle to bring Corinth, Sikyôn, and Megalopolis to act together at all, than it was to bring about a much closer union between this and that horde of Ætolian plunderers. For, after all, the

The
Ætolians a
League of
Districts
rather
than of
Cities.

¹ So Brandstätter (p. 306); "Vielleicht hätte es sonst den Aetolern förderlich sein können, dass sie ursprünglich nicht sowohl ein Städtebund (wie die Achäer) sondern mehr ein Völkerbund waren, und folglich nicht in so viele einzelne Interessen sich zertheilen durften."

Tittmann (723) remarks that there is no recorded instance of separate action on the part of any Ætolian canton, while, in every other League, some instances do occur.

close union of the Ætolian Tribes was little more than CHAP. VI. the union of a band of robbers, faithful to each other, and enemies to the rest of the world.¹ It would be hard to say exactly how close that union was, and what measure of independence was left to each of the constituent members of the League.² But it seems probable that those cities which were incorporated with the League did not lose those rights which were essential to the existence of any Greek city. The exact terms of admission will be discussed presently; but it would be far easier to believe that Naupaktos and Hêrakteia were reduced to the condition of dependencies, without any share in the general deliberations of the Ætolian nation, than that they lost the universal rights of local legislation and free choice of local magistrates.³ The relation of dependent alliance was familiar in Greece; the sacrifice of local indepen-

¹ Compare what Isokratês says of the Lacedæmonians (Panath. 245), *ὅτι οὐδὲς ἐν αὐτοῖς διὰ γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντιστάς καὶ ληστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι σφίσι αὐτοῖς ὁμοσούντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλοῦσιν.* He then goes on to liken them to the Triballians, *οὓς πάντες φασιν ὁμοσεῖν ὡς οὐδένας ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ἀπόλλυται δ' οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὁμόρους καὶ τοὺς πλησίον οἰκοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσων ἂν ἐφικέσθαι δυνηθῶσι.* He might have said nearly the same of the Ætolians.

² Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 226) goes so far as to say, "Nor indeed is it quite certain that it is more correct to consider the whole body as a league than as a single republic." What follows at least is true. "It seems that the union of the Ætolians was still closer than that of the Achæans; that there was a deeper consciousness of the national unity, and a greater concentration of power in the national government."

³ In the two inscriptions 2350, 2351, in Boeckh (C. I. ii. 280), the Canton of Naupaktos (*ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ναυπακτίων*) votes all the private rights of citizenship to the people of Keos; *δεδοσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ πολιτείας ἐν Ναυπακτῷ καὶ γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἐγκτασιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ὧν περ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ναυπακτίοι μετέχουσιν, τοὺς Κεῖους μετέχειν.* But the Ætolian Union (*ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς*) seems to promise them nothing more than exemption from plunder at the hands of all Ætolians and all persons sharing in Ætolian citizenship (*μηθένα ἀγειν Αἰτωλῶν μηδὲ τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ πολιτευόντων τοὺς Κεῖους*). It may however be that a grant of citizenship lurks in the words *ὡς Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων τῶν Κεῖων*.

CHAP. VI. dence in exchange for a share in the general government was an idea confined to the pre-historic statesmen of Attica.

Democ-
ratic
character
of the
League,

tempered
with Aris-
tocratic
elements.

The constitution of Ætolia was Democratic in the same sense in which the constitution of Achaia was Democratic. That is to say, the supreme power was vested in the Popular Assembly, the Panaitôlikon,¹ in which, as in Achaia, every citizen had a vote.² But it is evident that, in so large a country as even the original Ætolia, the same causes must have been at work which infused so strong an aristocratic element into the Democracy of Achaia. One may however easily conceive that members of robber hordes would be more easily drawn from their mountains to arrange schemes of plunder, than the orderly citizens of Achaia would be drawn to discuss subtle points of diplomacy, which were safely left in the hands of those who were practically their representatives. It is probable then that an Ætolian Congress was, as a rule, more largely attended than an Achaian Congress. But in such a state of society the feelings of clanship and of personal attachment are always strong. A freebooting chief, at whose call many warriors had enriched themselves with

¹ Παναιτωλικά (Boeckh, C. I. ii. 632) or *Panætolicum*, Liv. xxxi. 29. Livy (xxx. 32) seems to use the word *Pylaicum* as synonymous. Possibly *Panætolicum* means an Ætolian Assembly, if held in its proper place in the old capital Thermon, or seemingly even at Naupaktos (Liv. xxxi. 29, 40), while *Pylaicum* is the same body held, as it sometimes was, at Hérakleia or elsewhere in the neighbourhood of Thermopylae.

² See Schorn, p. 26. Thirlwall, viii. 226. Diod. u.s. (see p. 330). τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, τὰ πλήθη. Pol. iv. 5. ἡ κοινὴ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν σύνοδος.

The nature of the Ætolian Assembly is plainly set forth in the description of Livy (xxxvi. 28, 29). *Censebant et ex omnibus oppidis convocandos Ætolos ad concilium; Omnis coacta multitudo*, &c. This comes from Polybios (xx. 10), γράφειν ἔδοξεν εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ συγκαλεῖν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς χάριν τοῦ βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν προσταπτομένων. He goes on to speak of τὰ πλήθη, οἱ πολλοί, &c. Yet Dean Liddell (Hist. of Rome, ii. 10) talks of "deputies," and seems to think that the Assembly had nothing to do but "to elect a Captain-General."

plunder, would command a deference blinder and more devoted than was paid in Achaia or at Athens to the wisest and most eloquent statesman. It is easy to believe that the decisions of the Assembly were yet more completely in the hands of a few leading men than they were in Achaia.¹ It is evident from the history that expeditions, or rather wars, could be undertaken with impunity by popular chiefs without any commission from the Assembly or any one else.² The regular Meetings of the Assembly were less frequent than they were in Achaia; at least we have not, as we have in Achaia,³ any evidence for the existence of a second yearly Meeting besides that at which the Magistrates were elected. This last, in Ætolia, was held at the autumnal equinox.⁴ But it seems that, as in Achaia, it was in the power of the General to summon extraordinary Meetings for the discussion of urgent affairs.⁵ The Assembly possessed the usual powers of a Greek National Assembly. Besides electing Magistrates, it made peace and war; it commissioned Ambassadors; it received the Ambassadors of other states.⁶ The body called the *Apoklêtoi* seem to have been the Senate, and to have discharged the usual functions of a Greek Senate. They were a numerous body, for we hear, in one case, of a

Influence
of leading
men.

Powers
of the
Assembly.

¹ Brandstätter (Gesch. Æt. 272), who is inclined to make out as good a case as he can for the Ætolians, allows "dass die mangelhaften Gesetze des Bundes und der allzu grosse Einfluss einzelner hervorragender Charaktere in demselben die Räuberei zum Vortheile der Einzelnen gestatteten, und insofern auch begünstigten."

² See the whole history of Skopas and Dorimachos, Pol. iv. 5.

³ See above, p. 275.

⁴ Pol. iv. 37. *Τὰς γὰρ ἀρχαιρεσίας Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν ποιοῦν μετὰ τὴν φθινοπωρινὴν ἰσημερίαν εὐθέως, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ τότε περὶ τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος ἐπιτολήν.*

⁵ This seems implied in Livy, xxxi. 32, and Pol. xx. 10.

⁶ Boeckh, C. I. (ii. 632), No. 3046. *Ἐπεὶ τῆμοι πρεσβευτὰς ἀποστελάντες . . . παρέκλεον τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς, κ.τ.λ.*

⁷ Pol. iv. 5. xx. 1. 10. So Livy, xxxv. 84. *Apocletos (ita vocant sanctius concilium; ex delectis constat viris).*

CHAP. VI. Committee of Thirty being appointed from among them.¹

The
Senate or
Apoklētoi.

This Senate, as usual, considered matters before they were brought forward in the General Assembly;² in concert with the General, it summoned the Assembly to discuss proposals which needed its sanction;³ and sometimes, whether by commission or by usurpation, it acted in the name of the nation without consulting the Assembly at all.⁴ That it represented particular noble families,⁵ or that it was an aristocratic body in any other sense

¹ Pol. xx. 1. *Τριάκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων προεχειρίσαντο τοὺς συνεδρέουσας μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.* Liv. xxxv. 45. *Triginta principes, cum quibus si qua vellet consultaret, delegerunt.*

This election was made by the Assembly. See Schorn, 27, note 4. Thirlwall, viii. 228.

A passage in Livy (xlv. 28) might lead one to believe that the Ætolian Senate was a body so large as to contain more than 550 members of one party. In B.C. 167 the Romanizing leader Lykiaskos procured the murder, by Roman hands, of that number of citizens of the patriotic party. "*Quingentos quinquaginta principes ab Lycisco et Tisippo, circumseuso senatu per milites Romanos, missos a Bæbio præfecto præsidii, interfectos; alios in exsilium actos esse.*" It is however possible that the meeting may really have been one of the Popular Assembly, and that Livy uses *Senatus* vaguely, as Polybios once at least (xxiii. 9) does *βουλευτήριον*. Still a Senate of a thousand members, the number most naturally suggested, is quite possible according to Greek ideas.

² This seems implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 5), *ὅτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσεδέμενοι σύνοδον ὅτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμεταδόντες, κ.τ.λ.* and (xx. 10) *ἔφη φάρ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀποκλήτους ποιήσῃ τὰ προσταττόμενα, προσδεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν πολλῶν, εἰ μᾶλλον κυρωθῆναι τὰ παραγγελλόμενα.* Drumann (p. 504) says, "Die Apocleten unterschieden sich darin von den Demiurgen der Achæer, dass sie in dringenden Fällen im Namen des Volkes beschliessen durften." But the Achaian parallel to the Apoklētoi is not the Dēmiourgoi, but the Senate, which doubtless did often receive such a delegated power from the Assembly.

³ Pol. xx. 10. Liv. xxxvi. 28, 29. See above, p. 334.

⁴ See Livy, xxxv. 34. The Apoklētoi here decree certain important military expeditions, for which secrecy, or rather treachery, was needed.

⁵ Schorn, p. 27. "Dieser [Rath] scheint die edlen Geschlechter vertreten und aus der Häuptlingen bestanden zu haben." If Schorn, as Bishop Thirlwall suggests, gets his "Häuptlinge" from Livy's *Triginta Principes* just quoted, it is really a very slight foundation to build on. The word *Principes* is constantly used by Livy to denote men of influence in a commonwealth, whether actually in office or not.

CHAP. VI.

Magi-
strates.

than that in which all Ætolian and Achaian institutions may be called practically aristocratic, is an idea supported by no evidence whatever. Of other Magistrates, besides the General, we find but few notices. There was a body called Synedroi,¹ and another body called Nomographoi.² It would be a natural guess that the Synedroi were, like the Achaian Dêmiourgoi, the Assessors or Ministers of the General, but our only notice represents them as a Court acting with the General to take cognizance of cases of piracy.³ In Ætolia such a function may well have been vested in the Executive Government of the League; probably no inferior power would have been able to act with efficiency on those occasions when the national interest required that the national tendency to plunder should be restrained. It is at least evident that the Synedroi were a permanent Magistracy, and not merely appointed on occasion. The language used about the Nomographoi⁴ seems to show that the Ætolian state-papers were revised at certain times, when these officers had to insert such laws, treaties, and other public acts, as had been passed since the last revision. It certainly implies that they were a regular permanent Magistracy.⁵ B.C. 205. Therefore when we read of Dorimachos and Skopas⁶

¹ Boeckh, C. I. 2850, 3046 (vol. ii. p. 280, 632), cf. i. 857,

² Ib. 3046.

³ The Têians in the one case and the Keians in the other obtain from the Ætolian Assembly letters of protection against Ætolian inroads. Any cases of infraction are to be referred to the General and Synedroi. 2350. *εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἄλλῃ τοὺς Κεῖους, τὸν στρατηγὸν δὲ τὸν ἐνάρχοντα τὰ ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ καταγόμενα καταδικάζοντα κύριον εἴμεν, καὶ τοὺς συνέδρους καταδικάζοντας τοῖς Κεῖοις τὰν τῶν ἀγόντων αὐτοὺς ζαμίαν, ἃ γὰρ δοκιμάζοντι, κυρίους εἴμεν.* 3046. *εἰ δέ τις καὶ ἄλλῃ ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ τὰ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἢ χώρας, τὰ μὲν ἐμφανῇ ἀναπράσσειν τὸν ἐγδικήσαντα πρὸς συνέδρους δὲ τοὺς ἐνάρχους.*

⁴ The Têian decree is thus ordered to be enrolled. Ib. 3046. *ὅπως δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους καταχωρίσθῃ ἡ ἀνιέρωσις καὶ ἡ δούλια, τοὺς κατασταθέντας νομογράφους καταχωρίζαι, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ νομογραφίαι γίνονται, εἰς τοὺς νόμους.*

⁵ Pol. xiii. 1. *Οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ . . . οἰκείως διακείμενοι πρὸς καινοτομίαν τῆς οἰκίας πολιτείας, εἰλοντο νομογράφους Δορίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, . . . οἱ καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἔγραψαν νόμους.*

CHAP. VI. effecting large changes in the Ætolian laws by virtue of this office, we may believe that they were appointed Nomographoi with enlarged and unusual powers, but not that the office itself was something extraordinary or occasional.

Powers
of the
General.

At the head of the League, as in Achaia and elsewhere, stood the Federal General. His main powers, civil, military, and diplomatic, were much the same as those of the General of the Achaians. He commanded the armies of the League, and represented it in negotiations with foreign powers. But what we may call his parliamentary functions seem to have been somewhat different from those of the Achaian chief magistrate. In Achaia we have seen that the General was required to be an effective speaker in the Assembly, like our own Leader of the House of Commons, while the formal Presidency was vested in his Ministers.¹ In Ætolia, on the other hand, the General appears to have been strictly the President of the Assembly,² and, being President, he was expressly forbidden to give any opinion on questions of peace and war.³ We may take for granted that an Ætolian General would be far more likely to take the warlike than the peaceful side of any such question; such would doubtless be the bias of the mass of the Assembly also; it was therefore wisely provided that they should not be exposed to have their passions yet further roused by inflammatory harangues from the chief magistrate of the commonwealth. But the restriction seems also to point to a certain feeling of jealousy towards the General and his high powers of which we find no trace in the Achaian body. As Presi-

¹ See above, p. 296, 7.

² Liv. xxxi. 32, where the General Damokritos clearly acts as President.

³ Liv. xxxv. 25. Bene comparatum apud Ætolos esse, ne Prætor, quum de bello consulisset, ipse sententiam diceret.

Some editions have *Achaos*, but it is clear that no reading but *Ætolos* has any force. On the causes of the restriction, see Thirlwall, viii. 227.

dent of the Assembly, he could, as we have seen, summon extraordinary Meetings.¹ He was elected² at the regular Autumnal Congress, and he seems to have entered upon his office the same day,³ without the delay which took place between the election of an Achaian General and his actual entrance upon office. Besides the General, there were, as in Achaia, a Commander of Cavalry and a Secretary of State. These three seem to be spoken of as the three chief officers of the Republic.⁴

CHAP. VI.
Com-
mander of
Cavalry,
and Secre-
tary of
State.

Our notices of the internal constitution of Ætolia are so slight, and they present so few important points of contrast with that of Achaia, that a more interesting field of inquiry is opened with regard to the foreign policy of the League. One point which calls for special examination is the relation of the League to those non-Ætolian states which

Foreign
Policy
of the
League.

¹ See above, p. 335.

² Tittmann (Staatsverfassung, 387) and Dr. Schmitz (Dict. Ant. art. *Ætolicum Fœdus*) infer from an obscure passage of Hēsychios (v. *κυάμφ πατριφ*) that "the Assembly nominated a number of candidates, who had then to draw lots, and the one who drew a white bean was strategus." The passage in Hēsychios is, *Κυάμφ πατριφ. Σοφοκλῆς Μελεάγρῃ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς κυαμεύοντων διεκλήρουν δὲ αὐτὰς κυάμφ, καὶ ὁ τὸν λευκὸν λαβὼν ἐλάγχχανεν· ἀνάγει δὲ τοὺς χρόνους, ὡς καὶ ἐν Ἰνάχῃ κυαμοβόλον δικαστήν.* There is not a word here about the Assembly nominating candidates who drew lots. If the words of Hēsychios prove anything, they prove that the election of all Ætolian magistrates was left wholly to the lot. To make us accept so improbable a story, we should need some much better authority than Hēsychios. The lot was never applied, even at Athens, to really important offices, like that of General, and we hear nothing of it in Polybios or any trustworthy author. No doubt Sophoklēs, as usual, transferred the practice of Athens in his own day to the mythical days of Ætolia, and Hēsychios, by way of explanation, transferred it to historical Ætolia also.

³ Pol. ii. 3. *Δέον τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ γενέσθαι τὴν ἀρεσιν καὶ τῆς παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶν Αἰτωλοῖς.* iv. 67. *παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἤδη τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων καθηκόντων στρατηγὸς ἤρθετο Δορίμαχος, ὅς παραντίκα τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαβὼν, κ.τ.λ.*

⁴ Pol. xxii. 15. Liv. xxxviii. 11. The Ætolians (B.C. 189) are required to give hostages to Rome, but these three great officers are exempt.

CHAP. VI. were induced, or more often compelled, to become, in some sense or other, members of it. The history of Ætolia is conspicuously a history of annexation. So, it may be said, is the history of Achaia also. From Markos to Philopoimên the League was ever extending itself over a wider territory, ever increasing the number of the cities which formed its component members. Some of the Achaian annexations may have been unjust and impolitic; those at all events were so which were effected against the will of the annexed cities. But it does not appear that any city, when once admitted, by whatever means, into the Achaian League, was ever placed in a position of dependence, or of any kind of formal inferiority to those cities which were in the League before it. The object of the League was to unite Achaia, Peloponnêsos, if possible all Greece, in a single free and equal Federation. The end at least was noble, even if over-zeal sometimes misled Achaian statesmen into the employment of questionable means. But it is hardly possible, by the widest stretch of charity, to attribute such a broad and enlightened patriotism to the brigands of the Ætolian mountains. It is true that their character is known to us only from the descriptions of enemies, and something may fairly be abated from the general pictures of Ætolian depravity¹ which we find in our Achaian informants. But the facts of the case plainly show both that powerful men in Ætolia

Contrast
with
Achaia.

¹ Pol. ii. 45. Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. ix. 34, et seqq. xviii. 17, and especially iv. 3. θηριώδη ζῶσι βίον, κ.τ.λ. The favourite process of "rehabilitation" has not failed to be extended to the Ætolians. They have found vigorous advocates in Lucas (Ueber Polybios Darstellung des Aetolischen Bundes. Königsberg. 1827) and Brandstätter (Die Geschichten des Aetolischen Landes, Volkes, und Bundes. Berlin. 1844).

No doubt the judgement of Polybios about the Ætolians, just like his judgement about Kleomenês, must be received with some caution; but I see nothing to shake one's general confidence in his narrative. The worst deeds attributed to the Ætolians are too clear to be denied.

could venture upon the grossest breaches of International Law without any fear of restraint from the national Government,¹ and also that the avowed policy of the Government itself was seldom swayed by any regard to good faith or to the rights of others. Notwithstanding the gallant behaviour of their ancestors both in the Lamian and in the Gaulish War, the Ætoli-ans of the times with which we have most to do could make less claim than any other people in Greece to a character for extended Hellenic patriotism. The Greek commonwealth which deliberately introduced the strong arm of Rome into Grecian warfare² was far more guilty than even the commonwealth which gave up Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian. Long before that time, Ætolia had agreed upon a partition, first of Akarnania and then of Achaia, with a Macedonian King;³ she now agreed with Rome to make a series of conquests at the expense of Akarnania⁴ and other Grecian states, in the course of which the soil of the conquered countries was to remain an Ætolian pos-

CHAP. VI.

Ætolian
Treason
against
Greece.

B.C. 211.

¹ See above, p. 335. Compare the curious declamation of Philip in Pol. xvii. 5. *Τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἔθος ὑπάρχει μὴ μόνον, πρὸς οὓς ἂν αὐτοὶ πολεμῶσι, τοὺτους αὐτοὺς ἔχειν καὶ τὴν τούτων χώραν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτεροὶ τινες πολεμῶσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅντες Αἰτωλῶν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι, μηδὲν ἤττον ἐξεῖναι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἄνευ κοινοῦ δόγματος καὶ παρῆναι ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πολεμοῦσιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἔχειν τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, ὥστε παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς μήτε φίλος ὄρους ὑπάρχειν μήτ' ἐχθρὸς, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τίνος ἐτοίμους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι τοὺτους καὶ πολεμῖους.* Brandstätter (272) calls on us to distinguish between the piratical doings of individuals and the national action of the League, but the charge is that the Federal Government did nothing to stop the piratical doings of individuals.

² The first diplomatic intervention of Rome in Grecian affairs was indeed made at the intercession of Akarnania (see the next Chapter), and, curiously enough, it was in support of Akarnania against Ætolia. But the Ætoli-ans were undoubtedly the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece, and the first to plan and carry out the destruction of Grecian cities in partnership with Roman commanders.

³ Pol. ii. 43, 45. ix. 38. See the next Chapter.

⁴ Pol. ix. 38. xi. 5. So Livy, xxvi. 24. *Darent operam Romani ut Acarnaniam Ætoli haberent.*

CHAP. VI. session, while the moveable spoil was to be carried off by the barbarians of Italy.¹ Aratos made at least no such infamous terms as these with his Macedonian patron. In all this we see a system of mere selfish aggrandizement, quite different even from the mistaken policy which occasionally led Achaian statesmen to enlarge their League by the incorporation of unwilling members. The annexations made by Achaia were at least made on terms of perfect equality; the annexations of Ætolia were, in many cases, simple conquests by brute force. As might be expected, there were wide differences in the condition of the annexed countries, and in their relation to the Ætolian state. That relation seems to have varied, from full incorporation on equal terms, to mere subjection, veiled under the specious forms of dependent alliance. It should be remembered that the Achaian League, besides the generous principles which it professed, and on which, in the main, it acted, had a great advantage in the continuity of its territory. The League gradually spread itself over all Peloponnêsos; under more favourable circumstances it might have spread itself over all Greece; in either case its territory would have been one continuous sweep, an inestimable advantage in the process of fusing the whole into one political body. No Achaian citizen, however remote, had, in the best days of the League,² to cross a foreign territory in order to reach the seat of the Federal Government. No Achaian citizen, with the single exception of the people of Aigina, had to expose himself,

Comparison between Ætolian and Achaian annexations.

Continuity of the Achaian territory; scattered nature of the Ætolian.

¹ Pol. ix. 39. (Speech of Lykiskos the Akarnanian.) *Ἡδὴ παρήρηται μὲν Ἀκαρνάνων Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νῆσον, κατέσχον δὲ πρῶν τὴν τῶν ταλαίπωρων Ἀντικυρέων πόλιν, ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι μετὰ Ῥωμαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι, πεισόμενα δηλονότι ἅπερ εἰκός ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας τὰ δ' ἐδάφη κληρονομοῦσι τῶν ἡτυχηκότων Αἰτωλοί.*

² The outlying cantons of Pleurôn and Hêrakleia are exceptions, but they were united to the League only in very late times.

even during the shortest voyage, to the risk of capture by sea. Achaia then knew only two forms of political connexion—the alliance of wholly independent powers on equal terms, and the incorporation of cities as equal members of the national Achaian League. But the Ætolian possessions and alliances were scattered over all parts of Greece, inland and maritime. Mantinea¹ in her Arkadian valley, Teôs² in the middle of the Ægean, Kios³ on the shores of the Propontis, all were compelled, or found it expedient, to enter into some relation or other, be it subjection, alliance, or incorporation, with the Ætolian Federation. Nor was the League less busy in extending its borders nearer home. I have already had occasion incidentally to mention some of the Ætolian acquisitions in central Greece, such as Naupaktos, Hêrakraia, Stratos, and Oiniadai. Even the whole Bœotian League at one time entered into relations with Ætolia which seem to have been more intimate than those of mere alliance between two independent powers.⁴ Delphi must have been seized upon in some way or other, as the Temple and the Amphiktyonic Council are spoken of as at one time needing deliverance from Ætolian bondage.⁵ Now these annexations were made in various ways. Some of them were simple conquests; in others, including, strange to say, Mantinea,⁶ the inhabitants are said to

CHAP. VI.

B.C. 220.

Variety of relations in the Ætolian League.

¹ As also Tegea and Orchomenos. Pol. ii. 46.

² And Keôs; see above, p. 333.

³ As also Lysimacheia and Kalchêdôn. Pol. xv. 23. Kios had an Ætolian Governor; *στρατηγὸς παρ' Αἰτωλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοντος καὶ προεστῆτος τῶν κοινῶν*. This is something more than the mere commander of a Federal garrison. Mommsen (Röm. Gesch. i. 513) seems to take him for the General of the League.

⁴ Pol. xx. 5. *Προσένευμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος*. See above, p. 162, and the next Chapter.

⁵ Pol. iv. 25. See above, p. 142.

⁶ Pol. ii. 57. *Μαντινεῖς . . . ἐγκαταλιπόντες τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν ἐθελούτην Αἰτωλοῖς ἐναχέρισαν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα*.

CHAP. VI. have deliberately preferred the Ætolian to the Achaian connexion. Between these two classes would come two others; namely those cities which, like Hêrakteia, were united indeed by force, but still on terms which, nominally at least, included political incorporation,¹ and those which, like Teôs and Keôs, merely found some sort of connexion with the Ætolian League to be better than exposure without defence to unrestrained Ætolian incursions. It almost naturally follows that allies or subjects gained in so many different ways were admitted to union with the League on widely different terms. But it does not follow that the nature of their relation to the League was always determined solely by the way in which they were acquired. Geographical position would have a good deal to do with it. It is evident that Nau-paktos and Hêrakteia could be really incorporated as component members of the League, and it is equally evident that Teôs, Kios, and Mantinea could not. And again, in many cases of absolute conquest or of forced adhesion, the existing inhabitants may well have been wholly or partially expelled, and their place supplied by Ætolian settlers.² Thus, under the terms of the Ætolian treaty with Rome, the inhabitants of Aigina, and doubtless of other conquered places also, were regarded as part of the moveable spoil, and were sold, or put to ransom, by their Roman owners.³ The Ætolians must therefore, in some cases at least, have entered on possession of empty cities and districts, which they doubtless speedily filled with inhabitants of their own nation. An Akarnanian town which, by such a process, became Ætolian, was doubt-

Differ-
ences of
position
among the
conquered
States.

¹ On Hêrakteia see above. Compare their attack on Medeôn, Pol. ii. 2. Αἰτωλοὶ οὐδ' αὖτως δυνάμενοι πείσαι Μεδωνίους μετέχειν σφίσι τῆς αὐτῆς πολιτείας ἐπεβάλλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἐλεῖν αὐτούς.

² In Pol. ix. 39 the word κληρονομεῖν at once suggests the Athenian κληρουχία.

³ See Pol. ix. 42. xi. 6. xxiii. 8.

less freely admitted to equal rights with the other Ætolian cantons. And, even when the former inhabitants were allowed to retain possession, it is easy to imagine cases in which incorporation on equal, or nearly equal, terms may have suited Ætolian policy better than simple dominion. Important points like Naupaktos and Hérakleia could not be safely left in the hands of discontented subjects; their inhabitants must either be expelled¹ or be converted into willing Confederates. These various considerations, combined with such little direct evidence as we possess, will lead us to prefer, among the various opinions on the subject, that which holds that the relation between the acquired territories and the original Ætolia varied from absolute equality to absolute subjection. Cities on the Ætolian border, whether repeopled by Ætolian settlers or not, were fully incorporated with the League; their inhabitants are spoken of as Ætoli-ans,² and Ætolian Federal Assemblies were held within their walls.³ Distant cities, which could not be really incorporated, to which the offer of the Ætolian political franchise would have been simply a mockery, received charters of security against Ætolian rapine, together with admission

¹ This would seem to have been the case with the Phthiôtic Thebes. This city was held by the Ætoli-ans (Pol. v. 99. *κατεχόντων αὐτὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν*), when it was taken by King Philip, the inhabitants enslaved (Pol. v. 100), and Macedonian settlers put in their places. As Philip and his allies had engaged to liberate all cities annexed to Ætolia against their will, either the then population of Thebes must have been Ætolian, or else Philip must have been guilty of a greater breach of faith than seems likely at that stage of his reign.

² In the Inscription in Boeckh, No. 2352 (vol. ii. p. 382), which contains the Keian decree in return for the Naupaktian and Pan-Ætolian decrees already quoted, the Naupaktians are at least included under the word *Αἰτωλοί*. In fact we shall, as we go on, find two Naupaktian citizens, Kleonikos and Agelaos, among the most eminent men in Ætolia; Agelaos even rose to the office of General.

³ The Federal Government, and apparently the Federal Assembly also, transact business at Hypata. Pol. xx. 9. xxi. 2, 3.

CHAP. VI. to the private rights of citizenship, either throughout Ætolia or in some particular Ætolian canton. The Teïan or Keian ally had probably no great desire for a vote in the Ætolian Federal Assembly which he could hardly ever exercise. But it was a great matter for him to be guaranteed, even if it were by payment of tribute, against the ravages of Ætolian privateers; and it was something for him to find himself, at that point of Ætolia which he was most likely to visit, dealt with, not as a foreigner, but as one clothed with all the private rights of a Naupaktian citizen. Important outlying points, inland or maritime, points suited to act as checks upon enemies or to be made the starting-points for plundering excursions, seem to have been seized upon without scruple; and these, whether their inhabitants received any sort of franchise or not, were held as Ætolian outposts, defended by Ætolian garrisons, and, sometimes at least, paying tribute to the Ætolian Treasury.¹ Such was certainly the case with the Arkadian town of Phigaleia;² such was also most probably the case with the island of Kephallënia.³ These various kinds of

¹ The Ætolian garrison and governor of Kios have been already mentioned. So the allies in the Social War speak of the cities in their several territories which the Ætolians have seized (εἰ τινα κατέχουσιν αὐτῶν Αἰτωλοὶ χώραν ἢ πόλιν), and go on to speak of Ætolian aggressions in general; παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἡναγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείας καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις. (Pol. iv. 25. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 232.) Flathé, whom Thirlwall quotes, calls these expressions "Redensarten" (ii. 237), and retorts on Macedonia as an enslaver of Greeks no less than Ætolia. It is however hard to see how this perfectly fair *tu quoque* affects the fact of Ætolian domination.

² Pol. iv. 3. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 232.

³ Schorn, 29. Thirlwall, u.s. Schorn's argument seems to me to prove that Kephallënia was not admitted to even a forced *συμπολιτεία*. It does not follow that some cities which were, like Phigaleia, nominally incorporated—for Phigaleia was *συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς*—may not have been practically in the same subject condition.

relations between a dominant country and its dependencies are familiar enough in our own political experience. CHAP. VI.

The inhabitants of Kephall nia and of the other Ionian Islands are held by our own nation in a condition of dependent alliance, which, in the opinion of the weaker ally, does not differ from absolute subjection. The inhabitants of Malta and Gibraltar legally possess all the rights, public and private, of British subjects, but they have no opportunity of receiving anything more than that general protection which is equally afforded to the Ionian ally. The inhabitants of Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, though their islands are not formally incorporated with the United Kingdom, are not looked on as foreigners; their position practically combines the advantages of protection and of incorporation, they unite the strength of a great monarchy with the local freedom of a small commonwealth. We can thus easily understand the great variety in the practical condition of the various states which formed the outlying portions of the  tolian Federation. And besides these dependencies and half-incorporated members,  tolia of course had, like other states, equal allies, united only by the ordinary bonds of international engagements. The ancient connexion between  tolia and her supposed colony Elis lasted down to the latest days of Grecian history; and, though the weaker state doubtless often humbly followed the lead of the stronger, it does not seem ever to have deviated, in form at least, from the nature of a free alliance between two independent and equal powers.

Comparison with the different relations of British Dependencies.

I have, in my last Chapter, endeavoured to trace at some length the points of analogy and diversity between the League of Achaia and the United States of North America. There are several points in which the League of  tolia suggests a similar comparison with the Swiss

Comparison between  tolia and Switzerland.

CHAP. VI. Confederation. But the parallel between Ætolia and Switzerland is far from being so close as the parallel between Achaia and the United States. That the part played by Switzerland in modern Europe is far more honourable than the part played by Ætolia in ancient Greece is a distinction not directly to the purpose, as we are not discussing the moral characters of nations, but their political constitutions. But it is certainly only in the weaker points of the Swiss constitution, and in the less honourable features of the Swiss character, that we find the chief points of likeness to Ætolian models, while the likeness between Achaia and America is mainly shown in those points which are most honourable to both nations. In most of those respects in which the League of Ætolia differs from the League of Achaia it approaches to the old constitution of Switzerland. The Ætolians, like the Swiss, were a nation of mountaineers, and their League, like that of Switzerland, was originally an union not of cities, but of tribes or districts. The oldest members of the Swiss League, the famous Forest Cantons, contained, and still contain, no considerable town; they still remain the most perfect examples of rural Democracy which the world ever saw. A mountain Democracy of this sort is something very different from the Democracy of a great city; it is sure to be brave and patriotic, but it is also sure to contain a stronger conservative, not to say obstructive, element than can be found under any other form of government. Nowhere does the wisdom of our forefathers meet with greater reverence than in a small community of democratic mountaineers. That the Ætolians lagged behind the rest of Greece, that the rural Cantons lag behind the rest of Switzerland, is no more than any one would naturally expect. In Switzerland, the accession of considerable towns to the original League of the Forest Cantons, probably saved the whole body from reproducing

Ætolia and Switzerland resemble each other in their worst points, Achaia and America in their best.

Both originally Leagues of Tribes not of Cities.

Later civic element in Switzerland.

some of the worst features of Ætolian life. When Bern CHAP. VI. attached herself to the mountain alliance, it was as if A.D. 1352. Athens or Corinth had joined the Ætolian League and had become its ruling spirit. Even the earlier accession A.D. 1332. of the much smaller town of Luzern had a considerable effect on the character of the League. This civic element in Switzerland saved her both from remaining in perpetual obscurity, like some of the Leagues of Northern Greece, and from obtaining an importance purely mischievous, like that of Ætolia. And, even as it was, the history of Switzerland exhibits only too many instances of an Ætolian spirit. The tendency to serve as mercenaries, regardless of the cause in which they serve, is the least disgraceful form which this spirit has taken. The purely conservative and defensive history of Switzerland is the most glorious portion of modern European history. It is one tale of unmixed heroism, from the day when the heroes of Morgarten first checked the course of Austrian tyranny, to the day when their descendants calmly appealed to admiring Europe against the base perfidy of their own apostate citizen, who had robbed them of the bulwark which Europe had guaranteed, and which the robber himself promised to respect up to the very moment of the consummation of his crime. But the warmest admirer of the brave Confederation cannot deny that, at the only time when Switzerland played an important part in general European affairs, it was a part conceived far too much in the spirit of Skopas and Dorimachos. The Swiss too often appeared in the Italian wars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a character not very unlike that in which the Ætoli-
Grandeur of the conservative history of Switzerland, A.D. 1315-1860.
 ans appeared in the days of Aratos and Philopoinên. The betrayal of Lewis Sforza by his Swiss Guards was an act A.D. 1500. which required the devotion of the Swiss Guards of a later A.D. 1792. Lewis to atone for it. The territories south of the Alps, whether possessed by the Confederation at large or by

Aggressive warfare of the Swiss in Italy.

CHAP. VI. particular Cantons, were won by aggressions as little to be
 A.D. 1503- defended as the annexations of either Buonaparte. Now
 1512.

Subject
 districts of
 Switzer-
 land and
 of Ætolia.

that the Canton of Ticino enjoys equal rights with its German and Burgundian¹ fellows, no one would degrade the citizens of a free republic into the subjects even of an Italian King; but history cannot forget that there was a time when the Switzer was to the Lombard as truly an alien master as the Gaul, the Spaniard, or the Austrian.

It is in relation to these subject districts that the resemblance between Ætolia and Switzerland becomes most close. The union between the original Ætolian Tribes was indeed far closer than that between the old Thirteen Cantons, closer even than that between the Achaian Cities or the American States. But while Achaia, like America, admitted no members to the League except on terms of perfect equality,² Ætolia, like Switzerland in her old state, possessed allies and subjects in every conceivable relation, from equal friendship to absolute bondage. The state of things under the old Swiss League—the various positions of Confederate States, Allied States, Protected States, Districts subject to the League as a whole, Districts subject to this or that Canton, Districts subject to two or more Cantons in partnership—relations, all of them, which a Greek might well express by his elastic word *Sympolity*—all this teaches us, better than anything else, what was the real condition of the cities, districts, and islands, which were brought into connexion with Ætolia in such various ways and on such various terms. The Swiss territory, Confederate, Allied, and Subject, was indeed

Swiss
 territory
 continu-
 ous,

¹ *Burgundian*, not *French*. No one who regards either the past or the future, will ever apply, as is too often done, the name "French Switzerland" to that part of the Confederation where a Romance language is spoken. See above, p. 31.

² The peculiar circumstances of the District of Columbia prevent it from being looked on as a real exception, and a "Territory" is simply an infant State.

continuous, or nearly so,¹ while the allies and subjects of Ætolia were scattered over the whole mainland and islands of Greece. This is the natural difference between a purely inland country, like Switzerland, and one which, like Ætolia, always possessed some sea-board, and soon found means to acquire more. But, if our analogy fails in this purely external and physical point, the experience of our own nation, or of any other nation which has conquered or colonized by sea, steps in to supply the deficiency. Thus does history ever reproduce itself, at all events within the great circle of European civilization. The Greek, the Swiss, the Englishman, are all beings of the same nature, all possessed of the same good and evil qualities, ready to be called out by the recurrence of the same excitements and temptations. Till we learn wholly to cast away the silly distinction of "Ancient" and "Modern," and freely to employ every part of history to illustrate every other part, we shall never fully take in the true unity of the political life of Europe, or realize as we should that the experience of man in times past, alike in great empires and in single cities, is no mere food for antiquarian dreams, but is the truest and most practical text-book of the philosopher and the statesman.

¹ Mühlhausen was an isolated ally of Switzerland, which, after the French annexation of Elsass, was entirely surrounded by French territory; —we are now unhappily driven to use nearly the same language of Geneva itself. Mühlhausen, by more recent arrangements, has been handed over to the same fate as Colmar and Strassburg.

CHAPTER VII.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN
LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA. B.C. 281—222.

CHAP. VII. I DO not propose to give, in this and the following Chapters, any complete narrative of the later history of Greece. Such a task belongs to the historian of Greece or of the Greek people, not to the historian of a particular class of governments. But a certain amount of direct narrative seems essential at this stage of my subject. We have now traced out the origin and the political constitutions of those two great Federations which became the leading powers in the last days of independent Greece. It seems necessary to the completeness of the subject to show their systems actually at work, and to give some account of the eminent men who guided their internal developement and their foreign policy. With this view I propose to go through the last century and a half of Old Grecian history, passing lightly over such points as do not concern my immediate subject, but stopping to narrate and comment in detail when we come across things or persons directly interesting to a student of the history of Federalism.¹

¹ Of this period, as of so many others, we have no complete contemporary history: for a great part of it we have no contemporary history at all. Polybios narrates in detail from the beginning of the War of the Leagues in B.C. 221; of the earlier times he gives merely an introductory sketch. But we have Polybios' history in a perfect state only for about five years; from B.C. 216 onwards, we have only fragments, though very extensive and important fragments. Down to B.C. 168, we

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§1. *From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Deliverance of Corinth, B.C. 281—243.*

Revolu-
tion of
Greece and
Macedonia
during the
first years
of the
League.
B.C. 281-
272.

The first years of the growth of the Achaian League are contemporary with the invasion of Macedonia and Greece by the Gauls and with the wars between Pyrrhos and Antigonos Gonatas. Pyrrhos, for a moment, expelled Antigonos from the Macedonian throne, which Antigonos recovered while Pyrrhos was warring in Peloponnêsos. By the time that Pyrrhos was dead, and Antigonos again firmly fixed in Macedonia, the League had grown up to maturity as far as regarded the cities of the old Achaia. For the next ten years also Antigonos had his hands full in other quarters. He was engaged in a war with Athens, in the earlier stages of which the republic had the support of Sparta and Egypt. He had also a much nearer and more dangerous enemy in Alexander the son of Pyrrhos, who had succeeded his father on the

B.O. 273.

B.C. 272.

B.C. 272-
263.

B.C. 268-
263.

have the history of Livy, who, in Greek matters, commonly followed, and indeed often translated, Polybios. From B.C. 168 to B.C. 146, that is, till the final loss of Achaian independence, we have only the fragments of Polybios. We have also Plutarch's Lives of Aratos, Philopoimên, Agis, Kleomenês, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus. These are largely derived from contemporary writers now lost, especially from Phylarchos, a strong Kleomenist writer, and from the Memoirs of Aratos himself. We are thus often enabled to hear both sides of a question. There are also occasional notices in Pausanias, Strabo, and other writers, which, in the case of Pausanias, often swell into considerable fragments of history. It is evident therefore that to study this period in detail is a very different business from studying the history of the Peloponnesian War, where a man has little more to do than to read his Thucydids, and then to turn for illustrations to Aristophanês and Plutarch. In the later period, not merely the illustrations, but the history itself, has to be dug from a variety of sources. The English scholar will generally find it enough to read Bishop Thirlwall's last volume, accompanied by those portions of Polybios and those Lives of Plutarch which belong to the subject. Having compared every word of Bishop Thirlwall's narrative with the original writers, I can bear witness to its unflinching accuracy, as every reader can to its unswerving impartiality and wisdom.

CHAP. VII. throne of Epeiros. Alexander inherited all Pyrrhos' enmity towards Antigonos, and, like Pyrrhos, he actually succeeded in expelling him for a short time from Macedonia.¹ The war with Athens, known as the Chremônidean War, ended in the capture of Athens, the placing of Macedonian garrisons in the city and its ports, and apparently in the destruction of the Long Walls.² This was the last blow to the little amount of power which Athens still retained. Of the Peloponnesian cities, many, especially Sikyôn and Megalopolis, were held by Tyrants in the Macedonian interest. Corinth was in the more singular position of being held, not by a native Tyrant, but by a Macedonian prince of the royal house, who was, virtually at least, independent of the King.³ It was held successively by Krateros (half-brother to Antigonos through his mother Phila), by Alexander son of Krateros, and by Alexander's widow Nikaia. Sparta remained independent, with her old constitution and laws, with her two Kings, her Ephors, and her Senate; but she was sadly fallen both from her Hellenic position without and from the purity of her Lykourgeian discipline within. The old spirit however, as we shall soon see, was still there, and she was able to drive back Pyrrhos from her gates with as much energy as a hundred years before she had driven back Epameinôndas. Still it marks the decay alike of her power and of her discipline that she had gates from which to drive him back. Thus far, then, circumstances had favoured the quiet and peaceful growth of the League. Achaia was surrounded by enemies, but all were so occupied with what appeared more important matters that there was little fear of their meddling with her. Such a period of danger, ever threatening, but never striking, was admirably suited to strengthen the feeling of union, and to give an impulse towards good government

Circa B.C.
264.

State of
Pelopon-
nésos.

State of
Sparta.

B.C. 272.

Favour-
able posi-
tion of the
Achaian
League.

¹ See Thirlwall, viii. p. 98.

² Ib. p. 100.

³ Ib. p. 118.

and improvement of every kind. This period embraces the first twenty years of the League, during which, beyond the gradual growth of the League itself, we have not a single notice of its history. Then follow ten years during which all Greece is nearly a blank to us, but in the course of which one most important change was effected in the Achaian polity.

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B.C. 281-261.

B.C. 261-251.

It was in the twenty-fifth year of the revived League that, instead of the two Generals who had hitherto been yearly chosen, the Achaians for the first time placed at the head of the Federal Commonwealth a single General or President with full powers. Markos of Keryneia, as he deserved, was the first citizen thus called upon to wield in his own hands the full authority of the state. Polybios¹ records the fact and its date, but he gives no explanation of the causes which led to this great constitutional change. In those threatening times, the feeling of union among the members of the League must have been growing stronger and stronger. To vest the chief power of the nation in one man's hands expressed a clear national conviction of the advantage and the need of unity of purpose and vigour of action. It is easy to conceive that practical evils may have arisen, especially in a Federal state, from the existence of two supreme magistrates with equal powers. The working of the Ætolian League, which, with all its faults, was a model of united and vigorous action, may well have taught the Achaians that, in this respect, their constitution was inferior to that of their neighbours. Be this as it may, the change was made, and it was made at a time when it led the way to still greater changes. From this time forward, the history of the League becomes mainly the biography of several eminent men, who, in their turns, presided over its councils. This personal character of the Achaian history gives it a peculiar kind of interest,

Institution
of the sole
General-
ship,
B.C. 255.

Biogra-
phical
character
of the
Achaian
history.

¹ ii. 43.

CHAP. VII. an interest more like that of modern history, and one widely different from the feeling with which we study the records of aristocratic commonwealths. In the stately march of the Roman annals, greater men, it may be, than any that the League produced seem as nothing beside the superior greatness of the commonwealth in and for which they lived. The Roman polity did not derive its impress from them, but it stamped its own impress upon them. The Achaian League, on the other hand, derived, as we can hardly doubt, its first character from Markos of Keryneia; there can be no doubt whatever that, in its wider and more ambitious form, it was essentially the work of Aratos of Sikyôn.

Up to this time the League had been confined to the ten cities of the original Achaia. We have no reason to suppose that its extension beyond those limits had ever presented itself to the mind of any Achaian statesman. Within those narrow bounds, it had doubtless given an example of all those republican virtues of equality and good government for which Polybios gives it credit; it had already displayed, on a small scale, that generous zeal for freedom, that readiness of exertion for the freedom of others,¹ which he claims for it as its distinguishing virtue. But the Achaian League had hitherto been strictly an Achaian League; it had not aspired to become a League of all Hellas, or even of all Peloponnêsos. It was now to receive a new member and a new citizen, who were to impress upon its policy a wholly different character, or, more truly, to find for its original character a wider field of action. The League, by receiving Sikyôn into its fellowship, ceased to be Achaian in any strict ethnical sense; it might now consistently advance till it embraced

Results
of the
annexa-
tion of

¹ Pol. ii. 42. Ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν παρέχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἐκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελοποννησίων. Cf. c. 38, and Plut. Ar. 9.

all Peloponnêsos or all Hellas. And by receiving Aratos CHAP. VII.
 along with the city which he had delivered, it received the SIKYON
 citizen who was, for nearly forty years, to be the guiding to the
 spirit of its councils, and who was to do, for Achaia and League.
 for all Greece, more good and more evil than any other ARATOS ;
 man of his age. his lasting
influence.

Aratos, like his precursor Markos, had learned love of freedom and hatred of tyranny in the school of exile. His native city Sikyôn had once stood high among Grecian commonwealths of the second rank, and, inferior as it was to Thebes or Sparta or Athens, it held a position far above any of the towns of the Achaian shore. The prevailing blood among its citizens was Dorian, and its ancestral government, when not interrupted by periods of tyranny or revolution, was the old Dorian aristocracy. In early times indeed that aristocracy had been supplanted by one of the most splendid lines of Tyrants in all Grecian history. The reigns of Orthagoras and Myrôn and Kleisthenês form the most brilliant period in the Sikyônian annals, and the last of the dynasty had the honour of transmitting his blood and name to the founder of the Democracy of Athens.¹ In later times we find another Sikyônian statesman, whom the ruling oligarchy branded with the name of Tyrant, but whom the mass of his fellow-citizens worshipped as the founder of their freedom.² Euphrôn founded a Democracy ; what was its later history, or how long it outlived its founder, we know not. We read vaguely of factions and demagogues,³ but we get at no details till, in the Macedonian times, the unhappy city

History of
Sikyôn.

Its early
Tyrants,
B.C. c. 680
-580.

Euphrôn
founds De-
mocracy,
B.C. 365.

¹ Kleisthenês of Sikyôn was, through his daughter Agaristê the wife of Megaklês, the grandfather of Kleisthenês of Athens. See Herod. vi. 126-131.

² Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 44. Diod. xv. 70.

³ Plut. Ar. 2. *Eis στάσεις ἐνέπεσε καὶ φιλοτιμίαις δημαγωγῶν.*

CHAP. VII. **was handed over from one oppressor to another. During**
 Sikyôn **the wars of the Successors Sikyôn had its share of cala-**
 under the **mities as well as other Grecian cities. At one stage of**
 Successors, **those days of sorrow, Sikyôn had to endure the ignominy**
 B.C. 308- **of being ruled by a female usurper. Kratêsipolis, the widow**
 301. **of Alexander, son of Polysperchôn, held possession of the**
city, and proved herself a worthy rival of her fellow-
oppressors of the other sex.¹ At another time it was
garrisoned for five years by Ptolemy, when he liberated
Greece.² When Dêmétrios came to liberate Greece
back again,³ he not only expelled Ptolemy's garrison, but
persuaded the Sikyônians to change the site of their
city and even to alter its name to Dêmétrias. This in-
novation probably lasted no longer than the power of its
author. After this, we find Sikyôn in the hands of local
oppressors, whose appearance seems to have nearly coin-
cided with the fall of the power of Dêmétrios at Ipsos.⁴
Tyrant now succeeded Tyrant, and Tyrants, we may well
believe, of a very different order from Orthagoras and
Kleisthenês.⁵ At last a gleam of better things appeared
for a moment. Kleôn, the reigning Tyrant, was slain,
seemingly in some popular movement, and two eminent
citizens, named Timokleidas and Kleinias, were placed by

Period
of Local
Tyrants,
B.C. 301-
251.

¹ Diod. xix. 67.

² Diod. xx. 37.

³ Diod. xx. 102. Plut. Dêmétr. 25.

⁴ Schorn (p. 69) ingeniously infers this from the statement of Plutarch (Ar. 9) that, at the return of Aratos in B.C. 251, there were Sikyônian exiles who had been nearly fifty years in banishment. These fifty years go back exactly to the date of the battle of Ipsos.

⁵ Droysen (ii. 304, 5) stands up for them on the ground of Strabo's expression (b. viii. c. 6. vol. ii. p. 218), *ἐτυραννήθη δὲ πλείστον χρόνον· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς τυράννους ἐπικεικὶς ἄνδρας ἔσχεν* "Ἀρατον δ' ἐπιφανέστατον, κ.τ.λ. It is much more likely, though Droysen despises the notion, that Strabo was thinking of the old Orthagorids; and, if his words are to be construed quite literally, Aratos himself must be reckoned among the Tyrants. It is very likely that some of these Tyrants may have been patrons of art—we know that one of the worst of them was something of a philosopher—but what then?

common consent at the head of affairs.¹ The exact nature of their office is not described; our brief notice of it reads like an extraordinary commission, for life or for some considerable time, to reform and govern the commonwealth.² Under their administration something like settled order and prosperity had begun once more to appear, when Sikyôn unhappily lost both her patriotic magistrates. Timokleidas died; Kleinias was murdered by a citizen named Abantidas, who seized the Tyranny and again subjected Sikyôn to a reign of terror. The friends of Kleinias were for the most part banished or put to death; his young son³ Aratos, then seven years old, was destined to the same fate;⁴ but he found a friend in the family of his persecutor. Sôsô, the sister of Abantidas, was married to Prophantos the brother of Kleinias; the child sought refuge in his uncle's house, and Sôsô found means to shelter him from her brother, and to send him in safety to Argos, where his father had many powerful friends. Here he was brought up till his twentieth year. His literary education seems to have been neglected, but it is quite possible that the neglect may have been no real loss. That Aratos was an eloquent and persuasive speaker we need no proof; without eloquence of some kind no man could have remained for life, as he did, at the head of a Greek commonwealth. Perhaps the very absence of rhetorical and sophistic training may have left

CHAP. VII.

Adminis-
tration
of Timo-
kleidas and
Kleinias.Tyranny of
Abantidas,
B.C. 264.Escape of
Aratos.Education
of Aratos
at Argos.

¹ By some strange confusion, Pausanias (ii. 8. 2) makes Timokleidas, after the fall of Kleôn, reign as joint-Tyrant with a certain Euthydêmos. The people under Kleinias rise and expel them.

² Plut. Ar. 2. *Εἰλοντο Τιμοκλείδαν ἀρχοντα καὶ Κλεινίαν. . . ἥδη δὲ τινα τῆς πολιτείας κατάστασιν ἔχειν δοκούσης Τιμοκλείδας μὲν ἀπέθανε, κ.τ.λ.*

³ In after times, the local legends of Sikyôn attributed to the deliverer a miraculous origin, like that of Aristomenês and Alexander. The God Asklepîos had visited his mother Aristodama in the form of a dragon. Paus. ii. 10. 3. iv. 14. 8.

⁴ Paus. ii. 8. 2. *Ἄρατον δὲ Ἀβαντίδας φυγάδα ἐποίησεν, ἣ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπεχώρησεν Ἄρατος ἐθελοντής.* He was now seven years old. Plut. Ar. 2.

CHAP. VII. room for something more nearly reproducing the native strength of Themistoklès and Periklès. His physical education was well cared for ; the future deliverer of Sikyôn and Corinth contended in the public games, and received more than one chaplet as the prize of bodily prowess. It is possible that this devotion to bodily exercises may not have been without influence on his future career. The discipline of the athlete and the discipline of the soldier were inconsistent,¹ and these early laurels were perhaps won at the expense of future defeats of the Achaian phalanx. Further than this we have no details of his early life ; but we find him, at the age of twenty, vigorous, active, and enterprising, full of zeal, not only against the Tyrants who excluded him from his own home and country, but against all who bore usurped rule over their fellows in any city of Hellas.

Succession
of Tyrants
at Sikyôn.

B.C. 252-1.

Expecta-
tions from
Aratos.

Meanwhile matters in Sikyôn went on from bad to worse. Abantidas had a turn for those rhetorical exercises which Aratos neglected ; he frequented the school of two teachers of the art named Deinias and Aristotelès, who, from what motive we are not told, one day assassinated the Tyrant in the midst of his studies. His place was at once filled by his own father Paseas, who was in his turn slain and succeeded by one Nikoklès. The eyes of men in Sikyôn now began to turn to the banished son of their old virtuous leader. Aratos was looked to as the future deliverer of his country, and Nikoklès watched his course with a degree of suspicion proportioned to the hopes of those whom he held in bondage. But, as yet, the Tyrant deemed that he had little to fear from the personal prowess of the youth. Indeed Aratos purposely adopted

¹ See Plut. Phil. 3. The remark however is as old as Homer. Il. xxiii. 668-671. Certainly Alexander of Macedon (Herod. v. 22) and Dôrieus of Rhodes combined the two characters (see Grote, viii. 217 and cf. x. 164), but one can hardly fancy Periklès stripping at Olympia.

a line of conduct suited to throw Nikoklès off his guard. CHAP. VII. He assumed, at all events when he knew that agents of the Tyrant were watching him, an appearance of complete devotion to youthful enjoyments and frivolous pursuits. Men said that a Tyrant must be the most timid of all beings, if such a youth as Aratos could strike fear into one.¹ But the real fears of Nikoklès were of another kind. He did not so much dread the personal prowess of Aratos as the influence of his father's name and connexions. The position which the family of Kleinias must have held is marked by the fact that the Kings both of Macedonia and Egypt were among his hereditary friends.² We may see also the first signs of a weakness which pursued Aratos through his whole life, when we hear that he at first hoped to obtain freedom for his country through royal friendship. To look for the expulsion of a Tyrant at the hands of Antigonos Gonatas was a vain hope indeed.³ It appears however that the King did not absolutely refuse the new character in which the inexperienced youth prayed him to appear: he put him off with fair words; he promised much, but performed nothing. Aratos then looked to Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt, whose rivalry with Macedonia seemed to guarantee his trustworthiness as an ally of Grecian freedom, and whose actions did not always belie his pretensions. But in leaning on Egyptian aid Aratos soon found that he was leaning on the staff of

Early
Schemes of
Aratos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 6.

² Schorn (p. 70) suggests, ingeniously enough, that the connexion between the house of Kleinias and the Ptolemies began during the Egyptian occupation of Sikyôn in B.C. 308-3. But how came the same family to be on such terms with both the rival dynasties at once, with the descendants of Ptolemy and with the descendants of Dêmétrios?

³ Something may be allowed to the inexperience of a youth of twenty; it is indeed hard measure to hint, as Schorn (p. 70, note) does, that Aratos at first merely wished to be Tyrant himself instead of Nikoklès. Every act of his life belies the imputation. Niebuhr (Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277, Eng. Tr.) does Aratos more justice.

CHAP. VII. a broken reed ; whatever might be the good intentions of Ptolemy, he was far off, and the hopes which he held out were slow to be fulfilled. The young deliverer at last learned no longer to put his trust in princes, but only in the quick wits and strong arms of himself and his fellow-exiles. A Sikyônian exile named Aristomachos, and two Megalopolitan philosophers named Ekdêmos and Dêmo-phanês,¹ are spoken of as among his principal advisers. The details of the perilous night-adventure by which Aratos and his little company surprised and delivered Sikyôn have all the interest of a romance.² Here, in the last days of Greece, our path is strewn with tales of personal character and personal adventure, such as we have met with but seldom since we lost the guidance of Herodotus. For our purpose it is enough that all Sikyôn lay down at night under the rule of Nikoklês, and heard at dawn the herald proclaim to the delivered city that Aratos the son of Kleinias called his countrymen to freedom. Never was there a purer or a more bloodless revolution ; Sikyôn was delivered without the loss of a single citizen ; the very mercenaries of the Tyrant were allowed to live, and Nikoklês himself, whom public justice could hardly have spared, contrived to escape by an ignoble shelter. Never did mortal man win glory truer and more unalloyed than the young hero of Sikyôn.

Deliver-
ance of
Sikyôn by
Aratos,
B.C. 251.

Sikyôn was now free, but she had dangers to contend against from within and from without. Antigonos, to whom the youthful simplicity of Aratos had once looked for help,

¹ The names are variously given. They are Ekdêmos and Dêmo-phanês in Pol. x. 22. Plut. Phil. 1. Suidas, v. *Φιλοσοφῆται* ; Ekdêlos and Megalophanês in Paus. viii. 49. 2 ; Ekdêlos in Plut. Ar. 5. Suidas also turns Nikoklês into Neoklês.

² One is strongly tempted to tell the tale once more ; but the Greek of Plutarch, the German of Droysen, and the English of Thirlwall are enough. It should be remembered that all the details rest upon good authority, namely the Memoirs of Aratos himself.

now hardly concealed his enmity.¹ The infection which he thought he could afford to neglect while it spread no further than the petty Achaian townships, was now beginning to extend itself to cities of a higher rank. And, within the walls of Sikyôn, Aratos had to struggle against difficulties which were hardly less threatening. With the restoration of freedom came the return of the exiles. Under this name are included both those who had been formally banished, and those who had voluntarily fled from the city, during the days of tyranny.² Nikoklès, during his short reign of four months, had sent eighty into exile; those whose banishment dated from the days of earlier Tyrants reached the number of five hundred. Some of these last had been absent from their country fifty years.³ Many of these men had lost houses and lands, which they naturally wished to recover, but which their actual possessors as naturally wished to keep. Doubtless, in so long a time, much of this property must have changed hands more than once, so that the actual possessor would often be an honest purchaser, and not a mere grantee of a Tyrant's stolen goods. The young deliverer was expected to satisfy all these opposing claims, as well as to guard his city against Antigonos and all other enemies. What was chiefly wanting for the former purpose was money; and here the friendship of King Ptolemy really stood him in good stead. He obtained, at various times, a sum of one hundred and seventy-five talents, partly, it would seem, as a voluntary gift,⁴

CHAP. VII.
External
and in-
ternal
difficulties
of Sikyôn.

Internal
pacifica-
tion by
Aratos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 9. Ἐπιβουλευομένην μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ φθορουμένην ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶντι [τῷ Ἀράτῳ] διὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ταρτατομένην δ' ὑφ' αὐτῆς καὶ στασιάζουσιν.

² The word *φυγάς* includes both classes. Many fled to escape death, but some were formally banished. τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλε, τοὺς δ' ἀνείλεν [δ' Ἀβαντίδας]. Plut. Ar. 2.

³ So says Plutarch (Ar. 9); but why did they not return during the administration of Kleinias and Timokleidas?

⁴ Plut. Ar. 11. Ἦκε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ χρημάτων δωρεὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.

CHAP. VII. partly as the result of Aratos' own request, for which purpose he made a voyage to Egypt in person. By the help of this money he contrived to satisfy the various claimants. Some of the old owners were glad to accept the value of their property instead of the property itself; some of the new ones were willing to give up possession on receiving a fair price for what they resigned. We are told that by these means he succeeded in pacifying the whole city.¹ It is added, as a proof of his true republican spirit, that, on being invested with full and extraordinary powers for the purpose, he declined to exercise them alone, but, of his own accord, associated with himself fifteen other citizens in the office.²

Annexa-
tion of
SIKYON
to the
ACHAIA
LEAGUE,
B.C. 251.

Against danger from without Aratos sought for defence by that step which first brings him within the immediate sphere of this history. He annexed Sikyôn to the Achaian League. This of course implies both that he prevailed on his own countrymen to ask for admission to the Achaian body, and that he persuaded the Achaian Government and Assembly to grant what they asked. It is much to be regretted that no record is preserved of the debates either in the Sikyônian or the Achaian Assembly on so important a proposal. The step was a bold and a novel one. For

¹ See Plutarch (Ar. 9-14) and the well known passage of Cicero (De Off. ii. 25), who winds up, as a Roman of his day well might, "O virum magnum, dignumque qui in nostrâ republicâ natus esset. Sic par est agere cum civibus, non (ut bis jam vidimus) hastam in foro ponere, et bona civium voci subicere præconis."

² Plut. Ar. 14. Ἀποδείχθεις γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτῆς καὶ κύριος ὧς ἐπὶ τὰς φυγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας μόνος οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ πεντεκαίδεκα τῶν πολιτῶν προσκατέλεξεν αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ. So Cicero, "Adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes." This is hardly done justice to by Schorn (p. 72) in the words, "Nach Hause zurückgekommen setzte er eine Commission nieder, an deren Spitze er selbst trat."

These internal measures of Aratos, or some of them, seem to have been later than the annexation of Sikyôn to the League. But it seemed better to finish the account of the deliverance and pacification of Sikyôn before entering on the career of Aratos as a Federal politician.

a Greek city willingly to surrender its full and distinct sovereignty was a thing of which earlier times presented only one recorded instance. Corinth and Argos had once removed the artificial limits which separated the Argeian and the Corinthian territory, and had declared that Argos and Corinth formed but a single commonwealth.¹ But so strange an arrangement lasted only for a short time, and it was offensive to large bodies of citizens while it did last. Still Argos and Corinth were, at least, both of them Doric cities; their citizens were kinsmen in blood and speech, sharing alike in the traditions of the ruling race of Peloponnêsos. It was a far greater change when Sikyôn, a city of the Dorian conquerors, stooped to ask for admission to the franchise of the remnant of the conquered Achaians.² Federalism, as we have seen, was nothing new in Greece, but the Federal tie had as yet united only mere districts or very small towns, and those always districts or towns of the same people. For one of the greater cities of Greece to enter into Federal relations with cities belonging to another division of the Greek race was something altogether unknown. But now the Doric Sikyôn was admitted into a League consisting only of small Achaian towns,³ any one of which singly was immeasurably her inferior, and whose united strength hardly equalled that of one of the great cities of Greece.⁴ The Sikyônians were to lose their

Import-
ance and
novelty of
the step.

¹ Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 6. See Grote, ix. 462. The change, in the opinion of Xenophôn and the Corinthian oligarchs, amounted to a wiping out of their city; *αἰσθανόμενοι ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλιν*. The whole description is very curious.

² Paus. ii. 8. 4. *Τοὺς Σικυνίους ἐς τὸ Ἀχαιῶν συνέδριον ἐστῆγαγε Δωριεῖς ὄντας*.

³ Plut. Ar. 9. *Δωριεῖς ὄντες ὑπέδυσαν ἑκουσίως ὄνομα καὶ πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν οὗτ' ἀξίωμα λαμπρὸν οὗτε μεγάλην ἰσχὺν ἐχόντων τότε· μικροπολῖται γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ πολλοί, κ.τ.λ.*

⁴ Ib. *Οἱ [οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ] τῆς μὲν πάλαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀκμῆς οὐδὲν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, μέρος ὄντες, ἐν δὲ τῷ τότε μιᾷς ἀξιολόγου πόλεως σύμπαντες ὁμοῦ δύνανται οὐκ ἔχοντες*.

CHAP. VII. national name¹ and being; Sikyôn indeed would survive as an independent canton, untouched in the freedom of her local government; but in all dealings with other states the name of Sikyôn would be sunk in the name of Achaia. The warriors of Sikyôn would be commanded by Achaian Generals,² and her interests would be represented in foreign Assemblies and at foreign courts by Ambassadors commissioned by the whole Achaian body.³ Such a change must have given a complete shock to all ordinary Greek feeling on such subjects. The accession of Sikyôn to the League was the beginning of a new state of things in Greece. No more striking testimony could be borne to the prudent and honourable course which the League had hitherto followed within its own narrow limits.⁴ This first extension beyond the limits of Achaia at once put the League on quite a new footing. Hitherto it had been a merely local union; it now began to swell into Pan-hellenic importance.⁵ When once Sikyôn had joined the League, other cities were not slow in following her example. From the moment of the admission of Sikyôn, it was an understood principle that the arms of the League stood open to

Beginning
of a new
Epoch.

General
extension
of the
League
and its
Objects.

¹ Plut. u.s. So Polybios (ii. 38), *πῶς οὖν καὶ διὰ τί νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν οὗτοι τε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἅμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν μετεληφότες*;

² Plut. Ar. 11. 'Ο δ' Ἀρατος . . . καίπερ συμβολὰς τῷ κοινῷ μεγάλας δεδωκὼς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος δύναμιν, ὥς ἐν τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων χρῆσθαι παρείχετο αὐτῷ τὸν ἀεὶ στρατηγῶντα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, εἴτε Δυμαῖος, εἴτε Τριταεὶς, εἴτε μικροτέρας τινὸς ὧν τόχοι πόλεως.

³ Aratos seems to have gone to Alexandria in a purely private character to ask help of King Ptolemy as a friend of his family.

⁴ See Plutarch's panegyric on the League (Ar. 9), and Polybios *passim*, especially ii. 38 and 42.

⁵ Droysen, ii. 369. "Durch den Beitritt von Sikyon und durch Aratos Verbindung mit Aegypten war die Rolle, welche die Achaier zu übernehmen hatten, bezeichnet; Arat war es, der die Thätigkeit des Bundes zuerst und vielleicht nicht ohne Widerstreben der bisher nur für die innere Ruhe und Selbstständigkeit bedachten Eidgenossen nach Aussen hin wandte."

receive any Grecian city which was willing to cast in its lot among the Confederates. The League now became the centre of freedom throughout all Greece; the supremacy of Macedonia in Peloponnêsos was doomed.

Sikyôn was admitted to the League on perfectly equal terms. She was subjected to no disqualifications as a foreign city, and she claimed no superiority on account of her power and fame being so vastly superior to those of any of the old Achaian towns. Like other Achaian cities, she obtained one vote, and no more, in the Federal Congress. The evil of this arrangement has been already¹ spoken of. It was right that Sikyôn should possess no privilege which could endanger the common rights of all; it was wise to avoid making Sikyôn the seat of government, or in any way giving her the character of a capital; but it was not abstractedly just that her large population should possess in the national Assembly only the single vote which belonged equally to Dymê and Tritaia.² Sikyôn, whose strength must have been equal to half, or more than half, that of the League as it then stood, could at any moment be outvoted ten times over by the petty Achaian townships. Not that we are at all entitled to blame, or even to wonder at, the omission. Federalism was then, not indeed exactly in its infancy, but still making its first experiment on a large scale. It could not be expected to hit upon every improvement at once, and this particular improvement

Sikyôn
admitted
on equal
terms.

¹ See above, p. 272, et seqq.

² Niebuhr, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* iii. 277. "The Sicyonians made a great sacrifice in joining the Achaeans, because each of the insignificant Achaean towns had the same rights and the same votes as Sicyon, which was itself as large as several of the Achaean towns put together. Achaia, on the other hand, gained considerably by the accession." This is perfectly true as a statement of one side of the case; but it is evident that Sikyôn gained also by the union, even if it were not made on perfectly equitable terms.

CHAP. VII. had been as yet suggested by no practical necessity. To give Sikyôn a double vote would have seemed to sin against the great principles of freedom and equality among all the members of the League. We may well believe that, though the accession of Sikyôn was such a clear gain to the League, there were Achaians who looked on its admission on any terms as a sort of favour. A proposal for giving Sikyôn a double vote in the Federal Congress would doubtless have met with great opposition, and would probably have shipwrecked the whole scheme of annexation. It is still more probable that the thought of such a proposal never occurred either to Aratos or to any one else.

B.C. 251-
245.

Position
of Aratos.

His rela-
tions to
Antigonos
and
Ptolemy.

For five years Aratos remained, either officially or through his personal influence, at the head of the local Sikyonian government, the Governor, so to speak, of the State of Sikyôn, but only a private citizen of the Achaian League. Now it was that he pacified the factions in his native city; now it was that, while serving in the Achaian cavalry, he won the admiration of his new countrymen by his strict discipline and punctual obedience to orders. The deliverer and leader of Sikyôn was never wanting, as his biographer tells us, even when command was vested in citizens of the pettiest Achaian towns.¹ We can well understand with what eyes King Antigonos watched his growing fame. He did not however profess open enmity; he rather professed his admiration of the young statesman; he showed him marked personal honours;² he talked

¹ See above, p. 366.

² Plut. Ar. 15. 'Ἀντίγονος δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀνιῶμενος ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ βουλό-
μενος ἢ μετᾶγειν ὅλως τῇ φιλίᾳ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ διαβάλλειν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον
ἄλλαι τε φιλανθρωπίας ἐνεδείκνυντο μὴ πάνυ προσιεμένῳ καὶ θύον θεοῖς ἐν
Κορίνθῳ μερίδας εἰς Σικυῶνα τῷ Ἀράτῳ διέπεμπε. This presence of Anti-
gonos at Corinth is puzzling. It was certainly not actually in his
possession till after the first Generalship of Aratos. The explanation of

ostentatiously of his good will towards him, and professed to believe that Aratos entertained an equal good will towards himself. Thus he hoped either really to win over Aratos to his interest, or at all events to make him suspected at the court of Alexandria. This last effect was actually produced, at all events for a season.

At last Aratos received the noblest tribute of confidence which his new countrymen had it in their power to pay; he was raised to the highest office in the Achaian commonwealth. At the age of twenty-six he was chosen General of the Achaians, that is, as we have seen, President of the Achaian United States. He thus became, not only the executive chief of the League in all civil and diplomatic affairs, but also its parliamentary leader and its personal Commander-in-chief. This office, from that day onwards, he held, as a general rule, in alternate years, till the day of his death, thirty-two years later. During all this time he was the soul of the League,¹ the first man of independent Greece. As such the merits and defects of a singularly mixed character had full scope for their developement.²

Aratos
elected
General
of the
League,
B.C. 245.

His per-
manent
position
and influ-
ence.

That Aratos remained so long at the head of a free

Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 118) must probably be adopted, though it is not without difficulties. Plutarch may easily have made some confusion, but what other place near enough to Sikyon was in the possession of Antigonos?

¹ Plut. Ar. 24. Οὕτω δ' ἴσχυσεν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ὥστ' . . . ἔργῳ καὶ γνώμῃ διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν. Pol. ii. 43. Μεγάλῃν δὲ προκοπὴν ποιήσας τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ λοιπὸν ἤδη διετέλει προστατὼν μὲν τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους, κ.τ.λ.

² See the character of Aratos drawn by Schorn, p. 66. He is however altogether too severe. It is surely too much to say, "Demgemäss besass Aratus nicht ein grosses hellenisches, sondern nur ein enges achäisches Herz." (This is curiously contrasted with Plutarch's words, οὐ Σικωνίων οὐδ' Ἀχαιῶν κηδόμενος, ἀλλὰ κοινὴν τινα τῆς Ἑλλάδος, κ.τ.λ. Ar. 16.) The vision of Aratos was often blinded as to ends, but surely, as to ends, no man ever had a more purely Pan-hellenic patriotism. Droysen (ii. 376, 7) is still more severe, and his language raises the indignation of Kortüm (iii. 168), who likens Aratos, perhaps not altogether without reason, to William the Silent. Niebuhr (iii. 275) is much fairer than Schorn or Droysen.

CHAP. VII. people, who could, at any time, simply by not electing him, have reduced him to a private station—that for so long a time he could guide the councils, not of a single city only, but of a great Federation, and could guide them alike for good and for evil—all this is of itself proof enough that he possessed many of the highest qualities of a statesman.

Character of Aratos. It shows at once that he had the gift of persuasive eloquence, that he understood the management of popular bodies, and that he was master alike of the domestic and the foreign affairs of the Confederation. It speaks also, especially in Greece, for the possession of some very high moral qualities. It shows that his fellow-citizens knew that in him they had one whom they could thoroughly trust, one who would not, wittingly at least, betray their interests for personal profit or personal ambition. Like Periklês, like Nikias,¹ Aratos was utterly inaccessible to bribes; and doubtless the confidence of his countrymen in his perfect pecuniary probity had much to do with his long continued influence. He conformed so far to the evil practice of his time as to accept, both for himself and for his country, presents from friendly Kings;² but all that he derived from this source, aided by large contributions from his private fortune, was always freely devoted to the public service.³ He was zealously devoted to the cause of freedom; to overthrow a Tyranny, to set free a commonwealth, to extend the area of free Greece, in a word, to win new confederates for the Achaian League,

Civil Merits of Aratos.

¹ On the pecuniary probity of Nikias and his consequent political influence, see Grote, vi. 387.

² Besides the large present at the beginning of his career, he received a yearly pension of six talents from Ptolemy. Plut. Ar. 41. This was seemingly paid by both Philadelphos and Euergetês. I see no ground for Flathe's suspicion (Gesch. Mak. ii. 156) that this Egyptian subsidy was the chief cause of Aratos' influence over the League.

³ See Plutarch (Ar. 19, 34), for his large contributions towards the deliverance both of Corinth and of Athens.

became the ruling passion of his soul.¹ In that cause CHAP. VII.
 Aratos spared neither personal cost nor personal exertion ;
 for the liberties of Greece he was ever ready to spend and
 to be spent. And again, in this also resembling Periklēs,
 he was wholly free from the fault which upset so many
 eminent Greeks, which ruined Themistoklēs, Pausanias,
 and Alkibiadēs, to say nothing of Alexander and Dēmē-
 trios—incapacity to bear success. Aratos, like Aristeidēs
 and Periklēs, remained, till his last day, the contented
 citizen of a free commonwealth. Even in the times of his
 worst errors, we can still see the difference between the
 pure gold of the republican chief and the tinsel of the
 Kings and courtiers with whom he is brought in contact.
 But these great and good qualities were balanced by Faults of
his civil
character.
 several considerable defects. The ambition of Aratos was
 satisfied with being the first citizen of Achaia and of
 Hellas, but he could as little bear a rival near his throne
 as any despot. It was, in his view, absolutely essential,
 not only that Achaia should be the first power of Greece,
 but that Aratos should be the first citizen of Achaia.
 National envy made his foreign policy unjust to Sparta ;
 personal envy made his home policy unjust to Lydiadas ;
 a mixture of the two converted a national struggle between
 Sparta and Achaia into a personal rivalry between Kleo-
 menēs and Aratos. His hatred to Tyranny, his zeal for
 freedom, his anxiety for the extension of the League,
 often carried him too far. He did not scruple to seek
 noble ends by dishonourable means ; he did not avoid the
 crooked paths of intrigue and conspiracy ; he was thus led
 into many unjustifiable, and some illegal, actions. And,

¹ Pol. ii. 43. Διετέλει . . . πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς ἐν
 τέλος ἀναφέρειν. τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ Μακεδόνας μὲν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου,
 τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλύσαι, βεβαιῶσαι δ' ἐκάστοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ πατριὸν
 ἐλευθερίαν. Plut. Ar. 24. Ἐσώρων γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ πλοῦτον, οὐ δόξαν, οὐ
 φίλιαν βασιλικήν, οὐ τὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος συμφέρον, οὐκ ἄλλοτι τῆς
 ἀξίσεως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκτεροσθεν ποιούμενον.

CHAP. VII. clear as his hands were of actual bribes, he cannot be acquitted of fostering, or at least of not withstanding, the most baleful habit of his age. He allowed his countrymen to look to foreign aid, when they should have looked only to their own wits and their own arms; he allowed them to trust to foreign mercenaries and foreign subsidies, and, for their sake, to practise an unworthy subserviency to foreign princes. As long as this subserviency took no worse form than that of flattering successive Ptolemies, the nation was indeed humiliated, its feelings of independence were weakened, but no actual danger to freedom could arise from friends at once so distant and so prudent. But had not Aratos and the Achaians already acquired the habit of looking to Ptolemy, they might never have fallen into the far more grievous error of looking to Antigonos. This fatal habit of putting trust in princes, combined with national and personal envy carried to an extreme point, led Aratos at last to the great error of his life, the undoing of his own work, the calling again of the Macedonian into Greece.

Character
of Aratos
as a General.

His skill
and daring
in adventures.

His incapacity
and cowardice
in the open field.

Such was Aratos as a man and a statesman. As a military commander, the contradictions in his character are more glaring still. No man was more skilful or more daring in anything like a military adventure; no man risked his life more freely in a surprise, in an ambushade, in a night assault; no man knew better how to repair failure in one quarter by unexpected success in another. But then no man who ever commanded an army had more need of the faculty of repairing failures. When Aratos led the Achaian phalanx to meet an equal enemy in a pitched battle, he invariably led it to defeat. It was not the fault of the men whom he commanded. Their discipline indeed was, in his age, very defective, but they had good military stuff in them, and Philopoimên, when it was too late, converted them with very little trouble into

efficient soldiers. Nor was it mere want of military skill in Aratos himself. The true cause lay deeper. Strange as it sounds, this man, so fearless in one sort of warfare, the deliverer who scaled the walls of Sikyôn and Corinth, was, in the open field, as timid as a woman or a slave who had never seen steel flash in earnest. One understands a similar phænomenon when irregular troops are suddenly called on to practise a mode of warfare to which they are unaccustomed. In the Greek War of Independence, some of the warriors who were most valiant in their own way of fighting, where personal strength, personal daring, and personal skill were all that was wanted, fairly ran away when they were expected to stand still in a line to be shot at. But Aratos was not a klepht from the mountains; he was a soldier and a general of a civilized Greek state; and if he and his countrymen had not reached the full perfection of Spartan or Macedonian discipline, they must at least have known the ordinary tactics common to all Peloponnesian armies. The marvellous inconsistencies of Aratos' military character were the subject of much curious disputation in his own age;¹ it may be left either to soldiers or to philosophers to explain the fact how they can; but history puts the fact itself beyond doubt—Aratos in the open field was a coward. And he was worse than a coward, he was a meddler. Accustomed, in political life, to exercise unbounded influence even when not in office, he carried the same habit into the camp, and often interfered with and spoiled the plans of commanders more skilful and more daring than himself. Anyhow, as his devoted admirer Polybios is driven to confess, he allowed Peloponnêsos to be filled with trophies commemorating not his victories but his defeats.² That the League could

¹ See Plut. Ar. 29.

² Polybios records (iv. 8) his chief exploits, and continues, *ὁ δ' αὐτὸς οὗτος ὅτε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουλευθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπι-*

CHAP. VII. not reap the benefit of his political skill, without at the same time reaping the evils of his military incapacity, is a speaking comment on that part of the Achaian system by which the functions of Commander-in-chief and of Leader of the House of Commons were inseparably united. And yet it would naturally take a long time, and would require much sad experience, before a nation could fully realize that the deliverer of Sikyôn and Corinth was a man utterly unfit to command an army in the open field.

First
General-
ship of
Aratos,
B.C. 245-
244.

War
between
Achaia and
Ætolia.

The first official year of Aratos was not to pass away without actual service; but as yet it was service of a kind which did not reveal his deficiencies. The two great Greek Leagues were at war; we know not whether the quarrel was of older date than the union of Sikyôn with the Achaian body, or whether a feud between Ætolia and Sikyôn had grown, now that Sikyôn was Achaian, into a feud between Ætolia and Achaia. It is certain that the Ætolians had made an attempt upon Sikyôn in the time of the Tyranny of Nikoklês;¹ it is certain that the two Leagues were now in such a state of hostility that the Achaians ventured on offensive operations on the other side of the Corinthian Gulf. One can hardly fancy this happening without previous Ætolian incursions into Achaia, and the good character which Aratos had already won, as a private horseman or as a subordinate officer, was probably won in resisting some of their plundering expeditions. It was more likely at this time than at any other that the Ætolian League made its famous agreement with Antigonos for the partition of the Achaian

νόλαις, ἄτολμος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὧς δ' οὐ μένων τὸ δεινόν. διὰ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ' αὐτὸν βλέπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῇδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πολέμοις ἀεὶ ποτ' ἦν εὐχέλρωτος.

¹ Plut. Ar. 4.

territory.¹ On the other hand the League was in alliance with Alexander, the Macedonian Prince of Corinth. Aratos had contemplated an attempt to drive out so dangerous a neighbour, but Alexander seems to have proffered his friendship to the League,² an act which, under such circumstances, was equivalent to throwing off all allegiance to his royal uncle. This friendly position of Corinth must have been a great advantage in any movement of the Achaian troops either by land or sea, but it does not appear that either Alexander on the one side or Antigonos on the other took any active part in the war. This struggle was therefore more strictly a Social War, a War of the Leagues, than the later war to which the name is usually confined. The belligerents were the three Leagues of Achaia, Bœotia, and Ætolia, the Bœotians having entered into an alliance with Achaia against the common enemy. Aratos crossed the Gulf; he ravaged the coast, from Kalydôn, the old Achaian outpost,³ now again an Ætolian city, to the Ozolian Lokris, now in willing or forced union with the robber League. He was then about to march into Bœotia to join his allies; but the Bœotarch Amaïokritos⁴ did not wait for him; he engaged the Ætolians at Chairôneia; he himself fell, and his army was utterly defeated. The Bœotians now joined the Ætolian alliance,⁵ and sank for ever into utter insignificance. Whether the failure of the intended meeting between the Achaian and Bœotian forces was the fault of the Achaian or of the Bœotian commander does not very clearly appear;⁶ but probably

CHAP. VII.
Alliance
of the
Achaïans
with
Alexander
of Corinth.

Defeat
of the
Bœotians
at Chairô-
neia.

¹ Pol. ii. 43, 45. ix. 34. See Thirlwall, viii. 116. Niebuhr (iii. 282) places it after the deliverance of Corinth, and Droysen (ii. 387) later still.

² Plut. Ar. 18.

³ See above, p. 239.

⁴ Ἀμαϊόκριτος, Pol. xx. 4. Ἀβουόκριτος, Plut. Ar. 16.

⁵ See above, pp. 182, 343.

⁶ Plutarch says that Aratos *δωρέθησε τῆς μάχης* (Ar. 16). Polybios,

CHAP. VII. Aratos was thereby saved from a defeat in his first year of command. Had he had an opportunity of displaying his characteristic weakness so early in his official career, the course of the subsequent history might have been greatly changed.

The Achaian constitution, as we have seen, did not allow the immediate re-election of the General; but after the necessary lapse of one year,¹ Aratos was again placed at the head of the state. The year of his second Generalship was one of the most memorable in the history of the League. Four new cities, one of them the most important point in Peloponnêsos, were added to the Achaian Union. We left the League at war with Antigonos, and on friendly terms with his rebellious vassal Alexander of Corinth. We know nothing of Alexander's personal character or of the nature of his government; but we may believe that the rule of a kinsman of the royal house, one too who came of a good stock, the grandson of Krateros and Phila, may have been some degrees less irksome than the rule of mere local oppressors like the Tyrants of Sikyôn. However this may be, Alexander died just at this time, poisoned, as some said, by the emissaries of Antigonos. His widow Nikaia succeeded to his power; the King of Macedonia did not scruple to make her the victim of a ludicrous deception, by which he contrived to win Corinth for himself.² The enemy was

Second
General-
ship of
Aratos,
B.C. 243.

Position of
Corinth
under
Alexander,

and his
widow
Nikaia.
Acquisi-
tion of
Corinth by
Antigonos,
B.C. 244.

as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 117) says, clearly lays the blame on Amaïokritos. See his whole description, xx. 4, 5.

¹ Plut. Ar. 16. *Ἐνιαυτῷ δ' ὕστερον αὖθις στρατηγῶν*. This is explained by the constitutional passage in cap. 24. Polybios (ii. 43) says, *ὁγδόω δὲ πάλιν ἔτει στρατηγὸς ἀρεθὲς τὸ δεύτερον*, that is, the eighth year from the deliverance of Sikyôn.

² The tale is well told by Plutarch, Ar. 17. It naturally moves the indignation of the Macedonian Droysen (ii. 371). According to him the story comes from Phylarchos, and therefore is not to be believed. Why may not Phylarchos have sometimes told the truth? and why may not the story have come from the Memoirs of Aratos?

now brought to the very gates of the League, and Aratos' own city was the most exposed of all. Another brilliant enterprise of his own peculiar kind, a night-adventure as perilous as that which had rescued Sikyôn, restored Corinth to freedom.¹ For the first time for nearly a hundred years the Corinthians were masters of their own city.² Aratos easily persuaded them to join the League;³ their mountain citadel now became a Federal fortress⁴ instead of a stronghold of the oppressor. The port of Lechaion at once shared the fate of the capital; that of Kenchreia remained for a time in the hands of the enemy.⁵ So great a success raised alike the fame and the power of the Achaians and their General. Megara was occupied by a Macedonian garrison;⁶ its people now revolted, probably with Achaian help, and at once joined the League. Within Peloponnêsos, the cities of Troizên and Epidaurós⁷ followed their example. The territory of the fifteen Confederate cities now stretched continuously from the Ionian to the Ægæan Sea, from Cape Araxos to the extreme point of the Argolic peninsula. The key of Peloponnêsos was now in the hands of the Union—the fetters of Greece⁸ were broken.

CHAP. VII.

Deliverance of Corinth and its accession to the League, B.C. 243.

Accession of Megara, Troizên, and Epidaurós.

But, immediately beyond the new Achaian frontier, two of the most famous cities of Greece were still in

¹ Plut. Ar. 18-23. The tale is brilliantly told by the biographer. Cf. Pol. ii. 43.

² Plut. Ar. 23. See above, p. 251.

³ The scene in Plutarch (c. 23) is a fine one. Aratos, weary with his night's labour, appears in the Corinthian theatre leaning on his spear, unable for a while to speak, amid the cheers of the delivered people. Then, *συναγαγὼν ἑαυτὸν διεξῆλθε λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τῇ πράξει πρόποντα καὶ συνέπεισε τοὺς Κορινθίους Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι*.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 24. See above, p. 310.

⁵ It must have been acquired soon after, as we find it Achaian a few years later. Plut. Ar. 29.

⁶ Plut. Ar. 24. *Μεγαρεῖς ἀποστάντες Ἀντιγόνου τῷ Ἀράτῳ προσέθεντο*. Cf. Pol. ii. 43.

⁷ Ib.

⁸ Corinth, Chalkis, and Dêmétrias, so called by the last Philip.

CHAP. VII. bondage. To win Corinth, Athens, and Argos to the League in a single year would have raised Aratos to a height of glory which the heroes of Marathôn or Thermopylæ might have envied. Athens, fallen as she was, still retained her great name and the shadow of her ancient freedom, and she was now beginning to assume the character which she held under her Roman lords as the sacred city of literature and philosophy. How far this last claim spoke to the heart of the Sikyônian athlete it is hard to say, but certain it is that to win Athens to the cause of Grecian freedom was an object on which the heart of Aratos was always strongly bent. To Argos he was bound by still closer ties; his youth had been spent within her walls; her deliverance was the payment which he owed her for the shelter which she had given him in the days of his adversity.¹ The condition however of the two cities was different. Athens seems to have been at this moment in possession of as much liberty and democracy as was consistent with the presence of Macedonian troops, not indeed in the City itself, but in the other fortresses of the Attic territory.² The League was at war with Macedonia; and Attica was, under such circumstances, clearly liable to be dealt with as an enemy's country. Attica was once more, as in the days of Archidamos, invaded by a Peloponnesian army; even the isle of Salamis, occupied as it was by a Macedonian garrison, was ravaged by the Achaian troops. But Aratos took care to show that it was not against Athens, but against her oppressors, that he was warring. He released all his Athenian prisoners without ransom. This, it must be remembered, was, according to the received rules of

Achaian
Invasion
of Attica.

¹ Plut. Ar. 25. Ἀργείοις δουλεύουσιν ἀχθόμενος ἔπεβο λευσεν ἀνελείν τιν τυραννον αὐτῶν Ἀριστίμαχον, "μα τῇ τε πόλει θρεπτήρια τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοῦναι φιλοτιμούμενος καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς προσκομίσαι τὴν πόλιν.

² See Thirlwall, viii. 99, 100.

Grecian warfare, a piece of extraordinary favour. The ordinary fate of prisoners of war was to be sold as slaves ; even to put them to death, though a rare and extreme act of severity, did not actually violate Greek International Law.¹ It was not likely that Aratos should show any special harshness towards a people who were enemies only through their misfortune ; but his extreme lenity might fairly be expected to call forth some marks of Athenian gratitude. Aratos doubtless expected by this means to open negotiations which might lead to the union of Athens with the League.² No such result happened ; Athens gave no sign. Fear of Antigonos may well have been a stronger feeling than hope from Aratos, but this was not all. The Federal charmer always charmed in vain in Athenian ears. No Greek city ever needed the help of Confederates more than did Athens in the days of Aratos ; but the Athens of the days of Aratos had, unluckily for herself, not quite lost the memory of the Athens of the days of Periklēs. The once imperial city could not bring herself to give up the shadow of her old sovereignty ; she could not endure to see her citizens march at the bidding of a General from Sikyōn ; she could not endure to exchange absolute independence for a place in a Peloponnesian Assembly where the vote of Athens might be neutralized by the vote of Epidaurous or of Keryneia. A degrading subserviency to Macedonia and Rome, an abject worship of every foreign prince who would send alms to her coffers, was not inconsistent with a nominal independence and a nominal Democracy. Incorporation with the League would have given her the substance at the expense of the shadow ; Athens would have been once more really free, and the borders of liberated Greece would have been

Vain
attempt
to attach
Athens
to the
League.

¹ See above, p. 58.

² Plut. Ar. 24. Ἀθηναίους δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκεν ἄνευ λούτρων ἀρχὰς ἀποστάσεως ἐνδιδοὺς αὐτοῖς.

CHAP. VII. advanced to Kithairôn and Orôpos. But the shadow of independence must have been surrendered, and to that shadow Athens clave to the last.

Condition
of Argos ;
succession
of the
Argeian
Tyrants.

B.C. 272.

Tyranny
of Aristomachos
the First.

The position of Argos was different. That famous city was now ruled by a Tyrant named Aristomachos. Either he had first risen to power, or else the character of his government had become more distinctly oppressive, since the days when Aratos himself dwelt at Argos and there organized his schemes for the deliverance of Sikyôn. When Pyrrhos attacked Argos, the supreme power was disputed between his partisan Aristetas and Aristippos a partisan of Antigonos.¹ But it does not appear quite certain whether Argos had been continuously ruled by Tyrants ever since.² There may have been an interval of freedom there, like that at Sikyôn under Kleinias and Timokleidas. But at any rate Argos was now subjected to a grinding tyranny ; Aristomachos forbade the possession of arms by the citizens under heavy penalties.³ Against Aristomachos Aratos did not think it necessary to employ the same means of open warfare which he had employed against

¹ Plut. Pyrrh. 30.

² Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 124) suggests that Aristomachos was the son of Aristippos. The order of the names, Aristippos, Aristomachos, Aristippos, Aristomachos, certainly looks very like a family succession, and Phylarchos, as quoted by Polybios (ii. 60), distinctly calls the second Aristomachos a descendant of Tyrants (*πεφυκὸς ἐκ τυράννων*). On the other hand, had Aristippos the Second been the son of Aristomachos the First, one might have expected Plutarch to introduce him with some mention of his kindred to his predecessor, and not simply as a worse Tyrant than he was (*ἐξωλλέστερος ἐκείνου τύραννος*. Ar. 25). The enterprise of Aratos on Sikyôn also seems to show that Argos was free, or at least not under any very oppressive or inquisitorial government, in B.C. 251. Still, if the dynasty was a hereditary one, we may well believe that it was less oppressive than the common run of Tyrannies, till the advance of Aratos and the League began to put all Tyrants on their guard. If Aristomachos had any border feud with Nikoklês, especially if he thought that Aratos merely intended to substitute himself for Nikoklês as Tyrant of Sikyôn, he might even have encouraged his design.

³ Plut. Ar. 25.

Antigonos and the Ætolians. He found men in Argos willing to take the Tyrant's life, if they could only get swords to take it with. The General of the Achæians presently provided them with daggers. We must not judge of this action by our modern English notions. English feeling revolts against assassination under any circumstances. Sometimes it goes so far as to see more guilt in the conspirator who plots the slaughter of a single public enemy than in the conspirator who plots schemes of treason which involve the slaughter of innocent thousands. Greek feeling was very different. The Tyrant, that is, the successful conspirator, the triumphant plotter of a *coup d'état*, the man who had overthrown the freedom of his country, who had sacrificed the property, the liberty, and the lives of his fellow-citizens, was looked on as no longer a man but a wild beast. He who had trampled all Law under his feet, whose power rested wholly on the destruction of Law, had no claim to the protection of Law in his own person. As his hand was against every man, so every man's hand might righteously be against him. Against a criminal who, by the very greatness of his crimes, was placed beyond the reach of ordinary justice, every citizen was entitled to act as at once accuser, judge, and executioner. As Tyranny was the greatest of crimes, if for no other cause than that it involved all other crimes,¹ so the slaying of a Tyrant was looked on as the noblest of human actions.² The

CHAP. VII.

Aratos
encou-
rages con-
spiracies
against
him.

Greek
view of
Tyrants
and
Tyrant-
slayers.

¹ Pol. ii. 60. Ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦτομα [τὸ τυραννός] περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περιέληψε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.

² Mr. Grote (iii. 37) has collected some of the most important passages bearing on Greek feeling towards Tyrannicide. So also Isokrates (*περὶ Εἰρ.* 111), τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχόντων ἔργον ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελείαις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονεστέρους, τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις ἔθος καθέστηκε τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων πόνους καὶ κακοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζειν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς τοιοῦτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντας τυραννικαῖς καὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς περιπίπτειν, καὶ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν ὁδὴ περ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δράσωσι. So also Polybios, ii. 56. καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολῖτας ἀποκτείνοντάς μάλιστα ἀσέβημα τίθεται

CHAP. VII. Tyrannicide, the man who had broken the yoke, who had jeopardized his life to free his country, who had abolished the dominion of force and had brought back the dominion of Law, received honours among the foremost benefactors of mankind. In such a cause the ties of blood went for nothing; the rights of a man's kindred weighed as nothing against the wrongs of his country; Timoleôn himself, the purest of heroes, the deliverer of Corinth and the deliverer of Syracuse, scrupled not to slay the brother who held his native city in bondage.¹ The glory of the deed admitted of no doubt or controversy; Tyrannicide was as undoubtingly inscribed on the list of Hellenic virtues as Tyranny was inscribed on the list of Hellenic crimes. The Tyrant-slayer had votes passed in his honour by free commonwealths; philosophers argued, and rhetoricians declaimed, in his praise; poets twined their choicest wreaths of song upon his brow; men sang his praises at their festal banquets, and, in their brightest pictures of another world, they spake of him as dwelling in the happy island among the heroes and demigods of old. Englishmen

καὶ μεγίστων ἄξιον προστίμων· καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τὸν κλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῶς ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τὸν προδύτην ἢ τύραννον τιμωρῶν [τιμῶν] καὶ προεδρίας τυγχάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. Ib. 60. οὐδ' Ἀντιγόνη προσ-
απτεόν οὐδ' Ἀράτω παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχέλριον τύραννον
στρεβλώσαντες ἀπέκτειναν, ὅν γε καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελούσι
καὶ τιμωρησαμένοις ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογι-
ζομένοις. Two things are remarkable in this last passage. Polybios goes beyond all ordinary Greek feeling in justifying torture as applied to a captive Tyrant; he also recognizes in the *King* Antigones as much right to chastise a *Tyrant* as in Aratos himself. The facts of the case will be considered hereafter.

¹ The debates held at the time on the conduct of Timoleôn (Plut. Tim. 5-7) are among the most instructive pieces of evidence on the subject. Men doubted whether Timoleôn was a fratricide or a Tyrannicide; that is, they doubted whether he had killed Timophanês from patriotic motives or to gratify a private grudge; but no one doubted that, if he did kill him from patriotic motives, the deed was praiseworthy. It is worth notice that Timoleôn could not bring himself to kill his brother with his own hand (ib. 4).

cannot enter into the feelings with which the Greek looked upon the Tyrant-slayer, because Englishmen have never in any age known the full bitterness of Tyranny. We have had our oppressors and unrighteous rulers, our evil Kings and their evil Ministers, but we have never seen a power which wholly rested on the utter trampling down of law and right. We have seen bad laws and unjust judgements, we have seen civil wars and revolutions, but no age of English history ever beheld a Government which was founded solely on perjury and massacre. The nation has always had strength to resist by the might either of reason or of armed force. Our oppressors have been overthrown in peaceful debate, or they have been smitten to the earth upon the open field of battle. They have been sent to the block by sentences, sometimes, it may be, unjust, sometimes, it may be, illegal, but which still, by the very form of a judicial process, showed that the dominion of Law had not utterly passed away. Kings and rulers have indeed died by private murder, but such murder has always been a base and needless crime, condemned by the unanimous voice of the nation. No English Doctor of the fifteenth century would have ventured, as was done in contemporary France, to defend one of the basest assassinations on record by the abstract doctrine of the lawfulness of slaying Tyrants.¹ Once only, when a power, illegal indeed and founded on force, but neither degrading nor practically oppressive, showed some faint likeness to the Tyrannies of earlier and of later days, did

CHAP. VII.
The Greek view unintelligible to Englishmen, because of the circumstances of English history.

A.D. 1408.

¹ When Lewis, Duke of Orleans, was murdered in 1407 by John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, the act was defended in an elaborate discourse by John Petit, a theologian, who lays down the abstract doctrine of Tyrannicide, and justifies it by many examples, most of them very little to the purpose. See the whole speech in Monstrelet, cap. 39, p. 35, ed. 1595. Cf. Jean Juvenal des Ursins, A. 1407. p. 191. ed. 1653. Certainly the likeness between Duke John and Timoleon is not striking.

CHAP. VII. Englishmen ever venture to maintain the thesis that there
 A.D. 1657. are times when Killing is no Murder.¹ With the feelings
 naturally produced by such a past history as this, if our
 sympathy does not lie absolutely with the Tyrant, it lies
 strongly against the Tyrant-slayer. When seen through
 the mist of ages we do not refuse him a kind of reverence;
 we respect the names of Ehud, of Brutus, and of William
 Tell;² but we shrink from him as an assassin when he
 appears in the form of a man of our own age. We must
 learn to put aside a morality which arises mainly from the
 conditions of our own past history, if we wish to judge
 aright of a Greek of the days of Aratos. That the
 slaughter of Aristomachos at the hands of any citizen of
 Argos would have been a virtuous and noble action no
 Greek politician or moralist could have doubted for a
 moment. Whether Aratos was justified in having any
 hand in such a transaction is quite another matter. Aratos
 was the chief magistrate of a commonwealth with which
 Aristomachos was not at war, and to which apparently
 he had done no injury. And, if he had been at war
 with the League, the assassination of an open enemy was

In the
 estimate
 of their
 own time
 the Ar-
 geian con-
 spirators
 were
 praise-
 worthy,
 Aratos
 not so.

¹ The famous pamphlet bearing this title is well known. In 1662 we find a Captain Thomas Gardiner petitioning Charles the Second "for relief;" besides his services in the Civil War, he pleads as a title to the King's bounty that he "in 1657, intended an attempt on Cromwell, but was taken in the Gallery at Hampton Court with two loaded pistols and a dagger, kept 12 months a prisoner, and only failed to be sentenced to death by want of evidence on the trial." Calendar of State Papers, 1661-2, p. 623. We may doubt whether Aristomachos and Aristippos let conspirators go so easily.

² I trust to have a more fitting opportunity for discussing the story of the first deliverance of Switzerland. It is enough here to say that, in the tale as commonly told, the old Swiss Revolution appears as one of the purest of all Revolutions; there is only one act which the most rigid moralist could denounce as a crime, namely the slaughter of Gessler by William Tell. Now, strange to say, this one doubtful action is the one feature of the tale which has permanently fixed itself in popular memory; and it is never spoken of without admiration.

deemed as odious in Greek warfare as it is deemed now ; CHAP. VII. Aratos would never have thought of employing assassins against the General of the Ætolians or even against the King of Macedonia. We can hardly be wrong in saying that, however praiseworthy the slaying of Aristomachos might be in an oppressed Argeian, it in no way became the President of the Achaian League to encourage plots against his life. But in the mind of Aratos the hatred of Tyrants had become a kind of passion, under the influence of which he often forgot the dictates both of honour and of prudence. And Argos was all but his native city : there he had spent his youth ; thence he had gone forth to his great work ; the freedom of Argos was as dear to his heart as the freedom of Sikyôn, and he felt towards a Tyrant of Argos all the intensity of hate which would glow in the bosom of a native Argeian. In his eyes the Argeian Tyrant was not a mere foreign power, a national rival, capable either of honourable peace or of honourable war ; he was a common enemy of mankind, against whom all means were lawful ; he might be picked off from behind a tree or ensnared in a pitfall, with as good a conscience as men would pick off or ensnare a wolf or a tiger. Antigonos was a King, an enemy, not always, it may be, a very scrupulous or honourable enemy ; but he was still an enemy, entitled to be dealt with according to the laws of war and the laws of nations. Let him only keep within his own realm, and nothing hindered him from being the friend, or even the ally, of the Achaian commonwealth. Alexander of Corinth, a Prince and a Macedonian like himself, and the immediate ruler of a Grecian city, had not been deemed unworthy of the closest friendship of the League. Towards the Macedonian King of Egypt Aratos and his countrymen were only too lavish of their honours. But the Tyrant of Argos could, in the eyes of Aratos, never be an ally, a friend,

Aratos' special position with regard to Argos.

CHAP. VII. or even an honourable enemy. No Law of Nations could protect him whose very existence was the contradiction of all Law. With him short rede was good rede ; the only question was how to get him out of the way with the least cost of time and trouble. Aratos, with these feelings, mingled without scruple in all the Argeian plots against Aristomachos. Those plots failed ; the conspirators quarrelled and denounced one another. Soon after indeed Aristomachos was killed by his own slaves, but Argos was not delivered. In his stead arose a second Aristippos, a Tyrant, we are told, yet more cruel than himself.¹ Aratos seized, as he thought, the favourable moment. He entered Argolis with such Achaian troops as he could collect at so short a warning, hoping that the Argeians themselves would at once rise and join him. But Tyranny had done its work, the worst of all its evil works ; men's hearts were bowed down by oppression, and they had not courage to meet the deliverer. Aratos was of course in no position to undertake the conquest of Argos with his hurried levies, raised probably without any formal authority from the Achaian Assembly. He retired ; had he succeeded, the technical error in his proceedings would doubtless have been forgiven, and the deliverance of Argos would have been reckoned as glorious as the deliverance of Corinth. As it was, he earned only the questionable reputation of having led the Achaian troops against a city with which the Achaian League was not at war.² This breach of international right was referred, according to a custom not uncommon in Greece, to the arbitration of a friendly city. Aristippos pleaded his cause before a Mantineian

Death of Aristomachos the First ; succession of Aristippos the Second.

Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 25. See above, p. 380.

² Ib. τῶν δὲ πολλῶν [τῶν Ἀργείων] ἤδη διὰ τὴν συνθήκειαν ἐθελουσίως ἔχοντων, καὶ μηδενὸς ἀφισταμένου πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀνεχώρησεν ἔγκλημα κατεσκευακὸς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλεμον ἐξενηνοχόει.

tribunal;¹ Aratos, who did not appear, was condemned to a small fine. The condemnation shows that the Mantineian judges appreciated the formal wrong of which Aratos had been guilty; the insignificant amount of the penalty showed equally that they appreciated the circumstances and motives which extenuated his conduct.

CHAP. VII.

Suit at Mantinea between Aristippos and the League.

It would seem also to have been during this second Generalship of Aratos, that Ptolemy Philadelphos, hitherto the ally of Aratos and of Sikyôn, was prevailed on by him to become the ally of the Achaian League. The King was, in return, invested with the supreme command of the Achaian forces by land and sea.² The title and office were of course purely honorary; the only way in which Ptolemy could really help his Greek friends was by subsidies in money. We have seen how efficacious his aid in that way had been in the local affairs of Sikyôn. Either then or now Aratos accepted a yearly pension of six talents from the King.³ This has an ill look; but the

Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes the ally of the League.

¹ We must suppose (see Thirlwall, viii. 126) some treaty or agreement, general or special, by which the Mantineians were recognized as arbiters between Argos and the League. The way in which Plutarch tells the story implies that, though Aratos did not appear, the League did not at all decline the authority of the judges. The suit too was against the League, though the sentence was against Aratos personally. (Plut. Ar. 25. *Δίκην ἔσχον [οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ] ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ Μαντινεύσιν, ἣν Ἀράτου μὴ παρόντος Ἀριστίππος εἶλε δικάων καὶ μὲν ἐτιμήθη τριάκοντα.*) This seems to show that Aratos had acted without due authority from the League. Schorn's (p. 94) wild notion that the tribunal here spoken of was a Macedonian court to which all the Peloponnesian Tyrants held themselves responsible, is well refuted by Droysen (ii. 399). Aristippos might accuse before such a court, but neither the Achaian League nor any Achaian citizen would acknowledge its jurisdiction; indeed one can hardly fancy Aristippos being so foolish as to accuse Achaians before it. What the story does prove is that Mantinea, in B.C. 243, was independent, and neither Achaian, Ætolian, nor Macedonian.

² Plut. Ar. 24. *Πτολεμαῖον δὲ σύμμαχον ἐποίησεν [ὁ Ἀράτος] τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντα πολέμου καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.*

³ See above, p. 370.

CHAP. VII. only real evil was the habit of looking to Kings at all. Six talents a year could never have been meant as a bribe to the man who had spent sixty to achieve the deliverance of Corinth. The interests of Ptolemy, of Aratos, and of the League were all the same; the pension was simply a sum placed at the personal disposal of Aratos for the common good of all.

Aratos' pension from Ptolemy.

Survey of the first two Generalships of Aratos.

In these two years of office the League had abundant opportunity of testing the character of its new chief. The events of the first two Presidencies of Aratos brought into full light all his great qualities and many of his defects. He had abundantly displayed his zeal for the League and for Greek freedom in general, his liberality and self-devotion, his skill and daring in warfare of a particular kind. He must also have shown, although, except the scene in the Corinthian theatre, no details are preserved to us, parliamentary and diplomatic powers of the highest order. On the other hand he had shown that his zeal against Tyranny could sometimes carry him too far, and could place both himself and the League in positions not altogether honourable. He had also set the first example of that fatal habit of looking to foreign help, which, in such an age, was possibly excusable, but which in the end proved fatal both to himself and to his country. His two greatest defects did not as yet appear. He had no opportunity of showing his marvellous gift of losing pitched battles, because, the only time when a pitched battle was fought, he came too late to join in it. He had no opportunity of showing his incapacity to endure a political rival, because no political rival had as yet appeared. His administration had not been crowned with perfect success, but on the whole it had been glorious. Macedonia had become an open enemy; but the wealth, if not the strength, of Egypt had been won to the side of the League. The alliance of Bœotia had been lost; but

Troizên, Epidauros, Megara, above all Corinth, had been CHAP. VII. incorporated with the Achaian body. Aratos had taught Ætolia and Macedonia that the new power could venture to strike at both of them on their own ground. His campaign in Attica had utterly failed of its ulterior diplomatic object, but, as a campaign, it was successful, if not specially glorious. His only total failure was the unlucky attempt on Argos. On the whole, the League found itself, under his guidance, raised to a height of power and reputation which, a few years before, it had never dreamed of. The local Union of Achaia, aiming at nothing beyond its own independence, had grown into a great Pan-hellenic power, the centre of Grecian freedom, the foe of Tyrants and the refuge of the oppressed. No wonder that the author of such a change won and kept the boundless confidence of the whole League; that he was elected to the supreme magistracy as often as the Law allowed; and that, even when out of office, he still guided the councils of the republic, and that the actual holder of the highest office was looked upon as little more than his vicegerent.

The events of these important years clearly show how great and important was the office of the Federal chief in the Achaian constitution. Aratos seems to do everything; the Achaian people seem to do nothing. Doubtless this appearance arises in a great degree from the form in which our information as to these years has come down to us. What we know comes from the brief sketch of Polybios and from the Life of Aratos by Plutarch. But this is not all. In the analogous sketch by Thucydides, and in Plutarch's Life of Periklês, the Athenian People are not thus overshadowed by their leader. The difference arises mainly from the difference between Athenian and Achaian Democracy, and especially from the totally different position in which each placed its first citizen. Periklês was practically the master of the Athenian

Illustration of the Achaian Constitution supplied by these years.

CHAP. VII. Assembly, because that Assembly habitually voted as he counselled it. Legally he was the servant of the Assembly, bound to carry out whatever the Sovereign People had decreed. Aratos was practically as great as Periklès, and he was legally much greater. It was the Assembly which determined war and peace; but the whole plan of every campaign, where he would go and where he would not go, was the General's own affair. It is clear also that the details of diplomatic proceedings were left to his discretion, at most after conference with his Cabinet Council. It is evident that many of the things done and attempted by Aratos during these two years could not possibly have been debated beforehand in the Federal Assembly, or even in the Federal Senate. Achaia was at war with Antigonos; Antigonos held Corinth; whether to make a night-attack on Corinth or to forbear was a question for the General to settle on his own responsibility. That responsibility, like that of a modern Minister, came after the fact. These great powers vested in a single man undoubtedly tended to give the policy of the League a character of unity and consistency, above all of secrecy, where secrecy was needed, which could not possibly exist under the older form of Democracy. On the other hand, an officer holding such great powers was exposed, almost by the Constitution itself, to a constant temptation to overstep them. The invasion of Argos, if not a crime, was certainly a blunder; but it was a blunder which no Athenian General could ever have been tempted to make.

Great
powers
of the
Federal
General.

§ 2. *From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos.*

B.C. 243—228.

Aratos may now be looked upon as the permanent chief of the League. He filled the highest magistracy in alter-

nate years, and, even when out of office, he was still practically the guiding spirit of the commonwealth. In his third year of office we find the League still at war with Ætolia, but now in close alliance with Sparta. Agis was now one of the Spartan Kings, Agis the pure enthusiast and the spotless martyr, who perished in a cause than which none could be either nobler or more hopeless, the attempt to restore a corrupted commonwealth to the virtue and simplicity of times long gone by. His whole career is one of the most fascinating pieces of later Grecian history ; but his attempts at reform, his selfish adversaries and his no less selfish friends, the beautiful pictures of his domestic life, of his self-sacrifice and his martyrdom, do not directly bear on the history of Achaian Federalism. It is enough for our purpose that Sparta and the League were now closely allied, that the Ætolians were expected to enter Peloponnêsos by way of the Isthmus, and that Agis appeared at Corinth at the head of a Lacedæmonian contingent.¹ The two allied commanders were singularly

CHAP. VII.
Third
General-
ship of
Aratos,
B.C. 241.
King Agis.

Relations
of the
League
with
Sparta.

¹ Those who have studied the history of these times know well that the circumstances of this war are involved in much confusion. According to Pausanias (ii. 8. 5) the League was, some time or other, at war with Agis, who took Pellênê, and was driven out by Aratos. This account Droysen (ii. 380) adopts, and supposes that the alliance between Sparta and the League was concluded after this campaign, because the Lacedæmonians, in Pausanias, depart *πρόσπονδοι*. Pausanias also elsewhere (viii. 10. 5—8 ; 27. 13, 14) tells us of a siege of Megalopolis by Agis, and also of a pitched battle near Mantinea, in which Aratos and Lydiadas command the Achæians, and in which Agis is killed ! This tale is utterly absurd ; all the world knows that Agis was not killed in any battle at Mantinea or anywhere else. The whole question has been thoroughly sifted by Manso (Sparta, iii. 2. 123), who is confirmed by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 127, 148). The supposed capture of Pellênê by Agis is a stupid perversion of the real capture of Pellênê which will presently be mentioned. His imaginary Arkadian campaign comes from a confusion between this Agis and his predecessor of the same name in the century before (see above, p. 242), who really besieged Megalopolis and fell in battle near Mantinea. I might add that the details of the battle in Pausanias seem to be a mixture of those of the battle last mentioned and of those of the battle of Ladokeia, to be hereafter spoken of, where Aratos and Lydiadas did

CHAP. VII. contrasted. Agis was a hereditary King, yet he was, in a certain sense, a revolutionist; Aratos was a republican chief, the sworn enemy of Tyrants, and no lover of Kings, but he was at the same time a politician essentially conservative and aristocratic.¹ Both were reformers; the reforms of both consisted in restoration not in innovation, but while Aratos aimed at, and succeeded in, possible political reforms, Agis dreamed of social changes, the restoration of a past state of things, which it was as hopeless to attempt as to turn back the planets in their courses. Both were young—Aratos was still only thirty—but Aratos, even ten years before, had an old head on young shoulders, while Agis had all the best qualities of youth, its hopefulness, its daring, its pure and unselfish enthusiasm. One is tempted to believe that Aratos looked on Agis as a hare-brained fanatic, and that Agis looked on Aratos as a cold-blooded diplomatist, intriguing, disingenuous, and cowardly. The gallant young King longed for an opportunity to win credit for himself and his army; military renown would be of all things the most valuable towards his ulterior objects at home; to his Spartan heart war meant victory or death in the open field; schemes, surprises, night-adventures, were not his element; above

Contrast
between
Agis and
Aratos.

command against a Spartan King, though that King was not Agis but Kleomenés.

There is also a story, alluded to more than once, but never directly narrated, both by Polybios and by Plutarch (Pol. iv. 34. ix. 34. Plut. Kleom. 18), about a great Ætolian inroad into Lakonia, in which the plunderers carried off a wonderful amount both of spoil and captives. No date is given; Schorn (p. 91) and Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 135) place it later than this. It is, to say the least, very tempting to put it, with Droysen (ii. 387), about this time. It seems to agree well with a time when Sparta and Achaia are allied against Ætolia. This is one of the many things which make us wish that Polybios had begun his detailed history earlier.

¹ I have already often shown that the Achaian Democracy was practically an Aristocracy in the best sense of the word, an ἀριστοκρατία as distinguished from a mere δλιγαρχία.

all, if Lakonia had just before been pitilessly ravaged by these very Ætolians, every feeling of honour and revenge led him to wish for a decisive action. Aratos, on the other hand, looked on a battle as the last resource of an ignorant general; he had never fought a pitched battle yet, and he was not going to fight one now to please the young man from Lacedæmon. Let the Ætolians come; the harvest was gathered in; the country people might take refuge in the towns till the storm had passed by; the enemy could not do so much damage in a passage through Achaia as they would do if they won a battle at Corinth.¹ Agis, unconvinced, yielded to the superior authority of the Achaian General,² and, soon after, for some reason or other, he and his army retired.³ The common feeling of the Achaian army was strongly with Agis. Aratos had to bear many bitter reproaches on his supposed weakness and cowardice.⁴ But military and constitutional discipline prevailed; the chief of the League was obeyed. The Ætolians passed the Isthmus undisturbed; they passed through the Sikyônian territory; they entered the old Achaian land; they burst on the city of Pellêné, took it,

CHAP. VII.

Difference in their plans for the campaign.

Agis retires.

Capture and recovery of Pellêné.

¹ Here Plutarch definitely quotes the Memoirs of Aratos. (Agis, 15.) βέλτιον ἡγείτο, τοὺς καρποὺς σχεδὸν ἅπας συγκεκομισμένων τῶν γεωργῶν, παρελθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ μάχῃ διακινδυνεύσαι περὶ τῶν δλων.

² Ib. Ἐφη [δ' Ἀγίς] . . . ποιήσειν τὸ δοκοῦν Ἀράτῳ, καὶ γὰρ πρεσβύτερόν τ' εἶναι καὶ στρατηγεῖν Ἀχαιῶν, οἷς οὐχὶ προτάξων οὐδ' ἡγησόμενος, ἀλλὰ συστρατεύσόμενος ἦκοι καὶ βοηθήσων.

³ Aratos dismissed them—τοὺς συμμάχους ἐπαινέσας διαφῆκε (ib.). But why? Droysen (ii. 390) makes Aratos afraid of the revolutionary principles of his allies. This is quite possible; but it seems simpler to suppose with Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 128) that Agis, "considering his presence useless if no battle was to be fought," "requested leave to withdraw," and received it.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 31. Πολλὰ μὲν οὐεῖδη, πολλὰ δ' εἰς μαλακίαν καὶ ἀτολίαν σκάμματα καὶ χλευασμὸν ὑπομείνας οὐ προήκατο τὸν τοῦ συμφέροντος λογισμὸν διὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αἰσχρόν. How differently would Plutarch have had to write if the policy of Aratos had failed; Κλέων Προμηθεὺς ἐστὶ μετὰ τὰ πρῶτα.

CHAP. VII. fell to plundering, and were scattered about the town, fighting with one another and carrying off the spoil and the women.¹ This was doubtless the moment for which Aratos had waited; in a surprise he was as much in his element as in a battle he was out of it. The plunderers soon heard that the Achæians were in full march; before they could recover discipline and form in order of battle, they were attacked by Aratos and utterly routed. The whole army retreated, and we hear no more of Ætolian incursions for some time.

Estimate
of the
conduct of
Aratos in
this cam-
paign.

The result in this case was of course held to approve the foresight of Aratos. It is certain that he obtained a great and lasting success at a comparatively small price. But we may doubt whether it is the part of a patriotic ruler to stand by and allow even one city of his countrymen to be sacrificed rather than run the risk of defeat in the open field. And we may feel sure that, if the policy of Aratos had been unsuccessful, had he failed to recover Pellênê, or even failed to deal some decisive blow at the enemy, such failure would have been probably far more disastrous, and certainly far more ignominious, than any possible defeat in a pitched battle. The case is not like that of Periklês allowing the Lacedæmonians to ravage Attica undisturbed. Athens was strong in her fleet, but utterly unable to resist the Peloponnesian land-army. To be passive by land and active by sea was her only means of defence. But the combined forces of Sparta and the extended League ought to have been a fair match for any Ætolian invaders, and probably any other General than Aratos would have fought a battle at the Isthmus. Aratos, whether in prudence or in cowardice, judged otherwise. He ran a greater risk than that of any battle, but he succeeded, and, of course, as he succeeded, he added to his fame.

¹ See the pretty story of the daughter of Epigêthês. Plut. Ar. 32.

This relief of Pellênê and defeat of the Ætolians was in its results a very important event. Antigonos¹ concluded a truce with the League, which remained in force till his death. With the Ætolians the League, either then or soon after, concluded not only peace but alliance. This was brought about by Aratos and Pantaleôn, who is spoken of as the most powerful man in Ætolia, and who was doubtless the General of the year.* After the death of Antigonos, the combined forces of the two Leagues carried on a war with his successor Dêmétrios,² of which hardly any details have been preserved. It was now, most probably, that the Ætolian power extended itself over so many of the towns of Thessaly and the Phthiôtic Achaia.⁴ It is certain that Aratos fought a battle with the Macedonian Bithys, at a place which there is every reason to believe was in Thessaly.⁵ This seems to have been his first pitched battle, and he lost it. It is also certain that the Bœotians, for fear of an invading Macedonian army, now forsook the Ætolian for the Macedonian alliance.⁶ Altogether, the little that we hear of this war does not give us the notion of any great glory won by the Achaian arms in warfare so far from home, nor does it supply any details which illustrate constitutional questions. It is far more interesting to trace the progress of the League in Southern Greece.

CHAP. VII.

Truce
with
Antigonos.Alliance
between
the two
Leagues.Death of
Antigonos
Gonatas,
B.C. 239.The Dêmê-
trian War.

¹ This is implied in Plut. Ar. 33. σπονδὰς πεποιγημένων αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας, κ.τ.λ.

² Plut. Ar. 33. Πανταλέοντι τῷ πλείστον Αἰτωλῶν δυναμένῳ συνέργῳ χρησάμενος [δ' Ἀρατος]. Cf. Pol. ii. 44.

³ Pol. ii. 44, 46. Ὁ Δημογητριακὸς πόλεμος.

⁴ See Schorn, p. 88. He reckons up Hypata, Lamia, the Phthiôtic Thebes, Melitaia, Pharsalos, Larissa Kremastê, and Echinos.

⁵ Phylakia. Plut. Ar. 34. See Thirlwall, viii. 133, for an examination of several small controversies which have arisen about the details of the Dêmétrian War, but which do not at all bear upon the subject of this history.

⁶ Pol. xx. 5. See above, p. 182.

CHAP. VII.

Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on Peiræus, B.C. 239.

The two objects dearest to the heart of Aratos were still the deliverance of Athens and the deliverance of Argos. Over and over again did he attempt both.¹ Peiræus was still held by its Macedonian garrison. Even before the death of Antigonos, while the League was still at peace with Macedonia, Aratos did not scruple to cause one of his agents to attempt a surprise of the fortress. In his own Memoirs he strove to make the world believe that this man attacked Peiræus on his own account, and that, when he was beaten back, he affirmed that Aratos had sent him. His name was Erginos, a native of Syria, but doubtless of Greek or Macedonian descent, who had been one of the instruments of Aratos in the capture of Akrokorinthos.² He was therefore a tried and trusty agent of the Achaian General, very likely to be employed by him on such an adventure, but hardly the man to attempt to capture cities on his own account. So unlikely a story met with no credit at the time, and Aratos suffered somewhat in reputation among his countrymen³ for bringing on the League the discredit of a breach of truce. This piece of information is valuable on many grounds. It shews us the true position of Aratos as chief of the League. It illustrates the great powers which were vested in an Achaian General. The attack on Peiræus must have been made wholly on Aratos' own responsibility, or he could never have attempted to throw off that responsibility on the shoulders of a private foreigner. Aratos had undoubtedly exceeded his legal powers, but it was only the legal extent of those powers which gave him the opportunity or the temptation of exceeding them. But it also sets him before us as the really accountable chief of a free commonwealth. Great as Aratos was, he had

Illustrations of the position of Aratos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 33. Οὐ δὲς οὐδὲ τρίς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες.

² Plut. Ar. 18, 33.

³ Plut. Ar. 33. Διεβλήθη καὶ κακῶς ἤκουσεν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.

to undergo the free criticism and censure of a popular Assembly, and to meet and answer orators who evidently did not scruple to withstand him to his face. But it would seem also that the Assembly was satisfied with such criticism and censure; the permanent influence of Aratos was clearly not diminished, nor is it certain that there was any intermission in the practice of electing him President in alternate years.¹ We may also observe that the international morality of the League is higher than that of its chief. Aratos did not scruple at a breach of treaty which the feeling of the Achaian Assembly evidently condemned. We may remark again the different feelings with which a King and a Tyrant were looked upon. King Antigonos has his rights; he is entitled to all the advantages of International Law; the League at once feels that any breach of treaty towards him is a stain upon the national honour. But it does not appear that what we should call the far more dishonourable attempts of Aratos upon the Argeian Tyrants called forth any such indignation at home, and we have seen how lenient was the censure pronounced upon them even by neutral judges. When war again broke out with Macedonia, Aratos was able to renew his attempts on Athens in a more honourable form. He took a personal share in repeated, but always unsuccessful, invasions of Attica, in one of which he received a severe wound.² After his defeat in Thessaly two rumours were afloat, one that he was taken prisoner, the other that he was dead. The former was that which reached King Dêmétrios, who sent a ship from Macedonia to bring the captive to his

Various
attempts
on Athens,
B.C. 239-
229.

¹ The whole question of the Presidential years of Aratos will be discussed in a note at the end of the next chapter.

Plut. Ar. 33. "Ἀπαξ δὲ καὶ τὸ σκέλος ἔσπασε διὰ τοῦ Θριασίου φεύγων καὶ τομὰς ἔλαβε πολλὰς θεραπευόμενος καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον ἐν φορείῳ κομιζόμενος ἐποιεῖτο τὰς στρατείας.

CHAP. VII. presence. But in Athens and Peiraiæus men believed that Aratos was dead, and the inference was somewhat hastily drawn that the Achaian League had died with him. Diogenēs, the Macedonian commander in Peiraiæus, at once summoned Corinth to surrender; Aratos was dead, and the Achæians would do well to retire quietly. In Athens men wore crowns at the report of his death, as their forefathers had done at the report of the death of Philip. A certain amount of real repugnance to union with the League was probably mingled with a certain amount of flattery towards their Macedonian masters.¹ But Aratos, alive and within the walls of Corinth, himself dictated the answer to the summons of Diogenēs, and the Achaian army, with its General at its head, presently advanced as far as the Academy. The would-be deliverer was cut to the heart that Athens should look, or even pretend to look, upon him as an enemy; but he allowed himself to be persuaded by an Athenian embassy, and he retired without doing hurt to the city or its suburbs.²

Feeling
towards
Aratos at
Athens.

Attempts
of Aratos
on Argos,
B.C. 243-
229.

Meanwhile the Achaian leader was not a whit less anxious to restore freedom to the city where he had spent his own days of exile. After Aratos' first attempt in his second Presidency, a constant warfare seems to have gone on, not so much between Argos and the League as between Aristippos and Aratos.³ The Tyrant was always plotting the death of the patriot, at which indeed we cannot wonder when we remember that the patriot

¹ Plut. Ar. 34. Πᾶσαν δ' Ἀθηναῖοι κουφότητα κολακείας τῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνας ὑπερβαλόντες ἐστεφανηφόρησαν, ὅτε πρῶτον ἡγγέλθη τεθνηκώς.

² Ib. Πρὸς ὀργὴν εὐθὺς ἐκοστρατεύσας ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἄχρι τῆς Ἀκαδημίας προήλθεν· εἰτα πεισθεὶς οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν.

³ See the comparison in Plutarch (Ar. 25, 26) of the position of the two. Compare also the description of the private life of Aristippos with that of Alexander of Pherai in Plut. Pel. 85. Alexander however has a wife, Aristippos has only an ἐρωμένη with a complaisant mother.

had equally plotted the death of the Tyrant's predecessor, possibly his father. But one would rather not believe that King Antigonos was a fellow-conspirator, and it may well be that the report to that effect was only an unauthorized conjecture of Aratos himself.¹ On the part of Aratos, every sort of attack, secret or open, was employed for many successive years. The war was of the usual kind; Aratos fought and lost one or two pitched battles, but in diplomatic dealings, in surprises, in night-marches, he was as skilful and as daring as ever. In the open field, by the banks of the river Charês, the General of the Achaians ran away, when victory was declaring for his army;² yet the same General could in his own person scale the walls of Argos, fight hand to hand with the Tyrant's mercenaries, and only retire when disabled by a severe wound.³ Bitter was his disappointment when he found that the Argeians, whom he came to deliver, stirred not hand nor foot in his behalf, but sat by and looked on at his exploits as if they were sitting to adjudge the prize in the Nemean Games.⁴ But if he ran away at the Charês, if he had to retire from Argos, he presently gained the city of Kleônai as a member of the League. When the Tyrant marched against this new acquisition, Aratos, by a forced march, forestalled him, entered the city, sallied forth vigorously, drove back the enemy, chased them to Mykênê, and left Aristippos dead upon the field. The victory, however, was for the present fruitless; a second Aristomachos, perhaps the son of Arist-

Kleônai joins the League.

Death of Aristippos the Second.

¹ "Συνεργούτος Ἀντιγόνου. Plut. Ar. 25,—perhaps only a suspicion expressed by Aratus in his Autobiography." Thirlwall, viii. 126.

² See the whole story in Plut. Ar. 28.

³ Ib. 27.

⁴ Ib. Οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι, καθάπερ οὐκ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς μάχης οὖσης, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Νεμείων βραβεύοντες, ἴσοι καὶ δίκαιοι θεῶται καθήντο τῶν γινομένων πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντες. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 126) says, is probably Aratos' own comparison.

CHAP. VII. **ippos,¹ seized upon the government with Macedonian help,² and Argos was as far from deliverance as before.³**
 Tyranny of Aristomachos the Second.

¹ See above, p. 380.

² Plut. Ar. 29. 'Ο δ' Ἀρατος, οὕτω λαμπρῶς εὐτυχήσας . . . δμῶς οὐκ ἔλαβε τὸ Ἄργος οὐδ' ἠλευθέρωσε, τῶν περὶ Ἀγίαν καὶ τὸν νεώτερον Ἀριστομάχον μετὰ δυνάμεως βασιλικῆς παραιπεσόντων καὶ κατασχόντων τὰ πράγματα. Agias was doubtless the Macedonian commander.

³ The accession of Aristomachos involves a question of some importance. Was this the time mentioned by Polybios (ii. 59), when Aratos entered Argos, but retired on finding that the Argeians did not support him, on which Aristomachos put eighty of the chief citizens to death with torture as adherents of the Achaians? The point is worth examining, for this Aristomachos was afterwards General of the League, and one naturally wishes to know whether any man who held that office had ever been guilty of such a monstrous crime. Droysen (ii. 436) and Bishop Thirlwall—the latter perhaps not quite positively—place it at this time. (See the narrative and note, Thirlwall, viii. 134.) According to this view, Aratos pressed on in his pursuit to Argos itself, and entered the city; but Aristomachos had already seized on the government, and, as soon as Aratos had retired, he murdered the eighty citizens. I confess that the narrative of Plutarch does not give me the idea that Aratos continued the pursuit beyond Mykéné, and the words of Polybios do not give me the idea that the massacre was the very first act of the rule of Aristippos. It may well be doubted whether the story in Polybios and the story in Plutarch have anything to do with one another. Dr. Schmitz, in the Dictionary of Biography (art. Aristomachus) places the massacre much later, in the time of the Kleomenic War, after Aristomachos had joined the Achaian League, and again forsaken it. I can find no point in the history of those times which suits the events, and the whole language of Polybios points to the days when Aratos was trying to deliver Argos from the Tyrants, not to the days when Argos was a revolted city of the Achaian Union. Schorn, on the other hand (p. 118), throws out a hint which seems to me to have great probability. "Das Verbrechen, welches ihm [Aristomachus] der genannte Schriftsteller [Polybios] (2, 59, 8 f.) zur Last legt, hat jener wahrscheinlich nicht begangen. Aus Plutarch (Arat. 25 und 27) lässt sich vermuthen, dass Polybios den jüngeren Aristomachus mit dem älteren oder vielmehr mit Aristippos verwechselt hat." That Polybios has thus confounded Aristomachos with one of his predecessors seems really very likely. The description which he gives of Aratos entering Argos, and retiring because he found no help from the citizens, agrees with nothing which is elsewhere mentioned of the reign of Aristomachos the Second. But it very well agrees with the first passage quoted from Plutarch by Schorn, in the time of Aristomachos the First, and still more with the second one, in the time of Aristippos. The question then arises whether Polybios could have made such a mistake. We must remember that Polybios, in this part of his work, is writing of

The accession of Kleônai, though in itself an incon-
siderable city, must have added somewhat to the position
of the League in general estimation. The Kleônaians
were doubtless willing and zealous confederates. Their
city had hitherto occupied a position with regard to
Argos somewhat like that which had been occupied by
Pisa with regard to Elis. As the Pisatans claimed to
be the lawful presidents of the Olympic festival, so the
Kleônaians claimed to be the lawful presidents of the
Nemean festival. But, for ages past, their rights had been
usurped by their powerful neighbours of Argos, who seem
to have held Kleônai in the condition of dependent al-
liance. Accession to the League was, to a city in such
a position, promotion in every sense. The League knew
of no distinctions between its members, and Kleônai was
doubtless admitted as an equal confederate, on a perfect
level with Sikyôn and Corinth. And, more than this, the
Kleônaians were now, for the first time, able to vindicate
their rights, and to celebrate their own Nemean Games.
The League, numbering Corinth and Kleônai among its
members, had now two out of the four great national
festivals of Greece celebrated within its territory. But
the Argeians did not tamely surrender their privilege.
Like the Eleians, when the Arkadians celebrated
Olympic Games under Pisatan presidency,¹ they ignored

CHAP. VII.
Accession
of Kleônai
to the
League.
Its effects.

B.C. 364.

events which happened before his own birth, and that Plutarch had before him the same contemporary writers that Polybios had. The difference between the authority of the two is therefore not so very great. And Polybios does not mention this massacre in any part of his own regular narrative, but as an *obiter dictum* in a somewhat rhetorical attack on the historical credibility of Phylarchos. In the very next chapter (ii. 60) there is a flat contradiction as to the fate of this very Aristomachos between Polybios and Phylarchos followed by Plutarch. It therefore really does not seem so very unlikely that Polybios may have here confounded the younger Aristomachos with one of his predecessors.

Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 28, et seqq. On this occasion the claimants came to a regular battle within the sacred precincts, of which we do not hear at Nemea.

CHAP. VII. the Kleônaiian festival, and celebrated Nemean Games of their own. It was part of the International, or rather of the Canon, Law of Greece, that all competitors on their way to or from any of the national games had free passage, even through the territories of states with which their own cities might be at war. This immunity is said never to have been violated before; but now all competitors at the Argeian Nemeia who passed through any Achaian territory—and none could come by land from Northern Greece without doing so—were seized by the Achaians and sold as slaves.¹ This unjust and cruel act was doubtless vindicated on the technical ground that the Argeian Nemeia were not the true festival, and that therefore competitors going to or coming from them had no right to any privilege. But anyhow they were travellers from friendly or neutral states, who were not injuring the League or any of its cities. Plutarch calls this proceeding a proof of Aratos' inexorable hatred² towards Tyrants; it was at all events a strange and pitiful way of showing it.

Rival celebrations of the Nemean Games.

Extension of the League in Arkadia.

Ætolian acquisitions in Arkadia.

We must now trace the progress of the League on the side of Arkadia. It is evident that the old Arkadian Union, the work of Lykomêdês, had now utterly passed away. No Assembly of Ten Thousand could, for many years past, have been gathered together in the theatre of the Great City. The Arkadian cities now appear altogether single and disunited, and many of them were ruled by Tyrants. And, up to this time, those cities which had joined either of the two great Confederations had, whether by choice or by compulsion, attached themselves to Ætolia rather than to Achaia. It must be remembered that, inaccessible as Arkadia and Ætolia look to one another on

¹ Plut. Ar. 28.

² Ib. Οὕτω σφοδρὸς ἦν καὶ ἀπαράλτῃτος ἐν τῷ μισεῖν τοὺς τυράννους.

the map, the close alliance which always existed between CHAP. VII. Ætolia and Elis gave the Ætolians constant opportunities of meddling in the internal affairs of Peloponnêsos.¹ Tegea, Phigaleia,² Orchomenos, became Ætolian allies or subjects. Kynaitha, on the other hand, at some time of which we do not know the exact date, had joined the Achaian League. This city had been torn to pieces by internal struggles, till at last the party which had the upper hand asked for Achaian help, and received a garrison under an Achaian commander.³ This precaution does not show that Kynaitha was admitted to the Union on any but the usual equal terms; for we have already seen that a Federal garrison was also kept at Corinth, which was beyond doubt an independent and highly important member of the League. Other Arkadian towns were also won to the League, as Stymphalos, Kleitôr, Pheneos, Kaphyai, Hêraia, and Telphousa, but generally we know nothing of the time or manner of their acquisition, but learn the fact only from afterwards finding them incidentally spoken of as Achaian towns.⁴ Mantinea went through a series of revolutions, of which we should like to know the exact dates.⁵ She first united herself to

Accession of Kynaitha and other Arkadian towns to the Achaian League.

Revolutions of Mantinea.

¹ Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 136) connects these Arkadian acquisitions of Ætolia with the great Ætolian invasion of Lakonia. See above, p. 392.

² Pol. iv. 3.

³ Ib. 17. See above, p. 310. We may suppose that the failure of Aratos before Kynaitha, mentioned incidentally by Polybios (ix. 17), took place at some early stage of these events. Aratos was *νέος ἀρχηγός*, which can only refer to the time of one of his earliest Generalships, or possibly to some subordinate command before he was General. See Brandstätter, p. 237.

⁴ See Pol. ii. 52. 55. iv. 19. Polybios (ii. 36) records a stratagem by which the Achaian General Diotias obtained possession of Hêraia. It is a silly story enough, and Polybios shows how little he understood the Achaian constitution, by making the Hêraians offer themselves as *subjects* of the Achaians; *ἱκετεύοντες ἀπολαβεῖν τὴν πατρίδα, ὡς εἰσαῖθις ὑπήκοοι γενησόμενοι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς*. But the tale preserves to us the name of an otherwise unknown Achaian General.

⁵ Pol. ii. 57.

CHAP. VII. the Achaian body, and then—our first recorded instance of secession—deserted it for a connexion, on whatever terms, with Ætolia. We have no certain information when this revolt took place, except that it was before the war with Kleomenês, and therefore at some time within our present period. Mantinea was perhaps induced to forsake the League, when the League admitted to its fellowship a city which was Mantinea's special rival. For we have now reached the time when the League made, in point of actual strength, its greatest acquisition since that of the Corinthian Akropolis, and one which proved in its results the greatest of all its acquisitions since that which made Aratos himself its citizen. Megalopolis, the Great City, once the Federal capital of Arkadia, now became a single canton of the Federation of Achaia. No greater gain did the Achaian Union ever make than this which gave her one of her greatest cities, and a long succession of her noblest citizens. It was a bright day indeed in the annals of the League which gave her Philopoimên and Lykortas and Polybios, and, greater than all, the deathless name of Lydiadas.

Before
B.C. 227.

Union of
MEGALOPOLIS
with the
Achaian
League,
B.C. 234.

Character
of LYDIA-
DAS.

Lydiadas, Tyrant of Megalopolis and thrice General of the Achaian League, is a man of whom but little is recorded, but that little is enough at once to place him among the first of men.¹ We know him mainly from records tinged with the envy of a rival, and yet no fact is recorded of him which does not in truth redound to his honour. In his youth he seized the Tyranny of his native city, but he seized it with no ignoble or unworthy aim. We know not the date² or the circum-

¹ Besides the account of Lydiadas in Plutarch's *Lives of Aratos and Kleomenês*, and the brief mention of Polybios (ii. 44), there is an admiring picture of him drawn by Pausanias, viii. 27. 12.

² Droysen (ii. 372) places it about B.C. 244, soon after the seizure of Corinth by Antigonos, but this date rests on no certain evidence.

stances of his rise to sovereign power, but there is at least CHAP. VII. nothing to mark him as one of those Tyrants who were the destroyers of freedom. He is not painted to us as a midnight conspirator, plotting rebellion against a state of things which made him only one free citizen among many. Still less is he painted as the chief magistrate of a free state, bound by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to its freedom, and then turning the limited powers with which his country had entrusted him to overthrow the liberties of which he was the chosen guardian. We do not read that he rose to power by driving a lawful Senate from their hall by the spears of mercenaries, or by an indiscriminate massacre of his fellow-citizens in the streets of the Great City. We do not read that he reigned by crushing every nobler feeling, and by flattering every baser passion, of his subjects; we are not told that every man of worth or talent shrank from his service, and left him only hirelings and flatterers as the agents of his will. There is no evidence that the dungeons of Megalopolis or the cities of free Greece were filled with men whose genius or whose virtue was found inconsistent with his rule. We do not hear that his foreign policy was one of faithless aggression; that he gave out that Tyranny should be Peace, and then filled Peloponnêsos with needless wars. It is not told us that he seized on city after city, prefacing every act of plunder with solemn protestations that nothing was further from his thoughts. Still less do we find that he ever played the basest part to which Tyranny itself can sink; that he stretched forth his hand to give a hypocritical aid to struggling freedom, and then drew back that he might glut his eyes with the sight of a land wasted by anarchy and brigandage to which a word from him could at any moment put an end. No; Lydiadas was, in the sense of his age and country, a Tyrant, but it was not thus that he either gained or used a power which in

CHAP. VII. formal speech alone deserved to be called a Tyranny.

Others had reigned in the Great City far less worthy to reign than he ; he felt within himself the gifts and aspirations of the born ruler ; and, in a city which had long been used to the sway of one, the vision of his youthful imagination took, pardonably enough, the form not of a republican magistrate but of a patriot King. Men told him that the sway of a single man was best for times like his, that his heart and arm could better guard his native land than the turbulence of the many or the selfish narrowness of the few. He looked on sovereign power as a means of working his country's good and of winning for himself a glorious name ; he would fain be a King of Men, a Shepherd of the People, like the Kodros of legend or the Cyrus of romance. He grasped the sceptre, and for a while he wielded it. But he soon found that his dreams of patriotic royalty were not suited to the land or the age in which he lived. And soon a nobler path stood open before him. He saw the youth of Sikyôn enter upon a higher career than that into which he himself had been deluded. He saw that a man might rule by better means than an arbitrary will, and might rest his power on better safeguards than strong walls and foreign mercenaries. He saw Aratos, the chosen chief of a free people, wield a power greater than his own, purely because his fellow-citizens deemed him the wisest and the worthiest among them. He saw how far higher and nobler a place in the eyes of Greece was held by the elective magistrate of the great Confederacy than by the absolute master of a single city. He heard himself branded by a name which he shared with wretches like Nikoklês and Aristippos ; he saw the arm raised against him, which was, whenever the favourable moment came, to hurl him from power by a doom like theirs. Aratos had already marked Lydiadas for the next victim, and Megalopolis as the next city

for deliverance.¹ The Lord of Megalopolis, like Iseas at CHAP. VII.
 Keryneia, had now his choice to make, and he made it
 nobly and wisely. He called his rival to a conference, he
 laid aside his power, he dismissed his guards, he went
 back to his house, Tyrant now no longer, but one free
 citizen of the free commonwealth of Megalopolis. The
 first act of that commonwealth was naturally union with
 the Achaian League; the name of Lydiadas was passed
 from tongue to tongue through every city of the Confede-
 ration,² and at the next annual election of Federal magis-
 trates, the self-dethroned Tyrant of Megalopolis was raised
 to the highest place in his new country as the General of
 the year. Lydiadas, in resigning absolute power, did not
 wish to resign power altogether, but only to hold it by a
 tenure at once worthier and safer. He lived to be three
 times General of the League, to distinguish himself alike
 as a statesman and as a soldier, and at last he died in
 battle within sight of his native city, and was honoured in
 death by a conquering enemy whose career was only less
 noble than his own.

Lydiadas
 chosen
 General,
 B. C. 233.

The acquisition of Megalopolis as an Achaian city, Effects
 of the ac-
 quisition
 of Megalo-
 polia.
 and of Lydiadas as a leading Achaian citizen, were im-
 portant in many ways. The League was now brought
 into the very thick of central Peloponnesian politics;
 an increased impulse must have been given to its exten-
 sion throughout Arkadia, and the Tyrannies which still
 remained in the Argolic peninsula must have become
 more completely isolated. But the acquisition of Mega-

¹ It should be noticed that Plutarch, following doubtless the Memoirs
 of Aratos, puts this motive far more prominently forward than Polybios
 and Pausanias, who represent Megalopolitan traditions. The words of
 Pausanias are especially strong; ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤρξατο φρονεῖν, κατέπαυεν ἑαυτὸν
 ἐκὼν τυραννίδος, καί περ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἦδη οἱ τῆς ἀρχῆς καθωρμισμένης.

² Paus. viii. 27. 12. Μεγαλοπολιτῶν δὲ συντελούντων ἦδη τότε ἐς τὸ
 Ἀχαικόν, ὃ Ἀνθιδάδης ἐν τε αὐτοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν Ἀχαιοῖς
 ἐγένετο οὕτω δόκιμος ὥς Ἀράτῳ παρισωθῆναι τὰ ἐς δόξαν.

CHAP. VII. Iopolis and the conversion of Lydiadas had two results which were more important still. They made the territories of the League continuous with Lakonia, and they gave Aratos a rival. Hitherto the policy of Aratos and the policy of the League have been the same thing; except the one obscure mention of Dioitas, we hear the name of no other Achaian statesman; Markos was still living, still serving his country; we may well believe that he was placed in the chief magistracy in some of those years in which Aratos could not legally hold it, but he has well-nigh passed out of memory, and there is nothing which brings either him or any one else before us as a rival of the recognized chief of the League. We read indeed that some acts of Aratos brought on him a certain amount of censure in the Assembly, but none of them had given any lasting shock to his predominant influence in the commonwealth. The accession of Lydiadas to citizenship, his election to the chief magistracy, at once gave Aratos his match. Lydiadas was as ambitious and as energetic as himself, and, as events proved, a far abler soldier. Placed at the head of the armies and the councils of the League, he had not the slightest intention of acting as the instrument of another man. Our account of their disputes comes doubtless from the Memoirs of Aratos himself; it must therefore be taken with the necessary allowances, as we have no counter-statement from the side of Lydiadas. We can well believe that two veins of feeling ran through the Achaian public mind, as men spoke of the great citizen whom they had just adopted. Admiration would be the first feeling. The man who had voluntarily given up sovereign power, who had deliberately preferred the position of a republican magistrate to that of an absolute ruler, would be extolled as a hero indeed, as the very first and noblest of the friends of freedom. And of a truth the angel of freedom

Rivalry of
Aratos and
Lydiadas.

might well rejoice over such a repentant sinner, more than over a Markos or a Washington who needed no repentance. But, on the other hand, it is easy to believe that there were men who held that the Ethiopian could never change his skin, that the man who had once been a Tyrant would be at heart a Tyrant still, and that the destinies of a free Confederation could never be safe in the hands of a man who had once wielded an absolute sceptre over one of its cities.¹ By such men every action and every word of Lydiadas would be subjected to a far more rigid scrutiny than had ever attended the political or military career of Aratos. That Lydiadas was thrice chosen General—once at least in the teeth of Aratos' strongest opposition²—that, when that opposition prevented further reelections, he still served the League faithfully in subordinate commands, is quite proof enough that all such suspicions were utterly unfounded. We are told that he was constantly exhorting the League to needless undertakings,³ which the superior wisdom of Aratos discountenanced. Considering what we

Second
General-
ship of
Lydiadas,
B.C. 231.

¹ Plut. Ar. 30. "ὁφθῃ πεπλασμένῃ δοκῶν ἤθει πρὸς ἀληθινήν καὶ ἀκέραιον ἀρετὴν ἀμιλλᾶσθαι. καὶ καθάπερ τῷ κόκκυνγί φησιν Αἰσωπος ἐρωτῶντι τοὺς λεπτὰς ὄρνιθας, ὃ τι φεύγοιεν αὐτὸν, εἰπεῖν ἐκείνους, ὡς ἔσται ποτὲ ἰέραξ, οὕτως ἔοικε τῷ Λυσιάδῃ [Plutarch uses the form Λυσιάδης for the Λυδιδάδας of Polybios] παρακολουθεῖν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ὑποψία βλάπτουσα τὴν πίστιν αὐτοῦ τῆς μεταβολῆς. This curious comparison probably comes from Aratos himself.

² Plut. Ar. 30. Καὶ τό γε δεῦτερον ὁ Λυσιάδης στρατηγὸς ἦν ῥέθῃ, ἀντιπρόττοντος ἀντικρυς τοῦ Ἀράτου καὶ σπουδάζοντος ἐτέρῃ παραδοθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν.

³ Ib. "Ἄλλας τε πράξεις οὐκ ἀναγκαίαις εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ στρατείας ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους παρήγγελλεν. Droysen (ii. 446) conjectures that these needless proposals of Lydiadas had reference to changes in the constitution of the League, especially to a reform in the Council of Ministers, which Droysen supposes to have been still confined to the old Achaian towns. But surely the words used sound much more like military expeditions than political changes, and why should there be any feud between Aratos and Lydiadas upon the point supposed by Droysen? Any constitutional advantages possessed by the Ten Cities were a wrong to Sikyon as much as to Megalopolis, and, if Aratos could counterbalance them by purely personal influence, Lydiadas might hope to do the same.

CHAP. VII. know of the two men, it is hardly going too far to explain this as meaning that Lydiadas was ever the champion of open and vigorous action, in opposition to the surprises and diplomatic triumphs in which his rival delighted. But when we find Lydiadas charged with trying to induce the League to attack Sparta, we can more readily believe that we are here listening to a true accusation, and that Aratos had really found out the weak side of the Megalopolitan hero. Most certainly, as events a few years later proved, Aratos was, of all men, the last who ought to have brought such a charge ; but we can well understand that Lydiadas might advocate even an unjust war with Sparta, and he may have exhorted the Assembly to operations in that quarter, even to the discouragement of Aratos' darling schemes upon Athens and Argos. Megalopolis, the creation of Epameinôndas, had been at deadly feud with Lacedæmon ever since it had been a city, and we can well imagine that the hope of gaining the help of the League against this ancient enemy had been one motive which had led Lydiadas to unite his birthplace to the Achaian body. At all events we find a rivalry, a constant opposition of projects, between these two great citizens, which at last grew into a deep personal enmity. Aratos—for Plutarch here speaks as the mouth-piece of Aratos—tells us how Lydiadas' charges against him were rejected as the ebullitions of false virtue contending against true.¹ Lydiadas unfortunately left no memoirs ; but even Aratos lets us know that his own opposition to Lydiadas was, by some at least, attributed to envious feelings against a greater rival.² Before our tale is over, we shall find the two chiefs contending on points both of policy and of war, and in neither case shall we have much doubt in pronouncing Lydiadas to have been the sounder and the nobler counsellor.

Lydiadas'
enmity to
Sparta.

¹ Plut. Ar. 30.

² Ib. 'Επιστάμενος δ' ὁ Ἀρatos αὐτῷ φθονεῖν ἐδόκει.

We must now turn our eyes for a while to Northern Greece. Dêmêtrios is still reigning in Macedonia; the two Leagues, Achaian and Ætolian, are still on friendly terms with each other; Dêmêtrios is hostile to both, though we hear nothing of any vigorous warfare. His attention seems to have been mainly occupied by those barbarous tribes on his northern frontier, in repelling which Macedonia undoubtedly acted as an outpost of Greek civilization. Against the Achaians he seems to have worked chiefly by dispensing lavish subsidies among the petty Tyrants of Peloponnêsos;¹ these were doubtless devoted to the maintenance of mercenaries to act as guards against the plots of Aratos. It was about this time that Epeiros was transformed from a hereditary monarchy into a Federal Republic.² Dêidameia, the last of the line of Achilles, found herself unable to withstand the revolutionary spirit of the nation; she surrendered her royal powers to the people, retaining only the property and the honorary privileges of her forefathers. It was a bad beginning of freedom, and one which shows that the Epeirots had neither an Aratos nor a Lydiadas among them, that this innocent princess, the descendant of victorious Kings and deified heroes, was soon afterwards murdered in a temple in which she had taken sanctuary. The Democracy which succeeded is spoken of as turbulent and unruly,³ as we can well believe it to have been among a people only half Greek, and utterly unaccustomed to regular freedom. The young Republic soon became involved in a chain of events which brought quite new actors upon the stage of Grecian politics. The pirates of Illyria now begin to be heard

CHAP. VII.
Affairs of
Northern
Greece.

Revolu-
tion in
Epeiros,
B. C. 239-
229.

Character
of the
Epeirôt
Republic.

¹ Pol. ii. 44. Δημήτριος, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς [τοῖς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ μονάρχοις] οὐλοῦν χορηγὸς καὶ μισθοδότης.

² See above, p. 151.

³ Paus. iv. 35. 5. Ἐπειρώται δὲ ὡς ἐπαύσαντο βασιλεύεσθαι, τὰ τε ἄλλα ὁ δῆμος ὕβριζε καὶ ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπερέων. Cf. Justin, xxviii. 3. One would like however to hear the answer of a democratic Epeirôt to this charge.

CHAP. VII. of, and a common interest in repressing their depredations first brings the Greek commonwealths into any practical relations with the Senate and People of Rome. These were, in their results, great events in the history of Greece and of the world. But just now we are more interested in the glimpses which are given us of the political life of the Confederation of Ætolia. We are introduced not only to a siege by an Ætolian army, but to an election and a debate in the Ætolian Assembly. Characteristically enough, the army and the Assembly are but the same persons invested with two different functions, and the subject of the debate turns, as we might have expected, on questions of plunder and annexation.¹

First
political
intercourse
with
Rome.

Hostility
of the
Ætolians
towards
Akarnania.

Akarnanian
Embassy
to Rome,
B.C. 239-
229.

The restless hostility of the Ætolians towards their neighbours of Akarnania seems to have been in no way relaxed by the friendly relations between Ætolia and Achaia. Not long before, at least at some time during the reign of Dêmétrios, the Akarnanians had, in a fit of desperation, applied for help to the great commonwealth on the other side of the Hadriatic. They alone, so they pleaded, among all the Greeks, had no share in the war waged by Greece against the Trojan ancestors of Rome; the Akarnanians were not enrolled in the Homeric Catalogue even as an independent people, much less as countrymen or subjects of their Ætolian oppressors.² The Akarnanian embassy to Rome produced much the same effect as the Ionian embassy to Sparta in the days of Cyrus.³ In both cases the power appealed to interfered by a haughty message, but sent no effectual aid. Rome ordered the Ætolians to desist from all injuries towards Akarnania,⁴

¹ Pol. ii. 2-4.

² Strabo, lib. x. c. 3 (ii. 341). Οἱ Ἀκαρνανεὶ σοφίσασθαι λέγονται ῥωμαίους . . . λέγοντες, ὡς οὐ μετέδωκεν μόνου τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς προγόνους τοὺς ἐκείνων στρατείας· οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ Αἰτωλικῇ καταλόγῳ φράζονται, οὕτε ἰδίᾳ. Cf. Justin, xxviii. 1.

³ Herod. i. 141, 152.

⁴ The evidence for this Roman embassy to Ætolia seems quite sufficient.

a mandate which only led, in mockery of the barbarian interference, to a more cruel inroad than Akarnania had ever before suffered. At the time which we have now reached, we find the Ætolians engaged in their usual business of extending their Confederation by force of arms. They were besieging the Akarnanian town of Medeôn, which had refused to become a member of their League.¹ While the siege was going on, and when the inhabitants were already counted on as a certain prey, the autumnal equinox brought round the time for the yearly election of the Ætolian Federal Magistrates. The Assembly summoned for that purpose was evidently held beneath the walls of Medeôn. The Ætolians had come with their whole force,² and, under such circumstances, with Ætolians, as with Macedonians, the army and the nation were the same thing. Doubtless those citizens of Ætolia Proper who remained at home would be summoned; but it is clear that the outlying cities incorporated with the League could have no share in a Meeting so collected. In this Assembly of citizen-soldiers, the General who was going out of office—his name is not mentioned—set forth his hardships before his hearers. He had begun the siege of Medeôn; he had brought it to a point at which no man doubted of the speedy capture of the city; had it been taken within his year of office, he would have been entitled to the dispo-

SIEGE OF
MEDEÔN
BY THE
ÆTOLIANS,
B.C. 231.

ÆTOLIAN
ASSEMBLY
IN THE
CAMP
BEFORE
MEDEÔN.

Justin—that is, Trogus Pompeius—doubtless, as Niebuhr says (Kl. Schr. i. 256), followed Phylarchos. But it involves an apparent contradiction to a passage of Polybios, in which he seems to imply that the Roman Ambassadors who not long after visited Ætolia and Achaia were the first of their nation who had visited Greece in an official character. (See Pol. ii. 12.; Niebuhr, u.s.; Thirlwall, viii. 140.) But I am not certain that the words of Polybios positively, or at all events intentionally, deny the fact of this earlier embassy. As it led to no results, it probably was not in his thoughts, and even his words need hardly imply any direct contradiction of the story in Justin.

¹ Pol. ii. 2.

² Pol. ii. 2. *Στρατεύσαντες οὖν πάνθημι.*

CHAP. VII. sition of the spoil and to have his name inscribed on the arms which were preserved as trophies.¹ It would be an injustice unworthy of a nation of soldiers, if another commander should be allowed to step in, and to reap the fruits which he had sown amid so much of danger and of endurance. He therefore prayed the Assembly to decree that, whatever might be the result of the election, these honours and advantages might be reserved to himself as the true conqueror of Medeôn. Other speakers, especially those who were themselves candidates for the chief magistracy,² took the other side. Let the spoils and the honours go, according to the law, to him to whom fortune shall assign them. Some man of moderate views must have proposed a compromise; for the Assembly finally voted that the disposition of the spoil and the inscription of the name should be shared by the outgoing General with the General about to be elected. This discussion occupied that day; on the next day the new General was to be chosen, when, according to Ætolian law, he would enter upon his office at once.³ But that very night help came to the besieged. King Dêmétrios was the ally of Akarnania; his help took the same shape as the support which he gave to the Peloponnesian Tyrants, but it proved in this case very effectual. No Macedonian army marched to raise the siege of Medeôn; but Dêmétrios had, by a subsidy, engaged the Illyrian King Agrôn to send a large body of his subjects by sea. The fleet, a hundred of the light piratical vessels of Illyria, must have entered the Ambrakian Gulf and landed the troops at Limnaia. By a swift and well concerted march, they surprised the Ætolians, apparently while actually engaged in electing their

Relief of
Medeôn
by the
Illyrians.

¹ Pol. ii. 2. Δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὶ κρατήσεσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἑαυτοῖς συγχωρεῖσθαι.

² Ib. Τινῶν δὲ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀμφισβητούτως πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα.

³ Ib. 3. See above, p. 339.

General. This attack, supported by a sally from the city, CHAP. VII. completely routed the besiegers. Great spoil fell into the hands both of the Illyrians and of the people of Medeôn. The latter presently in turn held their Meeting, and the Medeônian Assembly voted that the decree of the Ætolian Assembly should be duly carried out, and that the names both of the outgoing Ætolian General and of his successor should be inscribed on the trophy raised by the victorious Akarnanians.¹

The Illyrian King Agrôn, and his widow Teuta, who Ravages of the Illyrians in Peloponnésos. presently succeeded him, were emboldened by this success over such renowned warriors as the Ætolians to carry on their piratical excursions on a yet wider scale. They ravaged the coasts of Elis and Messênia, as they had often done before. Both countries had a long seaboard, and the principal towns were inland, so that invaders by sea could gather a large booty without danger of resistance.² They now ventured on a bolder achievement. A party of Illyrian capture of Phoinikê, B. C. 230. them had occasion to land near Phoinikê in Chaonia. This place, one of the greatest cities of Epeiros, had been entrusted to the care of eight hundred mercenary Gauls, who betrayed the town to the Illyrians. This form of national defence certainly gives us no very favourable impression of the wisdom of the new Epeiroi Republic. Nor had its native armies another Pyrrhos at their head; they utterly failed in the attempt to recover Phoinikê. The young League of Epeiros now applied for help to the elder Leagues of Ætolia and Achaia.³ Help was sent, but no

¹ Brandstätter (269) derides what he calls "das Episodische und Unwesentliche dieser Anekdote." I confess to being thankful for so life-like a report of an Ætolian debate.

The independent action of the Medeônian Assembly (*ἐκκλησία*) should also be noticed. Akarnania formed one commonwealth in all dealings with other nations, but, just as in Achaia, the canton of Medeôn had its own local Assembly, with full sovereignty in local matters.

² Pol. ii. 5.

³ Ib. 6. *Ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος.*

CHAP. VII. battle was fought ; the cause of inaction is not mentioned, but Aratos was General of the year. Phoinikê however Alliance of Epeiros and Akarnania with the Illyrians. was restored on terms to its owners, and the Epeirota, together with the Akarnanians, concluded an alliance with the Illyrians, by virtue of which they for the future helped the barbarians against their benefactors from Southern Greece.¹ The two Leagues were now generally looked to as the protectors of Hellas. Epidamnos, Apollônia, Korkyra, were all attacked or threatened. All three are spoken of as independent states, from which we may infer that Korkyra, which had formed part of the Kingdom of Pyrrhos, did not form part of the Epeirot League.² Of these three cities, Epidamnos had gallantly beaten off an Illyrian attack ; Korkyra was actually besieged, when a joint embassy from all three implored the help both of Ætolia and of Achaia.³ The petition was listened to with favour by the Assemblies of both Leagues, and ten Achaian ships, manned with contingents from both nations,⁴ were sent to the help of Korkyra. Lydiadas was now General ; there was therefore no delay, no shrinking from action. Whether he himself commanded is not recorded, but the ships were sent at once,⁵ and they were sent, not to intrigue or to lie idle, but to fight. This is the first time that we hear of any naval operations on the part of the League, and that, singularly enough, at a moment when its chief was an Arkadian landsman. The Achaians of the original towns, though dwelling on a long sea-board, seem never to

Joint expedition of the two Leagues to relieve Korkyra, B.C. 229.

¹ Pol. ii. 6, 7, where the matter is discussed at length. Mommsen (Röm. Gesch. i. 369) says, " Halb gezwungen halb freiwillig traten die Epeiroten und Akarnanen mit den fremden Räubern in eine unnatürliche Symmachie."

² See Dict. of Geog. Art. Coreyra.

³ Pol. ii. 9.

⁴ Ib. Οἱ δὲ [Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ] διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ἐπλήρωσαν κοινῇ τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δέκα ναῦς καταφράκτους.

⁵ Ib. Καταρτίσαντες δ' ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ἐλπίζοντες λύσειν τὴν πολιορκίαν.

have been a maritime people ; their coast had no important harbours,¹ and we hear nothing of any Achaian exploits by sea. But the acquisition of so many maritime cities, above all of the great Corinth with its two havens, would naturally tempt the League to aspire to the character of a naval power. And it would well agree with the lofty spirit of its present chief to seek to win glory for his country on a new element.² The original Ætolians too were essentially a still more inland people than the Achaians, but the possession of Naupaktos would naturally give a maritime impulse to them also. The treaties with distant cities like Teôs and Kios³ show that Ætolian pirates infested the Ægean and even the Propontis, but the language of Polybios seems to imply that the Ætolians had no Federal navy, while the Achaian League habitually kept ten ships.⁴ This combined naval enterprise of the two Leagues unluckily failed. The Achaian squadron, with its half Achaian, half Ætolian crews, was defeated by the combined fleets of Illyria and Akarnania. Among other ships lost or taken, a quinquereme was sunk which carried Markos of Keryneia, the original founder of the League, still, in his old age, rendering faithful service to a commonwealth of which he had long ceased to be the guiding spirit. Korkyra had to surrender ; she received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by a man who was one of the chief pests of Greece and the neighbouring lands, Dêmêtrios of Pharos. This man, a Greek of the Hadriatic island from which he took his name, here began a career of treachery

Death of
Markos of
Keryneia.

Dêmêtrios
of Pharos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 9. θαλάττην προσέκουν [οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ] ἀλιμένῃ, τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ βαχίας ἐκφερομένη πρὸς τὴν ἡπειρον. Yet Patrai has become a great port in later times.

² This may well have been among the πράξεις οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι proposed by Lydiadas.

³ See above, p. 343.

⁴ This seems implied in the words τὰς δέκα ναῦς.

CHAP. VII. which lasted for many years. He was now in the service of Queen Teuta, but he soon found that her cause was not the strongest. Rome had declared war against the pirate Queen, in what was in truth the cause of all civilized states on both sides of the sea. The Consul Cnæus Fulvius came against Korkyra with the Roman fleet; Dêmétrios, who was already out of favour at the Illyrian court,¹ joined the citizens in welcoming the invaders, and surrendered the Illyrian garrison to Fulvius. Korkyra and, soon afterwards, Apollônia and Epidamnos, became the first Roman allies²—a condition which so easily slid into that of Roman subjects—on the Greek side of the Ionian Sea. The Illyrian kingdom was dismembered, and the adventurer Dêmétrios suddenly grew into a considerable potentate, a large portion of the dominions of Teuta being conferred upon him by the Roman conqueror.³ In the small part of her kingdom which she was allowed to retain, she was hampered with conditions which effectually hindered her from being any longer dangerous to Greece. Not more than two Illyrian ships, and those unarmed, might appear south of Lissos.

Inter-
ference
of Rome.

Korkyra,
Apollônia,
and Epi-
damnos
become
Roman
allies.

Humilia-
tion of
Illyria.

This is the first real interference of Rome in Grecian affairs. The former haughty message to the Ætolians had no effect. But now Rome appeared as an active, though as yet only as a beneficent, actor on the Greek side of the sea. She had broken the power which was just then most dangerous to Greece, and had delivered three Greek cities from a barbarian yoke. The wrongs of

¹ Pol. ii. 11. Ἐν διαβολαῖς ὦν καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν Τεύταν.

² Polybios (u.s.) uses a somewhat different word for the reception of each of the three. Οἱ Κερκυραῖοι . . . αὐτοὶ τε σφᾶς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἔδωκαν παρακληθέντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν. . . Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους εἰς τὴν φιλίαν ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀπολλωνίας . . . καὶ τούτων ἀποδεξαμένων καὶ δόγων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐπικροτήν, . . . Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐπίδαμνιους παραλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πίστιν προήγον, κ.τ.λ.

³ See Thirlwall, viii. 140, note.

Akarnania and the defiance of Ætolia were doubtless by this time forgotten. Ætolia, like Rome, was an enemy of Illyria, while Akarnanian galleys, if they had not sailed to Troy at the bidding of Agamemnôn, had undoubtedly swelled the numbers of the pirate fleet of Teuta. Aulus Postumius, the final conqueror of the Illyrian Queen, sent Ambassadors to the two Leagues, who explained the causes of the war with Teuta, and of the appearance of Roman armies in a quarter where their presence might seem threatening to Greece.¹ They then related the events of the campaign, and read out the treaty which had just been concluded, the terms of which were so favourable to the interests of every Greek state. The Roman envoys were received, as they well deserved, with every honour in the Assemblies of both Confederations. The political embassy was followed by one, apparently of a religious or honorary character, to Corinth and to Athens. The Corinthians bestowed on the Romans the right of sharing in the Greek national festival of the Isthmian Games.² This was equivalent to raising the Roman People from the rank of mere barbarians to the same quasi-Greek position as the Epeirots and Macedonians.³ It shows also that the administration of the Isthmian Games was still in the hands of the State of Corinth, and had not been at all transferred to the general Achaian body. As administra-

Roman
Embassies
to the Two
Leagues,
B.C. 228.

Honorary
Embassies
to Corinth
and
Athens.

¹ This seems implied in the expression of Polybios (ii. 12), ἀπελογίσαντο τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως.

² Pol. ii. 12. Ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν εὐθέως ἄλλους πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους· ὅτε δὲ καὶ Κορίνθιοι πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν Ῥωμαίων τοῦ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἀγῶνος.

"Soon afterwards the Romans sent other embassies to Corinth and to Athens, with no other object, so far as appears, than of introducing themselves to some of the most illustrious states of the Greek name, which many of the Romans had already learned to admire." Arnold's Rome, iii. 40.

³ Arnold, u.s. Thirlwall, viii. 140. The act, though done by a body of less authority, had somewhat the same effect as the admission of Macedonia to the Amphiktyonic franchise.

CHAP. VII. tors of those games, the Corinthians might lawfully receive and honour a Roman Embassy which was charged with no political object, but merely came on a pilgrimage to Corinth and its holy places. Such an Embassy in no way interfered with the Federal sovereignty in matters of foreign negotiation; those had been already dealt with by the Federal Assembly.¹ And truly Rome might just then seem worthy of any honours on the part of Greece. Not but that a feeling of shame² might arise in the breast of any patriotic Greek, when he thought that the freedom of three cities, which the two greatest powers of independent Greece had in vain attempted to deliver, had now to be received as a gift from a barbarian conqueror.³

The conduct of Rome throughout this war was thoroughly just and honourable; there is no reason to charge either the Senate or individual Roman leaders with any ulterior views of selfish aggrandizement; but it is clear that, when the Roman arms had once been seen before a Greek fortress, when the wiles of Roman diplomacy had once been listened to by a Greek Assembly, a path was opened which directly led to the fight of Kynoskephalê and to the sack of Corinth.

Eventual
results of
Roman
inter-
ference.

Inaction
of Mace-
donia.

The inaction of Macedonia during all these events is remarkable. Since Dêmétrios first engaged the Illyrians

¹ Τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος. Pol. ii. 12, of the other embassy. See above, p. 261.

² "Man kann fragen, ob der Jubel in Hellas grösser war oder die Scham, als statt der zehn Linienschiffe der achaischen Eidgenossenschaft, der streitbarsten Macht Griechenlands, jetzt zweihundert Segel der Barbaren in ihre Häfen einliefen und mit einem Schlage die Aufgabe lösten, die den Griechen zukam und an der diese so kläglich gescheitert waren." Mommsen, Röm. Gesch. i. 371.

³ "In the course of this short war, not only Coreyra, but Apollonia also, and Epidamnus, submitted to the Romans at discretion, and received their liberty, as was afterwards the case with all Greece, as a gift from the Roman people." Arnold, iii. 39.

to help Medeôn, we hear of absolutely no Macedonian CHAP. VII. interference, either warlike or diplomatic, in matters which would seem to have very directly touched Macedonian interests. We are not told with what eyes Macedonian statesmen looked upon the first appearance of so formidable a power as Rome in lands so closely bordering upon their own. Nor do we hear that Rome thought it necessary on this occasion to enter into any relations with the Macedonian Kingdom. Roman embassies went on political errands to Aigion and Thermon, and on honorary errands to Corinth and Athens, but no envoy seems to have been dispatched in either character to the court of Pella or to the sanctuary of Dion. This apparent temporary insignificance of a power lately so great, and soon to be so great again, is explained by the unusual activity of the restless northern tribes, and by the commotions which commonly attended a change of sovereign in Macedonia.¹ The reign of Dêmétrios ended about the time when the Romans first crossed into Illyria.² He appears to have died in battle with the Dardanians; certainly he had lately been defeated by them.³ The heir to his crown was his young son Philip, but the royal authority was assumed—first, it would seem, as Protector and then as King for life⁴—by Antigonos, surnamed Dôsôn,⁵ a distant kinsman of the royal house, but with a distinct reservation of the rights of young Philip as heir-apparent. A new King of Macedonia seldom ascended the throne without some disturbance, and a King reigning on such

Death of
Dêmétrios,
B.C. 229.

Protecto-
rate and
Reign of
Antigonos
Dôsôn,
B.C. 229-
221.

¹ See Flathe, *Gesch. Mac.* i. 143, et seqq.

² *Pol.* ii. 44. Δημητρίου δὲ βασιλεύσαντος δέκα μόνον ἔτη καὶ μετα-
λάσαντος τὸν βίον περὶ τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα Ῥωμαίων.

³ See Thirlwall, viii. 141.

⁴ Justin, xxviii. 3.

⁵ Ὁ Δῶσαν, he who is about to give, that is, he who promises and does not perform. It does not appear how he came by the nickname, as his general conduct is honourable and straightforward.

CHAP. VII. terms as these was even less likely than usual to find his power perfectly undisputed. We hear vaguely of fresh Dardanian inroads, of commotions in Macedonia itself, and even of some movements in Thessaly of which one would gladly know something more.¹ All these it appears that the energy of Antigonos sufficed to put down; but his hands, like those of Dêmétrios during the last years of his reign, must have been far too full for him to give much attention to the advance either of Achaia or of Rome.

Advance
of the
League
after the
Death of
Dêmétrios.

It is evident that the death of Dêmétrios, and the events which followed it, must have greatly shaken the Macedonian influence in Southern Greece, and must have given a proportionate advantage to the cause of Greek independence.² The two great desires of Aratos were now to be gratified; Athens and Argos were both to be delivered. It would seem that Aratos and the Athenians had at last come to an understanding. The Achaian chief was no longer looked on as an enemy at Athens, and he no longer pressed for the incorporation of Athens with the League. Both sides agreed to be satisfied if all Macedonian garrisons were withdrawn from Attica, and if Athens, again restored to freedom, became the ally of Achaia. The way in which this desirable end was brought about curiously illustrates the position and character of Aratos. He was not then in office, the Presidency of the League being held by his rival Lydiadas.³ But it was not to Lydiadas, but to Aratos, that the

Deliver-
ance of
Athens,
B.C. 229.

¹ Justin, xxviii. 3. See Thirlwall, viii. 164.

² Pol. ii. 44. Δημητρίου δὲ . . . μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον . . . ἐγένετο τις εὐροία πραγμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Plut. Ar. 34. Καὶ Μακεδόνων μὲν δαρχέων ὄντων διὰ τινος προσοίκους καὶ ὁμήρους πολέμους, Αἰτωλῶν δὲ συμμαχοῦντων, ἐπίδοσιν μεγάλην ἢ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐλάμβαναι δύναμις.

³ So Flathe, ii. 156. Plutarch (Ar. 34) says only ἐτέρου μὲν ἀρχοντος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, but it clearly was Lydiadas. This year, B.C. 229, is that of his third and last Generalship.

Athenians applied for help.¹ To them Aratos, whether as friend or as enemy, had always appeared as the one representative of the League; we hear of no application to the Achaian General, of no audience given to Athenian Ambassadors by the Achaian Assembly; he who had delivered Sikyôn and Corinth is prayed to deliver Athens also somehow or other. Probably the Macedonian garrisons would have hindered the progress of avowed Athenian envoys on such an errand; but nothing need have hindered Aratos from communicating the message which he had secretly received, if not to the Assembly or to the Senate, yet at all events to the Chief Magistrate of the year. But so to have done would have been to run the risk of winning glory and influence for a rival; it would have been giving the rash ex-Tyrant a fresh opportunity to propose some of his needless enterprises. Lydiadas might have gone the length of an open attack on the Macedonian garrisons, and have exposed the armies of the League to all the hazards of a pitched battle. Aratos, as ever, is zealous for the deliverance of a Greek state, above all for the deliverance of Athens; to promote that deliverance he is ready to undergo any amount of personal cost, personal exertion, and personal danger; he will gladly free Attica from the presence of the stranger, but he must be allowed to free her himself, and to free her in his own way. This time he did not try a night escalade; a long illness, which obliged him to be carried in a litter, prevented him from leading an attack on Peiræus or Mounychion; probably, as the Macedonians occupied four distinct fortresses, even a successful attack on one garrison might have done little

Applica-
tion of the
Athenians
to Aratos
when out
of office.

¹ Plut. Ar. 34. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι συμφρονήσαντες αὐτοῦ [Ἀράτου] τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐπεὶ Δημοκρίτου τελευτήσαντος ᾤκησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἐκείνον ἐκάλουν.

CHAP. VII. more than increase the watchfulness of the others.¹ His way of compassing his end was simple but daring. He went in his litter to a private conference with Diogenês, the Macedonian officer of whom we have already heard,² and negotiated a bargain, by which, in consideration of a sum of one hundred and fifty talents, Diogenês restored Peiræus, Mounychion, Sounion, and Salamis to the Athenians. At this particular juncture the position of Diogenês must have been very precarious and ambiguous. Macedonia had lost her King, and was in a state of utter confusion; he could expect no aid from home, nor could he tell what might be the policy of the new reign. The idea of such independence as Alexander had enjoyed at Corinth might have occurred to him, but one hundred and fifty talents in ready money may well have seemed more valuable than such a hope accompanied by so many risks. The money was paid; Aratos himself contributed a large sum,³ either out of his private estate or out of the accumulations of his Egyptian pension. The Macedonians departed; Athens was again free, but her incorporation with the League was not pressed. Aratos had won a victory after his own heart; he had achieved one of the foremost and noblest objects of his ambition. He had delivered a famous city, and had won a new ally for his country, and that without shedding a drop of blood, and at no one's risk or cost but his own. But we can well understand that Lydiadas might be displeased at seeing a private citizen do even such good deeds, without deeming the Chief Magistrate of the League worthy of any share in them; and he may have looked on the deliverance of Greek cities by gold instead of steel as

Aratos
buys the
Mace-
donians
out of
Attica.

¹ Paus. ii. 8. 6. Οὐ γὰρ ἤλπιζε δύνασθαι πρὸς βίαν αὐτὰ ἐξελεῖν.

² See above, p. 370, 388.

³ Twenty talents, according to Plutarch (Ar. 34); twenty-five, according to Pausanias (ii. 8. 6).

an unworthy substitution of the merchant's craft for that of the warrior. CHAP. VII.

Though Athens had not actually joined the League, yet this exploit of Aratos, and the consequent close alliance of Athens, greatly raised the Achaian credit and influence. Aigina at once joined the League; ^{Progress of the League.} Xenôn, Tyrant of Hermionê, followed the example of Lydiadas, ^{Union of Aigina and Hermionê.} laid down the Tyranny, and made Hermionê another member of the Achaian body.² We may also infer from a vague notice in Plutarch that some more of the Arkadian towns were gathered in at the same time.³ And now came the great acquisition of Argos. In the narrative of this event we have the rivalry between Aratos and Lydiadas more vividly set before us than ever. Lydiadas was General of the League; but Aratos did not think it inconsistent with the duty of a good citizen ^{Unauthorized negotiations of Aratos with Aristomachos of Argos.} to make private advances to Aristomachos, to send messages to him, to invite him to follow the example of Lydiadas in laying down his Tyranny and uniting his city to the Achaian League. Private action of this sort had long been familiar to Aratos, and it had never been, at all events when successful, very severely scrutinized by his countrymen. But then the chief place in the League had never before been filled by a personal rival, and a rival who was at least his equal in ability and ambition. Aratos continued his negotiations with the Argeian Tyrant; he enlarged to him on the miseries of absolute power, and on the far loftier position of a General of the Achaians, a post which, on the union of Argos with the League, Aristomachos might aspire to fill as well as Lydiadas. Aristomachos agreed to the proposal, on condition of receiving fifty talents to pay off his

¹ Plut. Ar. 34.

² Plut. u.s. Pol. ii. 44.

³ Plut. u.s. "Ἡ τε πλείστη τῆς Ἀραβίας αὐτοῖς [τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς] συνετέλεσ.

CHAP. VII. mercenaries. Money seems never to have been any difficulty with Aratos ; he undertook to provide this large sum, and began to collect it, from what sources we know not. Large as was doubtless his private estate, and inexhaustible as was the wealth of his friend King Ptolemy, it was a bold undertaking so soon after his large contribution towards the ransom of the Attic for-
tresses. While the money was collecting,¹ the negotiation came to the ears of the Achaian General. As Chief Magistrate of the League, Lydiadas was naturally and rightfully offended that a private citizen should undertake these unauthorized negotiations with foreign powers. As the personal rival of Aratos, we can hardly blame him for wishing that the glory of winning Argos, especially in his own year of office, should fall, not to Aratos, but to himself.² He entered into communication with Aristomachos ; Plutarch—that is, of course, Aratos—tells us that he counselled the Argeian Tyrant to trust him, Lydiadas, the ex-Tyrant, rather than Aratos the sworn foe of Tyrants.³ However this may be, Lydiadas simply did his duty, as head of the League, in taking the matter into his own hands. His position was that of an American President or an English Foreign Secretary who should find that his predecessor in office and rival in politics was busily engaged in planning treaties and alliances with foreign states. Lydiadas arranged the terms of union with Aristomachos ; he laid them before the Assembly for confirmation, inviting Aristomachos himself, as his own Ambassador, to plead his own cause before the Achaian People.⁴ A proposal was thus made, in the

Lydiadas
interferes
as General.

His pro-
posal for
the Union
of Argos

¹ Plut. Ar. 35. Τῶν χρημάτων πορίζομένων.

² Ib. Φιλοτιμούμενος ἴδιον αὐτοῦ πολίτευμα τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι.

³ Ib. Τῷ μὲν Ἀράτου κατηγορεῖ πρὸς Ἀριστόμαχον ὡς δυσμενῶς καὶ ἀδιαι-
λάκτως αἰεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ἔχοντος.

⁴ Ib. Αὐτῷ πείσας τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐπιτρέψαι προσήγαγε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὸν

most regular and constitutional way, to bring about an object which had been for years one of the darling wishes of the heart of Aratos, and which he had himself been endeavouring at some sacrifice to effect. We can understand the natural disappointment of Aratos at seeing the accomplishment of his own cherished scheme transferred to his rival; but this in no way justifies the factious and unpatriotic conduct to which he now stooped. What arguments could have been brought, above all by Aratos, against a Government proposal for the annexation of Argos, history does not tell us, and it is certainly very hard to guess them by the light of nature. He could hardly have had the face to argue that the General of the League had no right to discharge one of his constitutional functions, because a private citizen or an inferior magistrate¹ wished unconstitutionally to usurp it. But it is certain that Aratos spoke in strong opposition; that on the division the Noes had it, that the Government motion was thrown out, and that Aristomachos was dismissed from the Assembly, apparently with a degree of disrespect which, Tyrant as he was, he certainly had not deserved.² But, before long, things are quite altered; Aratos is again General;³ he has made his peace with Aristomachos; he brings forward, and triumphantly carries,⁴ the very motion

rejected
at the
instance of
Aratos,
[B.C. 229-8,]

but carried
on the
motion of
Aratos as
General,
B.C. 228.

ἀνθρώπων. Helwing (p. 102), the idolater of Aratos, sees in all this only a very improper interference with Aratos on the part of Lydiadas.

¹ It is always possible that Aratos may have filled some other Federal magistracy in the years when he was not General.

² Plut. Ar. 35. 'Αντειπόντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ [Ἀράτου] δι' ὀργὴν ἀπέλασαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀριστόμαχον.

³ See Flathe, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 166. The Assembly at which Lydiadas produced Aristomachos was probably the regular Spring Meeting of the year 228. At that Meeting Aratos would be elected General for the year 228-7. When he came into office, he might either summon a special Assembly for the discussion of the question, or might introduce it at the regular Autumnal Meeting.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 35. 'Ἐπει δὲ συμπεισθεὶς πάλιν αὐτὸς ἤρξατο περὶ αὐτῶν δια-

CHAP. VII.


Aristomachos
General,
B. C. 227.Union of
Phlious
with the
League.Estimate
of the
conduct of
Aratos.

which a few months before he had caused to be ignominiously thrown out; Argos is united to the League; and, at the next election of Federal Magistrates, Aratos is succeeded in his office, not, as had now become the rule, by Lydiadas, but by Aristomachos himself. This election was doubtless made through the personal influence of Aratos, and the narrative seems rather to imply that it was part of the bargain between him and Aristomachos. Along with Argos and Aristomachos, Phlious and its Tyrant Kleónymos¹ were also admitted into the League, which thus included all Argolis. By these annexations Aratos doubtless gained much fame, but it was at the expense of his true honour. Plutarch tells us of the wonderful proof of the national goodwill and confidence which the Achaian Assembly showed to Aratos.² One who is not a professed biographer of heroes might be tempted to say that neither Aratos nor the Assembly ever showed themselves in a more paltry light. It is perhaps not quite unknown in other constitutional governments for a statesman's view of a measure to differ a good deal, according as he is in office or in opposition. But to an impartial spectator this proceeding of Aratos will perhaps appear an extreme, not to say shameless, case of such sudden conversion. One cannot help wondering how any Assembly could be got to follow him to and fro in such a course. But, granting that some ingenious misrepresentations, some fervent declamations, had once beguiled the Assembly to reject the proposal of Lydiadas, yet afterwards to accept the proposal of Aratos was, on the

λέγεσθαι παρὸν, πάντα τάχως καὶ προθύμως ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ προσεδέξαντο μὲν τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Φλιασίους εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνιαντῷ δ' ὕστερον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστόμαχον εἰλοντο στρατηγόν.

¹ Pol. ii. 44.

² Plut. Ar. 35. Ἔνθα δὴ μάλιστα φανεράν ἐποίησαν οἱ σύνοδοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸν Ἀρατον εὐνύϊαν καὶ πίστιν.



part of the Assembly, whatever we say of Aratos himself, CHAP. VII.
merely a return to common sense.

The League was now at the height of its glory. Days Com-
manding
Position
of the
Achaian
League,
B.C. 228.
were indeed in store when its territorial extent was to be
far greater, but those were days when its true greatness
and independence had passed away for ever. But now it
was wholly independent of foreign influences; the Egyptian
connexion did not practically hamper its action, and,
in the political morality of those times, it carried with it
no disgrace. The League was now the greatest power of
Greece. A Federation of equal cities, democratically
governed, embraced the whole of old Achaia, the whole of
the Argolic peninsula, the greater part of Arkadia, to-
gether with Phlious, Sikyôn, Corinth, Megara, and the
island of Aigina. Within this large continuous territory
we hear of no discontent, no hankering after secession,
save only in the single turbulent city of Mantinea.
Achaians, Dorians, Arkadians, had forgotten their local
quarrels, and lived as willing fellow-citizens of one
Federal state. Tyrants and Tyrannicides confined their
warfare within the limits of parliamentary opposition, and
appeared in alternate years at the head of the councils
and armies of the League. The rival League of Ætolia
was still a harmonious ally; its alliance carried with it the
alliance of Elis; Athens was bound to the League by
every tie of gratitude; the breed of local Tyrants had
ceased to exist; some had been extirpated, others had
been converted into Achaian citizens and leaders. Mace-
donia was doubtless not friendly, but she was not in a
position to be actively hostile; Rome herself, a name
which doubtless already commanded a vague respect,
though as yet no servile fear, had entered into the
friendliest relations, cemented by the choicest honours on
either side. The work of the League seemed to be done;
Greece, all Greece at least south of Thermopylæ, was

CHAP. VII. free ; all her noblest cities enjoyed freedom from foreign garrisons and foreign tribute ; none of them were hostile to the League ; many of them were incorporated as its principal members. Never did the League itself stand so high in power and reputation ; never had Greece, as a whole, so fair a prospect of peace and good government. The time was now come when the man who had done all this good for his native land was to undo it with his own hands.

§ 3. *From the Beginning of the War with Kleomenés to the Opening of Negotiations with Macedonia.*

B. C. 227–224.

Condition
of SPARTA.

B. C. 371–
227.

The one possible rival of the Achaian League within Peloponnêsos was Sparta. That famous city had now indeed, for nearly a hundred and fifty years, utterly fallen from her ancient greatness. The day of Leuktra had not only cut her off from all hope of retaining or recovering her old supremacy, it had cut off the fairest portion of her home territory from her dominion. The President, we might almost say the Tyrant, of Greece was brought down to the rank of one Peloponnesian city among many. Instead of sending her armies to lord it over Thebes and Olynthos, she was hemmed in on one side by her new-born rival Megalopolis, on another by her own liberated serfs of Messênia. As for her internal state, we are told of corruptions of every kind ; the Laws of Lykourgos had become a name ; all power and all property were centred in a few hands ; Kings and people alike were held in bondage by the ruling oligarchs. And yet, on the whole, the history of Sparta during this age is more honourable than that of any other of the great Hellenic cities. Her

supremacy, her greatness, had passed away; but, within CHAP. VII. the narrow bounds in which she was pent up, she preserved her independence and her dignity in a way that Thebes and Corinth and Athens had failed to do. During the times of greatest violence and confusion, she had been free alike from foreign conquest and from domestic revolution. She could not indeed always defend her territories from invasion; still she had never seen either a native Tyrant or a Macedonian garrison. Philip had marched along her B.C. 338. coasts, he had contracted her borders, but his phalanx had never appeared before her unwall'd capital.¹ The democratic hero of Thebes and the royal hero of Epeiros had alike been driven back when they assaulted her in her own hearth and home. She had never recognized the Macedonian as chief of Greece; she had sent no deputies to the Corinthian Congress; her name was formally excepted in the inscriptions which described Alexander and all Greeks, save the Lacedæmonians, as victorious over the Barbarians of Asia. But she was not dead to the cause of Greece; her kingly Hêracleids could still command armies on behalf of Hellenic freedom; one Agis had died fighting in a vain attempt to break the Macedonian yoke; another had come ready, if Aratos would but have let him, to fight as bravely to free Peloponnêsos from the robbers of Ætolia. At home, whatever were her political or social Her internal condition. corruptions, they were the mere gradual decay of old institutions, not the lawless usurpations of high-handed violence. Her Kings, her Ephors, her Senate, her Assembly, were no longer what they once were; but the venerable names and offices remained unchanged. No Spartan King had ever trampled on the rights of Senate or People, none had even ventured to resist the far more doubtful pretensions of the despotic Ephors. And, on the other

¹ See Thirlwall, vi. 114.

CHAP. VII. hand, Sparta had seen no usurping citizen holding her in bondage by a mercenary force, nor had she ever acknowledged any chief but her own lawful and Zeus-descended Kings. Sparta lay quiet, seldom touched by the revolutions of the rest of Greece, fallen indeed, but neither crushed like Thebes, enslaved like Thessaly, nor degraded like Athens. She was still independent within her own borders; she might yet again become powerful beyond them. And now the day had come when Sparta was once more for a moment to stand forth as the first of Grecian states, and, after a short career of glory, to sink into a state of degradation, both within and without, almost lower than that of Athens itself.

Reform
and fate
of Agis,
B.C. 241.

First came Agis the reformer, Agis the martyr, the purest and noblest spirit that ever perished through deeming others as pure and noble as himself. Then, for the first time, internal revolution began in Sparta, and the hand of the executioner was raised against the sacred person of a Hêracleid King. But his memory died not; a successor and an avenger arose from the very hearth of his destroyer; Sparta had at last a King indeed;¹ no Tyrant, no invader, but a Spartan of the Spartans, a Hêracleid of the divine seed; one who grasped the sceptre of Agis with a firmer hand, and who scrupled not to carry out his schemes by means from which his gentle spirit

Reign
of KLEO-
MENES,
B.C. 236-
222.

Revolution
of Kleo-
menês,
B.C. 226-
225.

would have shrunk in horror. Kleomenês burst the bands with which a gradually narrowing oligarchy had fettered alike the Spartan Kings and the Spartan people. He slew

¹ The character of Kleomenês has been a subject of warm dispute both in his own days and in ours. Polybios, as a Megalopolitan, of course draws him in the darkest colours; in Plutarch we find the counter-statement of his admiring contemporary Phylarchos. I do not feel called upon minutely to examine questions which are matters of Spartan, not of Federal, history; but I believe that my notion of Kleomenês will be found quite in harmony with the views of Bishop Thirlwall. See his History, viii. 160-188.

the Ephors on their seats of office, and summoned the people of Sparta to behold and approve the deed. An age which has condoned the most deliberate perjury and the most cold-blooded massacre which history records is hardly entitled to be severe on the comparatively mild *coup d'état*¹ of the Lacedæmonian King. He put out of the way by violence, because Law could not touch them, men who, there is every reason to believe, had put to death his own royal colleague, and then charged him with the deed.² The slaughter of the Ephors was a stroke in which Agis or Epameinôndas would have had no share, but it was one at which Ehud, Tell, or Timoleôn could not consistently have scrupled. The Ephors, the real Tyrants, once gone, Kleomenês stood forth as the King of a free people, the General of a gallant army. He was no longer the slave of a narrow caste of ruling families; he was the beloved chief of a nation, which, recruited by a large addition from the subject classes, was now a nation once more. A people thus springing into a revived life is sure to be warlike, if not positively aggressive. The discipline of victory—and only a chief like Aratos can lead such a people to defeat—is needed to teach it to feel its own powers; it is needed to efface all divisions, all hostile memories, by common struggles and common triumphs in the national cause. How was Peloponnêsos to contain two such powers, each in the full vigour of recovered freedom, each fresh with all the lofty aspirations of regenerate youth? What were to be the mutual relations of the revived League and of the

Relations
between
Sparta
and the
League.

¹ Four of the Ephors were killed, with ten persons who attempted to defend them. Eighty citizens were banished, that is, not sent to some Spartan Cayenne, but allowed to live in any Greek city except Sparta, retaining their rights of property, and encouraged by a promise to be allowed to return home at some future day. So small an allowance of bloodshed and confiscation would be counted a very poor day's work at the "inauguration" of an Empire or a Red Republic.

² See Thirlwall, viii. 172. cf. 163.

CHAP. VII. revived Kingdom? Above all, what were to be the personal relations of two such chiefs as Aratos and Kleomenés? Free and equal alliance would be the bidding of cold external prudence. Sparta, such a counsellor would say, is far too great to become a single city of the League; Achaia, on the other hand, is far too free and happy as she is to be asked to admit the slightest superiority on the part of Sparta. Live in friendship side by side; and hang up your shields till the Ætolian again proves faithless, or till the Macedonian again becomes threatening. Advice sound indeed, advice at once prudent and benevolent, but advice which two ambitious chiefs and two high-spirited nations were never likely to take.

Causes
of war
between
Sparta
and the
League.

The war between Sparta and the League began before Kleomenés had accomplished his great revolution at home. There can be no doubt that it was a war which was equally acceptable to the leaders on both sides, and that in no case could peace have been kept very long. It was like the old Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens; in both cases war was the natural result of the position occupied by two rival powers;¹ in both cases the grounds of warfare which were alleged on either side were at most the occasions, and not the real causes, of the struggle. In the eyes of Aratos, Sparta was a power which stood in the way of his darling scheme of uniting all Peloponnésos into one Confederation.² On that object his mind had dwelt so long that he had begun to regard himself as having a mission to compel as well as to persuade the refractory; the deliverer was at last beginning to share

¹ Thuc. i. 23. *Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγον, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι, μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αὐτῶν ἦσαν ἑκατέρων.* This is as true of Orchomenos and Athênaiôn as of Epidamnos and Korkyra.

² Plut. Kl. 3. *Ὁ γὰρ Ἀρατος . . . ἐβούλετο μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, κ. τ. λ.*

CHAP. VII.

Different position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos.

some of the feelings of a conqueror. Elis, Sparta, and some Arkadian towns¹ were still wanting to the completion of his great work. Now Sparta, and Elis also, stood in a wholly different position from the cities which Aratos had incorporated with the League in earlier days. Sikyôn, Corinth, Megara, Argos, had every reason to rejoice in their annexation. Instead of foreign or domestic bondage, they obtained freedom within their own walls, and true confederates beyond them. Sparta had no such need; she had no foreign garrison, no domestic Tyrant; she lived under a Government which, whether good or bad, was a national Government, resting on the prescriptive reverence of eight hundred years. No enemy threatened her, and, had any enemy threatened her, she was fully able to resist. She was far greater than any one city of the League; indeed the event proved that she was able to contend on more than equal terms with the League's whole force. Her immemorial polity, the habits and feelings of her people, were all utterly inconsistent with the position of a single member of a Democratic Confederation.² What was deliverance and promotion to Corinth and Argos would to Sparta have been a sacrifice of every national feeling, and a sacrifice for which no occasion called. Sparta was never likely to enter the League as a willing member, and Aratos had yet to learn that none but willing members of a League are worth having. Sparta was too strong to be herself directly attacked; but she might be weakened and isolated, till she was either actually conquered, or else led to think that accession to the League would be the less of two evils. On this point Aratos, Lydiadas, and Aristoma-

¹ Plut. KL 3. Ἀπελείποντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἡλείοι καὶ ὅσοι Λακεδαιμόνιοις Ἀρκάδων προσείχον—that is, doubtless, Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenos. Phigaleia, too, and perhaps some other Arkadian towns, were not yet incorporated. He should also have added Messênê.

² See the remarks of Schorn, p. 96.

CHAP. VII. chos would be of one mind. To Lydiadas the matter would seem very simple : Sparta was the old enemy of his city ; Sparta and Megalopolis had, as usual, border disputes ; territory was said to be unjustly detained on either side ;¹ the hope of Achaian help against Sparta was doubtless one among the objects which had led him to join the League at all. To Aristomachos, if he had in him a spark of the old Argeian spirit, Sparta would be the object of a hatred no less keen than it was to Lydiadas. The day was at last come when the old wrong might be redressed, when Argos, if not, as of old, the head of Peloponnêsos, might at least see Sparta brought down to her own level. The three chief men of the League would thus be agreed, or, if there was a difference, it would be a difference as to the means rather than the end. We can well believe that, while Aratos was weaving his subtle web, Lydiadas and Aristomachos would be clamouring for open war with Lacedæmon, and setting forth the standing border-wrongs of their several cities. To Kleomenês, on the other hand, war was just as acceptable as it could be to the most warlike orator at Aigion. He had not as yet appeared as a revolutionist ; he was a young and orderly King, humbly obeying his masters the Ephors. But he was doubtless already meditating his daring plan of carrying out the dreams of Agis with the strong hand. A war in which he might win the popularity and influence which attend a victorious general, a war in which he might show himself forth as the retriever of Sparta's ancient glory, was of all things that which best suited his purpose.² He rejoiced at every hostile sign on the Achaian

War acceptable
on both
sides.

¹ Plut. Kl. 4. Ἐμβολή δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τὸ Ἀθήναιον ἐστὶ, καὶ τότε πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας ἦν ἐπίδικον. Pol. ii. 46. Τὸ καλούμενον Ἀθήναιον ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν χώρα. To the Megalopolitan historian the right of Megalopolis to Athênaiion did not seem open to those doubts which were intelligible at the distance of Chairôneia.

² Plut. Kl. 3. Οἰόμενος δ' ἂν ἐν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ' εἰρήνην μετα-

side, and nourished every hostile disposition among his own people. Small as was the actual authority of a Spartan King, all Spartan history shows that his position was one which allowed an able and active prince to acquire a practical influence in the state far beyond the formal extent of his royal powers.¹ Kleomenês, even thus early, was evidently popular and influential; Sparta felt that one of her old Kings, a Leônidas or an Agêsilaos, had again arisen to win back for her her ancient place in the eyes of men.

The position of the Ætolian League just at this time is singular and ambiguous. If we may believe Polybios, that is, doubtless, the Autobiography of Aratos, Ætolian intrigue was at the bottom of the whole mischief. The Ætoli-^{Ambiguous relations of Ætolia to Sparta and to Achaia.}ans, urged by their natural injustice and rapacity,² stirred up Kleomenês to make wrongful attacks on the Achaian League; they once more plotted with Macedonia to partition the Achaian cities; it was only Aratos who, by skilfully winning over Antigonos to the Achaian side, saved the League from being overwhelmed by three enemies at once. On the other hand, we have the facts that the two Leagues were still on friendly terms, and that there had been, to say the least, no open war between Achaia and Macedonia since the beginning of the reign of Antigonos. It might be doing the Ætoli-^{Inaction of the Ætoli-ans throughout the whole Kleomenic War, even though the}ans too much honour to suppose that a scrupulous regard to the faith of treaties would have kept them back from any aggression which might be convenient at the moment. But there is the fact that the Ætoli-^{ans throughout the whole Kleomenic War, even though the}ans did not strike a blow throughout the whole Kleomenic War, even though the

στήσαι τὰ παρόντα συνέκρουσε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῦ διδόντας ἐγκλημάτων προφάσεις. The whole state of the case could hardly be more tersely expressed. See also Droysen, ii. 478.

¹ See Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 154.

² Pol. ii. 45. Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες, κ.τ.λ.

CHAP. VII. Achaïans were, at one stage of it at least, at war with their cherished allies of Elis. There is the other fact, which we shall come to presently, that Aratos himself, before he took the final step of asking for Macedonian help, first asked for help from Ætolia. Had the two Leagues been on the same cordial terms on which they were a few years before, that help would never have been refused; but had the Ætolians been such bitter enemies to Achaïa as Polybios represents, that help would never have been asked for. In the latter case they would doubtless have taken an open part against the League long before. The truth doubtless is¹ that the Ætolians were jealous of the progress of the Achaïan League in Arkadia, but that, just now, Peloponnesian affairs seemed to them of secondary moment. Their hands appear to have been at this time full of enterprises for extending their power nearer home. They were hostile to Macedonia, and were occupied in some of their Thessalian conquests. This extension of their continuous territory was a more important object than the retention of a few inland towns in Peloponnesos. They were doubtless well pleased to see the two great Peloponnesian powers at war with one another; they may even have taken such steps as were likely to embroil them together; but their agency was clearly something quite secondary throughout the matter. It is evident that, in the explanation given by Polybios of the causes of the war, we have not the historian's own statement of matters of fact, but only the best apology which Aratos could think of for his own unpatriotic conduct. In fact, no very remote causes need be sought for to account for the Kleomenic War; Sparta and Achaïa, Kleomenês and Aratos, were shut up within one peninsula; and that was enough.

Ætolian
acqui-
sitions in
Thessaly.

out the
Kleomenic
War.

¹ See Thirlwall, viii. 168.

It will be remembered that the Ætolians had certain possessions in Arkadia, the nature of whose relation to the League, whether one of real confederation or of subjection, is not very clear.¹ One of these towns, Mantinea, had, as we have seen, from whatever cause, forsaken the Achaian for the Ætolian connexion. Mantinea now, together with Tegea and Orchomenos, was, on what ground or by what means we know not, induced by Kleomenês²—he is already always spoken of as the chief doer of everything—again to exchange the Ætolian for the Lacedæmonian connexion. On what terms these towns were united to Sparta, whether as subjects, as dependents, or as free allies, does not appear. But in any case their new relation was one which involved separation from the Ætolian body. The Ætolians however made no opposition, and formally recognized the right of Sparta to her new acquisitions.³ Such distant possessions were doubtless felt to be less valuable to the Ætolian League than the certainty of embroiling Sparta and Achaia. For it is evident that their occupation by Sparta was a real ground for alarm on the part of the Achaians. As the territory of the League now stood, these cities seemed naturally designed to make a part of it. As independent commonwealths, or as outlying dependencies of Ætolia, they had doubtless been always looked upon as undesirable neighbours. But it was a far more dangerous state of things now that a long wedge of Lacedæmonian territory had thrust itself in between the two Achaian cantons of Argos

Spartan acquisition of the Ætolian towns in Arkadia, B.C. 228.

Achaian interests involved in this annexation.

¹ Pol. ii. 46. Τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευομένας τότε πόλεις. See above, p. 346.

² Ib. Κλεομένους πεπραξικοπηκτός αὐτοῦς [τοῦς Αἰτωλοῦς] καὶ παρηρημένου Τέγεας, Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχομένον.

³ Ib. Οὐχ οἷον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιούντας αὐτῷ [Κλεομένει] τὴν παράληψιν . . . ἐκουσίως παρασπονδουμένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολλύντας πόλεις ἐθελοτήν. The sentence of which these extracts are parts is one of the longest I know in any language.

CHAP. VII. and Megalopolis.¹ But however much such a frontier might in Achaian eyes seem to stand in need of rectification, no formal injury was done to the League by the Lacedæmonian occupation of Orchomenos and Tegea, cities which were not, and never had been, members of the Achaian body. Mantinea indeed might, to an Unionist of extreme views, seem deserving of the chastisement of rebellion, but it was rather late in the day to take up such a ground, after quietly seeing the city—seemingly for several years—in Ætolian occupation. But nations and governments are seldom swayed by such considerations of consistency. Any nation, any government, would have been stirred up by seeing the frontier of a rival power suddenly carried into the heart of its territory, and that by the occupation of one district at least to which it could put forth some shadow of legal right. The course taken by Aratos was characteristic. He and the other members of the Achaian Government² determined that war should not be declared against Sparta. A declaration of war would have required the summoning of a Federal Assembly and the public discussion of the state of affairs. But it was determined to watch and to hinder the movements of Kleomenês. The mode of watching and hindering was doubtless left to Aratos himself. He began to lay plans for gaining Tegea and Orchomenos by one of

Deliberations of the Achaian Government.

Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos.

¹ "Durch sie war plötzlich das Spartanergebiet tief in den achäischen Bereich hinein vorgeschoben; die Eidgenossenschaft musste inne werden dass sie auf das Gefährlichste bedroht sei." Droysen, ii. 480. So Kortüm (iii. 183); "Auch blieb jene [die Eidgenossenschaft der Achäer], welche das Gefährliche einer fremden keilförmig in die Bundesmark hineingeschobenen Ansiedelung vollkommen erkannte, keineswegs ruhige Zuschauerin."

² Pol. ii. 46. "Ἐγὼ δὲ εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων αὐτός τε [ὁ Ἀρατος] καὶ πάντες ὁμοίως οἱ προσεστώτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου μὲν πρὸς μηδὲνα κατάρχειν, ἐνίστασθαι δὲ ταῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβολαῖς. The joint action of the President and his Cabinet is here well marked. In this particular year it is unlikely that Lydiadas was even in subordinate office.

his usual nocturnal surprises.¹ The policy of such a scheme is clear. If Tegea and Orchomenos were gained, Mantinea would be isolated, and the rebel city would be at his mercy. The justice of the scheme is another matter. The League was not at war with Tegea, with Orchomenos, or with Sparta, nor were those cities oppressed by Tyrants or occupied by Macedonian garrisons. But Tegea and Orchomenos contained a party favourable to the Achaian connexion,² and this, or much less than this, was always enough to blind Aratos to every other consideration, when he had the chance of winning new cities for the League. But Aratos had at last met with his match abroad as well as at home. Kleomenês found out what was going on, and, with the consent of the Ephors, he fortified a place called Athênaion, in the frontier district which was disputed between Sparta and Megalopolis. At the same moment the night attacks on Tegea and Orchomenos failed; the party favourable to Achaia lost heart, and Aratos had to retire amid the jeers of his rival.³ Kleomenês was anxious for a battle, or at least for what, with the numbers on both sides,⁴ would rather have been a skirmish. For this of course Aratos had no mind, and Kleomenês was recalled by the Ephors. Aratos, on his return home, procured a declaration of war against Sparta,

Kleomenês
fortifies
Athênaion,
B.C. 227.

Achaian
Declara-
tion of
War.

¹ I follow Bishop Thirlwall in the narrative (viii. 168, 9) which he seems to have put together by a comparison of Plutarch (Kl. 4) and Polybios; that is, of Phylarchos and the Memoirs of Aratos. There is no contradiction between the two, but each naturally dwells on different points in the story. Polybios tells us that the Achaian Government determined to hinder the further progress of Kleomenês; Plutarch tells us in what way it was that they sought to hinder it.

² Plutarch (Kl. 4) calls them *πρόδοται*, a touch clearly borrowed from Phylarchos.

³ See the curious correspondence in Plutarch (u.s.). It would be a relief if diplomatic dispatches were more commonly written in so amusing a style.

⁴ Plut. u.s. Κλεομένει μεθ' ἑπτάων ἰλίων καὶ πεζῶν τριακοσίων ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ στρατοπεδευομένῳ.

CHAP. VII. on the ground of the seizure of Athênaiôn. The passage of this proposal through the several stages of the General and his Cabinet, the Senate, and the Public Assembly, is, happily for our knowledge of the Achaian constitution, described by the historian with more than usual formality.¹

Aratos
annexes
Kaphyai
to the
League.

General-
ship of
Aristo-
machos,
B.C. 227-6.

The language of Polybios would lead us to believe that the Assembly at which war was declared was an Extraordinary Meeting summoned for the purpose. It was probably not till after the declaration that Aratos was enabled once more to enlarge the League by the acquisition of a new, though not a very important, member. He got possession of the Arkadian town of Kaphyai.² If, as seems likely, Kaphyai was then in the position of a subject district of Orchomenos, its citizens would doubtless embrace with delight the opportunity of entering the Achaian Union as an independent State. War now began in earnest; but the first important campaign fell in a year when Aratos was not at the head of the Federal armies. It was the year when Aristomachos, the Ex-Tyrant of Argos, was General. The election of Aristomachos at such a moment merits some consideration. There could not be a stronger proof of the bitterness of the feud between Aratos and Lydiadas. War had been declared on account of a violation of the Megalopolitan territory; a Megalopolitan citizen was one of the foremost men of the League; he had thrice filled the office of General; we cannot doubt that he aspired to it a fourth

¹ Pol. ii. 46. Τότε δὲ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναλαμβάνειν φανερώς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπὸ χειρὸς.

² Plut. Kl. 4. Plutarch does not mention the declaration of war, Polybios does not mention the taking of Kaphyai, but this seems the most natural order of events, if the Meeting at which war was declared was an Extraordinary one. If Kaphyai was taken before the declaration, it would be easier to suppose that war was declared at the regular Spring Meeting, when Aristomachos was elected General.

time; we cannot doubt that he would have the strong support of his own city, now that the main business of the General would be to defend the Megalopolitan territory. Everything, one would have thought, specially pointed to Lydiadas as the man fitted above all others to be the General of this important year. But his claims were rejected, and the defence of Megalopolis and of all Achaia was entrusted to that very Aristomachos, the glory of whose admission to the League had been so unfairly snatched by Aratos from Lydiadas himself. Many men and many cities have deserted the cause of their country on much slighter provocation. We can well believe that Kleomenês would willingly have purchased the alliance or the neutrality of Megalopolis by the surrender of the petty territory in dispute. It is even possible that Kleomenês was, in the plan of his campaign, partly guided by that subtle policy which has often led invading generals to spare the lands of their special rivals.¹ An attack on Megalopolis would seem the natural object for a Spartan commander in such a campaign, as indeed the later course of the war plainly shows. But Kleomenês first carried his arms into the territory of Argos, the country of the newly elected General, and though he seized on one point, Methydrion, in the Megalopolitan district, yet it was one in a remote part of the Canton, and which did not immediately threaten the capital. One can hardly avoid the suspicion that Kleomenês was expecting either to gain over Lydiadas and his countrymen, or at least to discredit them with the other members of the League. If so, his policy utterly failed; not a word of secession was

CHAP. VII.
Designs
of Kleo-
menês.

¹ The most famous cases are those of Archidamos and Periklês, Thuc. ii. 18; and of Hannibal and Fabius, Liv. xxii. 23. Plut. Fab. 7. Others are collected by the commentators on Justin. iii. 7. Tacitus (Hist. v. 23) calls it *nota ars ducum*.

CHAP. VII. breathed by the Megalopolitan leader or his countrymen. As for Aristomachos, his fault was that he was afraid to act independently of Aratos.¹ He took the field with an army far superior in number to the enemy,² whom he naturally wished to engage. But he did not venture to do so without consulting his patron. Aratos was at Athens, on what business we know not, and he wrote thence strongly warning the General against running such terrible risk. Aristomachos was a brave man, and was now high in popular favour;³ he was anxious to distinguish his Generalship by some exploit, and even aspired to an invasion of Lakonia. The temptation to do something might have been too strong for Aristomachos to resist, had not Aratos now appeared in person, and, as it would seem, pretty well relieved⁴ the constitutional chief of the League of his command. The two armies met face to face near Pallantion, between Megalopolis and Tegea; but Aratos seems to have thought that one Spartan would be more than a match for four Achaians, and the host of the League departed without striking a blow. A loud cry of indignation was raised against the cowardly meddler who had hindered the General of the League from doing his duty with every prospect of success.⁵ That Lydiadas was foremost in such accusations⁶ we are not surprised to

Campaign
of Aristo-
machos.

Battle
hindered
by the in-
terference
of Aratos.

¹ The narrative has here to be made up from two accounts in Plutarch. Ar. 35 and Kl. 4.

² The Achaians had 20,000 foot and 1000 horse; the Lacedæmonians were under 5000. Kl. 4.

³ Ar. 35. *Εὐμερῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ βουλευμένος εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐμβαλεῖν.*

⁴ Ib. *Ὁρμημένου δὲ πάντως [τοῦ Ἀριστομάχου] ὑπήκουσεν [ὁ Ἀρατος] καὶ παρὼν συνέστρατευσεν.* Kl. 4. *Φοβηθεὶς τὴν τόλμαν ὁ Ἀρατος οὐκ εἴασε διακινδυνεύσαι τὸν δεσπότην.*

⁵ Kl. 4. *Ἀπῆλθε λοιδορούμενος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, χλευαζόμενος δὲ καὶ καταφρονούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐδὲ πεντακισχιλίων τὸ πλῆθος ὄντων.* This clearly comes from Phylarchos.

⁶ Ar. 35. *Ἐπὶ Λυσιάδου κατηγορήθη.* Was this a legal impeachment, or merely an opposition speech in the Assembly?

hear. So loudly did public opinion make itself heard against Aratos that the Megalopolitan chief ventured on a step on which no man, probably, had ever ventured before. The Generalship in alternate years had, with one doubtful exception,¹ belonged to Aratos ever since he had been General at all; it was enough if Markos or Dioitas or Lydiadas or Aristomachos held the office when Aratos could not legally do so; no man had yet appeared as an opposition candidate when Aratos himself could lawfully stand. Now, trusting to the general feeling aroused by the disgrace of Pallantion, Lydiadas ventured on this extreme course; he stood forward, at the next Federal election, as a candidate to succeed Aristomachos in the Generalship.² But the indignation of the Achaian people against Aratos was never a very lasting feeling; he had the same gift of recovering a lost reputation that he had of retrieving a lost battle. Lydiadas stood for the Generalship in vain; the force of habit was too strong; to elect Aratos in alternate years was so old a prescriptive custom that it seemed to have the force of law. And thus the man who dared not look an enemy in the face on the field of battle was for the twelfth³ time chosen General of the Achaians.

CHAP. VII.
Indigna-
tion
against
Aratos.

Lydiadas
stands
against
Aratos
for the
General-
ship,
B.C. 226.

Twelfth (?)
General-
ship of
Aratos,
B.C. 226-5.

The campaign opened by an attack on Elis on the part of Aratos.⁴ How the Eleians had become engaged in the war does not appear.⁵ Their close connexion

Aratos'
campaign
in Elis.

¹ See note to Chapter viii.

² Ar. 35. *Περὶ τῆς στρατηγίας εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ ἀντιπαράγγελίαν αὐτῷ [Λυσιάδῃ] κατὰ τοὺς [δ' Ἀράτος] ἐκράτησε τῇ χειροτονίᾳ καὶ τὸ δωδέκατον ἡμέθη στρατήγος.*

³ According to the reckoning of Plutarch. I shall elsewhere give reasons for supposing that it was more probably the tenth.

⁴ Plut. Kl. 5.

⁵ "Die Aitolier haben ihren alten Verbündeten keinen Beistand geleistet; war es nur ein Raubzug, den Arat gemacht? oder versuchte er auch die Elier zum Eintritt in den Bund zu nöthigen?" Droysen, ii. 482.

CHAP. VII. with Ætolia would seem to show either that the Northern League was already looked upon as hostile, or else that the Ætolians were held to be so completely occupied with Thessalian and Macedonian affairs that their hostility was not dreaded. The Eleians are not said to have asked for help from Ætolia, but they did obtain help from Sparta. Kleomenês marched to their aid; the Achaian army was now on its return from Elis,¹ and its course seems to show either that Aratos entertained offensive designs against Sparta or else that he found it necessary to take measures for the safety of Megalopolis.

Kleomenês
defeats
Aratos at
Mount
Lykaion.

The two armies met unexpectedly near Mount Lykaion, in the western part of the Megalopolitan territory; Aratos could not avoid a battle; the Achaians were utterly routed; Aratos himself escaped, but for several days he was believed to be dead, just as after his former defeat at Phylakia.² This battle, one of the most disgraceful failures of Aratos, was characteristically followed by one of his most brilliant successes. He had lost a great battle; he would atone for it by recovering a great city. With such portions of his scattered army as he could collect, he marched straight upon Mantinea, where no one expected an attack from a routed army and a dead General. The city was taken, probably not without some cooperation from an Achaian party within.³ This was the first time that the League had to deal with a city guilty of the sin of Secession. But Aratos treated the conquered Mantinea almost as gently as he had treated the rescued Sikyôn or Corinth.⁴ He summoned a Mantineian Assembly;

Aratos
surprises
Mantineia.

¹ Plut. KL 5. *Περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον ἀπιοῦσιν ἤδη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπιβάλλον ἅπαν μὲν ἐτρέψατο καὶ διεπτόησεν αὐτῶν τὸ στράτευμα.*

² Plut. KL 5. Ar. 36 (cf. 34).

³ The expressions *κατὰ κράτος* (Pol. ii. 57), and the like, do not exclude this supposition, which is so probable in itself.

⁴ I again form my narrative from the different statements of Polybios

he neither inflicted nor threatened any hardship; he simply called on the citizens to resume their old rights and their old duties as members of the Achaian League. But he did not trust wholly either to their gratitude or to their good faith. There was at Mantinea a class of inhabitants¹ who did not possess the full political franchise. These Aratos at once raised to the rank of citizens. He thus formed a strong additional party, attached by every tie of interest and gratitude to himself and to the Union. From a Mantineian commonwealth thus reconstituted it was not difficult to obtain a petition to the Federal Government²

CHAP. VII.
Mantineia
readmitted
to the
League,

with some
changes in
its con-
stitution,

(ii. 57, 58) and Plutarch (Kl. 5. Ar. 36). Here too the colouring is different, but there is no actual contradiction. Plutarch does not enlarge on the free pardon given to the revolted city, on which Polybios is so emphatic; neither does Polybios mention the changes in the Mantineian constitution which Plutarch distinctly records.

¹ Plut. Ar. 36. *Τοῖς μετοίκους πολίτας ἐποίησεν αὐτῶν*. What *μέτοικος* means at Athens everybody knows. Everything at Athens fostered the growth of a large class of resident foreigners, whose children, though born in Attica, were, according to Greek notions, no more citizens than their fathers. Thus there arose at Athens, mainly in the city itself and its ports, a large class, personally free, but enjoying no political rights. But can we conceive the growth of any large class of *μέτοικοι* in this sense in an inland city like Mantinea? One is tempted to think that Plutarch here uses the word *μέτοικος* loosely, in much the same sense as *περίοικος*. He seems to do the same in a following chapter (38), where he speaks of Kleomenês as *πολλοὺς τῶν μετοίκων ἐμβαλὼν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν*. Now any large class of *μέτοικοι* in the Attic sense is still less likely to have existed at Sparta than at Mantinea. And in the parallel passage in the Life of Kleomenês (c. 11) Plutarch himself says, *ἀναπληρώσας τὸ πολίτευμα τοῖς χαριστάτοις τῶν περιόικων*. I am therefore inclined to think that these Mantineian *μέτοικοι* were really *περίοικοι*, inhabitants of districts subject to Mantinea, like those subject to Megalopolis and other cities spoken of already. See above, p. 256.

² Pol. ii. 57. *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προσφόμενοι τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς στάσεις καὶ τὰς ὑπ' Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβουλὰς, πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἤξιωσαν δοῦναι παραφυλακὴν αὐτοῖς*. This seems to imply a petition to the Achaian Assembly (such is the general meaning of *οἱ Ἀχαιοί*) or at any rate to the Senate, and some little time must have elapsed between the taking of the city and the sending and answering of such a message. Plutarch (Ar. 36) says that Aratos *φρουρὰν ἐνέβαλε* (so in Kl. 5, *εἰλε τὴν πόλιν καὶ κατέσχε*) before he goes on to mention anything else. Probably

CHAP. VII. asking for a permanent Federal garrison.¹ Polybios extols, and it was natural that he should extol, the wonderful magnanimity of the Achaians and their General towards the revolted city. Undoubtedly it stands out in honourable contrast to the cruel treatment of revolted dependencies at the hands of Athens. But he does not clearly bring forward the fact that this magnanimity was mainly exercised on behalf of the Achaian party in Mantinea itself. Indiscriminate massacres or banishments in a city where there was one class already favourable to the League, and another which could easily be attached to it, would have been no less impolitic than cruel. It was enough to change the constitution in a way at once liberal in itself and favourable to Achaian interests, and to secure the domination of the Achaian party by the presence of a Federal garrison.

Results of the recovery of Mantinea. The loss of Mantinea was a heavy blow to the Spartan interests, at least as Spartan interests were understood by Kleomenês. Now that Mantinea was again Achaian, Orchomenos was left quite isolated, and the hold on Arkadia which had been gained by the possession of the three contiguous districts was utterly lost. There was a party in Sparta, of whom the Ephors were at the head, who opposed the war, and who doubtless looked with

Temporary depression at Sparta.

Aratos left some troops at once, as a mere military precaution, and this more solemn embassy came somewhat later.

For Mantinea, now once more a city of the League, to send Ambassadors (*πρεσβευταες*) to the League, as if to a foreign state, has an odd sound, but we shall find the expression again. Why, it may be asked, could not the business be despatched by those Mantineian citizens who might attend the Assembly? Probably, when a city of the League wished to obtain some special object at the hands of the National Government, it was thought that more weight would attach to the demand, if it were made by citizens specially deputed by the State Government, than if it were brought forward as an ordinary motion by those citizens who might be present in their Federal capacity.

¹ On the Achaian Federal garrisons, see above, p. 310.

special jealousy upon the young conqueror of Lykaion. CHAP. VII.
 The loss of Mantinea depressed the national spirit; and it required the use of every sort of influence¹ on the part of Kleomenēs to obtain leave from the Ephors to continue the war. But it was continued.² Kleomenēs now directly attacked Megalopolis; he took the border town of Leuktra, and threatened the Great City itself. Aratos could not refuse help, and the whole force of the League marched to its defence. Close under the walls of Megalopolis, at a place called Ladokeia, the armies again met face to face. Aratos again shrank from battle. Lydiadas and his countrymen demanded it; they at least would not tamely see their lands ravaged, their city, it might be, taken, because an incompetent commander had been preferred to their own gallant and true-hearted hero. And doubtless the men of Megalopolis did not stand alone; in the wide compass of the League other cities must have sent forth warriors as little disposed as Lydiadas himself to turn themselves back in the day of battle. The fight began; the Lacedæmonians were driven to their camp by the light Achaian troops; the heavy-armed were marching to support their brethren, now broken in the pursuit, and perhaps engaged in plunder.³ But when they reached a trench,

Battle of
LADO-
KEIA,
B.C. 226.

¹ He is said to have bribed the Ephors; his mother Kratēsikleia married the powerful Megistonous in order to secure his influence on her son's side. Here also comes in the story of Archidamos, the King of the other house, murdered, some said by Kleomenēs, some said by the Ephors. I will not enter at large into the question, but I see nothing to inculcate Kleomenēs. I must again, on matters not immediately bearing on Federal History, refer generally to the History of Bishop Thirlwall. See also Droysen, ii. 484, 5.

² Droysen (ii. 483) infers, though doubtfully, that a truce was concluded with the League. But this rests only on the expression of Pausanias (viii. 27. 15), *Κλεομένης ὁ Λαωνίδου Μεγαλόπολιν κατέλαβεν ἐν σπονδαῖς*. But Pausanias deals with the history of Kleomenēs much as he deals with the history of Agis. The battle of Ladokeia and the death of Lydiadas in B.C. 226 are jumbled up with the capture of Megalopolis by Kleomenēs in B.C. 222.

³ Plut. Ar. 37. *Περὶ τὰς σκηνὰς διασπαρέντων*.

CHAP. VII. the heart of Aratos failed him, and he made them halt on the brink. This was too much for the gallant soul of Lydiadas; to be called on, at the bidding of a successful rival, to throw away a victory at the very gates of his native city, was a sacrifice to strict military discipline which it was hardly in human nature to offer.¹ He denounced the cowardice of the General; he called on all around him not to lose a victory which was already in their hands; he at least would not desert his country; let those who would not see Lydiadas die fighting alone against the enemy follow him to a certain triumph.² At the head of his cavalry³ he dashed on, but at the head of his cavalry alone; the Lacedæmonian right wing gave way before them; the ardour of pursuit carried them upon ground unsuited for the action of horse; the fugitives turned; they were reinforced by other divisions of their army,⁴ and by the King in person; and, after a sharp struggle, Lydiadas fell fighting within sight of the walls of Megalopolis.⁵ The rout of the cavalry followed the loss of their chief, and the rout of the cavalry carried with it the rout of the heavy-armed, who seem to have stood all the

Death of
LYDIADAS.

¹ Schorn (p. 110) seems to expect it of him. Helwing (p. 131), the worshipper of Aratos, gets quite indignant that any one should doubt his hero's valour. "Lysides aber, der beständige Gegner des Arat, beschuldigte den Feldherrn, der bei Sikyon, Korinth, und Argos genugsam persönliche Tapferkeit bewiesen hatte, offen der Feigheit," &c. In the next page Lydiadas is "der unvorsichtige Lysides," "der unbesonnene Befehlshaber," &c. It is hard for a brave and good man to be maligned after so many ages.

² Plut. Ar. 37. 'Ο δὲ Λυσιάδης περιπαθὼν πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὸν Ἀρατον κακίζων ἀνεκαλεῖτο τοὺς ἰππεῖς.

³ Was Lydiadas ἡνέδρχης of the League, or only commander of a Megalopolitan contingent?

⁴ Plut. Kl. 6. 'Ο Κλεομένης ἀνῆκε τοὺς Ταραντίνους καὶ τοὺς Κρήτας ἐν αὐτόν. That is, not natives of Tarentum, nor necessarily natives of Crete, but descriptions of troops so called, like modern Hussars and Zouaves. See Thirlwall, viii. 298.

⁵ Plut. Ar. 37. Ἔπεσε λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος τὸν κάλλιστον τῶν ἀγόνων ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς πατρίδος.

while on the other side of the trench, without striking a blow or advancing a step. The victory on the side of Kleomenês was complete; the Achaians fled in every quarter; and their army finally marched away, bitterly accusing the cowardice of Aratos, and openly charging him with the wilful betrayal of his valiant rival.¹ The charge was doubtless groundless; Aratos acted at Ladokeia only as he acted in all his battles; the trench and the enemy together were obstacles too fearful to be encountered, and personal courage and common sense alike deserted him. Lydiadas was left to perish by an act of combined cowardice and folly, but there is no reason to believe that, while he was fighting in the forefront of the hottest battle, the Achaian phalanx was bidden to retire from him that he might be smitten and die. But the noblest spirit of the League was gone; the best life of the nation was sacrificed to the incompetence of its chief; Lydiadas had fallen, and it was left for an enemy to honour him. The hero of Sparta could recognize a worthy foe in the hero of Megalopolis; and the body of Lydiadas, clothed in purple and with a garland of victory on his brow, was sent by Kleomenês to the gates of the Great City.² The robe of royalty which he had thrown away in life might fittingly adorn his corpse, now that he had gone to the Island of the Blessed to dwell with Achilleus and Diomêdês and all the Zeus-born Kings of old.

CHAP. VII.
Utter defeat of the Achaians.

Indignation against Aratos.

Assembly at Aigion.

Almost immediately after the defeat of Ladokeia an Assembly was held at Aigion. The account of it in our only narrative reads as if the army had itself formed this Assembly, or had compelled the General to summon it

¹ Plut. Ar. 37. Αἰτίαν δὲ μεγάλην ὁ Ἄρατος ἔλαβε δόξας προέσθαι τὸν Λυσιμάχην.

² Plut. Kl. 6.

CHAP. VII. against his will.¹ Never had the Achaian people come together with such feelings of indignation against their Chief Magistrate. Bitter indeed must have been their regret when they remembered the results of their last election. Aratos had been preferred to Lydiadas; and now the choice of Aratos had led to two disgraceful defeats, and Lydiadas was gone, some said betrayed to death by his rival, at any rate sacrificed to his rival's cowardice and incompetence. The indignation of the Assembly spent itself in a strange vote, which, while it shows their intense present dissatisfaction with their General, shows also the marvellous sort of fascination which he had acquired over the national mind. The Assembly passed a resolution that, if Aratos thought good to go on with the war, he must do it at his own cost; the Achaian nation would give no more contributions and would pay no more mercenaries.² This vote is not to be looked upon as a mere sarcasm. Aratos had carried on so many wars at his own cost and risk that for him to carry on a private war with Sparta seemed a thing by no means impossible. It would only be doing on a great scale what they had over and over again seen him do on a smaller one. They would not take upon themselves to run directly counter to his judgement on a matter of war and peace; he might, if he chose, go on with the war in his own style; he might win over Orchomenos or Tegea or Sparta herself either by diplomatic wiles or by nocturnal surprises; his own wealth and the contributions of King Ptolemy might possibly supply him with the means; if they did, the Federal Assembly would not stand in his way; but it should be his war and not that of the

Strange
vote of
censure on
Aratos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 37. Βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπερχομένων πρὸς ὄργην ἠκολούθησεν αὐτοῖς εἰς Λίγιον.

² Ib. Ἐκεῖ δὲ συνελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ διδόναι χρήματα αὐτῷ μηδὲ μισθοφόρους τρέφειν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ πορίζειν, εἰ θέοιτο πολεμεῖν.

Achaian people ; they would neither serve themselves, nor yet pay mercenaries, merely that Kleomenês might set up trophies against Aratos. Some such line of thought as this would seem to be the most natural explanation of a resolution, which at first sight seems the very strangest ever passed by a sovereign Assembly.

Aratos was naturally bitterly mortified at this vote of the Assembly. His first impulse was to resign his office—to lay down his seal¹—and to leave those who censured him to take the management of affairs into their own hands. But on second thoughts he determined to bear up against the popular indignation. The very terms of the resolution showed his extraordinary influence over the nation, and that influence was, before long, busily at work again. Deference to Aratos was too old a habit for the League to throw off, and the national indignation had no doubt in a great measure spent itself in the mere passing of the vote of censure.² Before long that vote was either formally or practically rescinded, and Aratos again, in the year of Lykaion and Ladokeia, found himself at the head of an Achaian army. Orchomenos was now, after the recovery of Mantinea, the natural object of attack ;³ Aratos did not take the town, but he gained some advantages over the Spartan troops in its territory. By the end of the official year, he seems to have been as powerful as ever. When the time of the elections came round, the office of General fell, not to Aristomachos—he might possibly have taken an independent course—but to a certain Hyperbatas, who is described as a mere instrument of Aratos,⁴ and who was doubtless chosen at his nomination.

Aratos
contem-
plates
resigna-
tion.

He reco-
vers his
influence.

General
ship of
Hyper-
batas,
B.C. 225-4.

¹ Plut. Ar. 38. Ἀποθέσθαι τὴν σφραγίδα. See above, p. 299.

² Compare the remarks of Grote, vi. 337.

³ But why did not Kleomenês attack Megalopolis immediately after Ladokeia?

⁴ Plut. Kl. 14. Ἐστρατήγει μὲν γὰρ Ὑπερβατῆς τότε, τοῦ δ' Ἀράτου τὸ πᾶν ἦν κρᾶτος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς.

CHAP. VII.

Kleo-
menês' Re-
volution
at Sparta,
B.C. 225.

His suc-
cesses in
Arkadia.

Mantineia
revolts
to Kleo-
menês.

The year of Hyperbatas is also the year of Kleomenês' revolution at Sparta. Its details belong to Spartan history; for our subject it is important mainly on account of the increased strength which it gave to the Spartan King in his war with the League. Up to this moment he had had to manage how he best could a body of Magistrates who disliked the war, and who were specially jealous of himself. When the one blow had been struck, Sparta and her King could put forth their full strength. The revolution itself came as a sort of episode in the war. Kleomenês was marching to and fro through Arkadia, he took Hêraia on the confines of Elis and Alea on the confines of Phlious; ¹ he introduced supplies into Orchomenos; he pitched his camp near Mantinea; thence, with a chosen band, he hastened to Sparta, slew the Ephors, justified himself to the people, enfranchised a multitude of new citizens, divided the lands, and marched back into Arkadia, the chief of a regenerated Lacedæmonian people, to plunder at will the lands of Megalopolis and to receive the voluntary surrender of Mantinea. The Lacedæmonian party in that city had now recovered its superiority; the Achaian garrison was massacred or expelled; ² Kleomenês was introduced by night, and, in the language of the party now dominant, the ancient laws and constitution of Mantinea were restored. ³ That is, the city became again attached to Sparta instead of to the League, and the citizens enfranchised by Aratos probably lost their newly acquired rights. Unchecked at home and successful abroad, Kleomenês now ventured to carry the seat of war into the enemy's own hearth and home. Passing through the whole breadth of Arkadia, he entered the old Achaia, and

¹ Plut. Kl. 7.

² Massacred according to Polybios (that is Aratos), ii. 58; expelled, according to Plutarch (that is Phylarchos), Kl. 14.

³ Plut. Kl. 14. *Τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδοῦς.*

at a place called Hekatombaion, in the canton of Dymê; in the very north-west corner of Peloponnêsos, he met the Achaian army, under the nominal command of Hyperbatas, but under the dominant guidance of Aratos. A total defeat, yet more overwhelming than all that had gone before,¹ was the result of this first meeting of Achaians and Spartans upon Old-Achaian ground.

CHAP. VII.

Third
victory
of Kleo-
menês at
Hekatom-
baion,
B.C. 224.

Aratos now utterly lost heart.² For years he had been the chief of the League, the first man of Peloponnêsos and of all independent Greece. He had done and suffered more in the cause of Grecian freedom than any man of his own age, almost more than any man of any other age. There was no longer a Tyrant or a foreign garrison from Thermopylæ to Tainaron. The worst faults that could be laid to his charge were a certain unscrupulousness as to means while pursuing the most glorious of ends, and an unwillingness, after a long career of undivided power, to share his commanding position with another. This he had shown alike in his domestic rivalry with Lydiadas and in his foreign rivalry with Kleomenês. He had led the League into a war with Sparta, in which the Achaian arms had been utterly unsuccessful. It was now clear that, whatever might be the result of the struggle, Sparta would never stoop to become a single city of the League, and that Kleomenês would never willingly be anything but, what he now was, the first man of Peloponnêsos. For the

Position
of Aratos.

¹ Polybios (ii. 51) clearly distinguishes the three defeats of Lykaion, Ladokeia, and Hekatombaion as three stages in a climax. Οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡλαττώθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον συμπλακέντες κατὰ πορείαν τῷ Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐκ παρατάξεως ἤττηθησαν ἐν ταῖς Λαδοκείοις καλουμένοις τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, ὅτε καὶ Λυδιάδας ἔπεσεν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὁλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν ἐν τῇ Δυμαίᾳ περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἐκατόμβαιον πανδήμει διακινδυνεύοντες.

² The state of things at this time is set forth by Droysen (ii. 496 et seqq.) with his usual power and eloquence. But he is, as usual, unduly hard both upon the League and upon Aratos personally.

CHAP. VII. League to continue the war by its own unassisted force was utterly hopeless; another such campaign as those of the last three years would throw all Peloponnêsos at the feet of the conqueror. And Kleomenês was not only winning battles, he was also everywhere winning hearts. We may feel sure that Aratos, besides his national and personal rivalry, honestly condemned the proceedings of the Spartan chief. In his eyes he was a bloody and usurping revolutionist; he had changed himself from a lawful King into a Tyrant;¹ he had ventured on the final stroke of revolution, the general re-distribution of lands. To a politician like Aratos, whose feelings were essentially conservative and aristocratic, nothing could seem more to be abhorred or more to be dreaded. The general opinion of Greece was evidently quite otherwise. Kleomenês appeared as something different from domestic Tyrants, from Macedonian conquerors, or even from veteran diplomatists like Aratos himself. The hero-King, the model of every soldier-like virtue,² was something more attractive than any of them. Instead of founding a Tyranny, he had put one down;³ he had restored both himself and his people to their ancient rights; his very division of lands was not a revolutionary interference with private property, it was the restitution of a lawful state of things which only modern corruptions had done away with.⁴ There was in every

Popularity
of Kleo-
menês.

¹ Pol. ii. 47. Τοῦ Κλεομένους τό τε πάτριον πολίτευμα καταλέσσαντος, καί τὴν ἔννομον βασιλείαν εἰς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένου δὲ καὶ τῇ πολέμῳ πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλῳ. Paus. ii. 9. 1. Κλεομένης . . . Παισάνην ἐμίμειτο τυραννίδος τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ νόμοις τοῖς καθεστηκόσιν οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. A string of the usual charges follow. The introduction of Pausanias at least is singularly unlucky. The Achaian view of Kleomenês reminds one of the Papal view of Manfred or the Norman view of Harold.

² See the description of his camp, Plut. Kl. 12, 13.

³ See his speech to the Lacedæmonian people, Plut. Kl. 10.

⁴ Whether an equal division of lands had ever really existed at Sparta is another matter; the point is that men believed that it had existed, and

city a party which only wished that Kleomenēs would come and divide the land there too as well as at Sparta. Even the leading men, those who filled the Senate and the subordinate magistracies, and who had the predominant influence in the Assembly, were getting sick of the long continued rule of a single man, a rule which had of late led only to such unparalleled national dishonour.¹ Men were weary of Aratos, weary of the war; if the war went on much longer with Aratos at its head, the League was clearly doomed. Each city would make what terms it could with the conqueror, rather than go on submitting to defeat after defeat, in the cause of the League, or, more truly, in the cause of its General. The cry for peace on any reasonable terms became universal throughout the Achaian cities.

CHAP. VII.
General dissatisfaction with Aratos.

Kleomenēs, on the other hand, was nowise disposed to push the League to extremities. That he had joyfully entered upon the war there can be no doubt; but he could say with perfect truth that he had been forced to enter upon it by the attempts of Aratos upon Tegea and Orchomenos. The war on his part had been a series of victories. He had won three pitched battles; he had taken several fortresses and smaller towns; and, if he had lost one great city, he had recovered it with its own good will. He was in a position to dictate what terms he chose, but neither inclination nor policy prompted him to dictate

Position of Kleomenēs.

that Agis and Kleomenēs professed to be only restoring the ancient and lawful state of things. See Grote, ii. 521-7. cf. 465. Kortüm (iii. 186 et al.), through forgetfulness of this distinction, misrepresents the position of Kleomenēs and his party, as if they were at all like modern Socialists.

¹ Plut. Kl. 17. *Ἐγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα μὲν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ἄρμησαν αἱ πόλεις, τῶν μὲν δῆμων νομὴν τε χώρας καὶ χρῆων ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπιδάντων, τῶν δὲ πρώτων πολλαχοῦ βαρυνομένων τὸν Ἀρατόν.* This description indeed belongs to a later time, when the tendency to secession had become much stronger, but the causes of discontent here mentioned must have already been busily at work.

CHAP. VII. severe terms. The main object of both sides was, in a certain sense, the same. Both Aratos and Kleomenês wished to unite all Greece, at any rate all Peloponnêsos, into one free Greek Commonwealth. That they differed irreconcilably as to the form which such a Commonwealth should take was only the natural result of their several positions. Aratos, a republican leader, sought to bring about the union through the forms of a republican Confederation, and, had not Sparta been so incomparably greater than any other Peloponnesian city, he would probably have succeeded in so doing. Kleomenês, a hereditary King of Sparta, started with the greatness of Sparta and her King as his first principle; he would unite Peloponnêsos by joining the Achaian League, but he would join it only with Sparta for its recognized chief city, and with the Spartan King for its recognized constitutional head.¹ That he wished to establish a Kingdom of Greece,² in the sense that there was a Kingdom of Macedonia, and had been a Kingdom of Epeiros, seems in no wise probable. It is far more likely that he wished to fall back upon the state of things which had existed in the days of Sparta's truest greatness, before the Peloponnesian War. In that state of things the Harmost, the garrison, and the Dekarchy were unknown; Sparta was the constitutional president of a body of free allies. Those allies were perfectly independent in their separate governments; they did not surrender the right of separate war and peace with states not belonging to the Confederacy; each state had a voice, and an equal voice,³ in deciding the policy of the Confederacy itself. But Sparta was still a recognized and effective head; the Spartan people deliberated apart,

Schemes
of Kleo-
menês.

Probable
nature
of the
supremacy
claimed
by him.

¹ Plut. Kl. 15. Ἐκέλευεν αὐτῷ παραδίδόναι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν.

² As Schorn (p. 115) seems to think, but there is much force and truth in his general description of the position of Kleomenês.

³ See Thuc. i. 125. No 141, πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες.

like a Senate, before the opinions of the other allies were asked;¹ the Spartan King was the hereditary General-in-chief of the forces of the whole alliance. This was probably the sort of supremacy which Kleomenês demanded for himself and his city. Such a supremacy would of course be utterly fatal to the most cherished principles of the Achaian constitution. The essential equality of the cities would be destroyed; the chief of one city, and that chief a hereditary King, would possess the powers which had hitherto belonged to a magistrate yearly chosen by the votes of all. For it is evident that, were such a supremacy once recognized in Sparta, if the League continued to elect a Federal General at all, he would be for the future a mere Vicegerent of the Lacedæmonian King. The demands of Kleomenês were such as the Achaians could not be expected to agree to till they had undergone so severe a discipline at his hands; but they were demands which could not but be looked upon as mild and generous when proceeding from one by whom such a discipline had been inflicted. The demands of Kleomenês did not require that the League should be dissolved, or that any of its members should become Lacedæmonian subjects; he did not claim to increase the Spartan territory, or to enrich the Spartan treasury, at its expense; he was ready to restore conquests which he might have annexed to his own dominions, and to release captives whom he might have sold towards defraying the expenses of the war.² The League was to exist, it was apparently to retain its name and position as an Achaian League; but he, Kleomenês King of the Lacedæmonians, was to become its chief. We must remember that Kleomenês, as a Hêracleid, was himself of old Achaian blood,³ and that he had largely enfranchised the subject

CHAP. VII.
Incon-
sistent
with the
Achaian
Consti-
tution,

but mode-
rate under
the circum-
stances.

¹ See Thuc. i. 79, 87, 119. Cf. Grote, vi. 105.

² Plut. Kl. 15. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εὐθὺς ἀποδόσων καὶ τὰ χωρία.

³ Ὁ γύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ Δωριεὺς εἰμι ἀλλ' Ἀχαιὺς, says the earlier Kleomenês

CHAP. VII. population of Lakonia, doubtless, in some measure at least, of Achaian blood also.¹ The Achaian name was consecrated by all the old associations of the Homeric poems; Kleomenês might dream that he was setting up again the throne of Tyndareôs or of Agamemnôn, and that he was about to reign, as an Achaian King, over the Achaian cities of Sparta and Argos and Mykênê. He proposed a scheme less noble and generous, it may be, than the pure republicanism of Aratos in his best days, but a scheme as noble and generous as a conquering King ever proposed to conquered enemies; a scheme which was at least better for Peloponnêsos than to become a dependency of Macedon, or to be again parcelled out among local Tyrants.

Aratos
begins to
look to
Mace-
donia.

Aratos looked on things with different eyes. We have now reached the time when the deliverer of Greece was so strangely transformed into her betrayer. Rather than submit to the slightest supremacy on the part of Kleomenês, he would call in Antigonos to protect the League against him. He would undo his own work; he would again bring Macedonian armies into Peloponnêsos; he would even endure to see a Macedonian garrison holding that very Akrokorinthos which he himself had freed. We have no reason to believe that he desired any such thing for its own sake, still less that he was actuated by any personal motives meaner than the jealousy which blinded

to the Athenian Priestess (Herod. v. 72). If Mr. Blakesley be at all right in his explanation of the designs of that Kleomenês in Herod. vi. 74, they were not so very different from those which I attribute to the great Kleomenês. But Mr. Grote (v. 59) takes a view which is easier and simpler, and at least I do not understand Mr. Blakesley's chronology, when he talks of "The Achæan League of nearly 400 years later"—than B.C. 509. Professor Rawlinson, as usual when the civilized world is concerned, gives no help.

¹ This of course partly depends on the view taken of the origin of the Lakonian Perioikoi. Mr. Grote (ii. 491) holds them to have been Dorian, contrary to the general opinion.

his eyes. He would rather have resisted with the un-aided force of the League; he would rather have called in the help of the sister League of Ætolia;¹ but rather than yield to Kleomenês, he would submit to become dependent upon Antigonos. Nor was it hard to call up plausible sophisms by which the worse cause might be made to appear the better. Plutarch, at his distance of time, saw the matter exactly as we do;² but it is clear that Polybios did not so see it;³ still less would it appear in the same light in the eyes of Aratos himself. The fear of Ætolia, on which Polybios enlarges, was doubtless put forth by Aratos both in his speeches and in his Memoirs; but it was a fear which the state of things did not justify.⁴ There is not the least sign of any understanding between Kleomenês and the Ætolians; what was most desirable in Ætolian eyes was doubtless to see Sparta and Achaia weaken one another. The real question was, If the League was to become dependent on some one, should it become dependent on Kleomenês or on Antigonos? To Plutarch, to a modern writer, both removed from the petty passions of the time, there seems no room for any doubt. If you must have a President, or even a King, take the Greek, the Spartan, the Hêrakleid, the gallant soldier, the generous conqueror. To Aratos the case may not have been so clear. To humble himself and the League before Kleomenês was a far deeper personal and national humiliation than to do the like to Antigonos. Kleomenês was a neighbour, a rival, a border enemy; Antigonos was a great King at a distance, submission to whom would be far less galling. And Kleomenês really demanded submission; he asked for a place in the League itself which

Difference
between
his view
and that of
Plutarch
or of
modern
writers.

¹ Plut. Ar. 41. See above, p. 438.

² He sets forth the case strongly and eloquently; Ar. 38. Kl. 16.

³ Pol. ii. 47 et al.

⁴ See Thirlwall, viii. 187.

CHAP. VII. would utterly destroy its constitution. Antigonos as yet demanded nothing ; Aratos might still flatter himself that the Macedonian King would step in as an equal ally, a friendly power external to the League, one with whom all matters of common interest would have to be debated, but whose alliance need in no wise interfere with the constitutional functions of the General, the Senate, or the Assembly. Kleomenês was the enemy of the moment ; his was the power which was actually threatening ; Antigonos came indeed of a hostile line, but he had never been personally an enemy ; national feuds need not last for ever ; the loss of Akrokorinthos might by this time be forgiven and forgotten. It was not more unpatriotic in Achaia to call in her ancient enemy against her ancient friend than it was in Sparta and Athens, after fighting side by side at Salamis and at Plataia, to call in the Mede as an ally or a paymaster against their old comrades. When the Captain-General of Greece marched forth against Persia, the vows of every patriotic Greek were on the side of the Barbarian. And, if Aratos had been gifted with prophetic vision, he might have gone on to behold the League of Switzerland in alliance with Austria and the Seven United Provinces in alliance with Spain. Why then should an alliance with Macedonia be so specially disgraceful to the League of Achaia ? And Kleomenês was a Tyrant, a revolutionist, the subverter of the laws of his own country, the apostle of every kind of mischief elsewhere. Antigonos was a King ; the legitimacy of his title might be doubtful, but he was a King and not a Tyrant ; he had upset no Senate, he had murdered no Ephors, he had divided no lands among a revolutionary populace ; he was a steady, respectable, conservative Monarch, who might not object to act in concert with a steady, respectable, conservative Republic. Anyhow he was much better to be trusted than the young firebrand at

Sparta, to calculate on whose eccentric doings baffled even the experienced diplomacy of Aratos himself. Such may well have been the process of self-delusion by which the deliverer of Corinth and Athens persuaded himself that to call in the Macedonian was no treason against Greece. As for Akrokorinthos, doubtless Aratos at first contemplated no such sacrifice; it was only after a terrible struggle, when it was at last clear that none but Macedonian aid was to be had, and that Macedonian aid was not to be had on any milder terms, that even Aratos, much more than the Achaian People, finally agreed to pay so fearful a price.

§ 4. *From the Opening of Negotiations with Macedonia to the End of the War with Kleomenés.*

B.C. 224–221.

In the spring then of the year 224 before Christ, Kleomenés stood completely victorious over the armies of the League. He was willing to conclude peace on what, as proceeding from a conquering enemy, could only be called most favourable terms. But Aratos, rather than admit the slightest supremacy in the Spartan, had made up his mind to seek for help from the Macedonian. From this time, two sets of negotiations are going on side by side, one between the League and Kleomenés, the other between Aratos and Antigonos. The successive steps in each are clearly marked by our authorities,¹ but the chronological parallelism of the two is less easy to follow. The first proposals of peace

Twofold negotiations with Sparta and Macedonia, B.C. 224.

¹ Plutarch—that is, mainly Phylarchos, but Phylarchos compared with the Memoirs of Aratos—gives us the internal history of the League and the negotiations with Kleomenés. On these last Polybios is quite silent, but, as a native of Megalopolis, he describes at full length the intrigues of Aratos with Antigonos, in which his own city was so deeply concerned, and the facts of which are almost lost amid Plutarch's declamation, eloquent and righteous as it is.

CHAP. VII. seem to have come from Kleomenês. The Spring Meeting of the year apparently followed not very long after the rout of Hekatombaion. It is not certain whether Spartan ambassadors were then actually introduced to the Assembly, but it is probable that negotiations had already begun. Possibly they were not yet in a state advanced enough to allow of a formal vote being taken. Certain it is that the final decision was adjourned to a Special Meeting to be held at or near Argos.¹ But it is clear that public opinion declared itself strongly in favour of peace with Sparta,² and that the conduct of Aratos was discussed with considerable freedom.³ Still long habit, or the peculiar way in which the votes were taken, caused the usual custom to be followed, and Aratos was elected General for the following year. For the first time in his life, as far as we know, he declined the office, and the choice of the Assembly then fell on a partisan of his⁴ named Timoxenos. Perhaps he really shrank from the personal responsibility of office at such a moment, a cowardly failure in duty for which he is indignantly rebuked by his biographer.⁵ Or perhaps he merely hoped to carry on his intrigues with the more ease when unfettered by the trammels of office. Certain it is that, while public negotiations were going on between Kleomenês and the League, a counter-negotiation was going on between Antigonos and one of its cities, and that with a sort of licence from the National Congress itself. This was a

Beginning of negotiations with Kleomenês.

Aratos declines the Generalship.

First Generalship of Timoxenos, B.C. 224-223.

¹ *Eis 'Argos*. Plut. Ar. 39. *eis Λέρναν*. Kl. 15. Is not this last a confusion arising from the fact (Ar. 39) that Kleomenês, when on his way to Argos, got no farther than Lerna? Lerna was not a city, and it seems a strange place for a congress.

² Kl. 15. *Βουλομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς δέχεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις*.

³ Ar. 38. *Ἡ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ὀχλοὺς ὀργή, κ.τ.λ.*

⁴ See Pol. iv. 82. Cf. above, p. 304.

⁵ Plut. Kl. 15. *Ὁ δὲ καλῶς οἶον ἐν χειμῶνι πραγμάτων μείζονι μεθεῖς ἑτέρῳ τὸν οἶακα καὶ προέμενος τὴν ἐξουσίαν*. Cf. Ar. 38.

very singular transaction, which illustrates several points CHAP. VII.
both in the constitution of the League and in the general
politics of Peloponnêsos.

I have said in a former Chapter ¹ that the general Law of the League forbade all diplomatic intercourse between foreign powers and any particular city of the Union. Foreign Ambassadors were to be received, and Achaian Ambassadors were to be commissioned, by no authority short of that of the League itself. I mentioned also that instances were occasionally met with both of the law being dispensed with and of the law being broken. Here we have a case of dispensation.² Aratos did not venture to propose with his own mouth to the Assembly that the King of Macedonia should be invited into Peloponnêsos; he artfully contrived to throw the responsibility of taking the first step upon a city, which, of all the cities of the League, might seem the least likely to be under any irregular influence on his part. Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, would seem to speak with more independence than any other; and, as the city more immediately threatened by Sparta, it had more claim than any other to be heard.³ With the help of two hereditary friends in Megalopolis, Nikophanês and Kerkidas, Aratos planned his whole scheme. These men appeared in the Megalopolitan Assembly, and there moved and carried a resolution for their own appointment with a special commission to the Federal Assembly. They were to ask leave, in the name of the State of Megalopolis, to go into

Begin-
ning of
negocia-
tions with
Antigonos.

Dealings
of Aratos
with Mega-
lopolis.

Commis-
sioners
sent from

¹ See above, p. 261, 2.

² "Allerdings war mit solchen besonderen Verhandlungen einer einzelnen Gemeinde das Wesen der Eidgenossenschaft und ihrer Verfassung gefährdet." Droysen, ii. 501. This is true, but hardly the whole truth. An American commentator would here be more valuable than a German.

³ Plut. Ar. 38. Ὅδοι γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα, συνεχῶς ἄγοντες αὐτοὺς καὶ φέροντες τοῦ Κλεομένου. So Pol. ii. 48.

CHAP. VII. Macedonia and to ask Antigonos for help.¹ A more cunningly devised scheme could not have been hit upon. Megalopolis was more closely connected with Macedonia than any other Peloponnesian city; there had been no slight interchange of good offices between the two states,² and Megalopolis had actually stood two sieges in the Macedonian interest.³ Had Megalopolis been a wholly independent commonwealth, it would have been nowise monstrous, as seen from a local Megalopolitan point of view, to ask for Macedonian help against a Spartan enemy. Consequently the motion in the Federal Assembly, unexpected as it doubtless was, would not strike the hearers as something so utterly strange and unnatural as if it had proceeded from Corinth or Megara, or from Aratos himself. The Megalopolitan commissioners probably appeared at the Meeting at which Timoxenos was appointed General, that is, the Spring Meeting of the year 224.⁴ They obtained the permission for which they asked, permission namely

¹ Pol. ii. 48. ῥαδίως διὰ τούτων ὁρμὴν παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλεῖν πέμπειν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον ὑπὲρ βοηθείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλοπολῖται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκιδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρὸς τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ὃν αὐτοῖς συγκατάθεται τὸ ἔθνος. The same account, according to Plutarch (Ar. 38), was given by Phylarchos. On these special commissioners from particular cities to the Federal Assembly, see above, p. 448.

² Pol. u.s. Σαφῶς γινώσκων οἰκέως διακειμένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον εὐεργεσιῶν.

³ One against Agis, B.C. 330; another against Polysperchôn, B.C. 318. See above, p. 206.

⁴ I do not feel at all certain as to the exact date. It should be remembered that we have no *annals* of these transactions. Polybios gives, almost incidentally, the account of the Macedonian negotiations; Plutarch gives the account of the Spartan negotiations. Each narrative is clear enough in itself, but it is hard to arrange the two series side by side, and to fit each stage into its exact place. Some of the expressions of Polybios (ii. 51) might make one think that this whole negotiation took place before the battle of Hekatombaion, but the passage, if construed strictly, might imply that it took place not only before Hekatombaion, but also before Lykaion, which it is impossible to believe.

to go into Macedonia, not as Federal, but as Megalopolitan, envoys. One would be well pleased to have some record of the debate which must have followed on such a request; but it is easy to understand that it would not meet with the same strenuous opposition which would certainly have befallen a proposal to send a regular Federal Embassy on such an errand. Megalopolis had a fair claim to ask for Macedonian help; if Antigonos chose to bestow on the hereditary friends of his house a body of troops for their protection, or a few talents to hire mercenaries for themselves, the League, as a League, might not seem to be dishonoured or endangered. But Aratos had gained his first point, that of familiarizing the Achaian Assembly with the notion of Macedonian help. He seems now to have withdrawn for a moment from public life; he refused to resume office, alleging that he felt the public indignation against him too strongly to allow him to serve with honour.¹ Such a plea, coming from the deliverer of Sikyon and Corinth, the man who had been twelve times General, would be, of all others, the most likely to touch the hearts of his hearers, and to pave the way for his speedy restoration to his old influence. The avowed negotiation between the League and Kleomenês must have been going on at the time when Nikophanês and Kerkidas, probably carrying with them much less of the public attention, went on their strange errand to Macedonia. They reached the court of Antigonos; they briefly set forth their ostensible commission from their own city; they described its dangers, and asked help from their old ally. They then went on to tell at much greater length the tale put into their mouths by Aratos.² The interests of

CHAP. VII.

They are allowed to go as Megalopolitan envoys to Macedonia.

Their interview with Antigonos.

¹ Plut. Ar. 38. See above, p. 464.

² Pol. ii. 48. Σπουδῇ δὲ συμμιζαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεῖ διελέγοντο μὲν περὶ τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὄλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις.

CHAP. VII. the League and of the House of Macedon were the same; Kleomenês and the Ætolians together threatened Achaia, they threatened all Greece, they indirectly threatened Macedonia. Nothing short of a general supremacy over all Greece would satisfy the ambition of the Spartan, and that supremacy could not be his without a previous triumph over the Macedonian power. Which was the wiser policy for Antigonos? To forestall so dangerous a competitor, to meet him at once, in Peloponnêsos, in a struggle for the supremacy of Greece,¹ with Bœotia and Achaia as Macedonian allies, or to fight in Thessaly for the possession of Macedonia itself, against the combined force of Lacedæmon and Ætolia, swelled, as by that time it would be, by the force of conquered Achaia and Bœotia? The Ætolians² were indeed outwardly neutral, they still professed unbroken friendship for the League; if they kept to these professions, the Achaians would still do their best to maintain the struggle against Kleomenês without foreign help. If Ætolia should interfere, or if all resistance should appear hopeless, then the League would call on the King for help. Aratos would pledge himself that Antigonos should receive every needful security, and he would himself point out the proper moment for action.

All this, it must be remembered, was altogether private and unauthorized dealing between Aratos, now a private citizen, and the Macedonian King. The only public character in which Nikophanês and Kerkidas appeared

¹ Pol. ii. 48. Μετ' Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεομένη πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας. "No arguments could have been devised better suited to the purpose of convincing and persuading the king. It is only surprising that Aratos, while he suggested them, should not have felt that they were so many reasons which ought to have deterred him, as a patriotic Greek, from the prosecution of his attempt." Thirlwall, viii. 188.

² See Droysen's note, ii. 500.

at Macedonia was that of envoys from the single city of Megalopolis. They were not Ambassadors from the League, nor in any way entitled to speak in its name.

Antigonos, strictly respecting constitutional forms, sent back the envoys with a letter to the commonwealth of Megalopolis, promising aid, if the Federal Assembly agreed to it.¹ The Megalopolitan Assembly were delighted at the favourable reception which their royal friend had given to their request. At the next Federal Assembly—or more probably at a Special Meeting called for the purpose²—the royal letter was read, first to the Senate³ and then to the Assembly; Megalopolitan orators urgently pressed the application for Macedonian help, and the inclination of both Senate and People was clearly favourable to them. Whether any formal resolution was passed does not appear.⁴ The League could not decently apply in its own name for Macedonian help while negotiations were going on with Kleomenês; but it is not impossible that the Assembly may have passed a vote authorizing Megalopolis to receive assistance on its own account. At any rate, it was on the reading of this letter that Aratos made his first public appearance in the business. No longer the chief of the League, apparently not even one of its Senators, he stepped forward as a private citizen to address the Assembly. In such a character he

CHAP. VII.

Favourable answer of Antigonos to the envoys from Megalopolis.

The letter from Antigonos read in the Federal Assembly.

¹ Pol. ii. 50. Ἐγράψε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθήσειν, ἰὰν καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλομένοις ᾖ.

² Ib. Μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται προθύμως ἔσχον ἵνα πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Such a state of mind would hardly allow of waiting for the Autumn Meeting, and Timoxenos, who was probably in the secret, would be ready to summon a meeting if Aratos wished it.

³ Ib. The Senate (τὸ κοινὸν βουλευτήριον) and the πλῆθος or πολλοί to whom Aratos speaks, seem here, as Droysen (ii. 503, note) says, to be clearly distinguished. But βουλευτήριον is, as we have seen (see above, p. 306), sometimes used for the place of meeting of the Assembly.

⁴ Pol. u. s. Ἐδοξε μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

CHAP. VII. would be heard, if possible, with even greater favour than when he spoke with the weight of official authority. The reaction on which he had reckoned was now beginning to set in. The whole state of the case had been fully set before him by Nikophanês; everything was going on exactly as he wished; the name of Macedonian help was becoming familiar to the Achaian people, but Aratos had not appeared as its first proposer. He wished to avoid having recourse to it, if possible; but if need—the supposed need of doing anything rather than submit to Kleomenês—drove the League to such a course, it should be the act of the League, not the act of Aratos; it should not even be the act of the League on the motion of Aratos.¹ If Antigonos should come, if he should conquer Kleomenês, if he should alter the Federal Constitution,²—it was more tolerable, it seems, to have it altered by a Macedonian than by a Spartan—no man should say that it was his doing; Megalopolis and the whole League must bear the responsibility of their own acts. Thus fortified, he came forward in the Assembly; he expressed his pleasure to hear of the good will of the King, his satisfaction at the present disposition of the Assembly; but he warned them not to be too hasty; let them make one more struggle to save themselves by their own exertions; it would be much better to do so if they could anyhow manage it; if they failed in the attempt, let them then call in the help of their royal friend. The Assembly applauded the speaker; they agreed to save themselves if they could—if not, to ask King Antigonos to save them.

Speech of
Aratos
in the
Assembly.

¹ Pol. ii. 50. *Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ ἔσπευδε μὴ προσδεθῆναι τῆς βοηθείας· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἐβούλετο δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλήσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.*

² Ib. *Εἰ παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομέ-
ρους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀλλοιούτερόν τι βουλευέσαιο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς
πολιτείας, μὴ ποθ' ὁμολογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν
αἰτίαν.*

To account for this disposition of the Achaian Assembly, CHAP. VII. we must suppose that the favourable intentions of Kleomenês, of which Polybios says not a word, were not as yet generally known. The General Timoxenos, as a partisan of Aratos, would doubtless conceal them as long as he could. But when it was known how mild a supremacy Kleomenês sought for, men began once more to doubt whether Antigonos would not, after all, be more dangerous Negotiations with Kleomenês. as a friend than Kleomenês was as an enemy. A Special Assembly was called to meet at Argos.¹ Public opinion throughout the League was now so strongly in favour of Kleomenês that there could be little doubt that peace Strong feeling in his favour. would be concluded on his own terms, that is, that the Spartan King would be accepted as Chief of the League.² It marks the diplomacy of the time that Kleomenês, like Aristomachos,³ was to plead his own cause before the Achaian Popular Assembly. A sudden illness on the road rendered him incapable of speaking. As a sign of his good will, he released the chief among his Achaian prisoners, and the Meeting was adjourned till he was able to attend. This illness of Kleomenês decided the fate of Greece. Negotiation interrupted by Kleomenês' illness.

It was probably during this interval that Aratos, having found the Macedonian King a less implacable enemy than he had expected, ventured to enter into direct communication with him. He no longer needed the roundabout way of dealing through Nikophanês and Kerkidas. He Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos. sent his own son, the younger Aratos, as ambassador—seemingly his own private ambassador⁴—and arranged all

¹ See above, p. 464.

² Plut. Kl. 15. Βουλομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ τὸν Κλεομένην καλοῦντων ἐς Λέρναν, and (still more strongly) Αἰ. 39, πέμπειν εὐθὺς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ τὸν Κλεομένην καλοῦντες ἐς Ἀργος.

³ See above, p. 426.

⁴ Pol. ii. 51. Πρεσβευτὴν τὸν υἱὸν ἑξαποστείλας Ἀρατος πρὸς Ἀντίγονου ἐβεβαίωσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς βοήθειας.

CHAP. VII. necessary matters with Antigonos.¹ To be sure there was one difficulty ; Antigonos was no more disposed than later potentates to do his work for nothing. The price which he set on that work was one most natural for him to ask, but most unnatural for Aratos to pay, the reunion to Macedonia of Akrokorinthos. No one can blame Antigonos for making the demand. He had not volunteered to meddle in Peloponnesian affairs ; Kleomenês had done him no harm, and the Achaïans had done him no good ; if any sentimental tie bound him to Megalopolis, it did not extend beyond that single city, and indeed it might be held to be cancelled by the union of Megalopolis with the League. It was as much as could be expected if the King of Macedonia merely sat still, and did not attack a people who had destroyed so large a portion of the influence of his house ; at any rate, he could not be expected to serve them for nothing. The terms on which his services were to be had were simply that Aratos should restore to Antigonos Dôsdn the invaluable fortress of which he had deprived Antigonos Gonatas. In all this Antigonos acted in a perfectly straightforward way, worthy of a ruler of the nation who called a spade a spade.² Macedonia did not profess to make war for an idea ; her King made no rhetorical flourishes about liberating Peloponnêsos from the Isthmus to the Cretan Sea. Antigonos, like an honest trader, named his terms ; his price was fixed, no abatement would be taken from the simple demand of Akrokorinthos. But how was Akrokorinthos to be had ? Aratos seems to have been ready even then to make the sacrifice ; but it would be hard to carry through the Achaian Senate and Assembly

Antigonos
demands
Akro-
korinthos.

¹ Plut. Kl. 17. "Ἦδη διωμολογημένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον τῶν μεγίστων.

² Plut. Apophth. Phil. 15. Σκαιοὺς ἔφη [ὁ Φίλιππος] φύσει καὶ ἀγροίκους εἶναι Μακεδόνας καὶ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντας.

a resolution for surrendering the most important Federal fortress ; it would be harder still for the League to compel the Corinthians to admit a foreign garrison into their city.¹ Was Aratos to reverse the exploit of his youth, and once more to scale the mountain citadel, but this time to drive out an Achaian, and to bring in a Macedonian, garrison ? And, beside this, the Achaian people were evidently ready to accept Kleomenês as their chief ; if his terms were once accepted, Akrokorinthos could be won only by a struggle for life and death against the combined force of Sparta and Achaia. Aratos seems not to have dared to make any open proposal to the Assembly ; but he contrived that such deadly offence should be given to Kleomenês¹ that the Spartan King broke off the negotiations, and, instead of appearing personally to plead his cause in the Assembly at Argos, he sent a herald to declare war against the League. Here again Aratos contrived to get his work done for him by other hands. All hope of a fair accommodation with Kleomenês was now at an end. Aratos would not now have to endure the disgrace of seeing the Spartan youth

Kleo-
menês
breaks off
the nego-
ciations.

¹ The Accounts given by Plutarch in his two biographies (Ar. 39 and Kl. 17) do not exactly agree. The first makes Aratos send ambassadors (*πρέσβεις*) to Kleomenês, who had advanced with his troops as far as Lerna, bidding him come, as to friends and allies, with only three hundred followers, and offering hostages, if he felt any distrust. The other version is that he was to come alone, and to receive three hundred hostages. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 192) hints, looks like a confusion with the number of followers in the other story, which, though Droysen (ii. 507) thinks otherwise, seems decidedly the more probable. But one does not see in either story, as told by Plutarch, any ground for the excessive indignation which he attributes to Kleomenês. There must have been something specially offensive in the tone or form of the message. This was followed by some more epistolary sparring between Kleomenês and Aratos, such as Plutarch gave some specimens of at an earlier time. The two chiefs seem at last to have got very abusive towards one another, and that on very delicate points ; *ἐφέροντο λοιδορίαι καὶ βλασφημίαι μέχρι γάμων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλλήλους κακῶς λεγόντων*. (Ar. 39.) We know nothing of the domestic life of Aratos, but what could any man have to say about the noble wife of Kleomenês ?

CHAP. VII. installed as his acknowledged Federal superior; he was several degrees nearer to the more pleasant prospect of acting as the counsellor or the slave of a foreign master. And the final step, the breaking off of all negotiations, the last blow, as it seemed, to any plan of union between the League and his rival, had come, not from Aratos, but from Kleomenês himself.

In all this web of cunning intrigue the practised diplomatist of Sikyôn had overreached himself. What he had really done was to proclaim the dissolution of the League. The Achaian Union had hitherto advanced and prospered by strictly adhering to its principles of perfect brotherhood and equality. Every city, great or small, old or new, had equal rights; each member was alike precious to the whole body; an injury done to one was an injury done to all, and to be redressed by all alike. By this course of action Aratos had, now for nearly thirty years, won honour and power and influence for himself and for the commonwealth at whose head he stood. But he had now gone away backwards; he was not only willing to bring foreign armies into Peloponnêsos; he was ready to give up, as the price of their aid, a city of the League, one of the great cities of Greece, a city which was the very gem and flower of the Confederacy, a fortress which was the key of the whole peninsula, a spot whose name always suggested the most glorious exploit of his own life. The moment it was suspected that the surrender of Corinth had been hinted at by a Federal politician, the tie was at once broken, a whole storm of concealed passions burst forth. Secession, as Secession, had never been dreamed of; but if the League was about to cede its cities to the Macedonian, it was high time for those cities to take care of themselves. No one wished to separate from a League of free and equal Greek cities, but, if they were to have a master, men

New position of Aratos.

Universal indignation at the thought of surrendering Corinth.

would have Kleomenês for their master rather than Anti-CHAP. VII.
gonos. The Assembly had not deemed it its duty to hinder a single Canton, which it could not protect, from asking and receiving aid from a hereditary friend. But the Assembly had never dreamed that a measure apparently so harmless really meant the surrender of Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian King. If Corinth was to be thus betrayed, who could answer for the freedom of Sikyôn or of Argos? Even a conservative Federal politician might consistently argue in this way: The object of the League is to preserve the liberties of its several cities; if the League fails to discharge that duty, those cities are at once absolved from their Federal allegiance. And now parties began to show themselves, which, in the quiet days of the League, had kept themselves concealed. The practical working of the Achaian Constitution threw all power into the hands of respectable well-to-do citizens, led by chiefs whose ambition looked no higher than the rank of an elective and responsible magistrate. Tyrants, oligarchs, Red Republicans, were all alike without sympathizers in the Achaian Congress. The two extremes of political faction, hitherto kept in check by the legal restraints of the constitution, now burst forth.¹ There were powerful men who hated the sway of Law in any shape, who would fain rule as Tyrants or as members of some narrow oligarchic body. Then there were extreme Democrats, Socialists, men of wild theories or of broken fortunes, who longed for the abolition of debts and the division of lands. Others, of all ranks and parties, were thoroughly tired of Aratos, and

Appear-
ance of
extreme
factions
in the
Achaian
Cities.

¹ Plut. Ar. 40. 'Ητρέμει γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔστεργεν ἐπὶ τοῖς παρούσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σικωνίων αὐτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων ἐγένοντο πολλοὶ καταφανεῖς διειλεγμένοι τῷ Κλεομένει καὶ πάλαι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ δυναστείων ὑπουλῶς ἔχοντες. Kl. 17. 'Εγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ὤρμησαν αἱ πόλεις, τῶν μὲν δῆμων νομὴν τε χώρας καὶ χρῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπιδόντων, τῶν δὲ πρώτων βαρυνομένων τὸν Ἀρατὸν, ἐνίων δὲ καὶ δι' ὀργῆς ἔχοντων ὡς ἐπάγοντα τῇ Πελοποννήσῃ Μακεδόνας.

CHAP. VII. thought Kleomenês, if only as a novelty, the more promising leader of the two. The disappointed men of rank and wealth hoped that Kleomenês, whose foes called him a Tyrant, might, like Antigonos Gonatas, patronize Tyranny everywhere, and might set them up to lord it as his vassals over their several cities. The populace, on the other hand, heard of his revolutionary doings at home; they longed for the day when a bonfire of promissory notes should be kindled in the market-place of every city,¹ and when the lands of the wealthy should be divided into equal lots for the benefit of the poor. Both parties mistook their man. Whatever Kleomenês had done at Sparta professed to be the restoration of the old laws and discipline of the country; it therefore by no means followed that he would appear as an apostle either of Tyranny or of confiscation anywhere else.* And it is easy to conceive that another set of motives, different from any of these, might attract some partizans to the side of Kleomenês. The question was no longer whether certain terms should be agreed upon between Kleomenês and the League as a whole; it now was whether each particular city should adhere to the Achaian connexion or should embrace that of Sparta. Now the schemes of Kleomenês, if they were at all grounded on the old Pan-hellenic position of Sparta, would hardly include a true Federal Union, a *Bundesstaat*. The tie by which he would unite his conquests would be alliance rather than incorporation; they would form a Confederacy

Both extremes lean to Kleomenês.

The schemes of Kleomenês appealed to Town-Autonomy against the Federal Principle.

¹ Plut. Agis, 18. Καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρεωστῶν γραμματεῖα συνενέγκαντες εἰς ἀγορὰν, ἃ κλάρια καλοῦσι, καὶ πάντα συνθέντες εἰς ἓν ἐνέπηρσαν. ἀρθείσης δὲ φλογὸς οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι καὶ δανειστικοὶ περιπαθοῦντες ἀπῆλθον, ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος ὥσπερ ἐφυβρίζων οὐκ ἔφη λαμπρότερον ἑωρακέναι φῶς οὐδὲ πῦρ ἐκείνου καθαρώτερον. Cf. Kl. 10, 11.

* Kortüm (iii. 188 et seqq.) seems throughout to picture Kleomenês as if he were at the head of a sort of Socialist Propaganda. For this notion I can see no evidence whatever. Kleomenês, from his own point of view, was as conservative as Aratos or Antigonos.

rather than a Confederation.¹ Into such a Confederacy CHAP. VII. it was indeed quite possible that the Achaian League, retaining its internal constitution, might enter as a single member; it was highly probable that the ten towns of the old Achaia would, if they entered it at all, enter it as a single member; but it was far more natural for the great cities which had only lately joined the League to revert, under such circumstances, to the principle of Town-Autonomy. A Confederacy of cities under Spartan supremacy might easily give to each of its members a greater measure of purely local independence than it possessed in the Federal Union. The position of the citizen would be lowered; he would sink into a citizen of one particular city instead of being a citizen of the great Achaian League; he would have far less direct influence in the general affairs of the proposed Confederacy than he had in the general affairs of the existing Confederation. But so long as Sparta remained a president, and did not become a despot, the mere principle of State Right would gain rather than lose.² However this may be, out of the several discontented elements which the cities of the League contained, a strong Kleomenizing faction began to show itself everywhere. In the cities which had been united to the League during the administration of Aratos,³ the Federal administration quite lost its hold. In Sikyôn itself, in Corinth, above all in Argos, large parties called aloud for Kleomenês. Nearly all the cities of Arkadia⁴

¹ The cities which went over to Kleomenês became, according to Plutarch (Kl. 17), *σύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν*. This is the old Lacedæmonian system, something wholly different from the *συμπολιτεία* of the Achaians or even of the Ætolians.

² Much the same view is taken by Droysen, ii. 495.

³ Plut. Ar. 39. "Ὅλως οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἐπικτήτων βέβαιον ἦν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἀλλὰ θορυβὸς πολλὴ περιεστῆκει τὸν Ἀρατὸν ὄρῶντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον κραδαινομένην καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐξανισταμένας ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτερίζοντων πανταχόθεν.

⁴ We may gather from Polybios (ii. 55) that Stymphalos and Kleitôr

CHAP. VII.

Kleo-
menés
wins the
Arkadian
and Argo-
lic cities.

Kleo-
menés
wins
Argos,
B.C. 223.

and all the cities of¹ Argolis fell away; Kaphyai, Phlius, Pheneos, Kleónai, Epidaurus, Hermionē, Troizēn, were all lost to the League; some towns Kleomenēs took by force, others willingly went over to him.² Megalopolis, almost alone among the Southern members of the League, stood faithful, if not to the Federal bond, at least to its love of Macedonia and its hatred of Sparta. Even Pellênē, in the old Achaia, was taken, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison.³ Nor was a greater prize long delayed—indeed it preceded the fall of its own smaller neighbours. Argos, the old rival of Sparta, Argos, which no Spartan King had ever been able to subdue, Argos, which Pyrrhos had found as unconquerable as Sparta herself,⁴ now opened her gates to a Lacedæmonian master. The Achaian force had been withdrawn from the city to protect the Federal interest in Corinth and Sikyón, and Aratos had gone with it, armed with some strange arbitrary commission; how obtained we know not.⁵ Kleo-

remained faithful; Kynaitha also is not mentioned among the conquests of Kleomenēs.

¹ Plut. Ar. 40. *Προσγενομένων αὐτῷ τῶν τῇν λεγομένην Ἀκτὴν κατοικούντων καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρισάντων.*

² Pol. ii. 52. *Ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης καταπληζόμενος τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐπιτοχίμασι λοιπὸν ἀδεῶς ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ἃς μὲν πείθων, αἷς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀναπεινόμενος.*

³ Droysen (ii. 508) makes Kleomenēs occupy Pellênē with the good will of the inhabitants. They rose, he says, and aided the Spartans against the Federal troops. This must be grounded on the odd expression of Plutarch (Kl. 17), *τοὺς φρουροῦντας ἐξέβαλε μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.* But this would be a strange way of expressing a very unlikely fact; in the old Achaia at least Kleomenēs had no partisans. Possibly *οἱ φρουροῦντες* may mean the mercenary garrison, and *οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ* the citizen militia. Was Timoxenos (see Schorn, 118) then in Pellênē, or does Plutarch use the words *στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν* (Ar. 39) loosely for the Federal commander in the town?

⁴ Plut. Kl. 18. *Οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πάλαι βασιλεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὰ πραγματεύσασθαι τὸ Ἄργος βεβαιῶς ἠδυνήθησαν, ὅ τε δεινότητος τῶν στρατηγῶν Πύρρος εἰσελθὼν καὶ βιασάμενος οὐ κατέσχε τὴν πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.*

⁵ Plut. Ar. 40. *Ἐξουσίαν ἀνυπεύθυνον λαβεῖν.* Polybios (ii. 52) speaks of him at this time as *στρατηγῶν*, seemingly meaning the same thing, for Timoxenos was still General, as appears by Plutarch's (Kl. 17) mention of

menês appeared before Argos ; Aristomachos, the former CHAP. VII.
 Tyrant, and late General of the League, espoused his
 cause ;¹ he hoped, so his enemies said, to gain more by
 submission to Kleomenês than by fidelity to the League.
 Through his influence the city was surrendered, hostages
 were given, a garrison was received, and Argos was admitted
 as an ally of Sparta, recognizing her supremacy. The
 whole Argolic peninsula followed its example. Meanwhile
 Aratos, armed with his new authority, put to death some Violent
proceed-
ings of
Aratos at
Sikyôn.
 whom he called traitors in his native city²—the first
 recorded instance of civil bloodshed in the name of the
 Federal power. He then went on a like errand to Corinth,
 but there he found the whole city stirred up against him.
 He and his Federal troops were at once ordered to
 depart ;³ according to one account he had to flee for his
 life.⁴ The Corinthians then sent for Kleomenês ;⁵ he Corinth
calls in
Kleo-
menês.
 entered the city, and besieged Akrokorinthos, whose
 Federal garrison still held out.⁶ The possession of
 Corinth by Kleomenês cut off Megara from all commu-
 nication with her confederates. She did not revolt to Megara
joins the
Bœotian
League.
 the Spartan, but attached herself, by leave of the League,
 to the now nearer Federation of Bœotia.⁷ We hear

the Nemean Games, which took place earlier in the year than the Federal elections. See Thirlwall, viii. 192-4.

¹ Pol. ii. 60. ὁ δ' ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων παρὰ πόδας, ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυδεστέρας ἔσχε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μάλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τὴν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις καιροῖς προσένειμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Plutarch does not mention Aristomachos in the business.

² Plut. Ar. 40. Τοὺς μὲν ἐν Σικυνίᾳ ἐφθαρμένους ἀπέκτεινε.

³ Pol. ii. 52. Τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῇ μὲν Ἀράτῃ στρατηγούντι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς παράγγειλάντων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τῶν Κλεομένη διαπεμπομένων καὶ καλούντων.

⁴ See the story in Plut. Ar. 40. Kl. 19.

⁵ Pol. u.s. Plut. Ar. 40. Οἱ Κορίνθιοι μετέπεψαντο τὸν Κλεομένη καὶ παρέδσαν τὴν πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.

⁶ Plut. Kl. 19. Ar. 40.

⁷ Pol. ix. 67. Ὅτε δὲ Κλεομένης εἰς τὸν Ἴσθμόν προσεκάθισεν, διακλεισθέντες προσέθεντο τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς μετὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν γνώμης. Megara

CHAP. VII. nothing of Aigina, which was equally cut off. As Kleomenês had no fleet, it may have retained its allegiance—it was again Achaian some years later—but there must have been a temporary suspension of communication between it and the other cities. The League was now reduced to nine Old-Achaian towns—Pellênê being lost—together with Sikyôn, Megalopolis, and a few other places in Arkadia. Kleomenês had been provoked into becoming an enemy; he had been rejected as a Federal chief; he now came as a conqueror, but, in most places, as a conqueror willingly received.

No real argument against Federal Government to be drawn from these events.

No better opportunity can be conceived for declamations on the weakness of Federal States than this general break-up of the most flourishing Federal State that the world had yet seen. But a little consideration will show that the events which I have just been recording really prove nothing of the kind. The true question is, not whether a Federal Government can be warranted to stand firm against every shock, but whether there are not times and places in which a Federal Government is more likely to stand firm than any other. It may be freely granted that some of the special evils and dangers which beset Peloponnêsos in the year 224 arose from the Federal form of the Achaian Government. But it is easy to see that any other form of Government would have brought with it evils and dangers greater still. The peculiar form taken by the dispute between Sparta and the League could not have arisen except between a single State and a Federation; but we may be quite certain that a Prince in the

afterwards again left the Boeotian for the Achaian connexion (Pol. *ib.*). In Roman times Megara was again Boeotian. Caius Curtius Proklos, whom we have already met with (see above, p. 138) as a Megarian Amphiktyon, was also a Megarian Boeotarch. Boeckh, C. I. no. 1058. Among his merits was that of treating the Megarians to a show of gladiators, a sight which would have somewhat amazed either Kleomenês or Aratos.

circumstances in which Kleomenès found himself would CHAP. VII. soon have attacked, or been attacked by, his neighbours, whatever might be their forms of government. Again, the proposal to cede Corinth to Antigonos derived its chief sting from the peculiarities of the Federal relation. For a League to pretend to cede to a foreign power one of the Sovereign States which compose it is clearly more monstrous, more threatening to the rights of every other portion of the whole, than it is for a Monarch to cede one of the provinces of his Kingdom. It is, as the event showed, far more likely to excite general indignation and rebellion. Yet it is easy to conceive that, even under a Monarchy, the cession of a province might raise serious disturbances, and might even lead other provinces to offer their allegiance to a master who seemed better able to protect them. And, after all, for a Federal power to pretend to cede one of its members is not more iniquitous than the practice, so common among Princes, of disposing of territories with which they have not even a Federal connexion, without consulting either their rulers or their inhabitants. Federal Government, like all other human things, is imperfect, and there is a certain pressure to which it will give way. But could any other form of government have stood the trial better in that particular time and place? A Kingdom of Peloponnèses was not to be thought of; the idea would have shocked every feeling of the Greek mind, and it could not have stood for an hour on any ground but that of naked brute force. No other form of Government then possible in Greece. Town-autonomy had had its fair trial; it had been found to mean, in that age, the presence either of local Tyrants or of Macedonian garrisons. But the League had hitherto completely excluded both evils; even in the degenerate days on which we are now to enter, it completely excluded one and greatly restrained and modified the other. And the cities which fell off from the League asked

CHAP. VII. neither for Monarchy nor for strict Town-autonomy ; they were ready for a relation with Sparta, which, if not in accordance with the most perfect Federal ideal, might still be called Federal as distinguished from either of the other systems.

Real
teaching
of the
history in
favour of
Fede-
ralism.

The truth is that, if the Federal Government of Achaia now gave way, it gave way only because it for a moment deserted its own principles. There was clearly no general wish to secede, no wish to exchange the Achaian for the Spartan connexion, as long as those who were at the head of the League did their duty as Federal rulers. When they were guilty of treason against Greece by invoking Macedonian help, when they added the special treason against Federal Law implied in the proposal to alienate a Sovereign State of the Union, then, and not till then, did the Union begin to fall asunder. The fact that a Federal Government, hitherto united and prosperous, fell in pieces as soon as it deserted strict Federal principles, is surely rather an argument for the Federal system than against it. And, after all, the breaking-up of the League was very partial. Except at Corinth, where no explanation need be sought for, the tendency to Secession was confined to those cities which had lately joined the League, and which may not as yet have become fully accustomed to Federal principles and habits. The Old-Achaian towns stuck closely together through the whole tempest ; Megalopolis stood firm, like an isolated rock against which every wave dashed in vain. Even in the seceding cities the party which desired separation from the League on any respectable political ground seems to have been nowhere the strongest. Everywhere Secession was brought about mainly by the very worst of political factions, by those classes whose impotence up to that moment is the most speaking witness to the general good government of the League. The opponents of Federalism are perfectly welcome to ally

themselves either with the would-be Tyrants of Sikyôn or with the Socialist rabble of Argos. It was only at Corinth, in the city which Aratos offered to betray, that the names of Aratos and his League stank, as they deserved, in the nostrils of every citizen. Everywhere else the movement towards Secession was either merely partial or merely temporary. It is clear that at Sikyôn the mass of the inhabitants still clung to their old deliverer amid all his short-comings; ¹ at Argos we shall presently see that the very party which urged Secession soon turned about and repented of it. The League, in short, was, before long, reconstituted, with somewhat diminished extent and with greatly diminished glory, but still in a form which, imperfect as it was, was better either than absolute bondage to Macedonia or than Town-autonomy, as Town-autonomy had in that age become.

Secession
only partial
and
temporary.

The loss of Corinth—the remark is that of Polybios, in other words that of Aratos himself—was felt by Aratos as a gain.² It took away all difficulties and all scruples as to the contemplated surrender of Akrokorinthos. The Corinthians were now rebels with whom no terms need be kept; their mountain-citadel was now a fortress held by Achaian troops in an enemy's country; it could now be handed over to the King without let or hindrance, if only he would come with his army and take it. The loss of Corinth and of so many other cities had also another result;—Aratos could now do what he pleased in the Federal Councils. He had no longer to deal with a great Peloponnesian Confederation which gave him rivals like Lydiadas and Aristomachos; the Achaian League once

Effects
of the
loss of
Corinth,
B.C. 223.

¹ See the description of the state of feeling at Sikyôn in Plut. Ar. 42, a remarkable contrast to the reception of Aratos at Corinth.

² Pol. ii. 52. Τοὺς δ' Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέλυσε τοῦ μεγίστου προβλήματος; and, directly after, ἀπεδόθη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀφορμὴ καὶ πρόφασις εὐλόγος, κ.τ.λ.

CHAP. VII. more meant ten cities on the Corinthian Gulf. Their citizens, or some of them, met at Sikyôn, elected Aratos General with absolute power, and voted him a guard for the defence of his person.¹ To such a depth of degradation had the deliverer fallen, that now, after living for thirty years as citizen and magistrate of a free state,² he needed a Tyrant's precautions to defend his life. And yet Aratos was not a Tyrant; he was not intentionally a traitor; he was simply blinded by a mischievous and obstinate prejudice, by a pride which, even in such a moment, could not stoop to submission to Kleomenês. He had brought his country into a state where her only choice was a choice of evils; he now stubbornly persisted

Aratos
invested
with
absolute
power and
defended
by a Guard,
B.C. 223.

¹ See above, p. 304.

² Plut. Ar. 41. *τριάκοντα μὲν ἔτη καὶ τρία* [I shall consider these numbers elsewhere] *πεπολιτευμένος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πεπρωτευνκός δὲ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ δόξῃ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τότε δ' ἔρημος καὶ ἄπορος, συντετριμμένος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ναυαγίου τῆς πατρίδος ἐν τοσοῦτῳ σάλῳ καὶ κινδύνῳ διαφερόμενος*. I need not stop to show how utterly unconstitutional all this was. But I may observe that this was not the regular election for the year B.C. 223-2, nor was that election held at the Meeting at Aigion to be presently mentioned, which comes too late in the year. (See the *τρεῖς μῆνας* in Plut. Ar. 41, for which Kleomenês besieged Sikyôn, compared with the date supplied by the mention of Nemean Games which were celebrated in February in Kl. 17. See p. 479.) The regular Spring Meeting of the year B.C. 223 must have come between the two. At it Timoxenos (see Pol. ii. 53. Thirlwall, viii. 196) was reelected General for the year—another unconstitutional act—Aratos seemingly still retaining his extraordinary powers.

During the siege of Charlestown in 1780, Governor Rutledge of South Carolina was made *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*, like Aratos. The Legislature of the State passed an act, "delegating to Governor Rutledge, and such of his council as he could conveniently consult, a power to do everything necessary for the public good, except taking away the life of a citizen without a legal trial." (Marshall's Life of Washington, iv. 185.) Aratos (see above, p. 479) seems not to have felt himself under even this last restriction.

The appointment of a Dictator was also contemplated, though not carried out, in Virginia, both in 1776 and in 1781. See Tucker's Life of Jefferson, i. 162.

The Roman formula, "Dent operam Consules ne quid Respublica detrimenti capiat," is familiar to every one.

in choosing the greater evil; he sacrificed the external independence, he risked the internal freedom, of his country, but he was no wilful conspirator against her. It was probably because he felt in his own heart no wish to tyrannize that he did not scruple to assume the power and the outward garb of a Tyrant. He soon showed his strict personal integrity, perverted as was the form which even his virtues now assumed. Kleomenês spared¹ his house and property at Corinth; he made him splendid offers; twelve talents a year, double his Egyptian pension,² should be the reward of the surrender of Akrokorinthos. Nay, in this hour of success, he lowered his terms; let the League, or what remained of it, acknowledge his supremacy, and he and they should garrison the key of Peloponnêsos in common.⁴ In attempting to bribe Aratos, Kleomenês showed that he failed to understand the man with whom he had been so long contending. Sad as were the passions and weaknesses with which the mind of Aratos was now clouded, mere personal gain was wholly absent from his thoughts. He would not sell the least atom of his pride or his prejudice, because such a sale would have been in his eyes a sale of his country. His answer was enigmatical; Circumstances were not in his power, but he was in the power of circumstances.⁵

Aratos
refuses the
offers of
Kleo-
menês.

¹ Compare the instances quoted above, p. 443.

² On Aratos' possession of real property at Corinth, see above, p. 258.

³ Plut. Ar. 41. KL 19. The Egyptian pension must now have been stopped. Ptolemy was now on the side of Kleomenês; Πτολεμαῖος ἀπογνοῦς τὸ ἔθνος Κλεομένει χορηγεῖν ἐπεβάλλετο. (Pol. ii. 51.) He naturally would take his side as soon as he knew of the dealings of the League with Macedonia.

⁴ He used, as his agent for this offer, not one of his own subjects, but a Messénian named Tritymallos (Plut. KL 19). This employment of a neutral envoy is a clear sign of moderation, and may be compared with the practice (see above, p. 387) of referring disputes to the arbitration of a neutral state.

⁵ Plut. Ar. 41. Ὅς οὐκ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα, μᾶλλον δ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἔχεται. So KL 19.

CHAP. VII. This reply was not satisfactory to the Spartan, whose rejoinder took the form of an invasion of the Sikyônian territory, and a siege of Sikyôn itself. In this deplorable state,¹ Aratos sought for allies, perhaps merely to satisfy his own conscience and the opinion of his countrymen, by showing that the application to Antigonos was really unavoidable. He asked, but of course he asked in vain, for help from those very Ætolians, whose expected hostility had been so prominently put forward in justification of his course.² He stooped so low as to ask for aid from Athens, as if Athens could again occupy Pylos or Kythêra, or could again win naval triumphs in the Corinthian Gulf. Incredible as it sounds, we are told that the Athenian people, who had once worn crowns on the report of Aratos' death, were now ready, in their gratitude, to send him help—such help as Athens could give. Two orators, named Eukleidês and Mikiôn,³ persuaded them not to run the hazard, and Aratos was left wholly without allies. And now there was no other hope—the die was cast. An Assembly was called at Aigion;⁴ Aratos—cut off from the place of meeting by the Lacedæmonian occupation of Pellênê—made his way thither by sea;⁵ and the Federal Rump, doubtless at his motion,⁶ passed the final resolution to invite the help of Antigonos and to cede to him Akrokorinthos as the price of his help.

Aratos
asks for
help of
Ætolia and
Athens.

Final vote
of the
League
to invite
Antigonos
and cede
Akroko-
rinthos,
B.C. 223.

¹ See an eloquent description of his position at this time—more fair towards him than is usual with the writer—in Droysen, ii. 511.

² Plut. Ar. 41. See above, p. 437.

³ These must be the same as Eurykleidês and Mikôn (Paus. ii. 9. 4), whom Philip is said to have poisoned. See Thirlwall, viii. 196.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 42. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀχαιοὶ συνεληλυθότες εἰς Αἴγιον ἐκεί τὸν Ἀρατον ἐκάλουν. The Meeting therefore was not summoned by himself as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, but by the regular General Timoxenos.

⁵ With ten friends and his son. (Plut. u. s.) These then formed the Sikyônian contingent to the National Congress. What were its whole numbers?

⁶ Plut. Kl. 19. Ψηφίσασθαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔπεισεν Ἀντιγόνη παραδιδόναι τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον. Cf. Ar. 42.

Thus it was that the deliverer of Greece became, CHAP. VII. deliberately and in the face of every warning, her betrayer. It would indeed be unfair to judge Aratos by our light, or by the light of Plutarch, but by this time he had been taught lessons which ought to have opened his eyes. He had passed a long and honoured political career as the chosen chief of a free commonwealth; he had had to face parliamentary rivals and to undergo occasional rebuffs and censures; but on the whole his career had been one of prosperity and honour singularly uninterrupted. The League, his own work, had held together as long as he adhered to the principles on which it was founded; it fell asunder only when he deserted the cause to which hitherto his life had been devoted. The moment Macedonian intervention is named, city after city falls away; he is driven to demand an unconstitutional authority from the wretched remnant that is left; and, in his own city, the city whence he had expelled the Tyrant, the deliverer cannot venture to appear without a guard. From that moment the glory of the League passes away. Lowered position of the League from this time. It still survived; it still honourably discharged many of its functions; it still secured to a large part of Greece exemption from border wars and a good and equitable form of internal government. It still produced wise and patriotic statesmen, and one chief of its armies far greater than Aratos himself. But Achaia never again became the independent bulwark of Greece, the unassailable and incorruptible home of freedom. It almost ceased to be an independent power; its future warfare, even its future legislation, was carried on by the sufferance, first of Macedonia and then of Rome. Its constitutional forms lightened the yoke of either master; they made the fall of Greece more gradual and less dishonourable; and so far the work of Markos and Aratos was even then not in vain. But the free and glorious League of so many equal cities

Estimate of the conduct of Aratos.

CHAP. VII. acting by a common will, the League which had warred with Kings and had overthrown or converted Tyrants, had now become a thing of the past. And the fabric had been overthrown by the very hands which had reared it; the Creator, the Preserver, and the Destroyer, had been united in a single man.

Comparison of
Cavour
and
Aratos.

We have in our own days beheld a sight in some respects alike, but on the whole the parallel affords more of contrast than of likeness. The deliverer of Peloponnēsos, the founder of the Achaian League, was also the man who surrendered a great Achaian city into the hands of the greatest enemy of independent Greece. So we have seen a statesman as subtle and as full of resources as Aratos himself, the deliverer of Italy, the founder of the Italian Kingdom, surrender two provinces of his native land into the grasp of the common enemy of Italy and mankind. That sad and subdued debate in the Italian Parliament which confirmed the cession of Savoy and Nizza to the Tyrant of Paris may give us some idea of what took place in that Assembly at Aigion which voted the cession of Akrokorinthos to the King of Macedon. In one respect indeed the modern side of the parallel is the darker of the two. Antigonos was a King, and not a Tyrant; he had broken no oaths, he had destroyed no freedom, he cloaked his ambition by no hypocritical pretences; when asked to interfere in a quarrel not his own, he—from his own point of view naturally and rightfully—demanded the restoration of a fortress which had been but twenty years before wrested from his predecessor. He did not trouble the world with Ideas and Questions and Solutions and Complications; he asked straightforwardly for a city which he had some decent pretext for looking upon as his own. Antigonos was a King, a Macedonian, the enemy of Greece and the enemy of freedom; but he was a fair and honourable enemy, openly seeking the natural interests of his

Character
of An-
tigonos.

order and of his nation. He would have been in his place as a member of the Holy Alliance, he might consistently have helped to partition out Europe at Vienna; but he would never have stooped to dictate pamphlets about mountain slopes and natural boundaries, or to ground his right to Akrokorinthos on the vote of a Corinthian Assembly, called on to say Yea or Nay beneath the shadow of the Macedonian sarissa. But if one would shrink from placing Antigonos Dôsôn in the same rank with Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, one would no less shrink from placing the act of Cavour on a level with the act of Aratos. There is indeed much likeness in the character and career of the two men; each sought the noblest of ends, but neither was so scrupulous as strict morality could wish as to the means by which those ends were to be compassed. Each was, in his own age, unrivalled for parliamentary and diplomatic skill; each indulged in the same dark and crooked policy; each could, when he chose, throw himself, in all freedom and openness, on the vote of a popular Assembly. But Cavour was never tried as Aratos was. The laws of his country did not require its parliamentary leader to act also as its military chieftain. While he himself spoke and plotted, he could use the sword of Garibaldi, of Cialdini, of the King of Italy himself. Cavour was thus spared the humiliation which always waited on the arms of Aratos, from Phylakia to Hekatombaion. Cavour again was never tried by the severest of all trials, the opposition of a rival on really equal terms, such as Aratos found, in different ways, in Lydiadas and in Kleomenês. But the cession of Akrokorinthos was a deeper sin against freedom even than the cession of Savoy and Nizza. Both the Achaian and the Italian statesman surrendered a portion of the land which he had saved into the hands of a foreign despot; one surrendered his own ancestral province, the other surrendered the scene of his

CHAP. VII.

Likeness
between
Aratos and
Cavour.

Greater
advantages
of Cavour.

Greater
error in
the cession
of Akro-
korinthos
than in
the cession
of Savoy.

CHAP. VII. own most glorious exploit. Each deed was equally the betrayal of a trust, the narrowing of the area of freedom. But the circumstances of the two acts differed widely. The cession of Savoy and Nizza was indeed a doing of evil that good might come ; it was seeking to compass a glorious purpose by a base means ; still it was the price paid for help which, hypocritically as it was given, was real help against a real enemy. It might be fairly argued that to liberate Lombardy with the aid of France was a less evil than to leave Lombardy helpless in the jaws of Austria, and probably even Cavour's sagacity did not foresee the base perfidy which drew back long before it reached the Hadriatic and left Venice in the grasp of the oppressor. To make the bondage of Savoy and Nizza the price of the freedom of Lombardy was a sin against all abstract morality ; but, striking the balance in a mercantile way, the gain was on the side of freedom, and a patriot not over scrupulous as to means might not shrink from the bargain. But the surrender of Akrokorinthos was simple treason ;—not wilful or corrupt treason, but treason nevertheless ; it was the price paid not for freedom, but for subjection ; it was not doing evil that good might come, but doing evil for the further promotion of evil. It doubtless required some personal and some national sacrifice to admit the claims of Kleomenês ; but it was a sacrifice which patriotism dictated, when the choice lay between Kleomenês and Antigonos. To have modified the constitution of the League so as to make Kleomenês its chief would have been a far less sin against freedom generally, even a far less sin against its special Federal form, than to retain the constitution in its outward integrity, but to make the League itself a mere dependency of a foreign power. It would be hard to find in all history an instance of so sad a fall as that from the Aratos of the year 251 to the Aratos of the year 223. He saved his

country, he raised it to the highest pitch of glory, and then pulled it down to the dust. Yet at heart he was not a traitor; he was only the saddest of all instances of the way in which pride, passion, and obstinacy will sometimes darken the judgement even of honourable and illustrious men.

From this time the war loses its interest, or rather it assumes an interest of quite another kind. Hitherto it has been a struggle between two Grecian powers for ascendancy in Peloponnêsos; it now changes into a struggle for Grecian freedom waged by one of the last and noblest of Grecian heroes against the overwhelming power of Macedonia. Our hearts now go along with Kleomenês, as with Leônidas of old or with Kanarês and Botzarês in the days of our fathers. Antigonos was indeed a foe of a nobler stamp, but he was as truly the foe of Greece as Xerxês or as Omar Brionês. Aratos the deliverer of Greece, and the remnant which still clung to him, have sunk from being the bulwark of Hellas into the rank of a medizing Theban at Plataia. Kleomenês had been refused as a chief, and now Antigonos came as a master, or rather as a God. He was declared chief of all the allies;¹ the Achaian League was now merged in a great Confederacy together with the lesser Leagues of Bœotia, Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros, together also with the Thessalians, who were hardly better than Macedonian subjects. The League deprived itself of the common rights of independent sovereignty; no letter or embassy was to be sent to any other King without the consent of the King of Macedon. King Ptolemy had been a friend and a paymaster; King Antigonos was a master who required heavy wages for his services. The Macedonian army was main-

Change
in the
character
of the
war,
B.C. 223-
222.

Kleomenês
now the
champion
of Greece.

Degrada-
tion of the
League.

¹ Pol. ii. 54. Κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμὼν πάντων τῶν συμμάχων. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 202. This was at the Autumn Meeting of B.C. 223.

CHAP. VII.
Monstrous
flattery of
Antigonos.

tained, and paid at the cost of the League. As for Antigonos himself, sacrifices were offered to him, games were held in his honour, and Aratos had to appear as something like the High Priest of this new Divinity.¹ All this impious flattery was indeed no more than the age was used to; Athens had long before set the example towards Antigonos' own ancestor Dêmêtrios;² but Athens at least did not take to King-worship till Dêmôsthenês had ceased to guide her councils. Who would have dreamed, when Aratos scaled Akrokorinthos to expel the garrison of one Antigonos, that the same Aratos would live to welcome another Antigonos with the honours due to Zeus and Poseidôn? That much that Aratos beheld and did he beheld and did most unwillingly³ we may most fully believe. But he was only reaping a harvest of his own sowing, a harvest whose nature any eyes not blinded by passion would have foreseen from the first.

The military details of the war between Antigonos and Kleomenês are worthy of careful study, and nothing in Grecian or any other history is more attractive than the whole personal career of the last Spartan King. For these I will refer to the general historians of Greece and to Kleomenês' own special biographer. A few points however stand out which more immediately bear on my own subject.

¹ Plut. Ar. 45. Ἐψηφίσαντο δ' ἄλλῃ μὴ γράφειν βασιλεῖ μὴδὲ πρεσβεύειν πρὸς ἄλλον ἄκοντος Ἀντιγόνου, τρέφειν δὲ καὶ μισθοδοτεῖν ἡναγκάζοντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας, θυσίας δὲ καὶ πομπὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας Ἀντιγόνῳ συνετέλουν. So Kl. 16. Διαδήματι καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ Μακεδονικοῖς καὶ σατραπικοῖς προστάγμασιν ὑπέβριψε μετὰ τῆς Ἀχαΐας αὐτὸν, ἵνα μὴ Κλεομένει ποιεῖν δοκῇ τὸ προστατόμενον, Ἀντιγόρεια θύων καὶ παιᾶνας ᾄδων αὐτὸς ἐστεφανωμένος εἰς ἀνθρώπων ὑποφθόῃς κατασηπόμενον. Helwing (p. 148, 9) seems to think the whole thing all right and proper, and takes Plutarch severely to task for his freedom of speech.

² See the details in Athênaios, vi. 62-4, especially the Ithyphallics in c. 63.

³ Plut. Ar. 45. Ὡν ἡτιῶντο ἐκείνων πάντων ἐκείνων . . . ἐπεὶ φανερῶς γὰρ πολλὰ τῶν πραττομένων ἐλίσπει τὸν Ἀρατον.

The combined forces of Antigonos and the League had little difficulty in recovering the cities which had revolted from their Federal allegiance. Some were taken by force, others received the conquerors, with what amount of willingness or unwillingness it would be hard to say. In one case a remarkable internal revolution restored the greatest of the seceding cities to its place in the Union. At the very beginning of the war, before Antigonos had entered Peloponnêsos, while Kleomenês was still master of a strong force at the Isthmus, and was still besieging the Achaian garrison in Akrokorinthos, Argos, his greatest prize, returned of its own accord to the Achaian connexion. The party which had invited Kleomenês to Argos was dissatisfied because the Spartan King had not proclaimed the abolition of debts among his new friends.¹ At the persuasion of one Aristotelês, the multitude rose, and called in Aratos and the allies. Now it was that Aratos, still, it would seem, Absolute General of the League, was elected local General of the State of Argos.² Aristomachos, once Tyrant of Argos, afterwards General of the League, was put to death,³ with the sanction, if not by the command,

CHAP. VII.

Recovery
of the
revolted
cities,
B. C. 223-
222.

Argos
returns
to the
League,
B. C. 223.

Execution
of Aristo-
machos.

¹ Plut. Kl. 20. 'Ο δὲ πρᾶττων ἦν τὴν ἀπόστασιν 'Αριστοτέλης' καὶ τὸ πλῆθος οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐπεισεν ἀγανακτοῦν, ὅτι χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς οὐκ ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Κλεομένης ἐλπίσας.

² Plut. Ar. 44. 'Αρατος δὲ στρατηγὸς ὑπ' Ἀργείων αἰρεθὲς. See above, p. 256.

³ Phylarchos asserted, and Plutarch (u.s.) repeats the assertion without expressing any doubt of its truth, that Aristomachos was put to death by torture, a thing utterly repugnant to Grecian feeling. Polybios (ii. 59, 60) denies the fact, and his denial is perhaps worth more because he argues that Antigonos and Aratos would have been fully justified if they had done so. (See above, p. 382.) It was no crime to torture a Tyrant, especially one who had himself tortured to death eighty of his own citizens. But whatever Aristomachos had once been, he was not a Tyrant now; in strong Unionist eyes he might be a rebel, but torture was no Greek punishment for rebellion. Moreover this charge of torturing the eighty Argeians is in itself very doubtful (see above, p. 400), and, even if true, it could not be decently urged against him by Aratos. Whatever were the old crimes

CHAP. VII. of Aratos. It was a hard sentence. Aristomachos had united a great city to the League; he had been chosen its Chief Magistrate; in that character he seems to have shown no fault except over-deference to Aratos; his only crime now was that, in the unavoidable choice of masters, he had preferred a Spartan to a Macedonian.¹ The property of other "Tyrants and traitors," whoever they may have been, was voted by the Argeian commonwealth, on the motion of its new General, as a benevolence or a testimonial to the King of Macedonia.² The recovery of Argos was the turning-point in the war; as soon as this first step took place, but of course before Aratos and his master had sated their vengeance, Kleomenês deserted his position at Corinth in order to relieve his troops in the Argeian citadel. Aratos was thus able to fulfil his pledge, and to surrender Akrokorinthos to his royal ally. Twenty years of freedom had succeeded a hundred years of bondage; thirty years more of bondage now began; after that freedom was to be once more restored to Corinth, but this time not by the hands of a Grecian deliverer, but

Antigonos
put in
possession
of Akro-
korinthos.

B.C. 338-
243.

B.C. 243-
223.

of Aristomachos, the League had condoned them by admitting him as a citizen and electing him as its Chief Magistrate.

The fate of Aristomachos, whatever it was, lies at the door of Antigonos and Aratos; but we may gather from a later allusion of Polybios (v. 17) that the Macedonian Leontios was guilty of deeds of slaughter of some kind or other without the authority of either. Aratos recounts the crimes of Leontios, and, among them, *τὴν γενομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν [τῶν περὶ τὸν Λεόντιον] ἐν Ἀργεῖ σφαγὴν, ἣν ἐποίησαντο μετὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνου χωρισμὸν.*

¹ Plut. Ar. 44. *Τὸν δ' Ἀριστόμαχον ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς στρεβλώσαντες κατεπ' ῥτισαν, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα κακῶς ἤκουσεν ὁ Ἀρατος ὡς ἀνδραπῶν οὐ ποσὴρὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεχηρμένον ἐκείνῳ καὶ πεπεισμένον ἀφαιῖναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ προσαγαγεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν ὅμῃς περιδὼν παρανόμῃς ἀπολλόμενον.* The Chaironeian, at his distance of time, does not share the passions of the Megalopolitan.

² Plut. ib. *Ἐπεισεν αὐτοὺς [ὁ Ἀρατος] Ἀντιγόνην τὰ τε τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰ τῶν προδοτῶν χρήματα δωρεὰν δοῦναι.* This sounds like the form of the decree.

as a gift from the Roman conqueror of Macedon and lord of Greece. CHAP. VII.
B.C. 223-196.

The other cities of Argolis and Arkadia were easily recovered during the autumn of the year 223 and the spring of 222.¹ The fate of the three Arkadian towns which had given the first occasion to the war, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Mantinea, calls for some remark. The Mantineians, in the eyes of Antigonos or at least of Aratos, were double-dyed traitors; they had revolted once to the Ætolians and once to Kleomenês; no terms therefore were to be offered them. Their city was taken, its inhabitants were slain or sold,² and the "lovely Mantinea" was handed over to the Argeians as a reward for their repentance³ and amendment. Its new masters planted a colony there, of which they chose their General Aratos as the Founder. His own native Sikyôn had once been called Dêmêtrias; the name had been lost, if by nothing else, by his own exploits as her deliverer; as if now to wipe out the error of his youth, he now changed the name of his refounded city to Antigoneia.⁴ Fate of
Mantineia,
B.C. 222.

Tegea and Orchomenos were also taken. To the people of Tegea Antigonos restored the constitution of their fathers,⁵ a strange boon, if what is meant is union to the Achaian League, of which they had never been members. Orchomenos the Macedonian King kept to Tegea
united
to the
League.

¹ Pol. ii. 54.

² Plut. Ar. 45. Pol. ii. 58.

³ Pol. ii. 58. Γενναίως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτίμως δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἐκ μεταμελείας αὐτὸν [Κλεομένη] ἀμυναμένων.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 45. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀργείων τὴν πόλιν παρ' Ἀντιγόνου δωρεὰν λαβόντων καὶ κατοικεῖν ἐγνωκότων αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς αἰρεθεὶς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὃν ἐφηφίσαστο μηκέτι καλεῖν Μαντίνειαν, ἀλλ' Ἀντιγόνειαν, ὃ καὶ μέχρι νῦν καλεῖται· καὶ δοκεῖ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἢ μὲν ἐρατεινὴ Μαντίνεια παντάπασιν ἐξαληλφθαι, διαμένει δ' ἡ πόλις ἐπ' αὐνυμος τῶν ἀπολεσάντων καὶ ἀνελόντων τοὺς πολίτας. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 204.

⁵ Pol. ii. 70. Ἀποδοὺς τὴν πατριὸν πολιτείαν. This was after the battle of Sellasia, but the city was taken before. See c. 54.

CHAP. VII. himself; Polybios¹ complains that it was not united to the League. It is hard to see on what ground any such complaint could be made. It had never belonged to the League; if conquest confers any rights, Antigonos had a perfect right to keep it, and, as Polybios himself shows, he had excellent reasons for so doing.

Kleomenés
takes Me-
galopolis,
B. C. 222.

First men-
tion of
PHILO-
POIMEN.

Meanwhile Megalopolis had, through the whole war, steadily adhered to the Federal cause. The war had been originally undertaken in its defence, and, through its whole course, it had, more than any other city, borne the brunt of it. At last, in almost the latest stage of the war, when Kleomenés, shorn of all his allies and conquests, was bearing up alone with the soul of a hero and the skill of a general, a blow, well timed and ably struck, made him master of the Great City.² Lydiadas was gone, but Megalopolis contained a citizen worthy to take his place, in Philopoimén the son of Kraugis. He, while the mass of his countrymen fled to Messênê, headed a diversion which secured their retreat. He, when Kleomenés offered to restore their city unhurt on condition of their forsaking the League, exhorted them to endure everything in the cause of their country and their allies.³ Kleomenés, when his offers were rejected, utterly destroyed the city which, for a hundred and fifty years, had been at once the memorial and the pledge of Spartan humiliation.

It was on the field of Sellasia,⁴ one of the saddest

¹ iv. 6.

² Pol. ii. 55. Plut. Kl. 23.

³ So says Plutarch (Phil. 5. Kl. 24), who makes the Megalopolitans inclined to accept Kleomenés' offer till they are dissuaded by Philopoimén. Phylarchos, whom Polybios (ii. 61) seems to follow, describes them as hardly needing such dissuasion. They would not hear Kleomenés' letter to the end, and could hardly be kept from stoning the bearer.

⁴ The battle of Sellasia is commonly placed in the year B. C. 222; but the succession of summers and winters given by Polybios (ii. 54) would rather bring it to 221, in which it is placed by Bishop Thirlwall.

names in Grecian history, that the final struggle took place between Sparta and Macedonia for the headship of Greece. One hardly knows whether to count it as an aggravation or as an alleviation of the blow that it was partly dealt by Grecian hands. Philopoimên and the Achaian cavalry had a distinguished share in winning the victory. Philopoimên, like Lydiadas at Ladokeia, charged without orders, but he was somewhat better supported by Antigonos than his great countryman had been by Aratos. After a valiant struggle, the Lacedæmonians were defeated; Kleomenês endured to survive, and to wait in vain, in the despotic court of Egypt, for better times. Sparta now, for the first time since the return of the Hêracleids, opened her gates to a foreign conqueror. Antigonos treated her with the same politic lenity which he had shown everywhere except at Mantinea. It would be his policy to represent the war as waged, not against Sparta, but against her so called Tyrant. The innovations of Kleomenês were done away,¹ but Sparta was not required to join the Achaian League. Her compulsory and useless union was reserved for a later stage of our history.

CHAP. VII.

Battle of
Sellasia,
B.C. 221.Defeat and
exile of
Kleo-
menês.Antigonos'
treatment
of Sparta.

The death of Antigonos soon followed his settlement of Peloponnesian affairs. Aratos, who had sung pæans in his honour, gave him a bad character in his Memoirs.² It is hard to see the reason for this in his acts, and it clearly was not followed by Polybios. Antigonos, a King and a Macedonian, was far less blameworthy than Aratos, a Greek and a republican leader. An opportunity was offered him for recovering an old and precious pos-

Death and
character
of Anti-
gonos,
B.C. 221.

¹ Pol. ii. 70. Πολίτευμα τὸ πατριὸν αὐτοῖς καταστήσας. Cf. Plut. Kl. 30. It is doubtful whether Antigonos did, or did not, leave Brachyllas the Theban, for a time at least, with some authority at Sparta. See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 218. If he did, it must have been only with some temporary commission, like that of Prytanis at Megalopolis.

² Plut. Ar. 38. Ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι λοιδορῶν διετέλει. Kl. 16. Ἀντίγονον εἰρηκῶς κακὰ μυρία δι' ὧν ἀπολέλοιπεν ὑπομνημάτων. But see Pol. ii. 70.

CHAP. VII. session of his house, and of vastly extending the power and influence of his Crown. That he accepted it no man can wonder; one would be half inclined to blame him if he had not. And, if we do not see in his career the wonderful magnanimity ascribed to him by Achaian admirers, it was at least something to win so many cities with so little needless cruelty. Both Sparta and Athens, in the days of their power, had shed Grecian blood far more freely. Altogether Antigonos Dôson was a King who need not shrink from a comparison with any but the selected few, the Alfreds and the Akbars, among those whom the accident of birth has called to rule over their fellows. Himself only a distant kinsman of the royal house, born a subject, and called to the throne by popular election, he better knew how to deal with freemen than the mass of Kings and their satraps. We shall soon see how both Macedonia and Greece could be made to suffer at the hands of one born in the purple.

B.C. 281-
221.

New posi-
tion of the
League.

B.C. 221-
146.

We have thus, for sixty years, traced the growth of the League, from the union of two small Achaian towns, till it became the greatest power of Peloponnêsos and of Greece. We have seen it fall from its high estate through the envy of the man who had done most to raise it. We leave it now restored nearly to its full extent, with the exception of that mountain citadel, that key to its whole position, without which its extent was a mockery, and its freedom little better than a name. We have still, in the following Chapter, to continue its history for another period of seventy-five years, retaining its internal constitution, vastly increased in territorial extent, but, in external affairs, with only a few very short intervals, reduced almost to the condition of a dependent ally, first of Macedonia and then of Rome.

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE
PEACE OF EPEIROB. B.C. 221—205.

THE Macedonian intervention in Peloponnêsos, and the results of the battle of Sellasia, had wholly changed the aspect of Grecian affairs. The greater part of Greece was now united in an alliance, of which the King of Macedonia was the real, if not the acknowledged, head. Beside the Macedonian Kingdom and the Achaian League, this Confederacy included all the Federal powers of Northern Greece,¹ with the exception of Ætolia. The spectacle of so many Federal Commonwealths thus closely allied, both with one another and with a Government of another kind, gives this Confederacy a special interest in the eyes of a historian of Federalism. The formal relations between the several allied powers were apparently those of perfect equality. The extraordinary authority which the Achaians had conferred upon Antigonos seems to have lasted no longer than the duration of the Kleomenic War. It certainly did not descend to his successor Philip. But Achaia and other republican members of the Confederacy

CHAP. VIII.

State of
Greece
after the
fall of
Kleo-
menês.

Grand
Alliance
under
Mace-
donian
headship.

¹ Pol. iv. 9. "Ἐτι γὰρ ἔνορκος ἔμενε πᾶσιν ἡ γεγεννημένη συμμαχία δι' Ἀντιγόνου κατὰ τοὺς Κλεομενικοὺς καιροὺς Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἡπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι, Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, Ἀκαρνανῶσι, Θετταλοῖς. Ib. 15. Ἦν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα Ἀχαιοὺς ταῦτα, πρεσβεύειν πρὸς Ἡπειρώτας, Βοιωτοὺς, Φωκέας, Ἀκαρνανάς, Φίλιππον. The Thessalians, as nominally independent, were enrolled in the alliance ; but, as practically Macedonian subjects, they were not thought worthy of a formal embassy being sent to them.

CHAP. VIII. were exposed to all the dangers which commonly attend alliances between the weak and the strong. It would be too much to say that they stood to Macedonia in the relation of dependent alliance; but they seem to have stood practically in the same sort of subordination in which the Peloponnesian allies stood to Sparta at the beginning of the great Peloponnesian War.¹ Sparta had now, by the fall of Kleomenēs, been reduced to an unwilling union with the Allies.² Messênē was friendly to the Allies, but was not formally enrolled among them.³ This enumeration includes pretty nearly all Greece, except Athens, of which we have just now no mention, and Elis, which of course retained its old connexion with Ætolia. As for Ætolia itself, notwithstanding all that we have heard of danger from that quarter, the old alliance between the Achaian and Ætolian Leagues was not held to be dissolved by the new engagements of the Achaians.⁴ In like manner Ætolia stood towards Messênē also in a relation which is spoken of as one of friendship and alliance.⁵

Relations
of the
other
Greek
States.

Internal
and ex-
ternal
condition
of the
Achaian
League.

As for the Achaian League itself, its internal constitution remained unchanged. Its General, its Senate, and its Assembly still continued to exercise their old functions. There is no reason to suppose that their practical working had at all degenerated. Achaia still retained its mixture of moderate Democracy and moderate Aristocracy, its freedom

¹ See above, p. 458.

² Sparta does not occur in the list, but its relation is spoken of in the same passage (Pol. iv. 9) by the name of *συμμαχία*. So also c. 23.

³ The Messênians (Pol. iv. 9) ask for admission to the Confederacy (*ἡ κοινὴ συμμαχία*), which the Achaians cannot grant without the consent of the other allies.

⁴ Pol. iv. 15. "Ὅντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ [οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ] σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων. Cf. iv. 7, Κατετόλμησαν [οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ] ἐπιβῆναι στρατοπέδῳ τῆς Ἀχαιῆς, παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας.

⁵ Pol. iv. 15. So c. 6. Οὔτε τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς [Αἰτωλοῖς] ἐκ παλαιῶν χρόνων πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας οὐδ' ἡντιοῦν ποιησάμενοι πρόνοιαν. So c. 5. Μεσσηνίων . . . φίλων ὄντων καὶ συμμάχων.

from the rule alike of mobs, Tyrants, and Oligarchs. CHAP. VIII.
There is no evidence that the relations between the Federal Government and the several States were in any way altered. We hear of no discontents, even in those cities which had fallen away to Kleomenês and had been recovered by Antigonos.¹ Nor does it appear that, with the single exception of Mantinea, the position of any of those cities had become worse by reason of their temporary secession. In all this the work of Markos and of Aratos still bore its fruit. An orderly democratic Federation still held together a large number of Grecian cities, to which no other system could have given any measure of peace and good government. But for their Federal Union, those cities might either have been held in bondage by local Tyrants or else occupied by foreign garrisons; or, if free, they might have abused their freedom and wasted their strength in ceaseless border-warfare with one another. The League, even as it now stood, was a power with which Macedonia, and Rome herself, felt it prudent to deal cautiously, to respect constitutional forms, and to abstain, for a long time to come, from high-handed acts of violence. But the old strength and dignity of the League was gone. Its dimensions were curtailed; Megara was now Boeotian, and, what was of far more moment, Corinth was now Macedonian. Orchomenos too, in the heart of the Federal territory, was held as a Macedonian outpost. The whole position of the League was changed; it well nigh lost its power of independent action, when it sank into a single member of a great Alliance under Macedonian headship. The Achaian League, in short, still remained an important and well-governed Federal

¹ Megalopolis of course does not come under this head, and the dissensions of which we shall presently hear there (Pol. v. 93), seem to have been purely local, and not to have been at all connected with Federal questions.

CHAP. VIII. Commonwealth, more important than Akarnania, better governed than Boeotia. But it had wholly given up its old and glorious office as the destroyer of Tyrants, the humbler of Kings, the deliverer and the uniter of Hellas.

Undiminished influence of Aratos.

Aratos still retained his old position and his old influence. One would think that he must have bitterly repented the day when he preferred Antigonos to Kleomenês. One might have expected that the events of the Kleomenic War would have utterly overthrown his power. But he still remained, the same man in the same place. He was still the chief of the League, regularly chosen to its highest Magistracy as often as the Law allowed his election. He still retained his faculty of losing battles in the field and his faculty of winning votes in the Assembly. We find indeed a party hostile to him,¹ which, as before, could take advantage of his errors to raise a momentary storm against him. But, so often as this happened, he was still able to display his peculiar gift of allaying complaints and of strengthening his position by every attack made upon him. For his old career of surprising cities, of overthrowing or converting Tyrants, the present state of things allowed no room. It gave him instead an opportunity of displaying his peculiar powers in a way, less glorious indeed, but, as affairs now stood, no less indispensable.² The republican chief had stooped to become a courtier and a Minister; he had to act, if sometimes as the obsequious flatterer, yet sometimes also as the honest adviser, of two successive Kings. Putting aside his one great error, assuming the ignominious position in which his own fault had placed both himself and his country, his conduct in his new office is honour-

Relation of Aratos to the Macedonian Kings.

¹ Pol. iv. 14. Τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων κατηγορούντων αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ.

² Plut. Ar. 48. Ἐδόκει δὲ πᾶσι ὁ Ἀρατος οὐ μόνον δημοκρατίας ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθὸς εἶναι παιδαγωγός.

able enough. We must now look on him as a sort of CHAP. VIII. Minister for Peloponnesian Affairs, first to Antigonos and then to Philip. In this position, we find his obsequiousness mainly confined to acts of homage which, if degrading, were merely formal. The counsels which he gives are commonly both prudent and honourable; even in his new and fallen position, the personal worth and dignity of the old republican leader stand forth in marked contrast to the utter villainy of the Macedonian courtiers. He paid the penalty of royal friendship;¹ like the Jehoiada of Jewish, and the Seneca of Roman, history, he undertook the guidance of a lion's whelp whose harmlessness was confined to the days of childhood.²

Yet at this very moment the League possessed a citizen, Character
of PHILO-
POIMEN. perhaps not endowed with all the varied gifts of her old chief, but a man, on the whole, of higher aims, and especially eminent in those very respects in which Aratos was so lamentably wanting. Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, had produced, in Philopoimên, a worthy successor of that hero. Assuming, as a native of Megalopolis could hardly fail to assume, that Kleomenês was to be resisted to the uttermost, Philopoimên had displayed, in the last stage of the Kleomenic War, every quality of a great citizen and a great soldier. A discerning historian has well remarked that the natural places of the two successive chiefs of the League seem to have been transposed by fortune.³ Had Philopoimên been in the place of Aratos, fewer surprises and diplomatic triumphs might have been won; but the Achaian phalanx and the Achaian General would never have become the laughing-stock of Peloponnêsos. What Philopoimên might have made of the Achaian army in

¹ Plut. Ar. 52. Ταῦτ', εἶπεν, ὁ Κεφάλων, ἐπὶ χεῖρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φίλιος.

² Æsch. Ag. 699. "Ἐθρεψεν δὲ λέοντα, κ.τ.λ. Aristoph. Frogs, 1427. Οἱ χερὶ λέοντος σκόμενον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν.

³ Thirlwall, viii. 406. Cf. Liddell's History of Rome, ii. 80.

CHAP. VIII. better times we may judge by seeing what he did make of it when Achaian armies were beginning to be useless. As a general, he needed only a wider field to have been the rival of his contemporaries Hannibal and Scipio. The man who at once transformed such military materials as Aratos had left him into an army capable of winning a pitched battle over Lacedæmonians was, in his own sphere, as great a commander as either of them. His policy, as well as that of Aratos, sometimes erred on the side of too great eagerness for the extension of the League. This error took a characteristic form in each of the two men. Aratos sometimes pushed the arts of the diplomatist almost to the verge of treachery; Philopoimên sometimes pushed the honest vigour of the soldier beyond the verge of violence and vindictiveness. In internal Federal politics, we find him the author of reforms designed to carry out in greater fulness the true ideas of Federal union and equality. These great qualities might have been of eminent use in the days of Aratos; in the days of Philopoimên they were nearly thrown away. During a great part of his life, all that he could do was, by a policy neither servile nor obstinate, to mitigate the bitterness of Roman encroachment, and to ward off the day of final bondage. For this purpose we can hardly doubt that the unrivalled diplomatic powers of Aratos would have been more useful than the straightforward energy of Philopoimên. He was a brave soldier and an upright citizen, but he had no special gift of influencing the minds of Macedonian Kings or Roman Proconsuls. Philopoimên, in short, was one of the heroes who struggle against fate, who are allowed to do no more than to stave off a destruction which it is beyond their power to avert.

Comparison
between
Philopoimên
and
Aratos.

Temporary withdrawal It is very remarkable that, for several years after the beginning of our present period, we lose sight of Philo-

poimên altogether.¹ His conduct at Sellasia procured him the marked notice of Antigonos. The King made him the most splendid offers; ^{CHAP. VIII.} wealth and high command were ^{of Philo-} ready for him, if he would only enter the Macedonian ^{poimên} service. That Philopoimên utterly refused to sell himself from Peloponnêsos. for all that Macedonia could give is no more than we should have expected from his general character. But his conduct in other respects is not so intelligible. He went into Crete to learn the art of war amid the constant local struggles of that island. While there, he contrived to do his country some at least apparent service, by extending her alliance among the Cretan cities.² But if Philopoimên wanted a field of action, why did he not seek it in Peloponnêsos? Why did he refuse to his own country the direct advantage of his skill and valour in the struggle with Ætolia which we are just about to record? History gives no answer to this question; but an obvious conjecture presents itself. ^{Probable explanation of his conduct.} Philopoimên absented himself from Peloponnêsos during the whole remaining life of Aratos; shortly after his death he returned. Was he warned by the example of the great citizen whom Megalopolis must still have been bewailing? Did he see that it was as hopeless for him as it had been for Lydiadas to depose Aratos from the first place in the League, and that, while Aratos held the first place in the League, his own great qualities would be as much thrown away as those of Lydiadas had been? He may have had no mind to enter on a vain rivalry, which was certain to issue in his being baffled and rejected in the Assembly, which was not unlikely to issue in his being forsaken, or even betrayed, on another

¹ Brandstätter (358) strangely introduces him, without any explanation, into the middle of the Social War, transferring thither an exploit which happened ten years later. See Plut. Phil. 7. Thirlwall, viii. 290.

² Plut. Phil. 7. He refused, according to his biographer, *μάλιστα τὴν τοῦ φέσων καταμαθὼν πρὸς τὸ ἀρχεσθαι δυσκόλως καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχουσιν*.

See Thirlwall, viii. 287.

CHAP. VIII. field of Ladokeia. He might do his country more real service by winning foreign states to her alliance, and by gaining, in a school of foreign war, the military experience which might one day be useful to her. Possibly the highest patriotism of all might have bid him devote himself to the immediate service of his country, at all hazards, under whatever difficulties, and in however subordinate a post. But the conjecture on which I have ventured seems to explain, in a way neither improbable nor wholly dishonourable to Philopoimên, a line of conduct which at first sight seems altogether inexplicable.

Accession
of Philip,
B.C. 221.

Causes of
the Social
War.

The death of Antigonos so soon after his victory at Sellasia seemed to promise some of those disturbances and revolutions which commonly attended a change of rulers in Macedonia. Young Philip however succeeded to the throne without opposition, but the accession of a prince who had scarcely emerged from boyhood opened a prospect to those who hoped to profit by any momentary weakness of Macedonia and her allies. It was, according to Polybios, the restless rapacity of the Ætolians which seized on so favourable an opportunity for the ravages which led to the struggle known as the Social War.¹ As we now have the direct narrative of Polybios, and no longer his mere introductory sketch, we know far more of the details of this war than of that which ended at Sellasia. But its inherent interest is far less. It has none of the heroic charm which attaches to the names of Lydiadas and Kleomenês; and the Achaian League itself no longer acts the primary part. It will be enough for our purpose here, as throughout the history, to run hastily over the purely military events, stopping only to comment on points which either illustrate Federal politics or throw light on the characters of the great Federal politicians.

¹ Ὁ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος. (Pol. iv. 13.) The War of the Leagues, or rather of the Confederacies, might perhaps better express the meaning.

§ 1. *The Social War.*

B.C. 221—217.

We have seen that most of the Ætolian possessions in Peloponnêsos had fallen into the hands, first of Kleomenês, and then of the Achaians or their Macedonian protector. The Ætolians however still retained the smaller city of Phigaleia, lying on the confines of Arkadia, Messênê, and Elis. The town stood to the Ætolian League in that doubtful relation in which we find so many of its outlying possessions; its inhabitants bore the name of citizens,¹ but their condition probably approached nearer to that of subjects, or, at best, of dependent allies. Phigaleia could not have been valuable to Ætolia in any way but as a military post; it was held by an Ætolian Governor,² and therefore doubtless by an Ætolian garrison also. Soon after the accession of Philip, Dorimachos, the Ætolian commander at Phigaleia, began to be guilty of various acts of plunder on the neighbouring and friendly territory of Messênê. A strange diplomatic quarrel followed,³ which led to the most bitter hatred on the part of Dorimachos towards those whom he had injured. In conjunction with a kinsman and kindred spirit named Skopas, and with the connivance of the Ætolian

CHAP. VIII.

Timoxenos
General
of Achaia,
B.C. 221-
220.

Phigaleia
held by the
Ætolians.

Dori-
machos
plunders
Messênê,
B.C. 221.

¹ Pol. iv. 3. Ἐπύχανε δὲ τότε συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. But we soon afterwards (iv. 79) find the Phigaleians dissatisfied with the Ætolian connexion, which there is called *συμμαχία*.

² Dorimachos was sent, according to Polybios (iv. 3), λόγῳ μὲν παραφύλαξιν τὴν τε χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Φιγαλέων, ἔργῳ δὲ κατασκόπου τάξιν ἔχων τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πραγμάτων. Brandstätter (342) asks, with some simplicity, "War das etwas so Schlimmes?" There is something really amusing in this writer's half apologies for his clients.

³ See Pol. iv. 4 and, more briefly, Thirlwall, viii. 233.

CHAP. VIII. General Aristôn,¹ but without any sort of authority from either the Popular Assembly or the Senate,² he planned a series of incursions which amounted, as Polybios expresses it, to a declaration of war against Messênê, Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Macedonia, all at once.³ Various acts of aggression on all these states followed; among other things, a fort named Klarion, in the territory of Megalopolis, was seized upon, but the Ætoliens were soon driven out by the Achaian General Timoxenos, with the help of Tauriôn, the Macedonian commander at Corinth. An Ætolian army also passed through the western cantons of the old Achaia; its leaders indeed disclaimed all hostile intentions, but their followers passed on to Phigaleia, plundering as they went, and from Phigaleia they began the devastation of Messênê in good earnest.

Extensive
incursions
of the
Ætoliens.

May,
B.C. 220.

The narrative of these events brings forward one or two points of political interest, of which I have already spoken in my general description of the Achaian Constitution. The Ætoliens chose for the time of their inroad the season when the Achaian official year was drawing to its close, when Achaia, in short, was in the throes of a Presidential election. Timoxenos, the General actually in office, was a friend and partisan of Aratos, and apparently no opposition was expected to the election, according to the usual custom, of Aratos himself as his

¹ Aristôn had some bodily infirmity (*διὰ τινος σωματικῆς ἀσθενείας*) which disqualified him from service; he was a kinsman of Dorimachos and Skopas; practically the chief power was in the hands of Dorimachos. Pol. iv. 5.

² Pol. ii. 8. Κατὰ κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμα παρακαλεῖν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς, κ.τ.λ. οὔτε κοινῇ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξάμεναι σύνοδον οὔτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμετεδόντες, κ.τ.λ.

³ Pol. ii. 8. Κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁρμῶς καὶ κρίσεις διαλαβόντες ἅμα Μεσσηνίους, Ἠπειρώταις, Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἀκαρνανῶσι, Μακεδόσι, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν. Of course this does not imply, but excludes, any formal declaration of war by Ætolia against all these powers.

successor.¹ Still the Ætolians knew² that even so slight a change would cause some additional weakness in the Government, and that the holding of the regular Spring Assembly for the election would draw away most of the leading men from the defence of their homes. At this moment the Ætolians marched, plundering as they went, through the cantons of Patrai, Pharai, and Dymé. The Assembly met; Aratos was elected General for the next year, but he would not, by Achaian Law, immediately enter upon his office. The Assembly also decreed that help should be sent to Messênê, that the existing General should summon the whole military force of the nation in arms, and that the body thus gathered together should be invested with the ordinary powers of the regular Assembly.³ Timoxenos was unwilling to enter upon any important business, whether civil or military, just before

CHAP. VIII.

Invasion during a Presidential Election.

Aratos General, B.C. 220-219.

¹ Polybios' (iv. 6) words are, ἐν ᾧ λοιπὸς ἦν Τιμοξένῳ μὲν ὀλίγος ἔτι χρόνος τῆς ἀρχῆς, Ἀρατος δὲ καθίστατο μὲν εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶόντα στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὕτω δὲ ἔμελλε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔξειν. These words, by themselves, would most naturally imply that Aratos was already actually General-Elect. But, directly after (c. 7), ἡ καθήκουσα ἐκ τῶν νόμων σύνοδος—that is, surely, the regular Spring Meeting of the year B.C. 220—comes together. At this Meeting the injured cantons complain of the Ætolian aggression; the inroad therefore must have been before the actual day of meeting. After the Meeting, Timoxenos is still actually in office, though Aratos is known to be his successor. We must therefore infer that Aratos was formally elected at the Meeting mentioned in c. 7, and that the words of Polybios in c. 6, only imply that his election was, before the Meeting, an understood thing, to which no opposition would be made. He was then, at the time described in c. 6, not General-Elect, but what some people would call General-Designate.

So in the American Presidential interregnum there are two stages. There is first the interval between the election of electors (which practically determines the election of the President) and the formal election of the President himself; there is secondly the interval between the formal election of the President, and his actual "Inauguration."

² That the Ætolians really had an eye to all this, is manifestly implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 6), παρατηρήσαντες τὸν καιρὸν.

³ Pol. iv. 7. See above, p. 275. The small attendance at the regular Meeting may be understood, if no opposition was to be offered to the election of the General.

CHAP. VIII. the end of his term of office.¹ Moreover he distrusted the military efficiency of his countrymen; their defeats in the early part of the Kleomenic War, and the habit of looking for Macedonian help which had grown upon them during its later years, had greatly relaxed the courage and discipline of the nation.² Timoxenos therefore delayed carrying out the resolution of the Assembly. Aratos, on the other hand, seems to have been seized with a sudden fit of military enthusiasm. He who had been the quench-coal to the warlike ardour of Lydiadas and Aristomachos now began to complain of the delays and lack of energy of Timoxenos.³ He felt sure that nothing effectual could be done till the reins of power were again in his own hands. He at last actually prevailed on Timoxenos to give up to him the seal, the badge of the Presidential office, five days before the legal time.⁴ Aratos at once issued his summons to the several cities;⁵ the military Assembly met under arms at Megalo-

Aratos
enters on
office
before the
legal time.

¹ Pol. iv. 7. "Ὅσον οὐπω ληγούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς. In the American War, in the year 1777, we find the operations of part of the American force hampered by a cause which, though not exactly the same, reminds one of this affair of Timoxenos and Aratos.

"The usual difficulty of obtaining the service of the militia, was at this time very much increased, by an event by no means common. The time for which the governor [of New Jersey] was elected had expired, and no new election had been made. The late executive, therefore, did not think himself authorized to take any measures as an executive, and had not General Dickinson ventured to order out the militia by his own authority, they could not have been put in motion." Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 206.

² Pol. u.s. "Ἀμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ βραθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαν, κ.τ.λ. So Plut. Ar. 47. ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες ἐν ἀργίᾳ πολλῇ καὶ ἀταξίᾳ διήγον.

³ Pol. u.s. Σχετλιόζων καὶ παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν θυμικώτερον ἐχρήτο τοῖς πράγμασιν. The ἀλλοτριότης spoken of directly after means hostility to the Ætolians, not to Timoxenos. See Lucas, p. 98, note.

⁴ Pol. u.s. So Plut. Ar. 47. See above, p. 299.

⁵ Pol. u.s. Πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἔγραψε—This is the usual formula.

polis, and acted in all respects as if it had been the regular Assembly at Aigion.¹ It received Messénian Ambassadors who asked for the admission of their city to the Grand Alliance.² The Achaian Government³ answered that the Achaians could not admit them without the consent of the other members of the Confederacy, but that they would themselves help them on the delivery of hostages to be kept at Sparta. The campaign which followed displayed, on the part of Aratos, something which even Polybios can only describe as the height of folly.⁴ He was not only beaten in the field as usual, but he had the incredible folly to send away the greater part of his army, and to allow himself to be altogether out-generalled. He underwent a defeat at Kaphyai, which was almost as destructive as any which he had undergone at the hands of Kleomenés. The Ætolians traversed Peloponnésos without opposition, and at last returned home by way of the Isthmus.⁵

CHAP. VIII.

Military
Assembly
at Mega-
lopolis,
B.C. 220.Disgrace-
ful cam-
paign of
Aratos.His de-
feat at
Kaphyai.

¹ Polybios calls them *πλήθος* (iv. 9) and *ἄχαιοι* (iv. 7), just like the regular Assembly.

² Pol. iv. 9. See above, p. 500. Drumann (p. 464) mistakes this for an application for admission to the Achaian League. For that purpose the word used would have been *πολιτεία* or *συμπολιτεία*, not *συμμαχία*.

³ Pol. iv. 9. *Οἱ προσεστώτες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν*, that is, the *δημιουργοί*. The proposal for the Messénian alliance being contrary to treaty, the *δημιουργοί* would not put it to the vote; but the promise of Achaian help must have required a vote of the Meeting.

⁴ Pol. iv. 11. *Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡγεμόνες* [he tries to veil the real culprit by the plural form] *οὕτω κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν ὥσθ ὑπερβολὴν ἀνοίας μὴ καταλιπεῖν*.

⁵ Pol. iv. 13. *Κατὰ τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἐποίησαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν*. So Schorn (142), "Kehrten nach Verheerung der Gegend von Sicyon durch den Isthmus nach Hause zurück," and Thirlwall (viii. 238), "Returned home by the Isthmus." Lucas (p. 103) seems to take the words *ἐποίησαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν* in the sense of "disbanded" or "separated"—"gingen auf dem Isthmus auseinander." He adds, "wo also für sie, etwa in Megara, freundliches Gebiet sein musste." But Megara was now (see above, p. 479) part of the Boeotian Confederation, therefore part of the Macedonian Confederacy. Also the Isthmus would be in any case a strange place to disband, with a Macedonian garrison at Corinth, and the hostile territory of Boeotia to be passed through.

CHAP. VIII. An Achaian Assembly was held a few days after the departure of the Ætolians. The national feeling was strong against Aratos. He had displayed unusual zeal for action; he had seized on office prematurely and illegally; and his haste had led only to greater national ignominy, and to the display of greater military incapacity, than ever. His political adversaries strongly pressed all the disgraceful points of the campaign, in accusations of which Polybios has preserved to us the heads.¹ One would be still more anxious to read the answer of Aratos. For answer he did, and with wonderful effect. Helpless as he had been on the battle-field of Kaphyai, in the parliamentary campaign of Aigion he was irresistible. We gather from Polybios that he denied some of the charges, asked indulgence upon others, and was eloquent about his old exploits. Anyhow he contrived, as he had so often done before, to turn the tide of popular feeling in his own favour. He succeeded in diverting the public indignation from himself to his accusers, and he again found himself directing the counsels of the League with all his old influence.²

Votes
of the
Achaian

At the same time the Assembly passed a series of decrees for the conduct of the war.³ The General was to gather a fresh army, and to concert measures with the Governments of Lacedæmon and Messênê for the common defence against the Ætolians. Ambassadors were also sent to all the members of the Grand Alliance,⁴ at once asking for help and proposing the admission of Messênê into the Confederacy. An Ætolian Assembly was held

¹ Pol. iv. 14.

² Pol. u.s. *Περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς ἅπαντα βουλευέσθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἀράτου γνώμην.* Schorn (p. 142) might have spared the remark, "Wie anders würde sein Loos ausgefallen sein, wenn er ein Athener gewesen wäre!"—at least if it is meant as a censure upon Athens. Surely Athenian confidence in Nikias and Phôkiôn was well nigh as blind as Achaian confidence in Aratos.

³ Pol. iv. 15.

⁴ See above, p. 499.

about the same time, and it passed a decree which, on first hearing, sounds incredibly strange and contradictory.¹ The Ætoli-
 ans, allies of the Achaiaans, allies of the Messênians, voted to keep the peace with the Lacedæmonians, Messênians, and everybody else, the Achaiaans included, unless the Achaiaans admitted the Messênians into their alliance. This last course they would look upon as a *casus belli*. Such a decree, in its naked form, seems so preposterous that we cannot help suspecting that there must be something behind, which our Achaian informants have not told us. The terms of alliance between Ætolia and Messênê may well have contained some provision which would be infringed by an alliance between Messênê and Achaia. The alliance between Ætolia and Achaia was of course an equal alliance, a partnership on equal terms between two great Confederations of nearly equal power. As allies on such terms, Ætolia and Achaia had, in better days, appeared side by side as the defenders of Greece against barbarian inroads. But we may doubt whether an alliance between Ætolia and Messênê was an alliance on perfectly equal terms. Messênê was not annexed; it did not become part of the Ætolian League;² it retained a perfectly distinct Government of its own.³ But all this is quite consistent with a state of practical, and even formal, dependence.

CHAP. VIII.
 and
 Ætolian
 Assem-
 blies.

Probable
 explana-
 tion of the
 Ætolian
 Vote.

Relations
 between
 Ætolia and
 Messênê.

¹ Pol. iv. 15. Πράγμα πάντων ἀλογώτατον. Lucas (p. 104) seems to see nothing wonderful in it.

² The word used to express the connexion between Ætolia and Messênê is always *συνμαχία*, not *συμπολιτεία*. Neither of these words implies anything as to the terms of union, but each implies a union of a different kind. *Σύμμαχοι* may be either equal or dependent allies; *συμπολῖται* may be either really equal citizens or *cives sine suffragio*. But *σύμμαχοι* are always mere allies of some kind; *συμπολῖται* are always actual citizens of some kind. *Συνμαχία* is union (forced or willing) in a mere *Confederacy*, *συμπολιτεία* is union (forced or willing) in a *Confederation*.

³ The Messênian Government at this time was oligarchic (Pol. iv. 32); the chief magistrates bore the Spartan title of Ephor (Pol. iv. 4). Polybios applies the term *συναρχαίαι* to their meetings, as to those of the Achaian *δημιουργοί*. See above, p. 282.

CHAP. VIII. Messênê may well have stood to Ætolia in much the same relation in which Chios and Mitylênê had once stood to Athens.¹ Had Sparta, even when Sparta was the friend and ally of Athens, interfered, either in a friendly or in a hostile way, in Chian or Mitylênaian affairs, such interference would certainly have been looked upon by Athens as a breach of friendship and alliance on the part of Sparta. If the present case was at all similar, we can understand the otherwise unintelligible vote of the Ætolian Congress. Their motive was doubtless what Polybios tells us; they wished to isolate the several Peloponnesian states, in order that each, when isolated, might be the better exposed to their rapacity. But nations and governments do not commonly avow such motives, however commonly they may act upon them. The Ætolians may have been robbers and pirates, but they were not fools or madmen; their Federal Assembly would hardly have passed a resolution utterly repugnant not only to International Law, but to common sense. The received policy of Ætolia was not so much to do acts of avowed injustice by the national authority as to connive at gross misconduct on the part of individual officers. The doings of Dorimachos and Skopas at this very time had all been done without any commission from the Ætolian Senate or Assembly. Those bodies might affect to be ignorant of what had happened, or even, as the words of the resolution may perhaps imply, gravely to condemn it. The historian tells us, doubtless with great truth, that the Ætolians rejected all demands for reparation, and rejected them with mockery.² But such mockery may well have taken a diplomatic form.

¹ See above, p. 25.

² Pol. iv. 16. Οὐδ' ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν [Αἰτωλοὶ] τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεχλεύαζον εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ἐς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ καὶ νῆ Δία τῶν μελλόντων. Is the invocation of Zeus a flourish of the Ætolians or of the historian himself?

No mockery could be more bitter than a grave answer that the Federal Government of Ætolia was guiltless of inroads on Achaia or Messênê; that, if Ætolian citizens had mis-conducted themselves—say, by plundering Messênian lands or by defeating the Achaian General at Kaphyai—such Ætolian wrong-doers, while on Achaian or Messênian territory, were subject to Achaian or Messênian law. An Ætolian Assembly, in such a frame of mind, when it heard of the application of Messênê to be admitted into the Achaio-Macedonian Alliance, might well vote any such admission to be a breach of friendly relations with Ætolia. In all this there would be not a little solemn and transparent hypocrisy. But it is with such solemn and transparent hypocrisy that international disputes are most commonly carried on, very seldom with the monstrous and irrational impudence which the words of the Ætolian resolution seem at first sight to imply.

The Achaian Embassies to King Philip and to the Epeirot League were so far successful that both those powers gave their consent to the admission of Messênê into the alliance.¹ But neither Epeiros nor Macedonia as yet sent any succours. All Greece, we are told, was so familiar with the evil deeds of the Ætolians that they did not excite any particular emotion. Both the King and the League refused for the present to declare war.² The

Achaian
Embassies
to Mac-
donia and
Epeiros.

¹ Pol. iv. 16. Οἱ δ' Ἡπειρώται καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσαντες τῶν πρεσβέων τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίους εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν προσέλαβον. That is, they gave their consent to their admission; they could not admit them of their own act, any more than their Achaians could. Their formal admission would take place at the general Congress of the Confederacy of which we shall presently hear.

² Pol. u.s. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένοις παραυτίκα μὲν ἡγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλείον ἐθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς. διόπερ οὐδ' ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλείον, ἀλλ' ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην ὅγειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς· οὕτως ἡ συνεχὴς ἀδικία συγγνώμῃς τυγχάνει μᾶλλον τῆς σπανίου καὶ παραδόξου πονηρίας.

CHAP. VIII. Ætolians therefore continued their career of iniquity.

Ætolian incursions in Peloponnēsos. They procured Skerdilaidos the Illyrian and Dēmētrios of Pharos to ravage the coasts of Peloponnēsos, while three Ætolian leaders, Dorimachos, Skopas, and Agelaos,¹

pressed on into the heart of the peninsula. They carried with them Ætolian troops in vast numbers; it was in fact an invasion of Achaia by the whole force of Ætolia.² Still there was no avowed national action; all was the private piracy of particular Ætolian chiefs; it was Agelaos who, of his own authority, made an alliance with Skerdilaidos; it was Dorimachos who, of his own authority, besieged and sacked a city of the Achaian League. The Ætolian Government knew nothing about it; the Ætolian President sat still at home, wondering what all his countrymen were gone after, and professing that he at least had no war with Achaia, but was at peace with all the world.³ Polybios argues that such conduct was extremely foolish;⁴ so it doubtless was on the principle that honesty is the best policy; but it really was little more than a stronger case than usual of an attempt to throw dust into men's eyes by diplomatic insincerity. Meanwhile Dorimachos pressed on. He was invited by a party⁵ in Kynaitha, that

Insincerity of the Ætolian Government.

¹ This seems to be the same Agelaos of Naupaktos whom we shall afterwards find acting in a more honourable character.

² Pol. iv. 16. *Συναθροίσαντες πανδημεὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Ἀχαΐαν μετὰ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν.*

³ Ib. 17. *Ἀρίστων δ' ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγός, οὐ προσποιούμενος οὐδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων, ἦγε τὴν ἰσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας, φάσκων οὐ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ διατηρεῖν τὴν εἰρήνην.* The comment of Lucas (p. 105) is curious. "Wenigstens hatten die Aetoler den Krieg gegen die Achäer nicht angefangen und ihn selbst jetzt nur für den Fall erklärt, wenn die Bundesgenossenschaft mit den Messeniern eingegangen würde. Behauptete ihr Strategos, doch wohl öffentlich, nur in diesem Sinne, das die Aetoler Frieden gegen die Achäer hielten."

⁴ Ib. *Εὐθὺς καὶ παιδικὸν πρᾶγμα ποιεῖν.*

⁵ Ib. 16. *Πραττομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλεως.* It is clear however from the narrative which follows that the Ætolian faction was only a small party in the city.

turbulent Arkadian city whose internal dissensions have been already mentioned.¹ We left Kynaitha an Achaian city, occupied by a Federal garrison. The ruling party were well affected to the present state of things, and the exiles professed anxiety to return home and dwell peaceably as citizens of the Achaian League. With the consent of the Federal Government,² the exiles were readmitted. At the same time the Federal garrison was withdrawn; it had been a necessary precaution in days of dissension; it was no longer needed now that Kynaitha was again an united commonwealth. Some of the exiles were leading citizens, who had in former times held the office of Polemarch.³ The reconciliation was in appearance so perfect that the exiled Polemarchs were restored to their office. But the confidence both of the Kynaithaians and of the Federal Government was infamously abused. The office of Polemarch involved the care of the city-gates; the restored Polemarchs slew their colleagues, and opened the gates to Dorimachos. They gained little by their perfidy; the Ætolians plundered, slew, and even tortured⁴ all parties without distinction; they then offered the town to their Eleian friends, who prudently declined it; next, they left it in the hands of an Ætolian garrison; finally, on hearing of the approach of Macedonian succours, the

CHAP. VIII.
Affairs of
Kynaitha.

Return
of the Ky-
naithaian
Exiles.

Kynaitha
betrayed
to Dori-
machos.

Horrible
sack of
Kynaitha
by the
Ætolians.

¹ See above, p. 403.

² Pol. iv. 17. Οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν πόλιν ἐπρόσβευον [on this word see above, p. 448] πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος, βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις. ἐπιχωρησάντων δ' ἐτόλμως διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι σφίσι δμοφτέρους ἐννοήσεις, κ.τ.λ.

³ From the description given of their duties, one may doubt whether the Polemarchs were the chief magistrates of Kynaitha. The Athenian Polemarch, it may be remembered, completely changed his functions at an early stage of the Democracy.

⁴ Pol. iv. 18. Ἐστρέβλωσαν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν Κυναϊθῶν, οἷς ἠπίστησαν ἔχειν κεκρυμμένον διάφορον ἢ κατασκευάσμα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν πλείονος ἀξίων. On this excess of cruelty, so unusual in Grecian warfare, I have made some remarks in my second Chapter, p. 57.

CHAP. VIII. garrison burned the city and departed. Meanwhile Dorimachos continued his devastations. He summoned Kleitôr to revolt from the Achaian League, and to become an ally of Ætolia.¹ But here the citizens gallantly resisted. Aratos, all this time, remembering, doubtless his unlucky rashness earlier in the year, did nothing at all. The Ætolians again returned home undisturbed; but Tauriôn won over the faithless Dêmétrios to the Macedonian interest, and the Pharian's share in the campaign ended with a devastation of the coast of Ætolia.

Phillip at
Corinth.

The young King of Macedonia had by this time made up his mind to assist his allies in earnest. He marched with an army to Corinth—now his own city—but he came too late; the Ætolians were already gone. He then sent letters summoning a general Congress of all the Allies at Corinth, and he meanwhile advanced into Peloponnésos as far as Tegea, with a view of settling the affairs of Lacedæmon. We here sadly feel our want of a Spartan historian, or at least of one not writing wholly in the Achaian interest. During the Kleomenic War, Plutarch's Life of the Spartan King gives us at least an echo of the reports on the Spartan side; but now we have to trust wholly to Polybios. In his view, Antigonos and the Achaians had been the greatest of benefactors to Sparta; they had freed her from a Tyrant, and had restored to her her ancient constitution and laws.² Sparta was bound to the Macedonian Alliance by every tie of thankfulness, and

Affairs of
Sparta,
B.C. 222-
220,

¹ Pol. iv. 19. Ἀποστάντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμμαχίαν. This sounds as if the Kleitorians were offered mere alliance, and not incorporation on any terms. But see above, p. 507, note 1.

² Pol. iv. 16. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, προσφάτως μὲν ἡλευθερωμένοι δ' Ἀντιγόνου καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτιμίας, δφείλοντες δὲ Μακεδόσι καὶ Φιλίππῳ μὴδὲν ὑπερναντίον πράττειν. He repeats the words προσφάτως ἡλευθερωμένοι δι' Ἀντιγόνου in c. 22, and in the same chapter, in the speech of Ademantos, we read of τοὺς Μακεδόνας εὐεργέτας καὶ σωτήρας.

every step on her part contrary to Achaian or Macedonian interests was a sin of the blackest ingratitude. Since the departure of Kleomenēs, the throne had been carefully kept vacant,¹ a fact which may surely be taken as implying that Sparta still looked upon him as her lawful King. Kleomenēs was not a Harold or a Sebastian, living only in the fond imagination of a heart-sick people; the hero of Sparta still lived, dwelling indeed in the house of bondage, but not without hope of being one day restored to his home and kingdom.² The government was in the hands of a College of Ephors, whose opinions are described as being divided, three favouring the Ætolians and two favouring the Allies.³ The Ætolian party was also the Kleomenic party, not assuredly out of any love towards Ætolia for her own sake, but because Ætolia represented opposition to Philip and the Achaians. In this divided state of things, troops were sent to support Aratos in his unlucky campaign, but Polybios implies that there was no real intention of giving the Achaians any effective help,⁴ and he even goes so far as to charge the Lacedæmonians—that is, doubtless, the majority among the Ephors—with concluding a secret treaty with the Ætolians.⁵ More violent measures now followed; Adeimantos, one of the philippizing Ephors, was murdered, together with some citizens of his party, with the connivance—so our Achaian historian tells us—of his colleagues of the other party.⁶ Other

Disturbances at Sparta.

¹ Pol. iv. 22, 35. The later passage is more emphatic; *πολιτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ πατρία σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἐκπτώσιν, οὐδ' ἐπενόησαν οὐδέποτε βασιλεῖς καταστήσαι τῆς Σπάρτης*. A strange turn is given to the fact by Pausanias (ii. 9. 3); *Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἄσμενοι Κλεομένους ἀπαλλαγέντες βασιλεύεσθαι μὲν οὐκέτι ἠξίωσαν*.

² Pol. iv. 35. *Οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ Κλεομένη καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὐνοίαν, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ καὶ προσδοκίαν ἔχοντες τῆς ἐκεῖνου παρουσίας ἅμα καὶ σωτηρίας*.

³ Ib. 22.

⁴ Ib. 9. *Ἐφέδρων καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ συμμάχων ἔχοντες τάξιν*. So c. 19, *στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ δοκεῖν μόνον*.

⁵ Ib. 16.

⁶ Ib. 22.

CHAP. VIII. citizens of Macedonian politics fled to Philip, who gave audience at Tegea both to them and to an Embassy from the *de facto* Government.¹ The envoys affirmed that the persons who had been killed had been the real cause of the disturbance, and they professed their own full intention to discharge towards the King every obligation of faithful allies.² The debate which followed is well

Philip sits
in judge-
ment
on the
Spartan
parties at
Tegea.

worthy of attention. It sets Philip before us in a light personally honourable, but it shows how effectually Aratos had done his evil work. The Macedonian King sits in one Greek city to decide the fate of another. That it rests with him to preserve or to destroy Sparta no one seems to doubt. Everything is made to depend on the King's personal sense of justice and expediency; we as yet see only Philip sober and are not introduced to Philip drunk, but we see that, drunk or sober, Philip is equally master of Peloponnêsos. There were not wanting counsellors who exhorted him to make an example of Sparta, such as his great predecessor had made of Thebes. No reasonable man could doubt that those now in power at Sparta were wholly in the interest of Ætolia, and that the victims of the late disturbance had perished solely on account of their attachment to Macedonia. Sparta had once been spared; she had abused the mercy of Antigonos; her day of grace was now past, and her destruction would be only an act of exemplary justice. But the counsels which finally prevailed with the young King were of a milder kind. According to Polybios, Aratos was their inspiring spirit.³ This we may well believe, but we may also well believe that Philip, young and as yet uncorrupted, was himself

¹ Pol. iv. 23. Οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων: a formula applied to the Spartan Ephors, as to the Achaian *δημιουργοί*.

² Ib. Πάντα δ' ὑπισχνούνται ποιῆσειν αὐτοὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὰ κατὰ τῆς συμμαχίας.

³ Ib. 24.

disposed to take the more generous part.¹ Aratos, save in that one terrible year of Secession, had never been a man of blood or an advocate of violent measures. We may fairly ascribe to him the answer which was finally given by the King, one which forestalls some principles of international right which modern diplomatists are only just beginning to understand. As such, it does him the highest honour. But one cannot help wishing that it had been dictated by him in the Assembly at Aigion, as a free President of the Achaian League, rather than suggested in Philip's council-chamber at Tegea in his new character of Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs. King Philip was made to answer that the Lacedæmonian Government had been guilty of no crime against the common Alliance ; that he accepted their professions of faithfulness to it, and exhorted them to continue in the same mind ; that the internal crimes and revolutions of any allied city were matters which did not come under his cognizance, so long as the city itself adhered to its public obligations. He might exhort and recommend as an ally, but he was entitled to go no further, except when the common alliance was violated, and then only in concert with all the other allies.² Sounder doctrines were never put forth in any age ; pity that their accomplishment depended solely on the will of a youth, of precocious talents indeed, and who had as yet given no signs of any but generous dispositions, but who was in danger, as the event proved, of

CHAP. VIII.
Declaration of Philip in favour of Sparta.

Aratos' liberal views of International right.

¹ So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 243), " Philip was of the age to which popularity is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial."

² Pol. iv. 24. 'Ο γὰρ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν κατ' ἰδίαν τῶν συμμάχων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήματα κἀθηκεῖν ἔφησεν αὐτῷ μέχρι λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων διορθοῦν καὶ συνεπισημαίνεσθαι· τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ἀνήκοντα συμμαχίαν ταῦτ' ἔφη μόνον δεῖν κοινῆς ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ διορθώσεως τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ πάντων. Philip and Aratos here keep the just mean between meddling interference in the affairs of foreign countries and the ostentatious selection of great public criminals as special objects of personal honour.

CHAP. VIII. being led astray by the corrupting influence of unrestrained power, and by the advice and example of some of the worst counsellors with whom any prince was ever cursed.

Congress
at Corinth.
War
agreed
upon,
B.C. 220,
Autumn.

Meanwhile the deputies of the Allies were assembling at Corinth. King Philip presided at the Congress; each member of the Confederacy set forth its own wrongs, and war was agreed upon by common consent. Juster grounds for war no state ever had; every one of the allied powers had wrongs to complain of, any one of which would be looked upon by the most peacefully disposed modern nation as supplying abundant reason for appealing to arms. Achaia, Epeiros, Phôkis, Akarnania, Boeotia, each had to tell of some territory ravaged, some venerated temple despoiled; Philip himself had as good a grievance as any; a Macedonian ship had been seized by Ætolian pirates, and the crew sold into slavery.¹ The decree passed by the Congress was worthy of the occasion. The Allies agreed to recover whatever territory any of them had been deprived of by the enemy since the death of King Démétrios; to set free all cities which had been joined to the Ætolian League against their will;² and to restore to the Amphiktyons their lawful authority over the Delphian

Opening
of the
SOCIAL
WAR.
Decree
of the
Congress
of Corinth.

¹ Pol. iv. 6. Πειρατὰς ἐξέπεμψαν, οἱ παρατυχόντες πλοῖφ βασιλικῇ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας περὶ Κύθηρα τοῦτό τε εἰς Αἰτωλίαν καταγαγόντες αὐτανδρῶν, τοὺς τε ναυκλήρους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας, οὖν δὲ τοῖσι τὴν ναὺν ἀπέδοντο. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 284), as any one would, translates ἀπέδοντο, "sold." Schorn and Helwing pass it by. Brandstätter (p. 345) objects to this translation, and would have us believe that ἀπέδοντο here means only "released on the payment of ransom" (*Die Seeräuber . . . geben dann in Ätolien nur gegen Lösegeld Schiff und Mannschaft frei*). Be it so; the barbarity would, on this showing, be somewhat less, but the breach of the Law of Nations would be just the same.

² Ib. 26. Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἡγαγασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν, ἀφορολόγητους, ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείας καὶ νόμους χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις. See Thirlwall, viii. 282, note.

Temple, which the Ætoli-ans had usurped. But the Treaty CHAP. VIII. still needed ratification by the sovereign Assemblies of the several Federations which made up the Alliance.¹ While Embassies were sent round to obtain their assent, Philip wrote a spirited letter to the Ætoli-ans. If they had any real defence to make, let them send and make it; but he and his allies could not listen to any excuses of the old sort. It would no longer do, when Ætolian fleets and armies were ravaging all Greece, to say that it was the mere act of private men, for which the Ætolian Government was not responsible. They must not expect either to escape by means of such transparent sophistry, or to throw upon the Allies the odium of beginning the war. The Ætolian Government, in answer, proposed a Conference at Rhion, expecting that Philip would not come. But when they heard that he was really on the road, they sent to say that they could do nothing without the authority of the Federal Assembly.² The ordinary electoral meeting of that body took place shortly after, and its principal act was to elect Skopas, one of the chief wrong-doers, to the place of General of the League for the following year.³

Philip's
Letter
to the
Ætoli-ans.

Shifts
of the
Ætolian
Govern-
ment.

Skopas
Ætolian
General,
B.C. 220-
219.

Achaian
Assembly
(Autumn,
B.C. 220)
ratifies the
decree.

The deputies from the Corinthian Congress meanwhile went round to the allied powers to obtain their ratifications of the decree against the Ætoli-ans. The regular Achaian Assembly was now held at Aigion; Philip appeared in person in the Senate,⁴ and spoke at length.

¹ Pol. iv. 26. Οἱ συνέδριοι παραχρηῖμα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλλον πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους, ἵνα παρ' ἑκάστοις διὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπικυρωθέντος τοῦ δόγματος ἐκφέρωσι πάντες τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πόλεμον.

² Ib. 'Απέστειλαν [οἱ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἄρχοντες] γραμματοφόρον διασαφούντες ὡς οὐ δύναται πρὸ τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συνόδου δι' αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν δλων οἰκονομεῖν.

³ Ib. 27.

⁴ Ib. 26. Προσελθόντος πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν. Did he not address the Assembly also? Or was this one of those Meetings where few but Senators attended? See above, p. 307.

CHAP. VIII. He made, as he deserved, a favourable impression, and all the honours voted to his predecessor were renewed to him. The Assembly unanimously ratified the decree, and proclaimed general licence of reprisals against Ætolia.¹ Philip then returned to Macedonia, to spend the winter in preparations for the campaign of the next year, leaving behind him in Greece the best possible expectations from his reign.² Macedonia and Achaia, the two most important members of the Alliance, were thus zealous in the common cause. Akarnania too, though the most exposed of all to Ætolian ravages, gave in her adhesion faithfully and without reserve.³ But the Ambassadors from the Congress of Epeiros, were not equally successful everywhere. The Epeiriot League played a double part. The Federal Assembly ratified the decree, and voted to begin hostilities as soon as Philip himself should begin them. But at the same time they assured—secretly, we must suppose—some Ætolian Ambassadors who were present, that it was their full purpose to remain at peace. Of the Boeotian and Phôkian Leagues we hear nothing. It has been aptly remarked that what remained of independent Phôkis was actually surrounded by the Ætolian conquests, and that the Boeotians, like the Thessalians, were too dependent on Macedonia to have a real voice in the matter.⁴ At Messênê, though it was really in defence of Messênian

¹ Pol. iv. 26. *Τό τε δόγμα πάντες ἐπεκύρωσαν καὶ τὸ λάφυρον ἐπακρόαζαν κατὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.*

² Polybios, when, at a later stage of his history (vii. 12), he records the degeneracy of Philip, can hardly find words to express the admiration which he excited in Greece at this time; *καθόλου γε μὴν, εἰ δεῖ μικρὸν ὑπερβολικώτερον εἰπεῖν, οἰκείωτατ' ἂν οἶμαι περὶ Φιλίππου τοῦτο ῥηθῆναι, διότι κοινὸς τις ὅλον ἑρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τ' ἧς αἰρέσεως εὐεργετικόν.*

³ Pol. iv. 30. It is now that the historian pronounces that emphatic eulogy on the Akarnanian people which I have quoted in an earlier chapter. See above, p. 147.

⁴ "Die noch selbstständigen von den Phociern waren ringsum von ätolischer Herrschaft eingeschlossen; von der Erklärung der Böoter kann

interests that the war was first undertaken, the envoys met CHAP. VIII. with an ambiguous and chilling answer. The mass of the Messênê, people were well disposed towards the Allies; but the oligarchic chiefs, led by the Ephors Oinias and Nikippos, caused an answer to be given, saying that the possession of Phigaleia by the Ætolians hindered Messênê from joining the Allies till the Ætolians should be driven out of that dangerous post.¹ At Sparta the Ambassadors had to depart without any answer at all.² Other envoys were sent to King Ptolemy, not to ask his alliance, but merely to request him to send no money or help of any kind to the enemy.³ This last embassy seems to have been successful, as the neutrality of Egypt was strictly preserved throughout the war.

These diplomatic proceedings illustrate one or two very obvious truths. It is clear that the actual strength of Ætolia was far inferior to that of the Allies. It is equally clear that the Ætolian League derived from its strong national unity an immeasurable advantage over the scattered members of the Macedonian Confederacy. The policy of Ætolia was determined by a single vote of a single Assembly; the Allies, before they could act in concert, had first to gather together the representatives of half-a-dozen powers, and then to send about to ask for ratifications—which, after all, might be refused—from a

nicht die Rede sein, denn sie gehorchten ohne Widerrede den Befehlen ihrer Schutzherren." Schorn, p. 148.

¹ Pol. iv. 31.

² Ib. 34. Τέλος γὰρ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους ἀπέστειλαν.

³ Ib. 30. I do not at all understand Brandstätter's comment (p. 357). "So war es also allem Ansehn nach nur ein Kampf des Philipp und der Achäer mit Hülfe eines illyrischen Seeräubers gegen die Aetoler, da Ptolemäus Philopator, der neue König Aegyptens, nicht die Freundschaft seines Vaters für Kleomenes fortsetzte, und, mehr durch eigne Angelegenheiten als durch Philipps Bitte bewogen, dem Kampfe fern blieb." Does this refer to the winning over of Démétrios of Pharos by Tauriôn (see above, p. 519), or what?

CHAP. VIII. King here and an Assembly there.¹ We may also see the danger of drawing general inferences for or against particular forms of government. Monarchy never looked better than it did at the Congress of Corinth; we there see a King acting as moderate and honourable a part as any man could act. We shall soon see this same King degenerate into a cruel and faithless tyrant. Single city commonwealths, in the form of Messênè and Sparta, appear in the poorest possible light. But we have whole centuries of earlier and later history to set against any rash inferences against Town-autonomy in the abstract. Federalism appears in every sort of light at the same moment. The disreputable filibustering of the Ætolians, the double-faced policy of the Epeirots, the honourable unanimity of the Achæians, and the heroic devotion of the

Warning
against
general in-
ferences as
to forms of
Govern-
ment.

¹ Dr. Arnold (History of Rome, ii. 245), comparing the strength of Rome and of Samnium in the fourth century B.C. says:—

“A single great nation is incomparably superior to a coalition; and still more so when that coalition is made up not of single states but of federal leagues; so that a real unity of counsels and of public spirit is only to be found in the individual cities of each league; which must each be feeble, because each taken separately is small in extent and weak in population. The German empire alone, setting aside the Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian dominions of the house of Austria, could ever, even with the addition of the Netherlands, have contended on equal terms with France.”

Our present narrative amply confirms Dr. Arnold's general remarks upon coalitions, but it hardly bears out what he says specially about Federal coalitions. In the present case the states in which a “real unity of counsels and of public spirit” is most clearly wanting are certainly the non-Federal cities of Sparta and Messênè.

See also Lord Macaulay's vivid description (Hist. of England, iv. 12, 13) of the difficult position of William the Third as chief of the coalition against France in 1691.

“But even William often contended in vain against those vices which are inherent in the nature of all coalitions. No undertaking which requires the hearty and long continued cooperation of many independent states is likely to prosper. . . . Lewis could do with two words what William could hardly bring about by two months of negotiation at Berlin, Munich, Brussels, Turin, and Vienna. Thus France was found equal in effective strength to all the states which were combined against her.”

Akarnanians; all proceed from nations whose political constitutions were very nearly the same. All alike were citizens of Democratic Federations. The only inference to be drawn is that Federal Governments, like all other Governments, are capable of any degree either of good or of evil. But the perfect unity and vigour, alike of Akarnania for good and of Ætolia for evil, is quite answer enough to the common talk about Federal Government being necessarily weak government. That the Ætolian Government did not restrain Dorimachos and Skopas was no sign of weakness. It was the received policy of the nation, such as it was. It was not the power that was lacking, but the will.¹

But the Ætolians, strong as they already were, both in their own power and in the fears of their neighbours, were not to remain much longer without allies in Peloponnésos itself. If the soil of Ætolia was fertile in robbers and pirates, it was also by no means barren in able diplomatists. While Dorimachos and Skopas undertook the plundering department, a certain Machatas was the ordinary representative of the League towards foreign powers. He easily persuaded Elis, the old ally of Ætolia, to declare war against Achaia.² His mission to Sparta is more worthy of notice, as it is closely connected with important changes in that now turbulent and revolutionary city. Political parties in Sparta seem now to have been mainly determined by the respective ages of their members.³ In the present condition of the city this was just what one could expect. To the old men Kleomenês had from the beginning naturally seemed a reckless innovator; they would now as naturally argue that his innovations

Ætolian
Embassies
in Peloponnésos,
B.C. 220-219.

Machatas
wins over
Elis.

State of
Sparta;
parties of
Old and
Young.

¹ What a well disposed Ætolian General could do we shall see presently. See Pol. v. 107.

² Pol. iv. 36.

³ See the frequent mention of *πρεσβύτεροι, νέοι, νεώτεροι*, &c. Pol. iv. 22, 34, 35.

CHAP. VIII. had led to nothing but the ruin and disgrace of the state.

We may perhaps doubt whether they felt that fervent gratitude towards Macedonia which the historian attributes to them ;¹ but they would certainly wish to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, if only as the side of quiet—they might add, in the immediate dispute with Ætolia, undoubtedly the side of justice. To the young, on the other hand, Kleomenês was the hero of Sparta and of Hellas. His kingly and soldierlike virtues had won every heart ; his single deed of violence was atoned for by its motives and by its results ; his victories had revived the old feeling of Spartan glory and greatness ; his defeat, after a hard contested struggle against overwhelming odds, had assuredly diminished nothing from his fame. But the fight of Sellasia and its results, had made the names of Achaia and Macedonia, of Aratos and Antigonos, hateful in the ears of every true-hearted Spartan. As long as Kleomenês lived, though in exile or in bondage, he was still their King ; when the news of his death was announced, they would no longer crouch under the timid yoke of oligarchic Ephors ; they would again have Kings according to the old laws of Sparta,² Kings who should be as Agis and as Kleomenês, Kings who should reform every wrong at home, and who should again lead them forth to avenge the loss of Sellasia, and to make Sparta once more the head of a regenerate Greece. It was not wonderful if, in the existing state of things, they did not shrink, in the hope of attaining such ends, either from violent measures at home or from the friendship of disreputable allies abroad. Ætolia, whatever were her crimes, was the type of hostility to Macedonia and

Effects of
the death
of Kleo-
menês.

¹ Pol. iv. 34. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἐπιστήσαντες τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τε τὰς Ἀρτιγόρου καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεργεσίας, κ.τ.λ.

² Pol. iv. 35. Ἄμα δὲ τῇ τὴν φήμην ἀφικέσθαι περὶ τῆς Κλεομένους τελευτῆς, εὐθέως ὄρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ βασιλεῖς καθιστάναί τε τὰ τε πλῆθη καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον.

Achaia; to Ætolia therefore the popular party at Sparta, ONAP. VIII. the party of the young, the party of Kleomenês, clung as to their natural ally. Our glimpses of the Spartan government at this time set before us the Ephors as the State of the Spartan Government. ruling magistrates; but they set before us also a Senate and a Popular Assembly, which the Ephors, like the ruling magistrates of other Greek states, were bound to consult on public affairs. All these were old Spartan institutions; the Ephors were doubtless revived when Antigonos restored to Sparta her ancient constitution; the Senate and the Assembly had equally their place in that constitution, but the Assembly at least was now a very different body from what it had been in times past. In the old state of things it had been lifeless, and almost nominal; but it had been restored to vigour by the reforms of Kleomenês, and the Spartan Assembly is now spoken of in the same language as the Assemblies of democratic Athens and Achaia.¹ The negotiations were begun by the Kleomenist party in Sparta, who, doubtless through some secret Intrigues of the Kleomenists with Ætolia. agency, requested the Ætoli-ans to send an Ambassador to their city. The Ephors now in office, as the historian distinctly mentions, were the successors of those who had pleaded their cause before Philip. They were themselves of the Macedonian party,² but they were kept in awe by the prevalent tendencies of the citizens the other way. The Ætolian Government was not likely to refuse an invitation which came from what was really the dominant party in Sparta. Machatas appeared as an Ætolian Ambassador, and was admitted to an audience with the Ephors. At the instigation doubtless of his Spartan confederates, he exhorted the Ephors to restore the Hêracleid Kingship as the only lawful constitution of Sparta, and he demanded an audience before the First and unsuccessful mission of Machatas.

¹ Τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, are the terms used by Polybios, iv. 34.

² Pol. u. s. Δυσταρεστούμενοι τοῖς ἑλλοῖς πράγμασιν.

CHAP. VIII. Sovereign Assembly of the Lacedæmonian people. The Ephors feared to refuse; they would consider about the restoration of royalty; but in any case the Ætolian Ambassador might address the Spartan Assembly. The Assembly was summoned, and Machatas addressed it. He strongly called on the people to embrace the alliance of Ætolia; he enlarged on the merits of his own countrymen and on the crimes of the Macedonians; that his speech was impudent, false, and unreasonable¹ in the eyes of Polybios we are in no way surprised to learn; but we have neither the speech itself, nor the comments of an Ætolian or Kleomenist historian. The debate began; some Lacedæmonian speakers strongly advised their countrymen to throw in their lot with Ætolia. The old, the prudent, spoke—so we are told—of the mercy of Antigonos, and of the old wrongs wrought by Ætolian hands against Sparta;² let Sparta remain as she was, and observe the terms of her alliance with the Macedonian King. Age and prudence prevailed; the Assembly resolved to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, and Machatas departed unsuccessful. But presently—we are reading the accounts of enemies—the party which had been defeated in argument had recourse to violence; they murdered the Ephors and certain Senators of the same party, disregarding in the act even the sanctity of their venerated temple of Athênê.³ They then chose Ephors of their own party; they voted an alliance with Ætolia; and—Kleomenês being now dead—they determined on the restoration of royalty. Two Kings, according to the old

Revolu-
tion at
Sparta,
B.C. 220–
219.

¹ Pol. iv. 34. *Συναχθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους παρελθὼν ὁ Μαχατᾶς παρεκάλει διὰ πλεόνων αὐτοὺς αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοῦς συμμαχίαν, εἰκὴ μὲν καὶ θρασέως κατηγορῶν Μακεδόνων, ἀλόγως δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς ἐγκωμιάζων τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς.*

² See above, p. 392.

³ The temple of Athênê of the Brazen House (*Χαλκίαικος*), famous in the history of the Regent Pausanias. See Thuc. i. 128, 134.

precedent, were chosen, Agésipolis and Lykourgos. Agé-
 sipolis was the lawful heir of the Agid Kings, and, as
 he was a child, he was placed under the guardianship
 of an uncle who bore the auspicious name of Kleomenês.
 The other royal house was not extinct; but Kleomenês
 had passed it by when he took his own brother Eukleidas
 for his colleague. The second throne was therefore filled
 by election;—Polybios says by bribery, and adds that
 Lykourgos was no Hêrakteid by birth, but became one
 by paying a talent to each of the new Ephors.¹ On
 hearing of this revolution, Machatas gladly returned to
 Sparta, and exhorted the Ephors and Kings, now the
 allies of Ætolia, at once to declare war on the Achaians.
 According to our Achaian informants, Lykourgos first
 made incursions into Argolis, took some towns and failed
 before others, and then, and not before, the Lacedæ-
 monians publicly proclaimed licence of reprisals against
 the Achaian League.²

CHAP. VIII.
 Agésipolis
 and Lyk-
 ourgos
 chosen
 Kings.

Second
 mission of
 Machatas.
 Sparta
 joins the
 Ætolian
 alliance,
 and begins
 war with
 Achaia.

The Social War now fairly began. On the one side was
 the whole Macedonian Alliance; for Epeiros joined with
 some zeal as soon as the war actually began, and Messênê
 joined also as soon as its course had removed the bugbear
 of Phigaleia. On the other side was the Ætolian League,
 with Elis and Lacedæmon as its Peloponnesian allies.
 The war lasted between two and three years, and many
 of its military details are highly interesting, those espe-
 cially which illustrate the extraordinary and precocious
 genius of the young King of Macedonia. His quick and
 enterprising spirit, his rapid marches, his winter cam-
 paigns, no less than his as yet generous and conciliatory
 demeanour, all marked him as a worthy successor of the

Beginning
 of the
 Social
 War,
 B.C. 219.

Character
 of the
 war.

Virtues
 and mili-
 tary skill
 of Philip.

¹ Pol. iv. 35. *Ὁς δὲ οὖς ἐκίστη τῶν ἐφόρων τάλαντον Ἡρακλείδους ἀπόγονος
 καὶ βασιλεὺς ἐγγεγόνει τῆς Σπάρτης.

² Ib. 36.

CHAP. VIII. Great Alexander, and make us the more deplore the fall which followed upon such a beginning. The daring and successful generalship of the young prince seems to have taken his contemporaries by surprise, much as the disciples of German military routine were taken by surprise at the irregular victories of the first Buonaparte.¹ And this glory at least was wholly his own; Aratos may have prompted many of his just and conciliatory actions, but it was certainly not in the school of Aratos that Philip learned the art of war. But this very aspect of the Social War gives it a less attractive character in the eyes of a historian of Federalism or of Greek freedom in any shape. We cannot dwell on it with the same interest as on the parliamentary strife between Aratos and Lydiadas, or on the diplomatic and military strife between Aratos and Kleomenês. The foremost figure of the picture is no longer a Greek citizen, but a Macedonian King. Greece has lost both her heroes; her practised and wily diplomatist survives, but he has sunk from the President of a free people into the Minister of a foreign sovereign. Philip is palpably the master; he is not as yet an unjust or an ungenerous master, but he is a master still. He acts as Commander-in-chief of the whole Alliance; he dispatches orders to the Achaian cities,² which, five years before, they would have received from none but the General of their own choice. The General himself becomes little more than his Vice-gerent, and receives orders from him as from his superior.³ On one occasion Aratos himself, the deliverer of Sikyôn, the father of Peloponnesian freedom, had to stand as something like an accused criminal before the throne of his master.⁴ He was indeed honourably acquitted, but that

Para-
mount im-
portance
of Philip.

¹ See Macaulay's *Essays* (Moore's *Life of Byron*), p. 146, 1 vol. Ed. On Philip's campaigns see *Pol. iv. 67*. Finlay's *Greek Revolution*, i. 109.

² *Pol. iv. 67. v. 17, 102. (?)* ³ *Ib. iv. 67.* ⁴ *Ib. iv. 85.*

did not in the least diminish the ignominy of being tried. The influence of Aratos can hardly be said to have been sensibly weakened ; but his influence was now exercised far more in the way of private counsel in the closet of the Macedonian King than of open parliamentary eloquence in the Federal Congress at Aigion. When the sunshine of royal favour was for a moment withdrawn from him, popular favour was withdrawn also, and the President of the League was chosen at the bidding of Philip, no longer at the bidding of Aratos.¹ The true hero of Achaia was absent ; Philopoimên was studying his art, and indeed serving his country, in the distant field of Crete ; the state of things in Peloponnêsos, between the Macedonian King and his Sikyônian counsellor, left no room for the true successor of Lydiadas.

The war was spread over the Presidencies of three Achaian Generals, of the younger Aratos, of Epêratos of Dymê, and of Aratos himself for the fourteenth time.² The younger Aratos, the son of the deliverer, was chosen to succeed his father at the Spring Congress of the year 219, just as the war was beginning in earnest. Philip was on his march from Macedonia ; the Ætolians, under their General Skopas, were continuing their depredations against Epeiros and Messênê, states which as yet did not venture to stir in their own defence.³ King Lykourgos of Sparta, in imitation, we are told, of Kleomenês,⁴ began his part by a second seizure of the Megalopolitan Athênaiôn. The Cretan cities, at war with one another, sent help to their several allies, and received help in return,⁵ but their movements do not greatly affect the general story. The year

General-
ship of the
younger
Aratos,
B.C. 219-
218.

¹ Pol. iv. 82.

² According to the arrangement of the Presidential years of Aratos to be hereafter discussed.

³ Ib. 37.

⁴ Ib. Λυκούργος ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων βουλευόμενος ἀρχεσθαι Κλεομένει.

⁵ Ib. 55.

CHAP. VIII. was distinguished by many brilliant successes on the part of Philip. The young King was everywhere; from a career of victory in Epeiros and Ætolia he returns to drive a horde of barbarians out of his own kingdom, and then astonishes all Greece by a rapid and successful winter campaign in Peloponnēsos. The Achaian General was far from being the compeer of the Macedonian King. He fully shared all his father's military defects, and there is no sign of his displaying any share of his father's abilities, either military or civil.¹ His neglect is said to have been the cause of a remarkable transaction which I have already spoken of.² Of all the territories of the League, the most exposed to Ætolian incursions were the western Cantons of the old Achaia. They were open to easy attack by sea, and by land they were almost hemmed in by hostile territory, by Elis, by Psôphis, now incorporated with Elis,³ and by the district of Kynaitha, which, if not in actual Ætolian possession,⁴ must have been at least open to the free passage of Ætolian troops. Euripidas, the Ætolian commander at Elis, constantly ravaged the territories of Dymê, Pharai, and Tritaia, and defeated Mikkos of Dymê, the Vice-General of the League,⁵ at the head of the whole force of the three Cantons. He then occupied a fort called Teichos, in the territory of Dymê, near Cape Araxos, and kept all Western Achaia

Ætolian
ravages
in the
Cantons
of Dymê,
Pharai,
and
Tritaia.

¹ Pol. iv. 60. Καθόλου τε ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασιν ἀτόλμως ἐχρήτο καὶ νωθρῶς.

² See above, p. 281.

³ Pol. iv. 70. 'Ἐπικείται δ' [ἡ Ψωφίς] εὐφυῶς τῇ τῶν Ἑλείων χώρα μεθ' ἐν συνέβαινε πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτήν. As Elis was not a Federal state, but a single city-commonwealth with an unusually large territory, this seems to imply that Psôphis had become a municipal town, possessing an Eleian franchise of some sort or other. Whether it possessed, like the Attic towns, the full franchise of the capital, or whether it had merely a *civitas sine suffragio*, is not implied in the word πολιτεύεσθαι. See above, p. 513.

⁴ For the Ætolians had burned the city the year before. See above, p. 517.

⁵ Pol. iv. 59. Ὑποστράτηγος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.

in dread. The three cities sent pressing messages¹ to the Federal General, asking for help. But he was not in any position to help them. Achaian military affairs were, at that moment, at a very low ebb. We have seen how much the military spirit of the national troops had decayed, and the League had just now great difficulty in obtaining the services of mercenaries. Large arrears of pay were still owing to those who had served in the war with Kleomenês; and, under these circumstances, few were disposed to enlist under such bad paymasters. Thus deserted by the Federal authorities, the three States most in danger set up a sort of *Sonderbund* of their own. They were among the oldest members of the League. It was the union of Dymê with Patrai which had been the first step towards its reconstruction,² and all three were among the four whose union had formed the nucleus of the revived Federation. Perhaps they may have felt themselves specially aggrieved, when the Sikyônian strangers whom they had allowed to become their citizens and their Presidents either could not or would not help them in their need. They did not secede; they did not proclaim a new Confederation or a new President; but they did agree to refuse for

“Sonderbund” of the three Western Cities.

¹ Pol. iv. 60. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεμπον ἀγγέλους πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, δηλοῦντες τὰ γεγονότα καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρεσβευτὰς ἐκπέστελλον τοὺς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιώσαντας. A distinction is here evidently drawn between the ἀγγελοι and the πρεσβευταί. The ἀγγελοι may have been mere messengers, bearing any sort of hasty and informal message; the πρεσβευταί, one would think, were regularly commissioned by the State Governments of the three cities. They remind one of the πρεσβευταί whom we have seen, on one or two occasions (see above, pp. 448, 466), commissioned by the State Governments to the Federal Congress. At the same time, Polybios uses the word πρεσβευτής somewhat loosely; in one place (v. 27) he applies it to the persons who carried a message to King Philip from a division of the Macedonian army, and he calls the messengers sent by Flamininus to the Roman Senate πρέσβεις. xvii. 10. xviii. 25.

² See above, p. 245.

CHAP. VIII. the time being all contributions to the Federal Treasury.¹

The money thus saved was to be spent in hiring mercenaries, horse and foot, for their own defence.² The historian gravely censures this act,³ which he looks on as specially unworthy of cities which might claim the honour of being the founders of the League. In such an emergency they were, he holds, justified in hiring mercenaries on their own account,⁴ but not in refusing to pay their Federal taxes. Such a refusal was not Secession, but it was Nullification; it was, as Polybios says, dangerous as a precedent for any who might hereafter wish to secede. The Federal General, who was unable to protect them, was naturally equally unable to punish them. Their separate union probably lasted no longer than the immediate occasion. At the next election, a citizen of one of

¹ Pol. iv. 60. See above, pp. 14, 309.

² If these cities could hire mercenaries when the Federal Government could not, are we to infer that in Achaia the credit of particular States stood higher than that of the Union?

³ Pol. u.s. *Τούτο δὲ πράξαντες ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν καθ' αὐτοὺς πραγμάτων ἐνδεχομένως ἔδοξαν βεβουλεύσθαι, περὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τάναντία· πονηρὰς γὰρ ἐφόδου καὶ προφάσεως τοῖς βουλομένοις διαλύειν τὸ ἔθνος ἔδωκον ἀρχηγοὶ καὶ καθηγεμόνες γεγονόται.* He then draws out this position at some length.

Schora (p. 153) says, "Polybios tadelt zwar diesen Schritt, aber wie kann man es den Städten verdenken, dass sie nicht länger zahlen wollen, da das Geld nicht zweckmässig angewandt wurde!" This is rather dangerous ground to be taken by tax-payers, in any state, Federal or otherwise.

Brandstätter (p. 360) goes further still; "Der Geschichtschreiber erhebt sich gegen diesen Entschluss der drei Städte mit dem grössten Unrechte, in dem er nur den Vortheil des Bundes im Auge hat." What else should he have in view? This is the doctrine of Secession with a vengeance.

⁴ They would almost be justified by the provision in the American Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 2) which forbids any State to keep troops or engage in war, unless actually invaded, &c. But the same article specially forbids any State to enter into any agreement or compact with any other State. Neither American nor Achaian foresight provided for the particular grievance of which these cities complained, namely that of an incapable Executive presiding over a bankrupt Treasury.

these very cities¹ was chosen President of the Union, CHAP. VIII. and, soon after that, the Ætoliens were expelled from their post by King Philip, and the fort restored to the Dymaïans.² The choice of a Pharaian General, while it was probably an act of special concession to these cities, shows that they were not looked upon as rebellious or suspicious members. The Western Sonderbund, if it is ever mentioned again, is mentioned only in one very obscure passage,³ and then not in a way which implies that it was looked upon as a hostile or unconstitutional body.

Among the military exploits of this year the most interesting, from our point of view, is one in which we find an Achaian city really acting for itself, and not begging for Macedonian, or even for Federal, help. The main body of the Ætoliens,⁴ under three of their chief leaders, Dorimachos himself being one, fell upon the Old-Achaian town of Aigeira, the defences of which seem to have been strangely neglected. The enemy were admitted in the night by a deserter,⁵ and, while in the full swing of massacre, they were attacked and driven out by the people of Aigeira themselves. This reminds one of Aratos' old exploit at Pellênê,⁶ only the people of Aigeira had not wilfully allowed the enemy to occupy their city. Two of the Ætolian leaders, Alexander and Archidamos, were killed; Dorimachos escaped, and his reputation among his countrymen does not seem to have been permanently damaged, for at the next election he succeeded his friend Skopas as General of the Ætolian League.⁷ Skopas had distinguished his year of office by an inroad into Mace-

Loss and
recovery
of Aigeira.

Dori-
machos
Ætolian
General,
B.C. 219-
218.

¹ Epératos of Pharai. Pol. iv. 82.

² Ib. 83.

³ Ib. v. 94. See above, p. 281.

⁴ Ib. iv. 57. τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.

⁵ An Ætolian, who had deserted to the Achæians, and who now sought to win his pardon at home by this double treason. Pol. iv. 57.

⁶ See above, p. 394.

⁷ Pol. iv. 67.

CHAP. VIII.

Sacrilege
of the
Ætolians
at Dion
and
Dôdôna.Psôphis
annexed
to the
Achaian
League.Philip's
conquests
of Phi-
galeia and
Triphylia.

donia and a barbarous devastation of the Macedonian sanctuary of Dion.¹ Dorimachos began his year by a still more flagrant breach of all Hellenic religion, the destruction of the venerated temple of Zeus at Dôdôna.² Philip's brilliant campaign in Peloponnêsos is chiefly interesting to us, because, on the surrender of the once Arkadian, but now Eleian, town of Psôphis, he made it over, with many expressions of good will,³ to his Achaian allies. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must suppose that Psôphis, like other Achaian acquisitions, was admitted as a member of the League, with a vote in the Achaian Assembly. But, as in other cases where strategic position or doubtful loyalty required the precaution, both the citadel and the town were secured by the presence of Federal garrisons.⁴ Psôphis was, as Philip took care to inform his friends, a valuable gift.⁵ An Achaian garrison there would do something to cover the exposed canton of Tritaia, and to hinder any more Ætolian visits to that of Kynaitha. But it does not appear that Philip now made over to the League any of the other cities which he took in Triphylia and the Eleian territory.⁶ Phigaleia itself, the cause of the war, soon after the cession of Psôphis, dissatisfied with the Ætolian connexion, gladly surrendered to Philip.⁷ Apparently he kept this important position in his own hands. In short, between Corinth, Orchomenos,

¹ Pol. iv. 62.² Ib. 67.³ Ib. 72. Ἀπελογήσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰρεσιν καὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν ἣν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος.⁴ This was done by authority of such of the Ἀχαῖκοι ἄρχοντες (Pol. u.s.) as were present. The word would properly mean the δημιουργοί, but I do not remember another instance of their interfering in purely military affairs.⁵ Pol. u.s. τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἐπεδείκνυε τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον.⁶ The Triphylian towns remained Macedonian till B.C. 208, perhaps till B.C. 198. See Livy, xxviii. 8. Cf. xxxiii. 34.⁷ Pol. iv. 79.

and the Triphylian towns, the League was pretty well hemmed in by outlying Macedonian possessions. In all this there is nothing for which Philip can reasonably be blamed; but who had caused the presence in Pelopon-
nêsos of Kings or of Macedonians at all?

It is also during the presidential year of the younger Aratos that we come across the beginnings of a remarkable story, which forms the best illustration of the unhappy

B.C. 219-218.

policy of his father. We have seen that the alliance between Achaia, Macedonia, and the other allies was, in name at least, an equal alliance. The King of Macedonia seems, as a matter of course, to have been accepted as Commander-in-chief of the whole Confederacy, but, what-
ever might be his practical powers, whatever might be the final results of so dangerous a partnership, nothing had yet been done which formally violated the independence of the League. The King of Macedonia might recommend, and it might be imprudent to neglect his recommenda-
tions; still the Achaian Assembly really discussed and voted upon them; the Achaian General was still the independent chief of an allied army, not merely the officer in command of a Macedonian division. The prudence, perhaps the generosity, of Antigonos had respected constitutional forms; the lord of Corinth knew that his friendship or enmity was of vital moment to the League, and that any direct interference with its liberties would not repay the cost and the shame of the undertaking.

Relations between Philip and the League.

Philip was young; the evil that was in him had not yet shown itself; he had accepted Aratos as his chief counsellor. The Sikyônian, with all his faults, was not a wilful traitor; he had no pleasure in undoing his own glorious work; he had no temptation to sacrifice the dignity or the interest of his country, now that there was no Kleomenês to awaken national and personal rivalry. He had brought his country into what was practically a state of bondage,

Relations between Philip and Aratos.

CHAP. VIII. but he at least did what he could to lessen the bitterness of that bondage. As the adviser of the young King, he preached strict observance of justice and mercy, strict fidelity to treaties, strict respect for the rights of the Achaian League, and of every other power, allied or hostile. There were no more Tyrants whom it was lawful to get rid of at all hazards, and, when dealing with Commonwealths or with lawful Kings, Aratos was as sensible as any man of the obligations of International Law. There was nothing galling in all this either to the mature prudence of Antigonos or to the youthful generosity of Philip. But to some of the Macedonian courtiers such a state of things was eminently displeasing. In their eyes the Macedonians were the natural masters of the world; at all events they were the natural masters of Greece; they had not come all this way to spend their blood and toil and treasure, merely as the equal allies of a cluster of petty republics. The Achaian League was, after all, little more than an association of rebels against the Macedonian Crown; the restoration of Corinth had only put that Crown into possession of a part of its just rights; no satisfaction had been made for the original insult and injury of its capture, or for all the other sins of the League and its chief against the dignity of Macedon. It was unworthy of the successor of Alexander to act on terms of equality with republican Greeks; if the Achaians wished for Macedonian help, let them become Macedonian subjects. They might keep their constitutional forms, if they pleased; they might amuse themselves by electing a General and meeting in a Federal Assembly. The Thessalians did something of the kind; they too fancied themselves a republic, and piqued themselves on their republican freedom.¹ But they were practically Macedonian

Dissatisfaction of the Macedonian courtiers.

¹ Pol. iv. 76. Βουλευθεις τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος ἀγαγεῖν εἰς παραπλησίαν διδθεσιν τῇ Θετταλῶν . . . Θετταλοὶ γὰρ ἐδόκουν μὲν κατὰ νόμους πολι-

subjects all the same. The Achaians must be reduced to the same level. No one had thought of consulting a Thessalian Assembly as to any wrongs which Thessaly might have suffered from the Ætolians, nor must the King of Macedon be any longer exposed to the indignity of consulting an Achaian Assembly either. The Thessalians obeyed the royal will without dispute or examination, and the Achaians must learn to do the like. Such thoughts, we may be sure, passed through the mind of many a Macedonian courtier and captain, beside him to whom the historian directly attributes the scheme for upsetting the liberties of Achaia. This was Apellès, one of the great officers whom Antigonos had left as guardians of the young King, and who naturally had great influence with him. With the view of breaking in the Achaians to slavery, he began to encourage the Macedonian soldiers to insult and defraud their Achaian comrades in all possible ways. Meanwhile he himself constantly inflicted corporal punishment on Achaian soldiers for the slightest faults, and sent to prison any one who ventured to interfere. The free citizens of the Achaian towns had not been used to this kind of treatment, either at the hands of their own Generals or at those of Philip's predecessor. We hear of no public remonstrance on the part of the League or of its President; but a party of young Achaians laid their wrongs before the elder Aratos, and the elder Aratos, in his private capacity as Philip's adviser, laid the

Plots of
Apellès
against
Achaian
freedom.

His ill-
treatment
of the
Achaian
soldiers.

τεύειν καὶ πολὺ διαφέρειν Μακεδόνων, διέφερον δ' οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἔπασχον Μακεδόσι καὶ πᾶν ἐποιοῦν τὸ προσταττόμενον τοῖς βασιλικοῖς. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 255. We have seen already an illustration of their position in the fact that they were enrolled in the Macedonian Confederacy as an independent power, but that no one thought it necessary to ask for the consent of the Thessalians to any of its acts. See above, pp. 499, 513, 524. In another place (vii. 12) Polybios speaks of Thessaly almost as of an integral part of the Macedonian Kingdom; μετὰ τὸ παραλαβεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τὰ τε κατὰ Θετταλίαν καὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ συλλήβδην τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν οὕτως ὑπετέτακτο, κ. τ. λ.

CHAP. VIII. matter before the King. Philip's heart was still sound, or the influence of Aratos was still paramount. He strictly ordered Apellês to abstain from his injurious conduct towards the allies; he was to give no orders to the Achaian troops, and to inflict no punishment upon them, without the consent of their own General. It is as yet a just master who is speaking, but it is a master all the same.

Fresh schemes of Apellês against Aratos.

Apellês now saw that his course of action must be changed. Nothing could be done to effect his evil purpose as long as Aratos retained any measure of influence with the King. He therefore made it his business to do all he could to undermine him in the good opinion both of Philip and of his own countrymen. He impressed on Philip's mind that, while he listened to Aratos, he could be nothing more than the limited chief of a free Confederacy; he must treat the Achaians strictly according to the terms of the alliance. But if he listened to him, he might soon become absolute lord of Pelopon-nêsos. A more honourable tribute to Aratos could hardly be paid; the old deliverer is again appearing, though on a humbler and feebler scale, as the champion of Grecian freedom. Apellês also made common cause with the political opponents of Aratos—for such there were—in every city of the League. He diligently sought them out, he admitted them to his own friendship, and presented them to the King.¹ He prevailed on Philip so far as to

¹ Pol. iv. 82. Ἐξετάζων τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀράτῳ, τινες εἰσὶν, ἐκαστοὺς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐπεσπάσατο, καὶ λαμβάνων εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἐψυχαγωγεῖ καὶ παρεκάλει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν, συνίστανε δὲ καὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ, προσηπιδεικνύων αὐτῷ παρ' ἑκαστον ὡς ἐὰν μὲν Ἀράτῳ προσέχῃ, χρήσεται τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἑγγραπτον συμμαχίαν, ἐὰν δ' αὐτῷ πειθῇται καὶ τοιοῦτους προσλαμβάνῃ φίλους, χρήσεται πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν. Were these opponents of Aratos—ἡ ἐναντία στάσις, as Plutarch (Ar. 48) calls them—remnants of the oligarchic or tyrannical faction which appeared at Sikyôn and elsewhere during the Kleomenic War?

induce him to appear at the Spring Meeting of the Federal Congress at Aigion, and to give his countenance to the party opposed to Aratos. This was not Philip's first appearance before an Achaian Assembly; but hitherto he had only appeared, as personal sovereign of Macedonia, to discuss matters of common interest with the many-headed sovereign of Achaia. To this there could be no more objection than to the appearance of a Macedonian Ambassador for the same purpose; it was a sign both of earnestness and of ability on the part of Philip, and the members of the Assembly were probably gratified at the opportunity of talking with their royal ally face to face. But it was another matter when the King of Macedonia appeared at the Meeting which was held for the purely domestic purpose of electing the Federal Magistrates. This seems to have been felt; and a rather lame excuse was made about the King being on his road through Aigion on his way to a campaign in Elis.¹ Apellês himself was less scrupulous; he busied himself about the election² with all the zeal of a native partisan. For some reason which is not mentioned, the elder Aratos did not appear this time, according to custom, as a candidate to succeed his son. His interest was given to Timoxenos,³ who had already twice held the seal of the League. He was an old partisan, and he had by this time apparently forgiven whatever wrong Aratos had done him two years before. When the Congress came to vote, Timoxenos was

CHAP. VIII.
Philip's
inter-
ferences
with the
Achaian
Election,
May,
B.C. 218.

¹ Pol. iv. 82. Πείθει Φίλιππον παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀρχαι-
ρεσίας εἰς Αἴγιον ὡς εἰς τὴν Ἠλείαν ἅμα ποιούμενον τὴν πορείαν.

² Ib. Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν εὐθὺς ἐσπούδαζε. Cf. Plut. Ar. 48.

³ Ib. Τιμόξενον . . τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον εἰσαγόμενον. See
Schorn's note, p. 157. He remarks that this illustrates the forgiving
temper of Aratos spoken of by Plutarch (ἐχθρὸς εὐγνώμων καὶ πρῶτος—
ἐχθρὸς δὲ καὶ φίλος δὲ τῷ κοινῷ συμφέροντι χρώμενος. Ar. 10), looking
on Timoxenos as an opponent of Aratos, because of their dispute in
B.C. 220. But surely this is making too much of a mere passing quarrel.

CHAP. VIII. unsuccessful, there being a small majority¹ in favour of Epêratos of Pharai. This is attributed by Polybios wholly to the intrigues of Apellês, but it must be remembered that Epêratos was a citizen of one of those Cantons which the neglect of the younger Aratos had driven to the unconstitutional foundation of the Sonderbund.² There can be little doubt that a wish to regain the confidence of the three western cities had something to do with the choice made by the Assembly on this occasion. These two views are in no way inconsistent with each other. Apellês, in influencing Achaian politicians, must have appealed to some Achaian political feeling. He could hardly have practised bribery on so gigantic a scale as to secure by that means a majority of votes in a majority of the cities. If he had some hired partisans, neither he nor they could well attack Aratos avowedly because he was the friend of Achaian freedom. But the neglect of the Western Cantons by the outgoing General would form an admirable cry for a dissatisfied party. A certain amount of genuine and reasonable discontent would doubtless exist, which Apellês and his creatures would turn to their own purposes. We can thus see also why Aratos did not stand himself, but put forward Timoxenos as his candidate. The administration of the two Aratos', father and son, had, for two successive years, brought nothing but disgrace on the League. But the Generalship of Timoxenos, three years earlier, had witnessed some little success in the form of the recovery of Klarion,³ and he had appeared as an advocate of prudence during Aratos' momentary fit of rashness.⁴ Altogether we can understand that Timoxenos was, just now, a better card for his party to play than Aratos himself. It was probably on the question of relief to the

General-
ship of
Epêratos.
B.C. 218-
217.

Connexion
of this
choice
with the
events of
the pre-
ceding
year.

B.C. 221-
220.

¹ Pol. iv. 32. *Μόλις μὲν ἦνυσε, κατεκράτησε δ' οὖν ὅμως.*

² See above, p. 535.

³ P. 508.

⁴ P. 510.

western cities that the division ostensibly turned, and we may believe that the majority of the Assembly, ignorant of the intrigues of Apellès, honestly meant the election of Epératos to be a deserved vote of censure on those who had neglected them. It falls in with this view that, immediately after the election, Philip marched to recover the fort of Teichos in the Dymaia territory.¹ It was small, but strongly fortified;² but its defenders were Eleians and not Ætolians. They at once surrendered to the King, who gave over the fortress to its lawful owners, and then proceeded to lay waste the territory of Elis. The cause which had led to the discontent of the Western Cantons was now effectually removed.

Philip
recovers
Teichos.

Apellès was naturally elated at his success. He had, as he thought, effectually poisoned the royal mind, and he had seen an Achaian President chosen at his own nomination.³ He now made another attack on whatever influence Aratos may still have retained over the mind of Philip. He now charged him with treason to the Grand Alliance. Philip had, among other Eleian prisoners, captured Amphidamos, the General of the Eleian commonwealth.⁴ He dismissed him without ransom, and employed him as a messenger to invite his countrymen to exchange the Ætolian for the Macedonian alliance, promising in such case to respect their liberties and constitution.⁵

Further
schemes of
Apellès.

Affair of
Amphi-
damos.

¹ See above, p. 584.

² Pol. iv. 83. Χωρίον οὐ μέγα μὲν ὑψηλισμένον δὲ διαφερόντως.

³ Ib. 84. Δοκῶν ἡνυκένει τι τῆς προθέσεως τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ καθεστᾶσθαι τὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγόν.

⁴ Ib. 'Ο τῶν Ἠλείων στρατηγός. This need not necessarily imply that this General was the chief magistrate of Elis, and in earlier times the Eleian magistrates bore other titles. See Tittmann, p. 366. Still it is not unlikely that the Eleians, though their constitution was not Federal, may now have so far imitated the practice of other Greek states as to place a single General at the head of their commonwealth.

⁵ Ib. Ἀδούς ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορρολογήτους, χρωμένους τοῖς ἰδίοις πολιτεύμασι, διατηρήσει. The words are nearly the same as those used in the decree of the Allies (c. 25) for liberating the cities in sub-

CHAP. VIII. These offers were rejected at Elis, but the transaction seems to have awakened some suspicions against Amphidamos in the minds of his countrymen, for, shortly afterwards, while Philip was ravaging the Eleian territory, they determined to arrest him and send him prisoner to Ætolia. Meanwhile Apellês accused Aratos to the King as the cause of the refusal of the Eleians to treat. He had, so his accuser said, dealt privately with Amphidamos, and exhorted him to use his influence on the anti-Macedonian side, because it was against the common interest of Peloponnêsos for Philip to become master of Elis.¹ This last was certainly, in itself, a proposition too clear to be disputed by any patriotic Peloponnesian, and it was quite reason enough for keeping Philip out of Greece altogether. Still such arguments would not, in the actual position of Aratos, have justified him in underhand dealings contrary to the general interests of the Confederacy. On this charge, Aratos, the deliverer of Peloponnêsos, the man who had been thirteen times President of the Achaian League, had to stand something like a trial before the Macedonian King.² He and his country could not have been subjected to greater indignities, if they had made up their minds to submit to the Federal headship of Kleomenês. Apellês brought his accusation; he even ventured to add that the King, having met with such ingratitude at the hands of Aratos, would explain matters to the Achaian Assembly, and then retire from the struggle to his own kingdom. All that Aratos could do at the

Apellês
accuses
Aratos of
treason.

jection to Ætolia. They were probably a common formula for such occasions.

¹ Pol. iv. 84. λέγειν ὅτι κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον συμφέρει τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τὸ γένεσθαι φίλιππον Ἡλείων κύριον.

² Ib. 85. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον φίλιππος δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους καλεῖν ἐκέλευε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον καὶ λέγειν ἐναντίον ἐκείνων ταῦτα τὸν Ἀπελλῆς. The *οἱ περὶ* seem to include both father and son, for directly after *ὁ πρεσβύτερος* Ἀρατος speaks.

moment was to ask Philip not to condemn him on the mere assertion of Apellês, but to search into the truth by every possible means before he laid any such charge before the Assembly. Philip had justice and candour enough to suspend his judgement; Apellês could bring forward no evidence to support his charge, while Aratos was soon able to bring forward a most convincing witness to his innocence. This was no other than Amphidamos himself, who, at this opportune moment, took refuge with Philip at Dymê. The King now fully restored Aratos to his favour and confidence, and began to look with equal displeasure on Apellês. It was about the same time that the Achaians gave the King a signal proof of the influence which their old chief still retained over their minds. Unless Apellês wished, as he probably did, merely to weaken the League by giving it an incompetent head, the election of Epêratos had proved a mistake. The Pharaian President was a man of no skill or daring in the field, and of no weight in the Assembly.¹ A special Meeting had been called by the Achaian Government at Philip's request,² in which the King appeared and asked for supplies. The wishes of Epêratos had no influence, and Aratos and his party, if they did not openly oppose, did not at all support Philip's request.³ In such a state of things no supplies were granted. Philip now perceived the importance of the friendship of Aratos. The Assembly

Aratos
restored to
Philip's
favour.

Influence
retained
by Aratos
in the
Achaian
Assembly,
B. C. 218.

¹ Pol. v. 1. τὸν δ' Ἐπήρατον ἀπρακτον ὄντα τῇ φύσει καὶ καταγινωσκόμενον ὑπὸ πάντων. We must allow a little for Polybios' admiration of Aratos.

² The expression of Polybios (u.s.) is a strong one; δ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος, ἐνδεὴς ὢν σίτου καὶ χρημάτων εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις, συνήγε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. This last phrase is the formula used elsewhere (see above, p. 275) to express the calling of an Assembly by the Federal General.

³ Pol. u.s. Ὅρων τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἀρατον ἐβелоκακοῦντας διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας γεγενημένην εἰς αὐτοὺς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀπελλῆν κακοπραγμοσύνην.

CHAP. VIII. had been held at Aigion, the usual place of meeting; the King persuaded the Achaian Government to adjourn it to Sikyôn.¹ This was in itself a compliment to Aratos, and in the interval he fully confessed his errors both to the father and the son.² He threw the whole blame upon Apellês, and begged them to be his friends as of old. Such an appeal was irresistible. In the adjourned Congress at Sikyôn the influence of Aratos was used on behalf of Philip, and a liberal money-bill was the result.³

Treason of
Apellês
against
Philip.

Apellês now took to schemes which, in a Macedonian officer, were even more guilty than any of his former evil deeds. He now entered on plans of direct treason against his own sovereign. He had already alienated the King's mind from Alexander and Tauriôn, two of his best officers, and both of them among the guardians named by Antigonos. He now, in concert with the other two, Leontios and Megaleas, devised a plot by which all Philip's enterprises might be thwarted, till he should at last be sufficiently humbled to put himself wholly under their guidance. The details of this vile scheme, and the general details of the campaign, belong rather to Macedonian than to Federal history. Philip and the Achaians fitted out a

Campaign
of B. C. 218.

¹ Pol. v. 1. Ἀθροισθέντος τοῦ πλήθους εἰς Αἰγίον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . . . πείσας τοὺς ἀρχοντας μεταγαγεῖν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς Σικυῶνα.

² Ib. Λαβὼν τὸν τε πρεσβύτερον καὶ τὸν νεότερον Ἀρατον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας. The relations between Philip and the younger Aratos gives us one of those strange glimpses of Grecian manners which we come across ever and anon. Ἐδόκει δ' ὁ νεάνισκος ἔρξαι τοῦ Φιλίππου. (Plut. Ar. 50.) Compare the relations of Kleomenês with Xenarês (Kl. 3) and with Pantena. (c. 37.)

³ Fifty talents down, as three months' pay for his army, seventeen talents a month as long as he carried on the war in Peloponnêsos, and corn in abundance (σίτου μυριάδας, Pol. v. 1).

If the Federal Government, a year before, could not pay its mercenaries (see above, p. 535) where did it find the materials for such a subsidy now? But the passage is remarkable as showing the full power of taxation which was in the hands of the Federal Congress. It is a pity that we are not told how the money was to be raised. See above, p. 309.

fleet, and attacked Kephallēnia, which had long acted as the Ætolian naval station. An all but successful assault on Palai, one of the towns in that island, was hindered by the arts of the traitors. Philip was as ubiquitous as usual; he invaded Lakonia; he invaded Ætolia, and avenged the destruction of Dion by the destruction of Thermon.¹ By rare prudence and forbearance he gradually discovered, crushed, and punished the hateful plot of which he had been the victim. Throughout, Aratos acted as his wisest counsellor, and was therefore made the constant object of insult, sometimes growing into personal violence,² at the hands of the conspirators. It is interesting to trace, in the course of the story, several notices of the substantial, though perhaps rather unruly, freedom which the Macedonians still enjoyed under their Kings. Polybios carefully points out the almost equal terms on which the Macedonian army, not of assumption but of ancient right, addressed their sovereign,³ and we find one of the culprits, just as in the days of Alexander, tried and condemned by the military Assembly of the Macedonians.⁴

Philip
crushes
the plot.

¹ Polybios (v. 9-12) censures this act at great length, and doubtless with good reason. Yet it is not fifty years since British troops destroyed the public buildings of Washington, and much more lately we have heard the savage yells of English newspapers crying for the destruction of Delhi and Pekin.

² Pol. v. 15. Plut. Ar. 48. Brandstätter's comment (p. 374) is curious, "Aratus wurde von der anti-achäischen Partei fast gesteinigt und nur durch des Königs specielle Theilnahme gerettet; über die Beweggründe sind verschiedene Vermuthungen möglich."

³ Pol. v. 27. *Εἶχον γὰρ δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς.* See above, p. 20.

⁴ Ib. 29. *Πτολεμαῖον κρίνας ἐν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἀπέκτεινε.* Cf. Diod. xvii. 79, 80. Arrian, iii. 26. 2. iv. 14. 3.

I have cut short these details, as not bearing immediately upon Federal history. The narrative is given at length by Polybios, and the English reader will, as usual, find the best of substitutes in the History of Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 258-68).

CHAP. VIII. It is more important for our subject to trace one or two points connected with the domestic history of the League. The Pharaian General did not secure the safety even of his own and the neighbouring cantons. His utter incapacity, and the general lack of discipline which prevailed during his year, are strongly set forth by Polybios.¹ Doubtless we here read the character of Epêratos as given by his political opponents, but, though there may be some exaggeration, there must be some groundwork for the picture. The Ætolians in Elis continued and increased their devastations in the western districts, and the cities in that quarter paid their contributions to the Federal Treasury with difficulty and reluctance.² The expression however shows that they were paid, so that the most objectionable resolve of the Sonderbund of the year before must have been rescinded. At the next election the elder Aratos was chosen General,³—we now hear nothing of Macedonian influence either way—and then things began to brighten a little. Incapable as Aratos was in the open field, his genius was admirably adapted for winning back men's minds, and he seems easily to have allayed all discontents. He summoned an Assembly,⁴ and procured a series of decrees for the more vigorous prosecution of the war. The number of troops to be levied, both of citizens and mercenaries, was fixed, and the number and nature of the contingents from at least two of the cities, namely Megalopolis and Argos, were made the

Weak
adminis-
tration of
Epêratos.
B.C. 218–
217.

Aratos
General,
B.C. 217–
216.

Decrees
of the
Achaian
Assembly,
B.C. 217.

¹ Pol. v. 30. Τοῦ δ' Ἐπεράτου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καταπεφρονημένον μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν νεανίσκων κατεγνωσμένου δὲ τελείως ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων, οὐτ' ἐπειθάρχει τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις οὐδεὶς οὐτ' ἦν ἔτοιμος οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν τῆς χώρας βοήθειαν. Cf. c. 91. Had Aratos or Timoxenos any hand in making it so?

² Ib. Αἱ μὲν πόλεις κακοπαθεῖσαι καὶ μὴ τυγχάνουσαι βοηθείας δυσχερῶς προσήγον τὰς εἰσφοράς. Patrai is now mentioned as well as Dymê and Pharai. Cf. c. 91, where the same seems to be said of the cities generally.

³ Ib. 30. 91.

⁴ Ib. 91. Παρακαλέσας τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς, καὶ λαβὼν δόγμα περὶ τούτων.

subject of a special decree.¹ No reason is given for the special mention of these particular States, but we know that the troops of Megalopolis were in every way more efficient than those of any other city of the Union.² But these decrees illustrate the thoroughly sovereign power of the Federal Congress in all matters of national concern. At the same time another decree, passed apparently in the same Assembly, shows no less clearly how careful the Federal power was to abstain from any undue interference with the State Governments in matters properly coming within their own sphere. It was now that, as has been mentioned in an earlier chapter,³ Aratos went as mediator to Megalopolis. Violent local disputes had arisen; there was a dispute about the laws which had been enacted by Prytanis; there was a still more dangerous dispute between the rich and the poor, arising out of the restoration of the city after its destruction by Kleomenês. Aratos was sent, by decree of the Federal Assembly, to mediate between the contending parties, and he succeeded in bringing them to terms of agreement. He then returned to hold another Assembly; the Ætolians, as before,⁴ watched this opportunity for an inroad, but this time Aratos was beforehand with them. He had entrusted the care of the exposed districts to Lykos of Pharai,⁵ with a strong body of mercenaries, at whose head Lykos gained a complete victory over the invaders. He afterwards, when the Ætolians had left Elis, retaliated the invasion by

CHAP. VIII.
Full
Federal
sovereignty
combined
with strict
regard to
State
rights.

Aratos'
mediation
at Mega-
lopolis.

¹ See above, p. 310.

² Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstätter, 365.

³ Pol. v. 93. See above, p. 256.

⁴ Ib. 94. *Εὐριπίδας . . . τηρήσας τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνοδον.* See above, p. 509.

⁵ Polybios (v. 94) gives as a reason for this selection, *διὰ τὸ τοῦτον ὑποστράτηγον εἶναι τότε τῆς συντελείας τῆς πατρικῆς.* These words are not very clear, and their meaning has been disputed (see above, p. 247), but one can hardly avoid the suspicion that they have something to do with the late Sonderbund. See above, p. 537.

CHAP. VIII. ravaging the Eleian territory in company with Dêmodokos the Federal Master of the Horse,¹ at the head of the mercenaries, together with the citizen force of Dymê, Pharai, and Patrai. Meanwhile Philip was dealing far severer blows at the Ætolian power in Northern Greece. One great success was the capture of the Phthiôtic Thebes ; but it is painful to read that, instead of liberating the city according to the agreement entered into at the beginning of the war,² he sold the inhabitants as slaves, planted a Macedonian colony in the town, and changed its name to Philippopolis. This was perhaps the first downward step in a career which had hitherto promised so brightly.

Philip's
success in
Northern
Greece.

Mediation
of Chios
and
Rhodes,
B. C. 218-7.

The Social War was brought rather suddenly to an end during this official year of Aratos. Before the year of Epêratos had ended, Ambassadors from Chios and Rhodes appeared before Philip at Corinth, offering their mediation towards a peace.³ Those islands were now independent and important states. Rhodes especially was governed by a prudent and moderate aristocracy, whose career is among the most honourable things in later Grecian history, and which preserved the independence of the island after that of continental Greece was lost. Pan-hellenic patriotism united with the natural interests of commercial republics⁴ to prompt both Chians and Rhodians to desire the restoration of peace. Philip, in the full tide of success, had no real wish for peace ; but he could not decently refuse the proffered mediation. He professed his willingness to

¹ Pol. v. 95. Τὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἑπάρχην.

² The words used by Polybios (v. 99, 100) certainly seemed to imply that the people of Phthiôtic Thebes were entitled to its benefits ; κατεχόντων αὐτὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν—παρέδοσαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὴν πόλιν. These expressions certainly sound like the presence of an Ætolian garrison in an unwilling city.

³ Pol. v. 24.

⁴ See Thirlwall, viii. 265.

treat, and bade the envoys go to Ætolia and offer their mediation there. They returned with an Ætolian proposal for a thirty days' truce, and for a meeting at Rhion to discuss the terms of peace. Philip accepted the truce, and wrote to the several members of his Alliance to send deputies to a Conference.¹ The Ætolians were perplexed; the whole war had taken a turn quite different from anything that they had expected; they had looked upon Philip as a mere boy,² over whom victory would be easy; they had found in him a great King and a successful general. But he was just now hampered by the conspiracy of his great officers, out of which they hoped that something might turn to their advantage. The result of their doubts and procrastination was that, when the appointed day came, no Ætolian representative appeared at Rhion. This exactly suited Philip; he could now continue the war, without incurring the odium of refusing offers of peace.³ He had done his part, and the impediment came from the other side. Envoys had already arrived from some at least of his allies, but, instead of discussing terms of peace, they received an exhortation to vigour in the war from the lips of their royal commander-in-chief.⁴

Failure of
the pro-
posed Con-
ference.

¹ Pol. v. 28. Τοῖς συμμάχοις ἔγραψε διασαφῶν πέμπειν εἰς Πάτρας τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας καὶ βουλευσομένους ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς διαλύσεως.

² Ib. 29. Ἐλπίζαντες γὰρ ὡς παιδίῳ νηπίῳ χρήσασθαι τῇ Φιλίππῳ διὰ τε τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, τὸν μὲν Φίλιππον εὖρον τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐφάνησαν εὐκαταφρόνητοι καὶ παιδαριώδεις ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.

³ Ib. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀσμένως ἐπιλαβόμενος τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης διὰ τὸ θαρρύν ἐπὶ τῇ πολέμῳ, καὶ προδιειληφὸς ἀποτρίβεισθαι τὰς διαλύσεις, τότε παρακαλέσας τοὺς ἀπηντηκότες τῶν συμμάχων οὐ τὰ πρὸς διαλύσεις πρόσσειν ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ I have not enlarged on Philip's campaign in Phókia, or on his general relations to the Phókian League. There are some good remarks in Schorn, p. 164, note. Between Ætolian enmity and Macedonian protection, it would seem that the Phókians had pretty well lost their independence. They are reckoned among the States which needed liberation after Kynos-kephalé. Liv. xxxiii. 32. Cf. c. 34 and Pol. xviii. 30.

CHAP. VIII.

Second
mission
from
Chios,
Rhodes,
Byzan-
tion, and
Egypt.

Philip
turns his
mind
towards
Italy.

B.C. 332-
326.

B.C. 280-
274.

The Chians and Rhodians however did not at once give up their praiseworthy scheme of restoring peace to Hellas. Their Ambassadors again appeared in Philip's camp, immediately after his conquest of the Phthiôtic Thebes. They were now accompanied by the representatives of two other powers; envoys from the King of Egypt and from the republic of Byzantion accompanied those of the islanders.¹ There is no reason to doubt that Ptolemy Philopatôr had strictly observed that neutrality which was all that the Allies had asked of him at the beginning of the war.² He might therefore appropriately join his voice in favour of peace to that of the maritime republics. Philip, on this second occasion, made much the same answer as he had done upon the first; he had no objection to peace; let the Ambassadors again go and try the mind of the Ætolians. At that moment Philip had still no real mind for peace; in truth, a young monarch, in the full tide of success in a thoroughly just war, may be forgiven if in his heart he longed for still further triumphs. But before the matter could be discussed, before indeed the mediators returned, tidings had reached him which changed his purpose. He was as anxious for war, as ambitious of conquest, as ever; but his heart now began to be bent on war on a greater scale than the limits of Hellas could afford; he began to dream of conquests greater than the destruction of Thermon or the colonization of Phthiôtic Thebes. Other Greek Kings had before now sought glory and conquest on the other side of the Hadriatic. Alexander of Epeiros had lost his life in battle against the invincible barbarians of Italy. Pyrrhos himself, after useless victories, had returned to confess that the Macedonian sarissa had at last found

¹ Pol. v. 100.

² See above, p. 526.

³ Schorn (169) remarks that the war injured Ptolemy by hindering him from hiring Ætolian mercenaries as usual. Cf. Pol. v. 63, 4.

more than its match in the Roman broadsword. But CHAP. VIII. the might of Philip was far greater than the might of either of the Molossian knights-errant. As King of Macedonia and Head of the great Greek Alliance, he might summon the countrymen of Alexander and Pyrrhos as merely one contingent of his army. And Italy was now in a state which positively invited his arms. While he, the namesake of the great Philip, the successor of the great Alexander, the unconquered chief of an unconquered nation, was wasting his strength on petty warfare with Ætolia and Lacedæmon, Hannibal was advancing, in the full swing of triumph, from the gates of Saguntum to the gates of Rome.

It is with a feeling of sadness that the historian of Greece turns at this moment to behold the mighty strife which was waging in Western Europe, the struggle between the first of nations and the first of men. He feels that the interests of Achaia and Ætolia, of Macedonia and Sparta, seem small beside the gigantic issue now pending between Rome and Hannibal. The feeling is something wholly different from that paltry worship of brute force which looks down on "petty states," old or new. The political lessons to be drawn from the history of Achaia and Ætolia are none the less momentous because the world contained other powers greater than either of the rival Leagues. Still it is with a mournful feeling that we quit a state of things where Greece is everything, where Greece and her colonies form the whole civilized world—a state of things in which, even when Greece is held in bondage, she is held in bondage by conquerors proud to adopt her name and arts and language—and turn to a state of things in which Greece and Macedonia form only one part of the world of war and politics, and that no longer its most important part. We have already seen the beginning of this change ;

Opening
of a new
period.
Close con-
nexion of
the history
of Eastern
and
Western
Europe
from this
date.

CHAP. VIII. we have seen Roman armies east of the Hadriatic; we have seen Greek cities receive their freedom as a boon from a Roman deliverer.¹ From this point the history of the two great peninsulas becomes closely interwoven. Greece and Macedonia gradually sink, from the position of equal allies and equal enemies, into the position, first of Roman dependencies and then of Roman provinces. We have now entered upon that long chain of events reaching down to our own times, the History of Greece under Foreign Domination.² Our guide has already begun diligently to mark the synchronisms of Greek and Roman history. Hannibal first cast his eyes on Saguntum at the same time that Philip and the Congress of Corinth passed their first decree against the Ætolians.³ He laid siege to the city at the time that the younger Aratos was chosen General.⁴ He took it while Philip was on his first triumphant march through Ætolia.⁵ He crossed the Alps about the time that the first Chian and Rhodian envoys came to Corinth.⁶ He defeated Flaminius at Lake Trasimenus while Philip was besieging Phthiôtic Thebes.⁷ The news was slow in reaching Greece; a letter—from whom we know not—brought the important tidings to the King; it was sent to him in Macedonia, and, not finding him there, followed him to Argos, where he was present at the Nemean Games.⁸ His evil genius was at his side; Dêmétrios of Pharos, the double traitor to Illyria and to Rome, expelled from his

Synchronisms of Greek and Roman history.

B. C. 220.
Spring,
B. C. 219.

Autumn,
B. C. 219.

B. C. 218.

B. C. 217.

Philip
at Argos,
B. C. 217.

Influence
of Dêmé-
trios of
Pharos.

¹ See above, p. 418-20.

² This subject is at last concluded in the two final volumes of Mr. Finlay's great work, the most truly original history of our times.

³ Pol. iv. 28.

⁴ Ib. 37.

⁵ Ib. 66.

⁶ Ib. v. 29.

⁷ Ib. 101.

⁸ Ib. 101. The Nemean Games must therefore have been restored to Argos (see above, p. 401). When Argos became a city of the League, the Federal power could have no interest in asserting the rights of Kleônai, one of the smallest members of the Union, against Argos, one of the greatest.

dominions by the Romans, had taken refuge with Philip, CHAP. VIII. and was gradually supplanting Aratos as his chief counsellor. To him alone the King showed the letter; the adventurer at once counselled peace with Ætolia and with all Greece; but he counselled it only in order that Philip might husband all his strength for an Italian war. Now ^{He} was the time, now that Rome was falling, for the King of ^{counsels} Macedonia to step in at once and to claim his share of the ^{interference in} prize. We could have wished to see the arguments of ^{Italy.} the Pharian drawn out at greater length. He could not have looked upon Rome as completely overthrown; for in that case Macedonian intervention would have been mere interference with the rights of conquest on the part of Carthage. Hannibal's position must have seemed not so perfectly secure but that he would still be glad to accept of Macedonian help, and to yield to Macedonia a portion of the spoil. As Philip gave himself out as the champion of Greek interests, the liberation of the Greek cities in Italy and Sicily would afford him an honourable pretext for interference.¹ To unite them to his Confederacy, perhaps covertly to his actual dominion, would be a natural object of his ambition. The Greek cities of Italy, which Carthage had never possessed, would naturally fall to the lot of Macedonia. Even Sicily would hardly prove a stumbling-block. The surrender of the old claims of Carthage to dominion in that island would hardly be thought too dear a price for an alliance which, by rendering Italy no longer dangerous, would effectually secure the Carthaginian dominion in Spain and Gaul. But the views of Philip at this time are mere matters of speculation. Before he actually concluded any treaty with Hannibal, the state of affairs had materially changed.

When Philip was thus disposed, the negociation of

¹ See Flathe, *Geschichte Makedoniens*, ii. 279. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note. See also the speech of Agelaos just below.

CHAP. VIII.

Opening
of the
Congress
of Nau-
paktos,
B.C. 217.

peace was not difficult. Without, as it would seem, even waiting for the return of the mediating envoys, he entered into communication with the Ætolian Government,¹ and gathered a Congress of his own Allies at Panormos.² But he was determined that no man should think that he sought peace because he dreaded war. He again ravaged the territory of Elis; and, while waiting for the arrival of the plenipotentiaries, he made the important conquest of Zakynthos. The Ætolian Assembly³ met at Naupaktos; the Congress of the Allies was assembled on the opposite shore of Achaia. Philip sent over Aratos⁴—such is the language now used—with his own general Tauriôn; their mission soon led to an Ætolian embassy, inviting Philip to cross with all his forces and to discuss matters face to face. He did so, and encamped near Naupaktos. The Ætolian Assembly—only distinguished from the Ætolian army by not being under arms⁵—took up a position near him. The details of the negociation required many meetings, many messages to and fro; but at last all seems to have settled without any serious difficulty. The principle of the *Uti Possidetis*,⁶ one highly favourable to Philip and his allies, was soon agreed to on both sides. The most remarkable event in the course of the Conference was a speech by Agelaos of Naupaktos, the substance of which has been preserved to us by Polybios. It shows the strange union of elements in the Ætolian

Speech of
Agelaos.

¹ This was done through Kleonikos of Naupaktos, the πρόξενος of Achaia in Ætolia, who was therefore exempted from slavery. See above, p. 58. The employment of Kleonikos for such a purpose is like the similar employment of Amphidamos of Elis. See p. 545.

² Pol. v. 102. Πρὸς μὲν τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις γραμματοφόρους ἐξαπέστειλε, παρακαλῶν πέμπειν τοὺς συνεδρεῦσοντας καὶ μετέξοντας τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν διαλύσεων κοινολογίας.

³ Ib. 103. Τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς πανθημεῖ συνηθροισμένοι ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ.

⁴ Ib. Ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς Ἀρατον καὶ Ταυρίωνα.

⁵ Ib. Οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοὶ χωρὶς τῶν ὅπλων ἦκον πανθημεῖ.

⁶ Ib. "Ὅστι' ἔχουν ἀμφοτέρους ἂ νῦν ἔχουσιν.

character, that this very Agelaos, whom we have seen CHAP. VIII. concerned in some of the worst deeds of Ætolian brigandage,¹ should now appear as a profound statesman, and even as a Panhellenic patriot. "Let Greece," he says, "be united; let no Greek state make war upon any other; let them thank the Gods if they can all live in peace and agreement, if, as men in crossing rivers grasp one another's hands,² so they can hold together and save themselves and their cities from barbarian inroads. If it is too much to hope that it should be so always, let it at least be so just now; let Greeks, now at least, unite and keep on their guard, when they behold the vastness of the armies and the greatness of the struggle going on in the West. No man who looks at the state of things with common care can doubt what is coming. Whether Rome conquers Carthage or Carthage conquers Rome, the victor will not be content with the dominion of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily; he will extend his plans and his warfare much further than suits us or our welfare. Let all Greece be upon its guard, and Philip above all. Your truest defence, O King," he continued,³ "will be found in the character of the chief and protector of Greece. Leave off destroying Greek cities; leave off weakening them till they become a prey to every invader. Rather

¹ See above, p. 517. It was worth noticing that the only two negotiators mentioned on the Ætolian side, Agelaos and Kleonikos, are both of them citizens of Naupaktos. It is thus clear that that city was now incorporated with the Ætolian League on really equal terms, but we can well believe that the arts of statesmanship and diplomacy were more flourishing among its citizens than among the boors and brigands of the inland country. Of the diplomatic powers of Agelaos we have seen something already when he persuaded Skerdilaidos to join the Ætolians.

² Pol. v. 104. Συμπλέκοντες τὰς χεῖρας καθάπερ οἱ τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβαίνοντες. This curious comparison shows that we really have a genuine speech.

³ I have thrown the somewhat lifeless infinitives of Polybios into the form of a direct address, but I have put in nothing, of which the substance is not to be found in his text.

CHAP. VIII. watch over Greece, as you watch over your own body; guard the interests of all her members as you guard the interest of what is your own. If you follow such a course as this, you will win the good will of Greece; you will have every Greek bound to you as a friend and as a sure supporter in all your undertakings; foreign powers will see the confidence which the whole nation reposes in you, and will fear to attack either you or them. If you wish for conquest and military glory, another field invites you. Cast your eyes to the West; look at the war raging in Italy; of that war you may easily, by a skilful policy, make yourself the arbiter; a blow dealt in time may make you master of both the contending powers. If you cherish such hopes, no time bids fairer than the present for their accomplishment. But as for disputes and wars with Greeks, put them aside till some season of leisure; let it be your main object to keep in your own hands the power of making war and peace with them when you will. If once the clouds which are gathering in the West should advance and spread over Greece and the neighbouring lands, there will be danger indeed that all our truces and wars, all the child's play with which we now amuse ourselves,¹ will be suddenly cut short. We may then pray in vain to the Gods for the power of making war and peace with one another, and indeed of dealing independently with any of the questions which may arise among us."²

The way in which Polybios introduces this remarkable speech leaves hardly room for doubt that it is, in its substance at least, a genuine composition of the Naupaktian diplomatist.³ It displays a Pan-hellenic spirit, sincere and

¹ Pol. v. 104. Τὰς ἀνοχὰς καὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ καθόλου τὰς παιδιὰς ἐς νῦν παίζομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

² It is amusing to see Justin's version of this speech (xxix. 2, 3), which he puts into the mouth of Philip.

³ The mere use of the *oratio obliqua* throughout so long a speech would

prudent indeed, but lowered in its tone by the necessities of the times. The policy of Agelaos is substantially the old policy of Isokratês¹ a hundred and thirty years before. Let Greece, say both Agelaos and Isokratês, lay aside her intestine quarrels, and arm herself, under Macedonian headship, for a struggle with the barbarian. But the policy which, in the days of Isokratês, was a mere rhetorician's dream, had become, in the days of Agelaos, the soundest course which a patriotic Greek could counsel. In the days of Isokratês, the barbarians of Persia were not real enemies of Greece; they in no way threatened Greeian independence; it was only a sentimental vengeance which marked them out as objects of warfare; the real enemy was that very Macedonian whom Isokratês was eager to accept as the champion of Greece against them. In the days of Agelaos, the barbarians of Rome and Carthage were, if not avowed enemies of Greece, at least neighbours of the most dangerous kind, against a possible struggle with whom Greece was bound to husband every resource. As Greek affairs then stood, an union under Macedonian headship was probably the wisest course which could be adopted. But such a course was now the wisest, simply because of the way in which Greece had fallen within a single generation. Thirty years before, but for Ætolian selfishness, all Greece might have united into one compact and vigorous Federal commonwealth. Ten years before, but for Achaian jealousy, Greece might have been united under the headship of one of her own noblest sons, a King indeed, but a King of her own blood, a King of Sparta and not of Macedon. Both these opportunities had passed away, and an union under Philip was now the

CHAP. VIII.

Policy of
Agelaos
compared
with that
of Iso-
kratês.

Union
under
Mace-
donian
headship
now
desirable.

seem to show that it is not, like so many other speeches, a mere rhetorical exercise or an exposition of the historian's own views.

¹ See the oration or pamphlet of Isokratês, called "Philip," throughout.

CHAP. VIII. only hope. Philip at least spoke the tongue of Greece, and affected to regard himself as the Greek King of a Greek people.¹ Macedonia had long been the bulwark of Greece against Gaulish and Thracian savages; she was now called upon to act in a yet higher character as the bulwark of Greece against the civilized barbarians of Rome and Carthage. But the scheme of Agelaos required greater patriotism and greater clearness of vision than was to be found either in Greece or in Macedonia. A noble career lay open before Philip, but he was fast becoming less and less worthy to enter upon it. He was fast obscuring the pure glory of his youth by schemes of selfish and unjust aggrandizement; he had already taken the first downward steps towards the dark tyranny of his later years. Agelaos' own countrymen were even less ready than Philip to merge their private advantage in any plans for the general good of Greece. We shall soon see Ætolia appearing in a light even more infamous than any in which she had appeared already. Achaia indeed presented more hopeful elements. We shall soon see her military force assume, when too late, an efficiency which, a generation earlier, might have been the salvation of all Greece. But that force was now to be frittered away in petty local strife, or in partnership with allies who took the lion's share to themselves. Peace was concluded. For a few years Peloponnêsos enjoyed rest and prosperity. Athens was delivered from her fears

Peace of
Naupak-
tos, B.C.
217.

¹ In Philip's treaty with Carthage (Pol. vii. 9) we find throughout such phrases as *Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα, Μακεδόνες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες*. So, in his conference with Flamininus (Pol. xvii. 4), he says *καὶ τοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων*. Cf. Arrian, ii. 14. 7. So in the speech of Lykiskos (Pol. ix. 37-8), we find the Achaïans and Macedonians called *ὁμόφυλοι*, while the Romans are distinguished as *ἀλλόφυλοι* and *βάρβαροι*. So in Livy, xxxi. 29. *Ætolas, Acarnanas, Macedones, ejusdem linguae homines, &c.*

of Macedonia, and from the necessity of thinking at all about Grecian affairs. She and her demagogues, Eurykleidēs and Mikiôn, had now abundant leisure for decrees in honour of King Ptolemy and of all other Kings from whom anything was to be got by flattery.¹ Ætolia at first rejoiced at the conclusion of a war which had turned out so contrary to her hopes; in a sudden fit of virtue the League elected Agelaos himself as its President, on the express ground of his being the author of the Peace. But the Ætolians, we are told, soon began to complain of a chief whose government kept them back from the practice of their old enormities, and who had negotiated peace in the interest, not of Ætolia only, but of all Greece.² But a vigorous chief of the League had much power, and, for once, power in Ætolia was placed in hands disposed to use it well. Agelaos had the honour of hindering, at least during his year of office, all violation of the repose of Hellas on the part of his countrymen.

Agelaos
Ætolian
General,
B.C. 217-
216.

§ 2. *From the End of the Social War to the End of the First War with Rome.*

B.C. 217-205.

The Peace of Agelaos may be compared with the Peace of Nikias in the great Peloponnesian War. Each proved little more than a truce, a mere breathing-space between two periods of warfare. Within a few years, the Leagues of Achaia, Akarnania, Boeotia, and Epeiros were again engaged in war with Ætolia, Sparta, and

Analogy
between
the Peace
of Agelaos
and the
Peace of
Nikias.
[B.C. 421.]

¹ Pol. v. 106.

² Ib. 107.

CHAP. VIII. **Elis.** And, just as happened in the second part of the Peloponnesian War, so, in what we may really look on as the second part of the War of the Leagues, new allies step in on both sides, and a wider field of warfare is opened. In the earlier instance, Athens, strengthened by the alliance of Argos, added Syracuse and nearly all Sicily to the number of her enemies, and saw the treasures of the Great King lavished to bring about her destruction. So now, Philip and his allies ran themselves into dangers greater still, and called mightier combatants upon the stage than Greece had ever before beheld. Except so far as Persian gold came into play, the Peloponnesian War remained throughout a purely Hellenic struggle; but the war in Greece now sinks, in a general view of the world's history, into a mere accessory of the mighty struggle between Hannibal and Rome. Macedonia and her allies enrolled themselves on the side of Carthage, while Ætolia was supported by the alliance of Rome and Pergamos. But the bargain between Hannibal and Philip proved in practice a rather one-sided one. It does not appear that Philip and his allies were in the least degree strengthened by the friendship of Carthage, while they undoubtedly did Hannibal good service by calling off some portion of the Roman force to the other side of the Gulf. Rome indeed, while Hannibal was in Italy, was not able to carry on a Macedonian war with the same vigour as in after-times. But even a slight exertion of Roman power was enough to turn the scale in Grecian affairs; and, what was of far more moment than any immediate success, Macedonia and Greece were now fairly brought within the magic circle of Roman influence. It was now only a question of time, how soon, and through what stages of friendship or enmity, both Macedonia and Greece should pass into the common bondage which awaited all the

Connexion
of the
Mace-
donian
and Punic
Wars.

Beginning
of Roman
influence
in Greece.

Mediterranean nations.¹ Nothing could be more impolitic than the conduct of Philip throughout the whole business. With all his brilliant qualities, he was far inferior to his predecessor. Had Antigonos Dôson survived,² we may feel sure that the course of Macedonian politics would have been widely different. So prudent a prince would either have kept out of the struggle altogether, or else have thrown himself heart and soul into it. So now, Hannibal and Philip together might probably have crushed Rome. The Roman broadsword triumphed alike over the horsemen of Numidia and over the spearmen of Macedon. But it could hardly have triumphed over both of them ranged side by side. And where Hannibal was weak, Philip was strong.³ Hannibal, unconquered in the open field, was baffled by the slightest fortress which had no traitors within its walls. Philip had the blood of the Besieger in his veins, and he had at his command all the resources of Greek military science. He could have brought to bear upon the walls of Rome devices as skilful as those with which Archimédês defended the walls of Syracuse. Aratos himself was not so old but that he might, on some dark night, have led a daring band up the steep of the Capitol, as he had, in earlier days, led a daring band up the steep of Akrokorinthos. But Philip shrank altogether from vigorous action; he did not deal a single effective blow for his Carthaginian ally or against his Roman enemy. He simply

CHAR. VIII.
Impolitic
conduct
of Philip.

¹ The gradual steps of the process by which Rome gradually and systematically swallowed up both friends and enemies is perhaps best set forth in the History of Mommsen. But the reader must be always on his guard against Mommsen's idolatry of mere force. Rome seems never to have definitely annexed any state at once; all had to pass through the intermediate stage of clientship or dependent alliance. See Kortüm, iii. 276.

² See Kortüm, iii. 203.

³ See Arnold, iii. 158, 241, 265.

CHAP. VIII. provoked Rome to a certain amount of immediate hostility, and caused himself to be set down in her account as one who was to be more fully dealt with on some future day. Probably Hannibal really cared but little for his aid. Whether by accident or by design, Philip did not conclude any treaty with the Carthaginian till after the crowning victory of Cannæ had made his assistance of far less value.¹ Probably he waited to see the course of events, and waited so long as to cut himself off from any real share in their control. The adventures of his Ambassadors, as recorded by Livy,² form a curious story in themselves, and they supply an apt commentary on some points in the Law of Nations, which have lately³ drawn to themselves special importance. But they concern us less immediately than some points both of the form and of the matter of the Treaty.

Philip too late to interfere with effect. B.C. 216.

Philip's Treaty with Hannibal, B.C. 216. Terms of the Treaty in Polybios.

Of this Treaty we have what seems to be the full copy preserved by Polybios,⁴ and we have notices in Livy⁵ and later authors. It is an offensive and defensive alliance between Carthage on the one side and Philip and his allies on the other. Each party is to help the other against all enemies, except where any earlier obligation may stand in the way. The Romans are not, in any case, not even if they conclude peace with Carthage, to be allowed to retain any possessions, whether in the form of dominion or alliance, on the eastern side of the Hadriatic. This is simply all, as it stands in Polybios; and a treaty concluded on such simple terms seems to have somewhat puzzled later writers, both ancient and modern. As it stands, there seems so little for either party to gain by it. The person really to profit by its stipulations would seem to be Dêmétrios of Pharos, who would regain his lost

¹ Thirlwall, viii. 277. Cf. Flathe, ii. 273.

² Liv. xxiii. 33, 34, 39. App. Mac. 1.

⁴ Pol. vii. 9.

³ January, 1862.

⁵ Liv. xxiii. 33.

dominions. Philip was to help Carthage in the war with Rome, and it is not said that he was to receive any payment for his labours. It has excited surprise¹ that no provision is made either for the independence of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks or for their transference from Roman to Macedonian rule. On the other hand, later Greek writers² have supposed provisions for the annexation of Epeiros and the rest of Greece to the Macedonian Kingdom. But the explanation of the Treaty as it stands does not seem difficult. The key to the whole position is that Philip was too late; he had missed the favourable moment; he was negotiating after Cannæ instead of before it. At an earlier time, Philip's help might well have seemed worth buying at the cost of a considerable portion of Italy; but, if it ever had been so, it was so no longer. Hannibal now deemed himself strong enough, perhaps absolutely to conquer Italy by his own forces, at all events to weaken Rome thoroughly and permanently. In the case of complete conquest, he would not be disposed to divide the spoil with an ally who stepped in only at the last moment. But if Rome were not to be conquered, but still to be dismembered, those parts of her empire which Philip would have the best claim for demanding as subjects or allies, namely Sicily and Greek Italy, were also exactly the parts which Carthage also would most naturally claim to have transferred to her dominion or protection. Still Philip, though not now of the importance which he once was, was not to be wholly despised. He was no longer needed as a principal; still he might, especially with his fleet,³ be useful as an auxiliary. For such services it would be reward enough if the Roman

CHAP. VIII.
Various
statements
and con-
jectures
of later
writers.

Probable
explanation
of the
Treaty.

¹ Flathe, ii. 279. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note.

² App. Mac. 1. Zonaras ap. Thirlwall, viii. 279, note.

³ Liv. xxiii. 33. Philippus Rex quam maximâ classe (ducentas autem naves videbatur effecturus) in Italiam trajiceret.

CHAP. VIII. possessions in his own neighbourhood were to be transferred to himself or his friends, and if Carthage, in any future war, gave him such help as he was now to give Hannibal. This seems to be the simple meaning of the Treaty in Polybios, and its terms agree very well with the position of things at the time.

Position
assumed
by Philip
in the
Treaty.

In this treaty, Philip negotiates as a Greek King, the head of a great Greek alliance. How far he was justified in so doing, that is, how far his negotiations were authorized by the Federal Assemblies of Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Boeotia, we have no means of judging. We have now lost the continuous guidance of Polybios, and we have to patch up our story how we can from the fragments of his history combined with the statements of later and inferior writers. Happy it is for us when the Roman copyist condescends to translate the illustrious Greek of whom he speaks in so patronizing a tone.¹ But whether authorized or not, Philip speaks in this treaty as the head of a Greek alliance, almost as the acknowledged head of all Greece. As such, he demands that Korkyra, Epidamnus, and Apollonia be released from all dependence on Rome. Probably they were to be formally enrolled as members of the Grand Alliance; practically they would most likely have sunk to the level of Thessaly, or even to that of Corinth and Orchomenos. As chief of such an alliance, Philip may not have been unwilling to stipulate for Carthaginian aid in any future struggles with Ætolia. All this would practically amount to making himself something like chief of Greece, a chief who would doubtless be, in name, the constitutional head of a voluntary alliance, but a chief whose position might easily degenerate into practical Tyranny, or even, before long, into

¹ Liv. xxx. 45. Polybius, *haudquaquam spernendus auctor*. Ib. xxxiii. 10. Polybius secuti sumus, *non incertum auctorem*.

avowed Kingship. But no such schemes could possibly find a place in a public treaty concluded by Philip in his own name and in that of his Greek allies.¹ In the later writers, the simple terms recorded by Polybios gradually develop into much larger plans of conquest. The Treaty in Polybios provides for a joint war with Rome, but it contemplates the possibility of that war being ended by a treaty with Rome, and it provides that, in such a case, certain definite cessions shall be made to Philip or his allies. After this, if Philip ever stood in need of Carthaginian help, Carthaginian help was to be forthcoming. In the copy in Livy these terms swell into something widely different. Italy is to be definitely conquered for the benefit of Carthage by the joint powers of Carthage and Macedonia; the allied armies are then to pass over into Greece; they are to wage war with what Kings they pleased, and certain large territories, somewhat vaguely expressed, are to be annexed to Macedonia. Philip is to take all islands and continental cities which lie anywhere near to his Kingdom.² All this has evidently grown out of the stipulated cession of Korkyra and the Greek cities in Illyria. Appian goes a step further. In his version the Carthaginians are to possess all Italy, and then to help Philip in conquering Greece.³ This was just the light in which the matter would look to a careless Greek writer of late times, who probably had his head full of Dêmôsthênês and Alexander and the earlier Philip, and who had no clear

Livy's
version
of the
Treaty.

Appian's
version.

¹ One of Philip's envoys (Liv. xxiii. 39) was a Magnésian. Does this simply show the utter subjection of Thessaly to Philip, or was Sôitheos armed with any commission from an imaginary Thessalian League?

² Liv. xxiii. 33. Perdomitâ Italiâ, navigarent in Græciam, bellumque cum quibus Regibus placeret, gererent. Quæ civitates continentis, quæ insulæ ad Macedoniam vergunt, cœ Philippi regnique ejus essent.

³ App. Mac. 1. Φίλιππος . . ἔπεμπε πρὸς Ἀννίβαν . . ὑπισχνούμενος αὐτῷ συμμαχεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, εἰ κἀκεῖνος αὐτῷ συνβοῖτο κατεργάσασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

CHAP. VIII. idea of the real position of the Greek states at this particular time. Philip no doubt aimed at a supremacy of some sort over Greece, but, when negotiating in the name of a great Greek Alliance, he could not well have publicly asked for Carthaginian help for the subjugation of Greece.

Version of
Zonaras.

In Zonaras we reach a still further stage; Hellas, Epeiros, and the islands are to be the prize of Philip, as Italy is to be the prize of Carthage. Now, in the genuine copy, Philip counts Macedonia as part of Hellas, and acts in the name of the Allied Powers, of which Epeiros was one. To ask for the subjugation of Hellas and Epeiros would have been quite inconsistent with his own language. There may of course have been secret articles, or the Romans may have tampered with the treaty; these are questions to which no answer can be given. But the copy as given by Polybios seems perfectly to suit the conditions of the case, and the variations of later writers seem to be only exaggerations and misunderstandings naturally growing out of his statements.

Import-
ance of this
Treaty in
Federal
History.

This treaty had the effect of placing all the Federal States of Greece, except Ætolia, in a position of hostility towards Rome. It is therefore an event of no small moment in a general history of Federalism. It was the first step towards the overthrow of the earliest and most flourishing system of Federal commonwealths which the world ever saw. From the moment that any independent state became either the friend or the enemy of Rome, from that moment the destiny of that state was fixed. The war which I am about to describe made Achaia the enemy, and Ætolia the friend, of Rome; but the doom of friend and of enemy was alike pronounced; as it happened, the present friend was the first to be swallowed up. On the eve of such a struggle, a struggle in which the republican Greeks had certainly no direct interest, one would be glad

to know how far the different Federations really com- CHAP. VIII.
mitted themselves to it by their own act, and how far Philip merely carried out Apellès' principle of dealing with Achaia and Epeiros as no less bound to submission than Thessaly herself. However this may be, the treaty was, in its terms, one which Philip contracted on behalf of his allies as well as of himself; Rome therefore, as a matter of course, dealt with all the allies of Philip as with enemies. It was however some time before the war directly touched any of the states of Peloponnêsos. Philip's immediate object was to secure those cities on the Illyrian coast which were in alliance with Rome. They were to be, in any case, his share of the spoil; if he still cherished any thoughts of an expedition into Italy, their possession seemed necessary as the first step. But he still found leisure to meddle in the affairs of Peloponnêsos, for which his possession of Corinth, Orchomenos, and the Triphylian towns¹ gave him constant opportunities and excuses. His character was now rapidly corrupting; his adviser was no longer Aratos, but Dêmêtrios of Pharos. The first time that we hear of his presence is at Messênê. In that city, the oligarchical government, which was in possession during the last war,² had lately been overthrown by a democratic revolution.³ But there was a powerful discontented party, and new troubles seemed likely to break out. Both the King of Macedonia and the President of the Achaian League, a place now filled by Aratos for the sixteenth⁴ time, hastened to Messênê, both, we may suppose, in the avowed character of mediators. Certainly neither of them could have any other right to interfere in the internal quarrels of a city which was neither subject to the Macedonian Crown nor enrolled in the Achaian Confederation. Aratos, we may well believe, went with a

Philip's
relations
with Peloponnêsos.

Affairs of
Messênê.
B. C. 215.

Interference of
Philip and
of Aratos.

¹ See above, p. 538.

² See above, p. 514.

³ Pol. vii. 9.

⁴ Or *fifteenth*. See note at the end of the Chapter.

CHAP. VII. sincere desire of preventing bloodshed, and not without some hope of persuading both parties that their safety and tranquillity would be best secured by union with Achaia.¹ With what views King Philip went was soon shown by the event. He arrived a day sooner than Aratos, and his arrival is spoken of in words which seem to show that he was anxious to outstrip him.² The day thus gained he is said to have spent in working on the passions of both parties, till the result was a massacre in which the magistrates and two hundred other citizens perished.³ The younger Aratos did not scruple to express himself strongly about such conduct;⁴ but the father still retained influence enough to persuade Philip, for very shame, to drop an infamous scheme, proposed to him by Dêmétrios, for retaining the Messénian citadel in his own hands.⁵ The next year Philip's crimes increase; he sends Dêmétrios, on what pretence we know not, to attack Messênê, an attempt in which the perfidious adventurer lost his life.⁶ We next

Disturbances
caused by
Philip.

Last influence of
Aratos
over
Philip.

Philip's
second
attempt on
Messênê,
B.C. 214.

¹ Plutarch's (Ar. 49) expression of *βοηθῶν* may mean anything or nothing.

² Pol. vii. 13. *Ἀράτου καθυστερήσαντος*. Plut. Ar. 49. *Ὁ μὲν Ἀράτας ὕστερον*. Cf. above, p. 375.

³ It seems quite impossible to reconcile the details of Plutarch's story (Ar. 49) with the direct statements of Polybios (vii. 9). Plutarch makes Philip ask the magistrates (*στρατηγοί*) if they have no laws to restrain the multitude, and then ask the multitude if they have no hands to resist tyrants. A tumult naturally arises, in which the magistrates are killed. This story implies an oligarchic government, yet it is clear from Polybios that the government of Messênê was now democratic, and Plutarch himself gives the magistrates the democratic style of *στρατηγοί*, not the aristocratic style of *ἐφοροί*. Still it is perfectly credible that Philip played, in some way or other, a double part between two factions, and encouraged the worst passions of both.

⁴ Plut. Ar. 50. *Ὁ νεανίσκος . . . τότε λέγων εἶπε πρὸς αὐτὸν, εἰς οὐδὲ καλὸς ἔτι φαίνεται τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα δράσας, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἀσχιστος*. (See above, p. 548.) Was the subsequent business of Polykrateia at all meant as revenge for this insult?

⁵ See the story in Pol. vii. 11. Plut. Ar. 50.

⁶ Pol. iii. 19. See Thirlwall, viii. 282, note. Cf. Paus. iv. 29. 1, who characteristically confounds Dêmétrios the Pharian with Dêmétrios the son of Philip.

find him charged with adultery with Polykrateia, the wife of the younger Aratos, and lastly, stung by the reproaches of her father-in-law for his public and private misdeeds, he filled up the measure of his crimes by procuring the death of the elder Aratos by poison.¹ Aratos himself believed that such was the cause of his death; he spoke of his mortal illness as the reward of his friendship for Philip.² Philip was no doubt, by this time, quite degenerate enough for this or any other wickedness; but one regrets to hear that his agent was Tauriôn, whose conduct has hitherto stood out in honourable contrast to that of the other Macedonian chiefs. Either now, or at some later time, Philip carried off Polykrateia into Macedonia, and gave her husband drugs which destroyed his reason.³ In short, the gallant young King and faithful ally has degenerated into a cruel tyrant and a treacherous enemy.

CHAP. VIII.
Death of
Aratos,
B.C. 213.

Thus died Aratos, the deliverer and the destroyer of Greece, while General of the League for the sixteenth or seventeenth time. His career had been spread over so long a space, it includes so many changes in the condition of Greece and of the world, that one is surprised to find that at his death he was no more than fifty-eight years of age.⁴ Sad indeed was the fall of Philip's friend and victim

Last days
of Aratos,
B.C. 213.

¹ Pol. viii. 14. Plut. Ar. 52.

² Polybios (viii. 14) makes him say simply, *ταῦτα τὰ πείχαιρα τῆς φίλης, ὃ κεφάλων, κεκομισμένα τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον*. In Plutarch (Ar. 52) this becomes, *ταῦτ', ὃ κεφάλων, ἐπείχαιρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φίλης*. Here there seems to be a slight touch of the rhetorical horror of Kings, which is hardly in character in the mouth of Aratos. On the probability of the story of the poisoning, see Thirlwall, viii. 283. Niebuhr, Lect. iii. 364.

³ Plut. Ar. 54. Liv. xxvii. 31. *Uni enim principi Achæorum Arato adempta uxor nomine Polycratia, ac spe regiarum nuptiarum in Macedoniam asportata fuerat.*

This comes in incidentally five years after. One is tempted to believe that Livy had never heard of either Aratos till he came to the events of B.C. 208.

⁴ Niebuhr (iii. 364 and elsewhere) talks of "old Aratos." So one is led

CHAP. VIII. from the bright promise of the youth who, thirty-eight years before, had driven the Tyrant out of Sikyôn. Yet, granting his one fatal act, his later years had been usefully and honourably spent, and he retained the affections of his countrymen to the last. His own city of Sikyôn and the League in general joined in honours to his memory; at Sikyôn he was worshipped as a hero; he had his priests and his festivals, and his posterity were held in honour for ages.¹ He was cut off when he might still have hoped to keep his place for some years longer as at least a spectator of some of the greatest events in the world's history. But he made way for a nobler successor, though one possibly less suited for the coming time than he was himself. The crafty diplomatist, the eloquent parliamentary leader, the cowardly and incapable general, passed away. In his stead there arose one of the bravest and most skilful of soldiers, one of the most honest and patriotic of politicians, but one who lacked those marvellous powers of persuasion by which Aratos had so long swayed friends and enemies, and had warded off all dangers except the poisoned cup of Macedonian friendship. The new hero of the League was Philopoimên, a hero worthy of a better age. He fell upon evil days, because the Fates had cast his lot in them. If the days of Aratos were few and evil, they were so by his own choice.

Com-
parison
of Aratos
and Philo-
poimên.

to fancy both Philip himself in after times, and still more the Emperor Henry the Fourth, as much older than they really were, because of the early age at which they began public life. Livy (xl. 5, 54) calls Philip, *senex* and even *senio consumptus*, when he was not above sixty; he makes (xxx. 80) Hannibal, at forty-five, call himself *senex*, and talks (xxxv. 15) of the *senectus* of Antiochos the Great, at about the same age. So historians almost always lavish the epithets "old" and "aged" upon Henry, who died at the age of fifty-six. On the other hand Justin (xxx. 4) makes Flamininus call Philip *puer immaturæ ætatis*, when he was about thirty-eight.

¹ Plut. Ar. 58, 54.

CHAP. VIII.

Meanwhile the Roman war had begun, though as yet the Achaian League had no share in it. The storm first broke upon the Federal States of north-western Greece, but it was not long before Achaia herself learned how terrible was the danger into which her royal ally had led her. Philip began by attacking the towns of Orikon and Apollônia on the Illyrian coast. He took Orikon; but, while besieging Apollônia, he fled ignominiously before a sudden attack of the Roman Prætor Marcus Valerius Lævinus.¹ This happened between Philip's two interferences at Messênê, and this was doubtless the expedition in which Aratos, disgusted with the King's conduct, refused to take any share.² Lævinus continued for some years to command on the Illyrian station, and he effectually hindered Philip—if indeed Philip had any longer any such intention—from crossing over to Italy or giving any sort of efficient aid to Hannibal. But Rome had as yet no Grecian allies; her condition was still such as hardly to make her alliance desirable. But to win allies in the neighbourhood of any prince or commonwealth with whom Rome was at war was an essential part of Roman policy. No line of conduct was more steadily adhered to during the whole period of her conquests. In each of her wars, some neighbouring power was drawn into her alliance; his forces, and, still more, his local knowledge and advantages, were pressed into the Roman service; he was rewarded, as long as he could be of use, with honours and titles and increase of territory; and at last, when his own turn came, he was swallowed up in the same gulf with the powers which he had himself helped to overthrow. In the wars between Rome and Macedonia this part,

Beginning
of the
Roman
War,
B.C. 214.

Roman
policy of
Alliances.

¹ Liv. xxiv. 40.

Plut. Ar. 51.

CHAP. VIII. alike dishonourable and disastrous, fell to the lot of Ætolia. The momentary fit of virtue which had placed Agelaos at the head of the League had now passed away. Skopas and Dorimachos were again in their natural place as the guiding spirits of the nation. Skopas was now General, and Dorimachos retained his old influence.¹ It does not appear that Philip or his allies had done the Ætolians any wrong, and the only intercourse between Rome and Ætolia up to this time had certainly not been friendly. A time had been when Rome had threatened Ætolia with her enmity, if she did not scrupulously regard the rights of her Akarnanian neighbours.² But Rome had now forgotten the claims of Akarnania upon the forbearance of the descendants of the Trojans. Ætolia bade fair to be a useful ally, and Rome was again giving signs of being a power which it was worth the while of Ætolia, or of any other state, to conciliate. Rome had survived the defeat of Cannæ; her prospects were brightening; Fulvius had recovered Capua, and Marcellus had recovered Syracuse. Lævinus now opened a negociation with Skopas and Dorimachos, possibly with other leading men in Ætolia,³ and he was by them introduced to plead the cause of Rome before the Ætolian Federal Congress. He enlarged on the happy position of the allies of Rome; Ætolia, the first ally beyond the Hadriatic, would be the most happy and honoured among all the allies of Rome. No Samnite or Sicilian orator was present to set forth the dark side of Roman connexion, nor was there any envoy from Apollônia or Korkyra to assert the claims of his own city to be

Position
of Rome.

B.C. 216.

B.C. 211.

¹ Liv. xxvi. 24. Scopas, qui tunc prætor gentis erat, et Dorymachus principes Ætolorum.

Princeps, in Livy, as I have already observed, implies political influence, whether with or without official rank.

² See above, p. 412.

³ Livy, u.s. Tentatis prius per secreta colloquia principum animis.

Rome's earliest ally in the Hellenic world. A treaty was agreed upon, that infamous league of plunder which made the name of Ætolia to stink throughout all Greece. Rome and Ætolia were to make conquests in common; Ætolia was to retain the territory, and Rome to carry off the moveable spoil.¹ But the great bait was Rome's old ally, Akarnania. What in modern political jargon would be called "the Akarnanian question" had always been a matter of primary moment in the eyes of Ætolian politicians. The moment of its solution seemed now to have come; the gallant little Federation was to be swallowed up by its powerful and rapacious neighbour. The negotiators of Rome and Ætolia forestalled the utmost refinements of modern diplomacy. Ætolia revindicated her natural boundaries; the reunion of Akarnania was decreed upon the highest principles of eternal right.² An end was to be put to the intolerable state of things which assigned to Ætolia any frontier narrower or less clearly marked than that of the Ionian and Ægean Seas. Elis, Sparta, King Attalos of Pergamos, and some Illyrian and Thracian princes,³ might join the alliance if they wished. The Romans began in terrible earnest. They invaded Zakynthos, occupied all but the citadel, captured the Akarnanian towns of Oiniadai and Nêsos, and handed them over to their allies. Early in the next spring the Lokrian Antikyra shared the same fate; the inhabitants were carried off as slaves by the Barbarians, and the Ætolians possessed the deserted city.⁴ Meanwhile the

CHAP. VIII.

Alliance
between
Rome and
Ætolia,
B.C. 211.Plots for
the "re-
union" of
Akarna-
nia.Roman
conquests.
B.C. 211.

B.C. 210.

¹ Pol. ix. 39. Liv. xxvi. 34. See above, p. 341.

² Liv. u.s. Acarnanas, quos ægrè ferrent Ætoli a corpore suo diremptos, *restituturum* se in antiquam formulam jurisque ac ditionis eorum.

³ Skerdilaidos we have met with already; on Pleuratos, see Thirlwall, viii. 284.

⁴ Pol. ix. 39. "Ἡδὴ παρήρηται μὲν Ἀκαρνανῶν Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νήσον, κατέσχον δὲ πρόην τὴν τῶν ταρακώρων Ἀντικυρέων πόλιν, ἐξανδραποδισμένοι μετὰ Ῥωμαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι,

CHAP. VIII. hosts of Ætolia set forth to take possession of the devoted land of Akarnania. The march of their whole force, while Philip was, as usual, occupied with his barbarian neighbours, seemed destined to bring this troublesome Akarnanian question to the speediest of solutions. But the invaders met, at the hands of a whole people, with a resistance like that of the defenders of Numantia or of Mesolongi. Every inhabitant of Akarnania stood forth with the spirit of a Hofer or an Aloys Reding. Akarnania was a Federal Democracy, but here at least Federalism did not imply weakness, nor did Democracy evaporate in empty vaunts. Women, children, and old men were sent into the friendly land of Epeiros; every Akarnanian from sixteen to sixty swore not to return unless victorious; their allies were conjured not to receive a single fugitive; the Epeirots were prayed to bury the slain defenders of Akarnania under one mound, and to write over them the legend, "Here lie the Akarnanians, who died fighting for their country against the wrong and violence of the Ætolians."¹ Not that this heroic frame of mind at all led them to despise more ordinary help; they sent messengers praying King Philip to come with all speed to their aid. The invaders shrank and paused when they found the frontier guarded by men bent on so desperate a resistance.² When they heard that Philip was actually on his march, the invincible Ætolians, harnessed as they were, turned themselves back in the day of battle. They departed, apparently without striking a blow, to enjoy the easier

Heroism
of the
Akar-
nanians.

Retreat
of the
Ætolians.

πεισόμενα δηλονότι ἀπερ εἰκός ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας· τὰ δ' ἔβλεψεν κληρονομοῦσι τῶν ἡτυχηκότων Αἰτωλοί.

¹ Liv. xxvi. 25. "Hic siti sunt Acarnanes, qui, adversus vim et injuriam Ætolorum pro patriâ pugnantes, mortem occubuerunt." Cf. Pol. ix. 40.

² Liv. u.s. Ætolorum impetum tardaverat primo conjurationis fama Acarnanicæ; deinde auditus Philippi adventus regredi etiam in intimes coegit fines.

prey which the Roman sword had won for them, and the difficulties and complications of Akarnania remained for the present unsolved. CHAP. VIII.

Among the Peloponnesian states, Elis and Messênē readily joined the Roman and Ætolian alliance;¹ but it was an important object with both sides to obtain the adhesion of Sparta. A series of revolutions had taken place in that city, some of them while the Social War was still going on, and some since its conclusion. One Cheilôn, a member of the royal family, who deemed himself to be unjustly deprived of the kingdom, raised a tumult, beginning his revolution with what was now the established practice of killing the Ephors. But he failed in an attempt to surprise King Lykourgos, and, finding that he had no partisans, he fled to Achaia.² A short time afterwards, the Ephors suspected King Lykourgos himself of treason, and he escaped with difficulty into Ætolia.³ Afterwards they found evidence of his innocence, and sent for him home again.⁴ The other King Agêsipolis is said to have been expelled by Lykourgos after the death of his guardian uncle Kleomenês.⁵ Certain it is that he is found as an exile and a wanderer many years after. Lykourgos left a son, Pelops,⁶ who seems to have

Condition
of Sparta.

Sedition of
Cheilôn,
B.C. 218.

Banish-
ment and
return of
Lyk-
ourgos,
B.C. 218-
217.
Agêsipolis.

Pelops.

¹ Pol. ix. 30.

² Ib. iv. 81.

³ Ib. v. 29. It is worth notice that the *véoi*, who always figure conspicuously in the Spartan revolutions of this age, appear on this occasion on the side of the Ephors. The young were the party of Kleomenês, and Lykourgos was suspected of unfaithfulness to his principles.

⁴ Pol. v. 91.

⁵ Such must be the meaning of Livy, xxxiv. 26. But he confounds this Kleomenês with the great Kleomenês; *Pulsus infans ab Lycurgo tyranno post mortem Cleomenis, qui primus tyrannus Lacedæmone fuit*. But what shall we say to a writer who tells us that Sparta had been subject to Tyrants *per aliquot ætates*? Livy's several generations stretch from the great Kleomenês to B.C. 195, about thirty years.

⁶ About Pelops, see Manso, iii. 369, 389. I do not however see the

CHAP. VIII. retained a nominal royalty in common with a certain Machanidas, who is of course branded by Achaian writers with the name of Tyrant.¹ We must remember that the same title is freely lavished on Kleomenēs himself.² It

Ætolian
and Akar-
nian
Embassies
at Sparta,
B.C. 210.

was during the reign of Machanidas that the Ambassadors of the rival Leagues of Ætolia and Akarnania came to plead their respective causes at Sparta. Machanidas, Tyrant as he was, must have respected popular forms, for it is clear that the speeches given by Polybios on this occasion³ were addressed to a Popular Assembly. The Ætolian envoys were Kleonikos,⁴ of whom we have before heard, and Chlaineas, who was the chief speaker. He sets forth the good deeds of Ætolia, which are chiefly summed up in her resistance to Antipater and Brennus, and also the evil deeds of Macedonia, which fill up a much longer space. He tells the Lacedæmonians that whatever Antigonos had done in Peloponnēsos was done out of no love either for Achaian or Spartan freedom, but simply out of dread and envy of the power of Sparta and her victorious King. The speech of Lykiskos, the envoy from the Federal Government of Akarnania,⁵ is more remarkable. It is an elaborate accusation of Ætolia and eulogy on Macedonia. It is worth notice, as showing that there was, on every question, a Macedonian side, which was really taken by many Greeks, and that we are not justified in looking at the whole history purely with Athenian eyes. In the eyes

Speech of
Lykiskos.

contradiction between the two passages, Livy, xxxiv. 32, and the fragment of Diodōros, 570 (iii. 105, Dindorf). But the matter is of very little importance.

¹ I can see no ground for the violent description of Machanidas given by Mr. Donne in the Dictionary of Biography. He seems to fancy that Machanidas was a Tarentine by birth, heedless of Bishop Thirlwall's warning, viii. 298.

² Pausanias (iv. 29. 10), by a strange confusion, makes Machanidas immediately succeed Kleomenēs.

³ Pol. ix. 28-39.

⁴ Ib. 37. See above, pp. 58, 558.

⁵ Ib. 32. See above, p. 149.

of Lykiskos, the representative of one of the most honour-
able and patriotic states in Greece, Macedonians, Spartans,
and Achaians are equally Greeks ;¹ the elder Philip is the
pious crusader who delivered Delphi from the Phókian ;²
Alexander is the champion of Hellas against the Bar-
barian, the hero who made Asia subject to the Greeks.³
Antigonos is of course the deliverer from the Tyranny of
Kleomenês, the restorer of the ancient constitution of
Sparta.⁴ He sets forth with more force the services of
Macedonia as the bulwark of Greece against Illyrian and
Thracian Barbarians.⁵ The old sins of Ætolia against
Akarnania, Achaia, Bœotia, Sparta herself, are all strongly
put forward ;⁶ the orator enlarges on the late infamous
treaty with Rome, the capture of Oiniadai and Nêsos
and Antikyra, their inhabitants carried off into bar-
barian bondage, and their desolate cities handed over
to Ætolian masters.⁷ He warns his hearers against the
common peril ; war with Achaia and Macedonia was, after
all, a struggle for supremacy between different branches
of the same nation ; war with Rome is a struggle for
liberty and existence against a barbarian enemy. The
Ætolians, in their envy and hatred against Macedonia,
have brought a cloud from the west,⁸ which may pos-
sibly overwhelm Macedonia first, but which will, in the

¹ Pol. ix. 37. 'Εφιλοτιμείσθε πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας ὁμοφύλους.
Cf. above, p. 562.

² Ib. 33.

³ Ib. 34. 'Τῆγκον ἐποίησε τὴν Ἀσίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.

⁴ Ib. 36. 'Εκβαλὼν τ'ν τύραννον καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ πάτριον ὕμιν
ἀποκατέστησε πολίτευμα.

⁵ Ib. 35. Μακεδόνες οἱ τ'ν πλείω τοῦ βίου χρόνον οὐ παύονται διαγωνι-
ζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀσφαλείας. Cf. Pol.
xviii. 20.

⁶ Ib. 34. See above, p. 392.

⁷ Ib. 39. See above, p. 577.

⁸ Ib. 37. 'Επισπασάμενοι τηλικούτο νέφος ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσπέρας. The same
metaphor is found in the speech of Agelaos at Naupaktos seven years
earlier. See above, p. 561.

CHAP. VIII. end, pour down its baleful contents upon the whole of Greece.

Sparta in
alliance
with
Ætolia.

Naval
warfare of
Sulpicius,
B.C. 210.

Desola-
tion of
Aigina.

The eloquence and the reasoning of Lykiskos were of no avail against that feeling of hatred towards Macedonia and Achaia, which had been the ruling passion at Sparta ever since the Kleomenic War. Sparta joined the Ætolian alliance; under her sole and enterprising King—I see no reason to refuse him the title—she soon began to take a vigorous share in the war. Achaia was now pressed by Sparta and Elis, just as she had been in the Social War. But she soon found that she had also to deal with an enemy far more terrible than any that could be found on her own side of the Ionian Sea. Publius Sulpicius now succeeded Lævinus in the command of the Roman fleet. He and Dorimachos first attempted to relieve Echinos, one of the Ætolian possessions on the Maliac Gulf, which was now besieged by Philip. The attempt failed, and the city soon after surrendered to the King.¹ An easier enterprise was presented by the Achaian island of Aigina. The city was taken; by the terms of the treaty, the moveables belonged to Rome, the real property to Ætolia. Thus the whole Aiginetan population became slaves, and it was with a very bad grace that Publius allowed them even to be ransomed.² As for the soil and buildings of the island, those the Ætolians sold for thirty talents to their ally King Attalos.³ Thus did an illustrious Greek island, a Canton of the Achaian League, see its inhabitants carried away by barbarian conquerors, and its soil become an outlying possession of a half-barbarian King. Meanwhile Machanidas was attacking the Achaian territory from the south, and the Ætolians were, as usual, plundering the north-west coast.⁴ The President Euryleôn, whatever may have been his political merits, was in warfare only too apt

¹ Pol. ix. 42.

² Ib. xxiii. 8.

³ Ib. Cf. xi. 6.

⁴ Liv. xxvii. 29.

a disciple of the school of Aratos.¹ The League was once more driven to ask help from Philip.²

CHAP. VIII.

The
League
asks help
of Philip,
B.C. 209.

Possibly they might have dispensed with his help altogether; at all events they might have confined themselves to asking for a fleet to guard their coasts. The League was now fully able to contend single-handed against any enemies that Peloponnêsos could send forth. If a new Kleomenês had arisen to threaten her southern frontier, that frontier was now guarded by a new Lydiadas, and there was no Aratos to thwart or to betray the plans of the new-found hero. Now that Aratos was dead, Philopoi-
mên had returned to his native land. He was at once elected to the office of Master of the Horse, or Commander of the Federal Cavalry,³ a post which was generally understood to be a step to that of General of the League.⁴ The whole military system of Achaia had become utterly rotten during the long administration of Aratos, but the ease with which Philopoi-
mên was able thoroughly to reform it shows that the nation must have had in it the raw material of excellent soldiers. He began, as a wise man should do, by reforming his own department. His predecessors had allowed every kind of abuse. Some had mismanaged
matters through sheer incapacity, some through misguided zeal;⁵ some had tolerated lack of discipline to serve their own ambitious purposes. The cavalry was composed of wealthy citizens, of those whose favour had most weight in the disposal of political influence, and whose votes would commonly confer the office of General.⁶ Some Masters of the Horse had knowingly winked at every sort of licence,

Philo-
poi-
mên
General of
Cavalry.

Abuses
in the
Achaian
Cavalry.

¹ Pol. x. 20. Εθρυλέων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἔτολμος ἦν καὶ πολεμικῆς χρείας ἀλλότριος.

² Liv. xxvii. 29.

³ ἱππάρχης. See above, p. 281, 552.

⁴ This is implied by Polybios (x. 22); οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ἀρρογόμενοι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plut. Phil. 7.

⁵ Pol. x. 22. Διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀδυναμίαν . . . διὰ τὴν κακοζήλιαν, κ.τ.λ.

⁶ See above, p. 295.

CHAP. VIII. hoping to make political capital out of a popularity so unworthily gained. Men bound to personal service were allowed to send wretched substitutes, and the whole service was in every way neglected. Philopoimén soon brought the young nobles of Achaia to a more patriotic frame of mind. He went through the cities of the League;¹ by every sort of official and personal influence he worked on the minds of the horsemen, he led them to take a pride in military service, and carefully practised them in the necessary lessons of their craft. An efficient body of Achaian cavalry seemed suddenly to have sprung out of the ground at the bidding of an enchanter.²

Philo-
poimén's
reforms.

King
Attalos
chosen
General of
Ætolia,
B.C. 209.

The Achaians had placed the worthiest man of Greece in the second place of their commonwealth, with every prospect of rising before long to the first. The rival League meanwhile made a stranger election. The Achaians had once given to a Ptolemy the nominal command of all their forces;³ the Ætolians now invested Attalos with

¹ Plut. Phil. 7. τὰς πόλεις ἐπιστύν.

² Paus. viii. 49. 7. Ἑπανήκων δὲ ἐς Μεγάλην πόλιν αὐτίκα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἤρετο ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἱππικοῦ καὶ σφᾶς ἀρίστους Ἑλλήνων ἀπέφαιεν ἱππεύειν.

Philopoimén was more fortunate in his reform of the Achaian cavalry than Washington in his attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry of the same sort in 1778.

"Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast importance of a superiority in point of cavalry, and calculating on the patriotism of the young and the wealthy, if the means should be furnished them of serving their country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with that pride of station which exists everywhere, it was earnestly recommended by Congress to the young gentlemen of property and spirit in the several states, to embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay till the close of the year. Provisions were to be found for themselves and horses, and compensation to be made for any horses which might be lost in the service. This resolution did not produce the effect expected from it. The volunteers were few, and late in joining the army." Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 492.

³ See above, p. 387.

what seems to have been meant to be a more practical Generalship.¹ For, as the King of Pergamos was taking an active part in the war, his election was quite another matter from the purely honorary dignity which the Achæians had conferred upon Ptolemy Philadelphos. Attalos first sent troops into Phthiôtis, and then came in person to what was now his own island of Aigina. Philip, on his march towards Peloponnêsos, defeated near Lamia a combined Roman, Ætolian, and Pergamenian force, and compelled the defeated Ætolians to retreat into the city. Things had strangely turned about since the days when Lamia had been the scene of a war in which Macedonians appeared as the oppressors, and Ætolians as the defenders, of Greece. Before Attalos had reached Aigina, ambassadors from Egypt, Rhodes, and Chios appeared in Philip's camp to offer their mediation; and one almost smiles to read that the diplomatic body was on this occasion swelled by an envoy or envoys from Athens. We seem to be reading over again the history of the Social War. All parties seemed inclined for peace; men's eyes began to open to the folly of letting Greece become the battle-ground of Macedonia, Rome, and Pergamos.² The Ætolians brought forward as a mediator a power of whom we have seldom before heard in Grecian affairs, Athamania and its King Amynder. This chief

CHAP. VIII.

B.C. 323-322.

Attempts at mediation on the part of Rhodes, &c.

¹ Livy's statements are exceedingly confused. He says first (xxvii. 29), *Attalum quoque Regem Asiæ, quid Ætoli summum gentis suæ magistratum ad eum proximo concilio detulerant, fama erat in Europam trajecturum*. Presently (c. 30) we find, *Ætoli, duce Pyrrhidi, qui prætor in eum annum cum absente Attalo creatus erat*. This might mean either that Attalos was chosen to be the regular General of the League, with Pyrrhias for his Lieutenant, or that Attalos was made *στρατηγὸς ἀδρονειδῶν* (cf. above, p. 484), Pyrrhias being the regular General of the year. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 288.

² Liv. xxvii. 30. *Omnium autem non tanta pro Ætoliis cura erat . . . quam ne Philippus regnumque ejus, grave libertati futurum, rebus Græciæ immisceretur*. So, just after, *Ne caussa aut Romanis aut Attalo intrandi Græciam esset*.

CHAP. VIII. WAS the prince of a semi-Hellenic tribe, whose territories were surrounded by those of the Ætolian and Epeïrot Leagues and of the Thessalian dependents of Philip. The Athamanians took a share on the patriotic side in the Lamian War,¹ but since then their name has not been mentioned. Probably the tribe rose to independence during the decay of the Molossian Kingdom, and, on its fall, continued to form a separate principality, instead of joining the Epeïrot League. Of Amynder himself we shall often hear again. Under his mediation, a truce was agreed upon, and a diplomatic Conference was appointed to be held at Aigion, simultaneously, it would seem, with a meeting of the Achaian Federal Assembly.² Any treaty which might be agreed upon could thus be at once ratified by the two most important members of the Macedonian alliance, by Philip himself and by the Achaian League. Meanwhile King Attalos was to be warned off or hindered from an attack on Euboia, which he was supposed to meditate. Philip spent the time of truce at Argos. It would have been very hard for any member of the Antigonid dynasty to make out his descent from the old Macedonian Kings, but, on the strength of such supposed connexion, the Argeian origin of Philip was asserted and allowed. In compliment to this mythical kindred, Philip was chosen to preside both at the local festival of the Hêraia and at the Pan-hellenic Games of Nemea.³ The management of this great national festival was wholly a matter of Cantonal and not of Federal concern; it was a vote of the Argeian people, not of the Achaian Government or Assembly, which conferred this high honour

Philip at
Argos.

¹ Diod. xviii. 11.

² This seems to be the meaning of the two expressions of Livy (xxvii. 30). *De pace dilata consultatio est in concilium Achæorum; concilioque ei et locus et dies certa indicta.* And, just after, *Ægium profectus est [Philippus] ad indictum multo ante sociorum concilium.*

³ See above, pp. 401, 556.

upon Philip.¹ Between the two celebrations, the King attended the Conference at Aigion. But meanwhile Atalos had reached, not indeed Euboia, but his own island of Aigina; the Roman fleet also had reached Naupaktos; the presence of such powerful allies drove away any feelings of Pan-hellenic patriotism which were beginning to arise in the minds of the Ætolians. The war had certainly not been glorious for them; all that they had done had been to enter into possession of empty cities conquered for them by the Roman arms. Philip had taken Echinus in their despite; he had beaten them and their allies before Lamia; their attack on Akarnania had been baffled by the heroism of the Akarnanians themselves. But, with the forces of Rome and Pergamos on either side of Greece, they recovered an even greater degree of presumption than usual. It was perhaps through an affectation of disinterestedness that they made no demands for themselves, but they made very inadmissible demands on behalf of their several allies. Besides some cessions of barbarian territory to their Illyrian friends, Atintania was demanded for the Romans, and Pylos for the Messênians. It is not very clear in whose hands Atintania then was; it was demanded for Rome as a "reunion,"² yet it does not seem ever to have been in the possession of the Republic; at an earlier time it seems to have been Epeirot,³ at a later time we shall find it Macedonian. At all events, Philip, who so ardently desired to expel the Romans from Apollônia and the neighbouring cities, and who had so lately defeated Romans,

CHAP. VIII.
Conference
at Aigion,
B.C. 209.

Demands
of the
Ætolians.

¹ As in the case of the Isthmian games, when Corinth was Achaian. See above, p. 419.

² Liv. xxvii. 80. Postremo negârunt dirimi bellum posse, nisi Messeniis Achæi Pylum redderent, Romanis *restitueretur* Atintania, Scerdilædo et Pleurato Ardyæi.

³ See Pol. ii. 5, 11. It was admitted to Roman *friendship* in B.C. 229; hardly ground enough for the phrase *restitueretur* twenty years later.

CHAP. VIII. *Ætolians*, and *Pergamenians* both in sieges and in the open field, was not willing to allow a strip of Roman territory to be interposed between himself and his *Epeirot* allies. And, whichever *Pylos* is intended,¹ it is hard to see on what grounds *Messênê* could just now claim an increase, or even a restitution, of territory. A spontaneous offering on the part of Philip might have been a graceful atonement for former wrongs; but it was hardly a cession which could be demanded of a victorious prince at a diplomatic conference. It is not wonderful that, on the receipt of such an *ultimatum*, Philip abruptly broke off the negotiation. He retired to *Argos*, and there began the celebration of the *Nemean Games*, when he heard that *Sulpicius* had landed between *Sikyôn* and *Corinth*. With that activity which he could always show when he chose, he hastened to the spot with his cavalry, attacked the Romans while engaged in plunder, and drove them back to their fleet, which retired to *Naupaktos*. He returned to *Argos*, finished the celebration of the festival, and then, casting aside his purple and diadem, affected to lead the life of a private citizen in the city of his ancestors. But, if he laid aside the King, he did not lay aside the Tyrant; he made his supposed fellow-citizens suffer under the bitterest excesses of royal lust and insolence.² He was roused from his debaucheries by the

Negociations
broken off.

Philip
repulses
the
Romans.

His alter-
nate de-
bauchery
and ac-
tivity.

¹ According to *Livy*, the *Achaians* were to surrender *Pylos*. But it is quite impossible that either the *Triphylian* or the *Messénian Pylos* can now have been in the hands of the League. Philip had conquered *Triphyly* in the Social War, and he had not yet given it to the *Achaians*. (*Liv.* xxviii. 8.) It is quite possible that Philip may have seized on the other *Pylos* in one of his *Messénian* expeditions, but it is still harder to conceive that this can have been an *Achaian* possession. Whichever *Pylos* is meant, it is clearly of Philip that the cession was demanded. Here, as throughout the period, we have to deplore the loss of the continuous narrative of *Polybios*. *Schorn* (p. 185) accepts the *Achaian* possession of the *Messénian Pylos*.

² *Pol.* x. 26. *Liv.* xxvii. 31. Cf. *Thirlwall*, viii. 289.

most threatening of all news for the Achaian cities, the news that an Ætolian force had been received at Elis.¹ The luxurious Tyrant was at once changed into the active King and the faithful ally ;² he marched to Dymê, where he was met by Kykliadas the General of the League, and by Philopoimên, who was still the Commander of the Federal Cavalry.³ In a battle by the river Larisos, the Ætolians were defeated, and Philopoimên slew with his own hand Damophantos, who filled the same post in the Eleian army which he himself did in that of Achaia.⁴ In another battle, the allies unexpectedly found that they had Romans to contend with as well as Ætolians and Eleians, and after a sharp struggle, in which Philip displayed great personal courage, they had to retreat.⁵ The advantages of the fight however seemed to remain with the allies, who ravaged Elis without let or hindrance. One of the constant invasions of Macedonia by the neighbouring barbarians called Philip back to the defence of his own kingdom, and about the same time Sulpicius sailed to meet Attalos at Aigina. The two great Leagues were thus left to fight their own battles, and the Achaians had now learned how to fight theirs. In a battle near Messênê,

Exploits
of Philip
and Philo-
poimên.

¹ Livy's notions of Grecian politics may be estimated by his idea that Elis was a State which had seceded from the Achaian League ; *Eleorum accensi odio, quod a ceteris Achæis dissentirent.* (xxvii. 81.) What can he have found and misunderstood in his Polybios ?

² "Durch die Verhältnisse gezwungen erduldeten die Bürger unwürdige Schmach und Beschimpfung ; denn Philipp war ihr Schutzherr gegen Feinde, denen der Staat die Spitze nicht bieten konnte." Schorn, 189.

³ One is almost tempted to believe that Philopoimên filled the office of Master of the Horse for two years together, as we shall find that he afterwards did with the Generalship itself. But, if we accept the belief of Schorn (210-4), considered probable by Thirlwall (viii. 295), that the Achaian Federal elections were now (ever since B.C. 217) held in the Autumn, it is possible that all the reforms and exploits of Philopoimên may have taken place during the one Presidency of Kykliadas, from November, 210, to November, 209. There would not however be the same political objection to the reelection of the *ἑταίρους* which there was to that of the *στρατηγοίς*.

⁴ Plut. Phil. 7. Paus. viii. 49. 7.

⁵ Liv. xxvii. 32.

CHAP. VIII. the Ætolians and Eleians were now defeated by the unassisted force of Achaia.¹ Such was the difference between Achaian troops commanded by Aratos and Achaian troops commanded by Philopoi mén.

Character
of the last
years of
the war,
B.C. 208-
205.

The war continued for about four years longer with various success. It is needless to recount all the gains and losses on both sides. The Ætolians continued their ravages in Western Greece, while the combined fleet of Rome and Pergamos cruised in the Ægean, descending on any favourable points, sometimes for conquest, sometimes merely for plunder. Once or twice, on the other hand, we get a momentary glimpse of a Punic fleet making its appearance in the Grecian seas, as an ally of Philip and the Achaians.² Philip himself shines here and there like a meteor, now giving help to his allies in Greece, now defending his own frontier against the Northern Barbarians.³ Notwithstanding all his crimes, it is impossible to refuse all sympathy to so gallant and active a prince, and one who was becoming more and more truly the protector of Greece against the Barbarians of the West as well as of the North. Only one of his many brilliant expeditions and forced marches need be recorded here. An Ætolian Assembly, or perhaps only a meeting of the Senate,⁴ met at Hêrakleia to discuss the interests of the League with their ally and chief magistrate, King Attalos.

Philip's
attempt on
Hêrakleia,
B.C. 207.

¹ Liv. xxvii. 33.

² Liv. xxvii. 15, 30. xxviii. 7.

³ Polybios (x. 41) gives a vivid description of the various calls made upon Philip's energies at one moment during the year 208. His own kingdom was threatened by Illyrians on one side and by Thracians on the other; he received at the same time applications for help from Achaia, Boeotia, Euboea, Epeiros, and Akarnania. Livy (xxviii. 5) translates Polybios.

⁴ Pol. x. 42. Πυθόμενος δὲ . . . τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀθροίζεσθαι χάριν τοῦ κοινολογηθῆναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς Ἰκοτούσης ὤρμησε σπεύδων καταταχῆσαι καὶ πτοῆσαι διασύρας τὴν σύνοδον αὐτῶν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν συλλόγου καθυστέρει. Liv. xxviii. 5. Eo nuntiatum est, conciliū Ætolis Heraclæam indictum, Regemque Attalum, ad consultandum de summâ belli,

The King of Egypt and the Rhodians were also renewing CHAP. VIII. their praiseworthy attempts to bring about a peace, and their envoys, as well as others from Rome, sent doubtless on an opposite errand, were present at the meeting at Hêrakleia.¹ We have before seen the Ætolians select the time of meeting of the Achaian Federal Congress as the time best suited for a safe and profitable inroad into the Achaian territory.² Philip now sought to repay them in their own coin; he hoped to surprise them in the act of debate, as the Medeônians had once surprised them in the act of election.³ He came however too late; the meeting, whether of the whole Ætolian body or only of the Senate, had already dispersed. The Egyptian and Rhodian ambassadors still continued to labour for peace, but it is almost impossible to follow their movements in detail,⁴ and as yet both the contending parties still preferred to make themselves ready for battle. We soon after find Philip at Aigion at an Achaian Assembly. He there made over to

venturum. Hunc conventum ut turbaret subito adventu, magnis itineribus Heracleam duxit. Et concilio quidem dimisso jam venit.

Both Schorn (191) and Thirlwall (viii. 292, 293) take this meeting for a General Assembly. Certainly *σύνδοξος* and *Concilium* are the regular words for such an Assembly, yet the words of Polybios seem to imply that the *ἄρχοντες* themselves formed the *σύνδοξος*, and did not merely summon it.

¹ Liv. xxviii. 7. ² See above, p. 509, 551. ³ See above, p. 415.

⁴ Livy (u.s.) makes the Egyptian and Rhodian envoys meet Philip at Elateia; he tells them that the war is not his fault, and that he is anxious for peace; the conference is broken up by the news that Machanidas is going to attack the Eleians during the Olympic Games. Philip goes to oppose him, Machanidas retreats, and Philip then goes to Aigion.

Now this is evidently one of Livy's confusions. The Eleians were allies of Machanidas and enemies of Philip. Livy's narrative also gives no place for the speech of the Rhodian envoys (Pol. xi. 5) addressed to an Ætolian Popular Assembly (*οἱ πολλοί*, c. 6), which cannot be the one at Hêrakleia, because the presence of Macedonian ambassadors (*οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβεις*) is distinctly mentioned.

I can really make nothing of the account in Appian, Mac. ii. 1, 2. See Thirlwall, viii. 295. One thing however is clear; from about this time (Livy, xxix. 12) Rome, Pergamos, and Carthage take no active share in the war; it is reduced to the old Greek limits of the Social War.

CHAP. VIII. his allies certain Peloponnesian districts which had been in Macedonian possession since the Social, some perhaps even since the Kleomenic, War.¹ These were the Arkadian city of Hêraia, which had once been a member of the League,² and the whole district of Triphylia,³ which had never before been part of the Achaian body. Philip also restored to the State of Megalopolis the town of Alipheira, which he had taken in the Social War. This was an old possession of Megalopolis, which Lydiadas, in the days of his Tyranny, had exchanged with the Eleians for some compensation which is not distinctly explained.⁴ This increase of territory would extend the boundary of the League to the Ionian Sea, and would interpose part of Achaia between Elis and Messênê. If it was really made over to the League at this time,⁵ it was an important acquisition, and one made at an opportune moment. The League could now, as of old, afford to liberate Grecian cities, for it was now able to withstand any Grecian enemy by its own unassisted force.

Philo-
poimên
General

Philopoimên was now at last chosen General of the League.⁶ For the first time since Markos and Lydiadas

¹ Pol. ii. 54. iv. 77 et seqq.

² See above, p. 403.

³ Liv. xxviii. 8. See above, p. 538.

⁴ Pol. iv. 77. Ἡλείοι προσελάβοντο καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀλιφειῶν πόλιν, ὅθεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπ' Ἀρκάδιαν καὶ Μεγάλην πόλιν, Λυδιάδου τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρὸς τινὰς ἰδίαις πράξεις ἀλλαγὴν δόντος τοῖς Ἡλείοις.

⁵ I speak thus doubtingly, because we find these towns, at a later time, again in the hands of Philip, and again ceded by him to the League. Liv. xxxii. 5. xxxiii. 34.

⁶ See Schorn, 195, Thirlwall, viii. 295. That Philopoimên commanded at Mantinea as General of the League is clear from the whole story, and follows from Plutarch's words (Phil. 11), στρατηγούμενα τὸ δεύτερον, which otherwise are not very clear. According to Schorn's view, he would be elected in November B.C. 208, so that he would be best called the General of the year B.C. 207; whereas, under the earlier system, the greater part of the official year fell in the same natural year as the election. The succession seems to have been 211-0 Euryleôn; 210-9 Kykliadas; 209-8 Nikias (Liv. xxviii. 8); 208-7 Philopoimên.

the Achaians had at their head a man capable of fighting a battle. Aristomachos, it may be remembered, had once wished to fight one, but he was hindered by Aratos.¹ During the long administration of Aratos, pitched battles were rare, and victories altogether unknown. The Old-Achaian cities had never been distinguished for martial spirit; and the Arkadian and Argolic members of the League seem generally, on becoming Achaian, to have sunk to the Achaian level. At Megalopolis and Argos indeed things were in a better state; we have seen the League, on one occasion, calling, in a marked way, for Argeian and Megalopolitan contingents;² and the Megalopolitan phalanx had been, even in the days of the Kleomenic War, reformed after the Macedonian model.³ Elsewhere, whatever military spirit there was had died away under Aratos. His successors, Euryleón, Kykliadas, and Nikias, seem to have been as incapable as himself of commanding in the open field, and not to have redeemed the deficiency by his diplomatic powers or his skill in sudden surprises. Polybios⁴ speaks with utter contempt of the Generals of this time, and we have seen that one common path to the highest office in the state was a course of gross and wilful negligence in the administration of the post next in importance.⁵ The League had learned, in the early days of Aratos, to trust to Egyptian subsidies, to diplomatic craft, or, at most, to midnight surprises; latterly they had trusted to Mace-

CHAP. VIII.

of the
League,
B.C. 208-
207.Inefficiency
of the
Achaian
army.¹ See above, p. 444.² See above, p. 550.³ Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstätter, p. 365.⁴ He says (xi. 8.) that there are three ways of attaining to military skill, by scientific study (*διὰ τῶν ὑπομημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κατασκευῆς*), by instruction from men of experience, and by actual experience of a man's own. The Achaian Generals at this time were altogether unversed in any one of the three; πάντων ἦσαν τούτων ἀνευρόητοι οἱ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγοὶ ἀπλῶς.⁵ See above, p. 583.

CHAP. VIII. donian help,¹ and to mercenaries, who never fought with real zeal in the service of a commonwealth.² But the League had now at its head a man who was a native of the most military city of the Union, who had given his whole life to the study of the military art, and whose most ardent desire was to see the League really independent. Philopoi-
 mén's
 Reforms. mên longed to see his country defended by the arms of her own citizens, not by mercenaries indifferent to her cause, or by foreign Kings who used the Achaian League only as an instrument for their own purposes. As Master of the Horse, he had reformed the Achaian cavalry; as General, he determined to reform the whole military system of the League.³ After so long a period of neglect, reform might have seemed almost hopeless. Philopoi-
 mén had first to carry proposals for improvement through a democratic Assembly; he had then to impose a course of severe discipline upon men who were in the least favourable condition for it. He had not, like his contemporary Hannibal, to bring brave but untutored warriors under the restraints of military order; he had the more difficult task before him of making soldiers out of the citizens of a highly civilized and somewhat luxurious nation. The forms of the Achaian constitution probably helped him in his work. If he gained his first point, he gained everything. In the

¹ Plutarch (Phil. 8) gives a good picture of the state of things in these respects.

² Pol. xi. 18. Under a Tyranny, he tells us, mercenaries fight well, because their master will reward them, and will use them, if victorious, for future conquests; but citizens fight ill (cf. Herod. v. 78), because they fight for a master and not for themselves. Under a Democracy, on the other hand, citizens fight well, because, they fight for their own freedom, but mercenaries fight ill, because, the more successful the commonwealth is, the less it will need their services.

³ The admirable summary of Philopoi-
 mén's reforms by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 295-8) makes one almost shrink from going again over the same ground. I have tried to bring out a few special points into prominence.

three days' session of the Achaian Assembly, it was possible that his proposals might be wholly rejected; it was not likely that they should be criticized, spoiled, patched, and pared down in detail. When his proposals were agreed to, it was doubtless a hard task to carry out his scheme in practice; yet his position had several marked advantages. He had already reformed the service which was filled by the highest class, and he had something like a model infantry to show in the contingent of his own city. And, when he had once received the necessary authority from the assembled People, he had almost unlimited powers for the execution of his plans. There was no King and no Ministry to thwart him; there were no Councillors or Commissioners to meddle; there was no mob of a metropolis to be cringed to; above all, there were no Special Correspondents to vex the soul of the hero.¹ He had simply to deal with a people whose intellect he had already convinced, a people who had themselves raised him to his high office, a people whose fault was certainly not that of disobedience, fickleness, or ingratitude towards the leaders whom they placed at their head. One vigorous speech in the Assembly²—probably at the Meeting where he was chosen General—settled everything. Let the Achaians, he told them, retain their fondness for elegance and splendour; but let it be turned towards fine arms rather than towards fine clothes and fine furniture;³ let men vie with one another, not in objects of mere luxury and show, but in those whose possession would of itself prompt them to vigorous and patriotic action. Eight months of severe training put Philopoimên at the head of an Achaian phalanx which he could really trust. Their

¹ Contrast the good luck of Philopoimên in these respects with the position of a Spartan, Byzantine, Venetian, or Dutch General in past times, or of an English or American General in our own day.

² Pol. xi. 10.

³ Pol. xi. 9. Plut. Phil. 9.

CHAP. VIII. short spears and small shields were exchanged for the full panoply and long sarissa of the Macedonians; they were practised in every evolution of the phalanx; and, before his year of office was over, Philopoimên assembled at Mantinea a force with which he did not dread to meet the power of Sparta in the open field. He did not wholly give up the use of mercenary troops, but strangers and citizens had now changed places. His mercenaries were now mainly Illyrian and other light-armed soldiers; the real strength of his army lay in the native phalanx and native cavalry¹ of the League.

The Three
Battles of
Mantineia;

With this new force the Achaian General met the Spartan King in a pitched battle near Mantinea.² It was the third great battle fought on the same, or nearly the same, ground.³

B.C. 418.

Here, in the interval between the two parts of the Peloponnesian War, had Agis restored the glory of Sparta after her humiliation at Sphaktêria; here Epameinôndas had fallen in the moment of victory; here now was to be fought the last great battle of independent Greece. One regrets that, at such a moment, the forces of the two worthiest of Grecian states should have been arrayed against each other; still it cannot be without interest that we behold the last act of the long drama of internal Hellenic warfare. Rome, Carthage, Pergamos,⁴ even Macedonia, had for a while withdrawn from the scene; the struggle was to be waged, as of old, between Grecian generals commanding

B.C. 362.

¹ As the Tarentines (Pol. xi. 12. Liv. xxxv. 28, 29. Thirlwall, viii. 298) on both sides were not natives of Tarentum, but only a particular sort of cavalry, there is no reason why they may not have been a citizen force on both sides. Polybios does not imply that they, but rather that the *εὐχαροι*, were mercenaries. And, in any case, Philopoimên would have the native Achaian cavalry, which he had himself organized.

² Polybios (xi. 10) uses the name *Mantineia*, which doubtless still remained in familiar use, and not the more formal title of *Antigoneia*.

³ On the three battles of Mantinea, see Leake's *Morea*, iii. 57-93.

⁴ Attalos had been called back to his own kingdom to repel an invasion of Prasias, King of Bithynia. Liv. xxviii. 7.

Grecian armies. If there were foreigners engaged on either side, they were mere auxiliaries, like the barbarian troops which had appeared in Peloponnêsos even in the days of Epameinôndas.¹ And we have no reason to doubt that Machanidas was a worthy foe, even of Philopoimên. His name of Tyrant he shares with the great Kleomenês; but he was as clearly a real national leader as Kleomenês himself. It is the old strife, the old hatred, between Sparta and the city founded by Epameinôndas. Machanidas marched forth, expecting a certain victory; like earlier chiefs of his nation, he looked upon Arkadia as his destined prey.² And no doubt it was with a special feeling of delight that Philopoimên, the follower of Epameinôndas,³ stood ready, with the force of Megalopolis and the whole Achaian League, to engage a Spartan King on the ground on which his model had conquered and fallen. The details of the battle are given at length by Polybios,⁴ who probably heard them from Philopoimên himself. It is enough for my purpose to say that, after a hard fought field, victory remained with the Federal army, and that a trench, which presented such difficulties to Aratos at Ladokeia, now seemed no such unsurmountable barrier either to Spartans or to Achaians. At the battle of Larisos, Philopoimên, Master of the Horse of Achaia, slew with his own hand the Master of the Horse of Elis; now, as General of the League, he slew with his own hand the King of Sparta. Had he been a Roman, he might have boasted of the *Spolia Opima*, like Romulus and Cossus and Marcellus. The death of Lydiadas was now avenged; but we regret to find that the Achaians, in their day of

Third
Battle of
Mantineia,
B.C. 207.

Complete
victory
of the
Achaians.

¹ Dionysios sent Celts and Iberians to the support of Sparta. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 20.

² Herod. i. 66; 'Ἀρκαδίην μὲν αἰτεῖς; μέγα μὲν αἰτεῖς' οὐ τοι δώσω, κ.τ.λ.

³ Plut. Phil. 8.

⁴ Pol. xi. 11-18. Cf. Plut. Phil. 10. Paus. viii. 50-2.

CHAP. VIII. victory, were far from showing the same respect to a fallen foe which Kleomenês had shown to their own hero. The corpse of Lydiadas had received royal honours from his conqueror; the head of Machanidas was cut from his body, and held up as a trophy and an encouragement to the pursuers. It was a victory indeed; four thousand Lacedæmonians lay dead; as many were taken prisoners; the whole spoil remained in the hands of the victors; and all this was purchased by the most trifling loss on the Achaian side. In point of military glory, it was the brightest day in the history of the League.


For a Lacedæmonian army to be defeated in a pitched battle, for Lakonia to be ravaged at will by an invader, were now no longer the miraculous events which they had seemed a hundred and sixty years before. But the fight of Leuktra and the Peloponnesian campaigns of Epameinôndas were hardly more wonderful than for a Spartan army, bred up in the school of Kleomenês, to be defeated by a native Achaian force, commanded by an Achaian General, without the presence of a single Macedonian soldier, and without the help of a single Egyptian talent. The Achaian army, with its General at its head, now marched as freely through Lakonia as had been done by Epameinôndas, by Pyrrhos, by Antigonos, or by either Philip. A prouder moment in a soldier's life can hardly be conceived than when Philopoimên crossed the hostile border at the head of the army of his fellow-citizens which he himself had trained to victory.


Philo-
poimên
ravages
Lakonia.

Nabis
Tyrant of
Sparta.

The remaining events of the war may be hastened over. Machanidas was succeeded at Sparta by one Nabis, a Tyrant in every sense of the word, but who did not as yet make himself formidable to the League. Philip, now that the Romans and Attalos were gone, easily drove the Ætolians to a separate peace, a proceeding on their parts

Peace
between
Ætolia





Macmillan & Co. Cambridge & London.

which gave deadly offence at Rome.¹ It was certainly a breach of the engagements towards Rome into which they had entered at the beginning of the war, but the fault lay with the Romans themselves, who had wholly neglected their Greek allies for two years.² Shortly afterwards the Proconsul Publius Sempronius landed at Epidamnus. Unable to persuade the Ætolians to break the peace—a rare scruple, which shows how much they must have suffered in the war—and unable to contend against Philip without their help, he gladly listened to proposals of peace. They first came from the Epeirots, who, if it be true that Philip had possessed himself of Ambrakia,³ once the capital of their great Pyrrhos, had almost as much reason to complain of him as of Romans or Ætolians. Conferences took place at Phoinikê in Epeiros between the Proconsul Sempronius, the Kings Philip and Amynder, and the Magistrates of the Akarnanian and Epeirots Leagues. The lead in the negociation was taken by the Epeirots General Philip, supported by his two colleagues Dardas and Aeropos.⁴ By the terms of the peace Rome obtained some Illyrian districts; Philip obtained Atintania, hardly to the advantage of the mediating power; and it was probably now that he made over to King Amynder⁵ the island of Zakynthos, his own conquest during the Social War.⁶ The best modern guide to these times⁷ marvels, and with reason, at this last “rectification” of territory. Amynder’s kingdom lay wholly inland, and he could not possibly visit his new dominions without the goodwill of the possessor of Ambrakia. It was even stranger than for a Duke of Savoy, who was at least

CHAP. VIII.
and Macedonia,
B.C. 205.

Conference
at Phoi-
nikê.

General
Peace,
B.C. 205.

¹ Cf. Pol. xviii. 21. Liv. xxxi. 29.

² Liv. xxix. 12.

³ See App. Mac. ii. 1. The Ætolians had taken it some time before.

⁴ Liv. xxix. 12. See above, p. 152.

⁵ Liv. xxxvi. 31. It was the price of a free passage through Athamania.

⁶ Pol. v. 102. See above, p. 558.

⁷ Thirlwall, viii. 300.

CHAP. VIII. master of Nizza, to be made King of Sicily or Sardinia.¹ The other allies seem to have had no representatives in the Conference, but they were equally included in the treaty. Philip stipulated for his own Thessalian dependents, for Prusias of Bithynia, whom it was needful to secure against his neighbour Attalos, and for the Leagues of Achaia and Boeotia, as well as those of Epeiros and Akarnania. The allies on the Roman side were Elis, Athens, Messênê, King Attalos, King Pleuratos in Illyria, Nabis the Tyrant,² and Rome's metropolis Ilium. This last piece of mythical diplomacy rivals the claims which Akarnania had once made for Roman support. The Ætolians were enrolled on neither side; Philip had granted them peace, but not alliance; Rome looked on allies who had made peace without her sanction as unworthy of her protection or care. This was the first great lesson which the Greeks learned in the school of Roman diplomacy. To become the ally of Rome was the first step towards becoming her subject; it involved the entire sacrifice of independent action. The peace was confirmed by the Roman Senate and People; it was accepted, tacitly at least, by the allies on both sides, and the land had rest for a short space.

¹ It was as if the Prince of Montenegro should receive one of the Greek Islands still in Turkish bondage, as compensation for the Turkish military road through his dominions.

² It was afterwards pretended that the treaty was concluded, not with Nabis, but with the lawful King Pelops. Liv. xxxiv. 32.

NOTE ON THE GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS.

IT is not easy to reconcile the number of Generalships attributed to Aratos by Plutarch with the distinct assertion (see above, p. 303) of the same writer that Aratos was elected General in alternate years, because the Law did not allow the retiring General to be immediately reelected. Droysen (ii. 438) holds that the Law was broken in favour of Aratos, and that he served for several consecutive years. Schorn (107) rather suspects an error in Plutarch's enumeration.

Aratos was first elected General in B.C. 245;¹ in 226 he was, according to Plutarch (Ar. 35), General for the twelfth time; in 213 he died, according to the same authority (c. 53), in his seventeenth Generalship. Among the intervening years, there are some when Aratos is mentioned as General, some when other persons are mentioned, and some where the name is not preserved. The statement that he died in his seventeenth Generalship would, in itself, present no difficulty; if he was elected in alternate years beginning with 245, then 213 would be his seventeenth year. But it is certain that his alternate reelection, though the common rule, was not adhered to so strictly as to exclude occasional deviations (see Plut. Ar. 38 and Pol. iv. 82 compared with iv. 37), and the twelfth Generalship in 226 cannot possibly agree with a system of alternate elections beginning with 245. Aratos was General in 245, 243, and 241. We then lose the succession for some years, and recover it in 234. From that date onwards we have as follows.

234 Aratos (viii.)	229 Lydiadas (iii.)
233 Lydiadas (i.)	228 Aratos (xi.)
232 Aratos (ix.)	227 Aristomachos.
231 Lydiadas (ii.)	226 Aratos (xii.)
230 Aratos (x.)	

If 226 were Aratos' twelfth Generalship, it follows that 234 was his eighth. But, as 241 was his third, the six intervening years, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235 do not give room for the four required Generalships (fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh), in alternate years. If Plutarch be right in calling 226 the twelfth Generalship, it follows that Aratos must have held office for four out of those six years, a clear violation of the law as stated by Plutarch himself. Droysen (ii. 435. 8) truly adds that in those years, only one General besides Aratos, namely Dioitias, is mentioned.*

¹ By the year of a General, I mean the year B.C. in which he was elected; his official year took in parts of two years of our reckoning. Thus the Generalship of B.C. 234 extends into B.C. 233, and so throughout.

* Droysen's reference is to Plut. Ar. 28, where there is no mention of Dioitias or of Héraia. The reference should have been to Polyainos (ii. 36, see above, p. 403), who mentions Dioitias as General, but gives no clue to the year to which his Generalship should be referred.

CHAP. VIII. Again, though the seventeenth Generalship in 213 would agree perfectly with a system of alternate reelection throughout the whole time, yet the first three Generalships are in odd years, 245, 243, 241, while the series beginning with 234 are in even years. Aratos must therefore, between 241 and 234, have either been in office or out of office for two years together. Again, he was not regular General in 224, nor General at all in 218, which, on the alternate system, he should have been. He certainly was General in 220, 217, 213. In 221, 219, 218, 216, we find other names. If then Plutarch be right in calling 226 his twelfth, and 213 his seventeenth, Generalship, we must not only supply two more Generalships in the years 222 and 215, but we must also suppose four Generalships between 241 and 234, that is, we must suppose, as Schorn says, that Aratos held the Generalship for three years together, in manifest breach of the law.

But, by supposing two slight and easily explained errors in Plutarch's reckoning, it is possible to arrange the years, so as not to imply any breach of a Law so distinctly stated by Plutarch himself. His mention of a seventeenth Generalship in 213 may have been a mere careless inference from the number of years and the common practice of alternate election. Or it may be explained in another way. The twelfth Generalship in 226 is the great difficulty. If for *δωδέκατος*, in Plut. Ar. 35, we might substitute *δέκατος*, we should then have to suppose that, between 241 and 234, Aratos, instead of being in office for three years together, remained once out of office for two years together,¹ as we know that he once did at a later time. We have then to suppose that Plutarch counted Aratos' Extraordinary Generalship in 224-3² (Ar. 41) as one of his regular years, and we have, between 224 and 213, to place Generalships in those years where it is allowable, namely in 222 and 215. This gives sixteen Generalships without any two being in consecutive years. Now in 219 the younger Aratos was General, and Plutarch may easily, in running his eye over a list, have mistaken his

¹ That this should be the case is not at all unlikely, when we remember (see above, p. 396, 7) the indignation excited by his attempt on Peiræus during the truce with Antigonus. That attempt must have been made either late in the official year B.C. 241-0 or early in B.C. 239-8. It is not an improbable conjecture that it was made when Aratos was General in 239, and that, in consequence of the popular feeling against him, he remained out of office during the years 238 and 237, and was elected for the fifth time in 236.

On the other hand it should be remarked that the time to which Droysen attributes the illegal elections of Aratos, and to which, if they occurred at all, they must be attributed, is precisely that when the power of Aratos was most unbounded. From 241 to 234, from the acquisition of Corinth to the acquisition of Megalopolis, Aratos was, with the exception of his temporary discredit about Peiræus, at the very height of his glory. Earlier, he was merely growing into power, later, he had rivals in Lydiadas and others.

² Aratos' election as *στρατηγὸς ἀντοκράτωρ* (see above, p. 434) was in the natural year B.C. 223, but before the expiration of the official year 224-3.

year of office for another year of his father's, and so have made the whole CHAP. VIII. number seventeen. The whole list would then stand thus :

245 Aratos (i.)	228 Aratos (ix.)
244	227 Aristomachos.
243 Aratos (ii.)	226 Aratos (x.)
242	225 Hyperbatas.
241 Aratos (iii.)	224 Timoxenos (i.)
¹ 240	224-3 Aratos (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ) (xi.)
239 Aratos (iv.)?	223 Timoxenos (ii.)
238	222 Aratos (xii.)?
237	221 Timoxenos (iii.)
236 Aratos (v.)?	220 Aratos (xiii.)
235	219 Aratos the Younger.
234 Aratos (vi.)	218 Epératos.
233 Lydiadas (i.)	217 Aratos (xiv.)
232 Aratos (vii.)	216 Timoxenos (iv.)
231 Lydiadas (ii.)	215 Aratos (xv.)?
230 Aratos (viii.)	214
229 Lydiadas (iii.)	213 Aratos (xvi.)

The question reduces itself to this. Was Plutarch more likely to go wrong in a reckoning of figures or in a distinct statement of constitutional practice? To me the former supposition certainly seems the easier of the two.

That Plutarch is by no means infallible in his chronology of the life of Aratos is plain from his strange remark that Aratos had been, in 224, for thirty-three years² an Achaian politician (τριάκοντα ἔτη καὶ τρία πεπολιτευμένος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, Ar. 41), whereas, in 224, only twenty-seven years had elapsed since the very beginning of his career in the deliverance of Sikyon. The only marked period of thirty-three years in the life of Aratos is that between his first Generalship in 245 and his death in 213; this is probably what Plutarch was thinking of. A mistake in reckoning up the Presidential years is one of exactly the same kind, and it is one, I certainly think, far more likely to occur than a direct and often repeated blunder on a point of constitutional law, committed by one who had the Memoirs of Aratos before him.

¹ The Generalship of Dioitas would come in one of the years 240, 238, 237 or 235, but I know of no evidence to fix it to any particular year.

² I do not at all know what Mr. Fynes Clinton means (iii. 36) by transferring this remark from the year 224 to 222, and adding "The thirty-three years of Aratos must be computed from the first prætor Marcus, B.C. 255." What have the years of Markos and Aratos to do with each other?

CHAPTER IX.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE PEACE OF EPEIROS TO
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE.
B.C. 205—146.

CHAP. IX. WITH the interference of Rome in Grecian affairs, the
Character of the period. main interest of our Federal history ceases. Hitherto we
have seen Greek Federalism in the days of its glory; we
have seen Greek Federal commonwealths acting as perfectly independent powers, and we have seen them acting in close union with Greek states possessing other forms of government. What is now left to us is to trace Greek Federalism in its decline; a decline, indeed, in no way peculiar to the Federal states, but one which they shared with all powers, whether kingdoms or commonwealths, which once came within the reach of Rome's friendship or enmity. The chief importance of this period for our purpose is indirect. We have now come within the life-time of Polybios; we shall soon come within the range of his personal memory. His narrative of events which he had seen himself, or had heard of from his father, is naturally much fuller than his narrative of events which rested on the traditions or the written records of a past generation. Unfortunately we now have his history only in fragments, but the fragments are often of considerable length, and there are also several narratives in Livy which are evidently translated from Polybios to the best of Livy's small ability. As

these later transactions were recorded by Polybios at great detail, the fragments of his history of these times contain a great mass of political information, and supply many constitutional details which we might otherwise never have known. We have several vivid pictures of debates in the Achaian and Ætolian Assemblies, such as we do not get in the history of earlier times. Still, when we read minute reports of debates in which Aristainos and Kykliadas, or Kallikratês and Archôn, were the chief speakers, we cannot restrain a wish to exchange them for equally minute reports of the parliamentary combats of Aratos and Lydiadas. I shall therefore touch comparatively lightly on this last period of Greek Federal history, leaving, as before, the details of warfare to the general historians of Greece and Rome, and stopping only at those points where the narrative affords us any important constitutional information.

CHAP. IX.
Importance of the period in Federal History chiefly indirect.

§ 1. *From the Peace of Epeiros to the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus.*

B.C. 205—194.

We left Greece at peace ; that she did not long remain so was again the fault of the King of Macedonia. Philip, whose youthful promise had been so bright, was gradually sinking from bad to worse. It was open to him to play the part of Piedmont in Greece ; he preferred, of his own choice, to play the part of Austria. Every step that he took alienated some old friend, or provoked some new enemy. In defiance of his treaty with Rome, he still continued his dealings with Hannibal, and Macedonian soldiers are said to have fought for Carthage at Zama.¹ In defiance

Aggressive proceedings of Philip, B.C. 202-200.

B.C. 202.

¹ Liv. xxx. 26, 33, 42. But Polybios does not mention them.

CHAP. IX. of his treaty with Ætolia, he attacked various cities, in Asia and elsewhere, which were allies or subjects of the League,¹ and, by his cruel treatment of his conquests, he degraded himself, in the eyes of all Greece, almost below the level of the Ætolians themselves.² He seems to have defrauded his old allies of Achaia of the Peloponnesian districts which he had professed to cede to them during the Roman war;³ he is even charged with an attempt to poison Philopoimên,⁴ as he was believed to have poisoned Aratos. He engaged in hostilities, which seem to have been altogether unprovoked, with the Rhodian Republic,⁵ with Ptolemy Epiphanês of Egypt, and with Attalos of Pergamos, the cherished ally of Rome. He engaged in a war with Athens, for which something more like an excuse could be pleaded;⁶ but he shocked the universal feeling of Greece by practising the same barbarous and useless kind of devastation of which he and his Ætolian enemies had alike been guilty during the Social War.⁷ Athens, politically contemptible, was already beginning to assume something of that sacred and academic character which she enjoyed in the eyes of the later Greeks and Romans. The destruction of Athenian temples and works of art doubtless aroused a feeling of general indignation even stronger than that which followed on the like sacrilege when wrought at Dion and Thermon. It was this attack on

His
dealings
with the
Achaian
League.

Philip's
devastation of
Attica,
B.C. 200.

¹ Lysimacheia, Kalchêdôn, Kios. See Pol. xv. 22. xvii. 2, 3.

² See Pol. xvii. 3. Cf. the somewhat later siege of Abydos, Pol. xvi. 29-34. Liv. xxxi. 16, 17.

³ See above, p. 592. That they were detained or recovered by him is clear by his again restoring, or pretending to restore, them at a later time. Liv. xxxii. 5.

⁴ Plut. Phil. 12.

⁵ Philip's war with the Rhodians produced several important sea-fights. See the description of those of Ladê and Chios. Pol. xvi. 1-9.

⁶ Two Akarnanians were put to death at Eleusis for an unwitting profanation of the mysteries. The Akarnanian League complained to their ally King Philip, who invaded and ravaged Attica. Liv. xxxi. 14.

⁷ See above, p. 538, 549.

Athens which finally drew Rome into the strife. The justice of the Roman declaration of war cannot be questioned. Philip had clearly broken the Treaty; he had helped the enemies of Rome and he had injured her allies. He had put himself in a position which enabled the Romans to assume, and that, for a while, with some degree of truth and sincerity, the character of the liberators of Greece. It was wholly Philip's own fault, that a Roman, a Barbarian, was able to unite the forces of nearly all Greece against a Macedonian King, and to declare, at one of the great Greek national festivals, that all Greeks who had been subject to Macedonia received their freedom from the Roman Senate and their Proconsul. There is no need to suspect the Senate, still less to suspect Flamininus personally, of any insincerity in the matter. That liberty received as a boon from a powerful stranger can never be lasting is indeed true. But it does not follow that the philhellenism of Flamininus was a mere blind, a mere trap for Greek credulity, or that the gift of freedom was deliberately designed from the beginning to be only a step towards bondage. One might as well suppose that the servants of the East India Company who first mingled in Indian politics and warfare deliberately contemplated the Afghan war and the annexation of Oude.

CHAP. IX.
Justice of
the war
on the
Roman
side.

Phil-
hellenic
feelings
of Flami-
ninus and
other
Romans.

The second Macedonian War—the second Roman War, as we may call it from our point of view—was carried on by three successive Roman commanders, Publius Sulpicius, Publius Villius,¹ and Titus Quinctius Flamininus.² Of these

Second
Mace-
donian
War,
B.C. 200-
197.

¹ I take Villius, in Greek *Ὀβίλλιος*, to be the name intended by the *Ὀρίλλιος* of Pausanias (vii. 7, 9). See Schorn, 240.

² For *Φλαμίνιος*, Pausanias (u.s.) and Appian (Syr. 2) have *Φλαμίνιος*; Aurelius Victor (c. 51) and, after him, Orosius (lib. iv. f. iii. ed. Venice, 1488) turn the *nomen* Quinctius into the *prænomen* Quintus, so as to change Titus Quinctius into Quintus Flamininus. Aurelius moreover makes him the son of Caius Flaminius who died at Trasimenus. This is not very wonderful in a late and careless compiler, but it is wonderful to find the error repeated by a scholar like Schorn, p. 237.

CHAP. IX. three, Titus became something like a Greek national hero. Plutarch¹ does not even stop to argue whether Titus or Philopoinén deserved the larger share of Grecian thankfulness; the merits of the Roman allow of no dispute or comparison. Titus² shone alike as a diplomatist and as a warrior; he showed himself as superior to Philip in the conference of Nikaia³ as he did upon the hill of Kynoskephalai. His real good will towards Greece there seems no just reason to doubt. He lived at a time peculiarly favourable to the growth of such a feeling. In earlier times the Romans despised the Greeks with the contempt of ignorance. In later times they despised them with the contempt of conquerors. Even Titus himself lived to change from the friend into the patron, and from the patron there are very few steps to the master. But, just at this moment, all the products of Grecian intellect were, for the first time, beginning to be opened to the inquiring minds of Rome. Greece was a land of intellectual pilgrimage, the birthplace of the art, the poetry, and the science, which the rising generation of Romans were beginning to appreciate. The result was the existence for a time of a genuine philhellenic feeling, of which the early conduct of Titus in Greece is the most illustrious example.⁴ Titus Quinctius was a Roman, and we may be quite certain that he would never have sacrificed one jot

Real good
will of
Flami-
ninus
towards
Greece.

¹ Comp. Phil. et Fl. 1.

² One can hardly help, when writing from the Greek side, speaking of him by his familiar prænomen, as he is always called by Polybios and Plutarch. It is not every Roman who is spoken of so endearingly.

³ See Pol. xvii. 1-10.

⁴ Mommsen, in his Roman History, very clearly brings out this fact, but he is, very severe both on Flamininus and on his countrymen for yielding to such foolish sentimentality. I confess that I cannot look on a generous feeling as disgraceful either to an individual or to a nation. But Mommsen's history of this period, as of all periods, is well worth reading, if the reader will only reserve the right of private judgement in his own hands.

A truer and more generous estimate of Flamininus will be found in Kortüm, iii. 251.

of the real interests of Rome to any dream of philhellenism. But, within that limit, he was disposed to be more liberal to Grecian allies and less harsh to Grecian enemies than he would have been to allies or enemies of any other nation. He would have Greece dependent on Rome; but he would have her dependent, not as a slave but as a free ally; the Greeks should be Plataians and not Helots; the connexion should be one, not of constraint, but of affection and gratitude for real favours conferred. He wished in short to make Rome become, what Macedonia ought to have become, the chosen head of a body of free and willing Greek confederates. For a few years he really effected his object. Macedonia did not retain a single ally, except the brave League of Akarnania, ever faithful to its friends in their utmost peril. The two great Leagues of Achaia and Ætolia did good service to the Roman cause; Epeiros and Bœotia, though not friendly in their hearts, did not venture openly to oppose it. Consistently with his whole system, Titus never pushed any Greek state to extremities. Philip received what, after such provocations as his, may be called favourable terms. When the Ætolians, like the Thebans after Aigospotamos, called for the utter destruction of Macedonia, Titus showed them how expedient it was that Macedonia should remain independent and powerful, the bulwark of Greece against barbarian inroads.¹ Philip was deprived of his conquests, and prevented from injuring the allies of Rome, but the original Kingdom of Macedonia suffered no dismemberment. Nor do we hear of the exercise of any severities against Philip's gallant allies of Akarnania, a marked contrast to the later treatment of the Epeirot cities after the fall of Perseus. A like indisposition to deal harshly with any Greek state may even account for Flamininus' over-lenity towards the Tyrant Nabis, the portion of his

Union of
Greek
States
under
Rome.

General
moderation
of
Flami-
ninus.

¹ Pol. xviii. 20. See above, p. 581.

CHAP. IX. career which, at first sight, is the most difficult either to justify or to understand.¹

Relation
of the
Federal
states
to Rome.

ÆTOLIA.

Condition
of Ætolia.

B.C. 200.

Damokritos
General.
Indecisive
Meeting
at Naupaktos.

The way in which the several Federal states of Greece stood affected to Rome during this war throws a good deal of light on Federal politics. It will therefore be worth dwelling on a little more fully than the purely military history. The Ætolians were the first among the Greek Leagues to embrace the Roman cause. They had good grounds for anger against Philip, because of his destruction of Kios and other of their allied or subject towns. On the other hand, they were not allies of Rome, and they had no special reason to be friendly to her after she had so carefully excluded them² from the Peace of Epeiros. Ætolia was perhaps just now a little more inclined to peace than usual. One main element of confusion in the country, Skopas, was absent. It was just after the Peace that he and Dorimachos received their special commission as legislators, and their legislation seems to have led only to internal commotions.³ Skopas was now at Alexandria, in the service of the young Ptolemy Epiphanês,⁴ and we just now hear nothing of Dorimachos. The General in office, Damokritos, seems to have been a moderate man, which was perhaps the reason why he was suspected of being bribed by Philip.⁵ During the first campaign of Sulpicius, an Ætolian Assembly was held at Naupaktos,⁶ under his presidency, which listened to Macedonian, Athenian, and Roman ambassadors, but came to no definite vote.⁷ The policy of Damokritos was to wait a little longer, and to see to which side success was likely to turn. He therefore exhorted the Assembly to pass no vote either

¹ Liv. xxxiv. 34, 49.

² See above, p. 600.

³ See above, p. 337. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 302.

⁴ Pol. xiii. 2.

⁵ Ib. xxxi. 32. Pecuniâ, ut fama est, ab Rege acceptâ.

⁶ Ib. 40.

⁷ Ib. 29-32.

way just yet, but to entrust the General with the power of calling a Special Assembly, when he should think fit, to settle the question of peace or war.¹ Shortly after, when the Roman arms seemed to have decidedly the advantage, Damokritos called his Assembly, and procured the adhesion of the people to the Roman cause.² The Ætoli-
Ætoli-ans join the Roman side, B.C. 200.

In Achaia the struggle with Sparta still continued ; but whether the League acted vigorously or not in any matter depended wholly on the presence of Philopoimén in office. He was twice General between the first and second Macedonian Wars. It seems to have been during his second Generalship³ that the Megarians, disgusted with the state of things in the Boeotian League, of which they then formed a part, returned to their old connexion with Achaia.⁴ As for Nabis, he continued his piracies, robberies, and domestic cruelties, on a scale such as Peloponnésos had never before seen. But he received several defeats from the Federal arms. The Tyrant surprised
ACHAIA. Importance of Philopoimén. B.C. 205-204 ? Reunion of Megara with the League. War with Nabis.

¹ Liv. xxxi. 32. Quum legibus cautum esset, ne de pace belloque, nisi in Panætolicum et Pylaico concilio, ageretur, decernerent extemplo, ut Prætor sine fraude, quum de bello aut de pace agere velit, advocet concilium ; et quod tum referatur decernaturque, ut perinde jus ratumque sit, ac si in Panætolicum aut Pylaico concilio actum esset.

This seems to mean that, by the Ætolian constitution, only the regular Annual Meeting could entertain questions of war and peace ; a Special Meeting, whatever were its powers, could not do that. The Assembly now passes either a general law for the future or a resolution for this particular case, allowing the General to call a Special Meeting with the full powers of the regular Assembly.

On the *Panætolicum* and *Pylaicum*, see above, p. 334.

² Livy (xxx. 40) says *proximo concilio*. This cannot possibly mean the next Annual Assembly.

³ Plut. Phil. 11. Thirlwall, viii. 303. It was in this Generalship that he exhibited his phalanx at the Nemean festival.

⁴ Pol. ix. 6. See above, p. 479.

CHAP. IX. Messênê, when Lysippos was General. Lysippos, like another Aratos, would do nothing, but Philopoimên, at the head of the militia of his own city, made him retreat.¹ Next year, being himself again General, he gathered the forces of the whole League together by a secret manœuvre, and then, suddenly entering Lakonia, defeated the Tyrant in a considerable battle.²

B.C. 203–202.

Deliverance of Messênê.

B.C. 202–201.

Generalship of Kykliadas, B.C. 201–200.

Philopoimên goes again to Crete.

The policy of Philopoimên was to keep the League, as far as might be, independent of all foreign powers. With this object he endeavoured to procure a peace between Philip and the Rhodians by Achaian mediation before the Romans stepped in.³ But Roman policy kept the allies of Rome from all separate negociations; his labours were therefore fruitless. He was succeeded in the Presidency by Kykliadas, a man devoted to Philip. Philopoimên seems then to have thought that Peloponnêsos was no longer a place for him, and, as in the days of Aratos, he went to find employment among his old friends in Crete.⁴ As before, one may be inclined to think that he would have acted a more truly patriotic part by staying to defend his country against Nabis, if only as a single soldier in the ranks; but there is at least no ground for supposing that Philopoimên was offended because he was not allowed to hold office two years together.⁵

¹ Plut. Phil. 12. *Τοὺς αὐτοῦ πολίτας ἀναλαβόν.* This means, I suppose, the citizens of Megalopolis only. So Thirlwall, viii. 305.

² See the whole story in Polybios, xvi. 36.

³ Pol. xvi. 35.

⁴ Plut. Phil. 13. Paus. viii. 50. 6.

⁵ Schorn (p. 230, cf. Kortüm, iii. 287) says, "Ein dritter ungünstiger Umstand war die Erbitterung Philopömens, welcher vergebens darnach gestrebt hatte, die Strategie noch ein Jahr zu behalten." This is, to say the least, a great deal to get out of the words of Pausanias (u.s.), *Φιλοποίμην δὲ, ὡς ἐξήκέν οἱ στρατηγούντι ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ἀρχειν ἄλλοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν βρηντο, αὐθις ἐς Κρήτην διέβη*, or out of those of Plutarch, *φυγομαχῶν ἃ φιλοτιμούμενος ἀκαίρως πρὸς ἑτέροισ.* I do not rely so much as I should have done at an earlier time on the unconstitutional nature of the scheme attributed to Philopoimên, as there is one instance somewhat later—

During his absence, while Kykliadas was still in office, an Achaian Assembly was held at Argos.¹ This was, seemingly, a little before the first Roman Embassy to Ætolia.

At this Meeting Philip suddenly appeared. He offered to carry on the war with Nabis on behalf of the League, if the Achaians would serve in his garrisons at Corinth and in Euboia. That is, he asked them to take his part against Rome.² This the Assembly was not ready to do; so Kykliadas, to save appearances with his patron, put aside the King's request on a point of order. The Meeting was a Special one, summoned to consider the war with Nabis; at such a Meeting nothing could lawfully be discussed except the war with Nabis.³ The present Assembly therefore was incompetent to declare war against Rome, or even to engage to send Achaian soldiers to Corinth or Chalkis. With this answer Philip was obliged to be content.

The League preserved its neutrality for some time longer. During the Consulship of Villius, Philip made another attempt to secure the fidelity of the League⁴ by ceding, or at least pretending or promising to cede, those Peloponnesian districts which he had once already professed to cede to Achaia.⁵ To the Triphylian towns his present offer added the yet more important cession of Orchomenos,⁶ which had not been mentioned on the former

Philip at Argos; his vain attempt to gain the League.

His pretended cession of Triphylia and Orchomenos, B.C. 199.

whether by a change in the law or by a breach of it—of his actually holding office two years together.

¹ Liv. xxxi. 25.

² Liv. u.s. Cf. Pol. xvi. 38. 'Ο δε Φίλιππος ὄρων τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εὐλαβῶς διακειμένους πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον, ἐσπούδαζε κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐμβιβάζει αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀπέχθειαν.

³ Liv. u.s. See above, p. 276.

⁴ Liv. xxxii. 5. He adds, *Ita enim pepigerant, quotannis juraturos in verba Philippi*. Livy has probably misunderstood the oath of adhesion to the Grand Alliance.

⁵ See above, p. 592.

⁶ This town had been a Macedonian possession since its capture by Antigonos in B.C. 223. See above, p. 493.

CHAP. IX. occasion. It would seem that the League did not, even now, really obtain possession of them,¹ but the mere hope may have prevented the Achaians from actually joining the Roman side. This final step did not take place till the Consulship of Flamininus. The then President, Aristainos,² was a strong Roman partizan, and Kykliadas already had been banished, seemingly on account of his Macedonian politics.³ Of the debate in the Assembly at Sikyôn which finally decreed the alliance with Rome, we have a vivid description in Livy,⁴ which is evidently translated from Polybios. It is a narrative of the utmost importance, as being one of our best authorities for several essential points in the Federal constitution. The General appears, not as Speaker, but as Leader of the House; the ten Ministers preside and put the question;⁵ and the vote is distinctly taken by States, not by heads.⁶ The Meeting lasts three days. On the first day the Assembly listens to the rival Ambassadors, first to those of Rome and her allies, and then to those of Macedonia. On the second day, as no other speaker rises, Aristainos, as Leader, first tries to draw forth the opinion of the House, and then, as silence is still kept, he himself speaks strongly in favour of the Roman alliance.⁷ His speech is received with different feelings in different parts of the House, some loudly applauding, others expressing disapprobation—in what particular form we are not told.⁸

The
League
joins the
Roman
Alliance,
B.C. 198.

Constitutional
details
supplied
by the
account
of the
debate.

¹ See Livy, xxxiii. 34.

² I know not why Kortüm (iii. 238) calls him "*Parainos*."

³ Liv. xxxii. 19. *Cycliadam, principem factionis ad Philippum tra-*
hentium res, expulerant.

⁴ Ib. 19-23.

⁵ Ib. 22.

⁶ Ib. 22. *Omnibus fere populis approbantibus. So c. 23. Ceteri populi*
confirmarunt.

⁷ Cf. Pol. xvii. 13. *Μετέβηψε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀρίσταινος ἀπὸ τῆς Φίλιππου*
συνμαχίας πρὸς τῇ Ρωμαίων.

⁸ Liv. xxxii. 22. *Murmur ortum aliorum cum assensu, aliorum in-*
clémenter assentientes increpantium.

The Ministers, when about to put the question, are found CHAP. IX. to be equally divided among themselves on a point of order—no bad argument, it may be thought, for the institution of a single Speaker. An unrepealed law forbade any Magistrate to put any question contrary to the Macedonian alliance.¹ On this ground five of the Ministers refuse to put the question of alliance with Rome.² On the third day, when the vote must be taken or not at all,³ one of the protesting five, Memnôn of Pellênê, yields to the entreaties and threats of his own father; a majority in the Cabinet is thus obtained in favour of putting the question. The question is put, and carried by a large majority, perhaps by an unanimous vote⁴ of those cities which voted at all. For the citizens⁵ present from Dymê and Megalopolis, and most of those from Argos, withdrew⁶ from the Assembly before the vote was taken. Dymê had been, but a few years before, rescued by Philip from conquest by the Romans.⁷ Megalopolis was the old ally,⁸ Argos was the supposed metropolis, of the Macedonian royal family. Dymaians, Argeians, Megalopolitans, could not be expected to vote against Philip; the other party,

¹ Liv. xxxii. 22. *Lege cautum testabatur, ne quid, quod adversus Philippi societatem esset, aut referre magistratibus aut decernere concilio jus esset.*

² See above, p. 276.

³ Liv. u.s. Tertio (die) lex jubebat decretum fieri.

⁴ It must be remembered that, according to the Achaian system of voting, an unanimous vote would not imply the actual consent of every man present, but only a majority among the citizens present from every city.

⁵ It is strange to find such a scholar as Mommsen (*Röm. Gesch.* i. 528) talking about "Gesandten." When Dr. Liddell (*ii.* 25) talks, in the same way, about "Representatives," one is less surprised.

⁶ Dr. Liddell says that they "withdrew *under protest*;" but there is not a word to that effect in Livy. Kortüm's "*stillschweigend Verwahrung*" (*iii.* 239) is another matter.

⁷ See above, p. 539.

⁸ The friendship between Macedonia and Megalopolis was indeed of old standing, but Livy can go back no farther than the capture of Megalopolis by Kleomenês, twenty-four years before, which he thinks happened *avorum memoriâ*.

CHAP. IX.: and the Romans themselves, did not expect it of them.¹ The alliance with Attalos and with Rhodes was at once concluded; that with Rome was voted provisionally, subject to the approval of the Roman People. The Treaty seems to have contained a clause, often violated by Rome in after days, providing that, according to the first principles of the Federal Union, Rome should receive no envoys from any single city of the League, but only from the League itself.²

Terms
of the
Alliance.

Share
of the
League
in the
War.

Unsuc-
cessful
siege of
Corinth
by Lucius
Quinctius.

The League now took a considerable share in the war. Achaian envoys appeared at the side of Titus at the conference of Nikaia,³ and though we do not hear of Achaian warriors at Kynoskephalai, yet they served the cause effectually elsewhere. Now that the League was at war with Macedonia, hopes arose of recovering Corinth. The city was besieged by the Romans under Lucius Quinctius, the Consul's brother, aided by the whole Federal force. But it was vigorously and successfully defended by the Macedonian garrison, by the Italian deserters, and by the Corinthian citizens themselves.⁴ This last fact surprises the reader, as it seems to have surprised Lucius and Aristainos at the time. But the resistance of the Corinthians does not show that they had any abstract repugnance to reunion with the League.⁵ To be captured by a combined host of Romans and Achaians was a different matter from being delivered by Aratos without foreign interference. The Macedonian governor, Andro-

¹ Liv. xxxii. 22. Neque mirante ullo neque improbante.

² Paus. vii. 9. 4. See above, p. 262.

³ Aristainos and Xenophôn; the banished Kykliadas accompanied Philip. Pol. xvii. 1. Liv. xxxii. 32.

⁴ Liv. xxxii. 23. Uno animo omnes, et Macedones tamquam communem patriam tuebantur, et Corinthii ducem præsidii Androstenem, haud secus quam civem et suffragio creatum suo, imperio in se uti patiebantur.

⁵ See Schorn (243), who enlarges on the fact that Corinth, as a member of the League, had only one vote alongside of Keryneia, &c. But Corinth, as a Macedonian outpost, had no vote anywhere.

sthenês, was personally popular, and the Corinthians may have remembered the fate of those cities which fell into the joint hands of Rome and Ætolia. Anyhow, the Macedonian Philoklês was able to reinforce the garrison, and Lucius, by the advice of King Attalos, raised the siege.

Argos, Dymê, and Megalopolis had declined to join in voting the Roman alliance. It does not however appear that the citizens of Dymê or of Megalopolis thought that this justified them in treason against the Achaian League. A Dymaian citizen, Ainêsidas, by name, commanded a Federal garrison which had been lately placed in Argos.¹ But the Macedonian feeling was strong at Argos;² the city was betrayed to Philoklês; Ainêsidas, after stipulating for the safe retreat of his troops, himself stayed with a few companions and fought to the last.³ The Argeians soon paid the penalty of their treason. In the course of the next year, Philip, in hopes of winning over Nabis to his side, made over his ancestral city to the Tyrant.⁴ After a short show of demagogic tricks,⁵ the oppressions of Nabis soon reached a pitch far beyond the worst excesses of Philip.⁶ Thus both Corinth and Argos, once two of the greatest cities of the League, were now, as in still earlier

CHAP. IX.

Argos
betrayed
to Philip,
[B.C. 198,]

and ceded
by him to
Nabis,
B.C. 197.

¹ Liv. xxxii. 25. Præsidium erat Achæorum nuper impositum, quingenti fere juvenes delecti omnium civitatum.

² The way in which it was shown was curious. In the Argeian Assemblies the Generals of the State (*Prætores*, Liv. u.s. See above, p. 256) pronounced the names of Zeus, Apollo, Héraklês, and King Philip. Philip's name was now left out. The people demanded its restitution, which was made amid loud cheers.

³ Liv. u.s.

⁴ Ib. xxxii. 40.

⁵ Nabis really did at Argos, what Kleomenês was in vain expected to do; he abolished debts, divided land, &c. This marks the difference between the two men. The innovations of Kleomenês at Sparta were held to be restorations of the old state of things; at Argos he did not feel called on to innovate at all. Nabis, who merely sought a cloak for his own tyranny, carried out the most extreme Socialist measures in both cities. See above, p. 476, and cf. Kortüm, iii. 234.

⁶ Liv. xxxii. 40. Pol. xvii. 17.

CHAP. IX.

Exploits
of the
Achaian
troops.

Victory
of Niko-
stratos at
Kleônai,
B.C. 197.

Achaian
troops
in Asia.

days, dangerous outposts of its enemies. But the Achaian troops had so greatly improved under the teaching of Philopoimên that, under any tolerable generalship, they were now capable of winning a battle for themselves. Androsthênês, the Macedonian governor of Corinth, ravaged all the neighbouring Achaian Cantons at the head of his mixed host of Macedonians, Corinthians, Thessalians, Bœotians, Akarnanians, and mercenaries of various kinds. At last Nikostratos, the successor of Aristainos in the Generalship, defeated him in a battle near Kleônai, and cleared all the territory of the League of his plundering bands.¹ This happened about the same time as the great fight of Kynoskephalai, and lovers of coincidences affirmed that the two victories were won on the same day. About the same time, also, an Achaian contingent aided in delivering the Rhodian Peraia² from Philip's General Deinokratês.³ One cannot read the narratives of these successes of the Federal arms without again and again forming the vain wish that Philopoimên and Aratos could have changed places.

EPEIROS.

Attempt
at Peace,
B.C. 198.

Such was the position of the Achaian League during the second war between Philip and the Romans. Among the other Federal states of Greece, we just now hear but little of Epeiros. Soon after the first landing of Flamininus, while he and his army were waiting on the banks of the Aoös, an attempt was made, as before, to bring about a peace under Epeirot mediation.⁴ This time, however, the attempt was unsuccessful. The Epeirot General⁵ Pau-

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 15.

² That is, the small Rhodian territory on the mainland, increased in B.C. 188 (see above, p. 214) by the addition of all Lykia and Karia.

³ Liv. xxxiii. 18.

⁴ Ib. xxxii. 10. *Spes data Philippo est, per Epirotarum gentem tentanda pacis.* Cf. above, 599.

⁵ On the number of the Epeirot Generals see above, p. 152, 599. There were three seven years before.

sanias, and the Master of the Horse, Alexander, brought the King and the Consul together. But the demands of Titus, namely the liberation of every Greek state, were such as Philip could not bring himself to yield before Kynoskephalai.¹ The League, as a League, remained neutral; but Charops, one of the leading men of the nation, though seemingly not in office at the time, acted as a strong partizan of Rome. It was by his help, like that of Ephialtēs at Thermopylæ, that Titus was enabled to turn Philip's strong position among the mountains.²

Charops
acts for
Rome.

The Bœotian League, meanwhile, was strongly attached to the cause of Philip. It was probably confirmed in its Macedonian politics by the loss of Megara. It would seem however that the Bœotarch Antiphilos was in the Roman interest; ³ at all events, Titus and his troops contrived to enter Thebes, so that the Federal Assembly, which was presently held there, could do nothing but accept the Roman alliance by the unanimous vote of all the cities.⁴ But the heart of the nation was still Macedonian. Bœotian soldiers served under Androsthēnēs at Corinth and under Philip himself at Kynoskephalai.⁵ The treatment of Bœotia by Titus after his victory hardly bears on our subject; it shows at once the strong anti-Roman feeling of the people, and the sort of contemptuous magnanimity which a Roman philhellen could, under such circumstances, afford to display.⁶

BŒOTIA.

Bœotia
constrained
to join the
Romans,
B.C. 197.

Akarnania was the home of a nobler race. That gallant people, who never betrayed a friend or evaded a treaty, clave to Philip to the last. They had seen only the

AKAR-
NANIA.

¹ Liv. xxxii. 10. Quid victo gravior imperares, T. Quincti?

² Ib. 11.

³ Ib. xxxiii. 1.

⁴ See above, p. 183.

⁵ Liv. xxxiii. 27.

⁶ Ib. 27-30.

⁷ See above, p. 147. So Livy (xxxiii. 16); "Dux autem maxime causas eos tenuerat in amicitia Regis; una fides insita genti, altera metus odiumque Ætolorum."

CHAP. IX. brightest side of Macedonia and the darkest side of Rome.

Firm
adherence
of the
Akarnanians
to Philip.

B.C. 197.

To them Philip, the Tyrant of Greece, was the true friend who had defended them against the Ætolians and who had avenged their wrongs on Athens. To them Titus, the deliverer of Greece, was but a chief of those barbarians who had carried off their citizens into slavery, and handed over their cities to their brigand neighbours. Shortly before Kynoskephalai, Lucius Quinctius contrived to gain over some leading Akarnanians to the Roman interest. An Assembly was called at Leukas,¹ at which a sham vote of alliance with Rome was hurried through the House.² But the national feeling was too strong to be cheated in this way. A real Assembly was held, in which the Roman decree was repealed and the alliance with Philip was re-enacted. The leaders of the Roman party were condemned as traitors, and the General Zeuxidas was deprived of his office, because he had put the question of the Roman alliance to the vote.³ The condemned, with a spirit worthy of their nation, refused to fly to the Roman post at Korkyra; they appeared before the assembled People, they pleaded their own cause, and procured the reversal of the sentences against them. But the League still firmly adhered to Macedonia. Leukas presently stood a siege at the hands of Lucius, and was taken only by the treachery

¹ Cf. above, p. 148.

² Liv. xxxiii. 16. Eo neque cuncti convenerunt Acarnanum populi: nec iis, qui convenerant, idem placuit. Sed et principes et magistratus pervicerunt, ut privatum decretum Romanæ societatis fieret. Id omnes qui abfuerant ægrè passi.

The distinction between *Principes* and *Magistratus* is again to be noticed. The former are men of influence, whether in office or not, in this case clearly not in office.

³ Liv. u.s. Zeuxidæ Prætori, quod de eâ re retulisset, imperium abrogaretur.

This seems to show that the Akarnanian General, like his Ætolian, but unlike his Achaian, fellow, presided in the Assembly, and put questions to the vote.

of some Italian exiles. But the result of Kynoskephalai soon made all resistance hopeless; all Akarnania now submitted, and the country seems to have been treated by Titus with his usual politic lenity.

CHAP. IX.
Sub-
mission of
Akar-
nania,
B.C. 197.

The settlement of Greece, and the famous proclamation of Grecian liberty at the Isthmian Games, was a work worthy of the spirit which undoubtedly prompted Titus himself, and which we have no right to assume was wholly absent from the minds of all his countrymen. All Greece was to be free. The proclamation of course enumerated those states only which had been in bondage to Philip; it would have been an insult to independent allies of Rome to have proclaimed the freedom of Ætolia or Achaia. Roman garrisons remained, but only for a season, in the three fortresses which were called the Fetters of Greece, Akrokorinthos, Dêmêtrias, and Chalkis.¹ Under this settlement, several new Federations arose in Thessaly and Eubœia, but it is really needless to enter into the details of commonwealths whose independence was so nearly imaginary. Still they are important as showing how completely Federalism was the received type of freedom in Greece in that age. And their establishment reflects high credit upon their founder, who may have had to contend against some degree of local prejudice in the liberated towns themselves, and who certainly had to overcome that national instinct in himself and his countrymen by which every Roman strove to make every Greek city weak and isolated.² Of this policy, so predominant a few years later, we see no signs in the administration of Titus. Corinth at once restored to the Achæians, and the League at last received the long promised possessions of Hæraia and Triphylia.³ A joint campaign of

Procla-
mation of
Grecian
Freedom,
B.C. 196.

New Fede-
rations in
Thessaly
and
Eubœia.

¹ Pol. xviii. 28.

² See Kortüm, iii. 250.

³ Liv. xxxiii. 34. Some words have dropped out of the text of the

MAP. IX. Romans under Titus and Achaïans under Aristainos, now again General, recovered Argos for the League.¹ The same expedition also separated from Sparta several of the Lakonian cities, which, if not absolutely incorporated with the League, were at least placed under Achaian protection.² Nabis however was allowed to retain possession of Sparta itself.³ This recognition of the Tyrant was seized on as a grievance by the Ætolians. They complained also that some of the Thessalian cities which Philip had taken from them had not been restored.⁴ Yet,

Nabis
retains
Sparta.

parallel passage of Polybios (xviii. 30) which, as it stands, gives Corinth and Triphylia to Euménès. Orchomenos is not mentioned, but it was probably joined to the League at the same time.

¹ Liv. xxxiv. 40, 41. According to Livy, one Timokratès of Pellênè commanded for Nabis in the citadel of Argos, but was let go by the Argeians, *quia clementer præfuerat*. The presence of an Achaian citizen in such a position is inexplicable, and one is tempted to suspect one of Livy's usual confusions.

² Liv. xxxv. 13. *Achæis omnium maritimum Laconum tuendorum a T. Quinctio cura mandata erat.*

This would strictly imply that these Lakonian towns stood to the Federal Government in a relation like that of Geneva or Mühlhausen to the old Swiss League. But as the League came to embrace all Peloponnésos, and as equal annexation was its unvarying principle, one cannot help thinking that they must have been admitted as States, if not now, yet afterwards, under the administration of Philopoimén. When Pausanias (vii. 13. 8) speaks of one of these towns as *Ἀχαιῶν ἐπήκοον*, it is probably simply the ignorance of a late and careless writer. These towns seem to be the same as those afterwards known as the Eleutherolakônè cities. (See Paus. iii. 21. 6 et seqq.) There were originally twenty-four, but, before the time of Pausanias, six of them had been recovered by Sparta.

³ The conference between Titus, Nabis, and Aristainos (Liv. xxxiv. 81-3) is curious. Aristainos tells Nabis of divers Tyrants, probably Iseas, Lydiadas, and Aristomachos, who had, of their own act, descended to a private station. As if even Aristomachos had been at all like Nabis, or as if Nabis could have borne, or been borne in, a private station like Lydiadas.

One remark of Nabis (c. 31) is worthy of notice in an age when Consuls and Presidents grow into Emperors. "Tum me Regem a vobis appellari memini; nunc Tyrannum vocari video. Itaque, si ego nomen imperis mutassem, mihi meæ inconstantia, quum vos mutetis vobis vestræ reddenda ratio est."

⁴ Liv. xxxiii. 84, 35. xxxiv. 22, 23. Pol. xviii. 21. In the first of

as Phókis, Lokris,¹ and Ambrakia² were recognized as parts of the Ætolian body, they hardly seem to have suffered. At last, when his whole settlement was finished, Titus withdrew the Roman garrisons from the three great fortresses,³ and left Greece to the enjoyment of such peace as Nabis and the Ætolians might allow.

CHAP. IX.
Discontent
of the
Ætolians.
With-
drawal
of the
Roman
Garrisons,
B.C. 194.

§ 2. *From the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus to the Death of Philopoimén.*

B.C. 194—183.

For about three years Greece was left to herself. Of the two great Leagues, the Ætolians were brooding over their real or supposed wrongs, and were planning how to raise up new enemies against their late allies. The Achaians were occupied with the war with Nabis and with some internal reforms. The nature of our information at this time is peculiar; the fragments of Polybios leave many deplorable gaps, but, when we have any knowledge at all, our knowledge is very full. The fragments are enough to give us a tolerable view of the state of parties in the Union, and to set clearly before us the characters of several Federal politicians. It cannot fail to strike every reader that the City of Megalopolis held at this time the same sort of position in the Achaian League which the State of Virginia held in the first days of the American Union. Without any sort of legal preeminence, without at all assuming the character of a capital, Megalopolis was clearly the first city of the League, the city

B.C. 194-191.

Affairs
of the
Achaian
League.

Eminence
of Mega-
lopolia.

Parallel of
Virginia.

these passages Livy makes one of his most curious blunders. He found in Polybios (xviii. 81) that Cnæus Cornelius went to the Ætolian Assembly at *Thermon*; ἦγον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν Ἀιτωλῶν σύνοδον. Livy first transfers the scene to *Thermopylae*, and then seemingly confounds the Ætolian Congress with the Amphiktyonic Synod; *Cornelius Thermopylas, ubi frequens Græcæ stasis diebus esse solet conventus, (Pylaicum appellant) venit.* See Brandstätter, 433. 4.

¹ Liv. xxxiii. 34. Pol. xviii. 30.

² Pol. xxii. 9.

³ Liv. xxxiv. 49-51.

CHAP. IX. which gave the nation the largest proportion of its leading statesmen. Megalopolis, like Virginia, was "the Mother of Presidents," and that too of Presidents of different political parties. As Virginia produced both Washington and Jefferson, so Megalopolis, if she produced Philopoimên and Lykortas, produced also Aristainos and Diophanês. Megalopolitan citizens are also constantly found in other posts of honour. We have already heard of a case,¹ though we have not yet reached it in chronological order, in which the Cabinet Council of the League contained at least four Megalopolitans out of eleven. Men of the same city seem, oftener than any other, to have represented the League as its Ambassadors abroad, and to have acted as its subordinate Magistrates at home. Now we must remember that all or most of these offices were conferred by an Assembly in which Megalopolis had only a single vote; we must also remember that these Megalopolitan statesmen were constantly opposed to one another, and therefore could not have represented any local section. We may thus recognize at once an honourable witness to a city which contributed so many members to the national Government, and a proof of the way in which the other cities rose above local prejudices, and kept the Union from the curse of geographical parties.

Absence
of geogra-
phical
parties.

B.C. 194.

Influence
of Philo-
poimên.

Philopoimên had now returned from Crete. He soon again became the chief man of the League, and, though he never attained the boundless influence of Aratos, yet he was felt to be the bulwark and glory of the nation. He filled the chief magistracy eight times, and died in office at the age of seventy, retaining the confidence of his countrymen to the last. He had fallen upon days in which it was clear that the fate of Achaia, or rather of the world, depended on the will of Rome. His policy, under such circumstances, was at once prudent and dignified. It

¹ See above, p. 283.

was the wisdom of the weaker state to abstain from all offensive boasts, from all needless opposition or provocation, but, at the same time, to keep up its position as an independent commonwealth, to give way to the unmistakable will of the Roman Senate and People, but not to make the laws of the League yield to the passing caprice of every Roman officer. He saw that Greece was doomed ; but he held that a course at once modest and dignified might stave off the evil day, and might make the blow less heavy and less disgraceful when it did come. The Romans themselves would not think the worse of a people who were in form their equal allies for preserving a decent degree of self-respect. But abject prostration before every insult would only make insults come thicker, and would bring on the final destruction sooner than need be.¹ He thus endeavoured to preserve for the League a respectable position both towards Rome and towards other powers. He strove to strengthen her at home both by constitutional reforms and by the accession of new members to the Union. It was this last branch of his policy which revealed the weak side both of his political plans and of his personal character.

CHAP. IX.
His moderate policy towards Rome.

Of the other Achaian statesmen the most important were Lykortas, Aristainos, and Diophanês, all of them citizens of Megalopolis. Lykortas, the father of Polybios, was, both in war and politics, the pupil and follower of his illustrious fellow-citizen. He pursued the same policy, possibly now and then carrying his opposition to Rome somewhat further than his master.² Diophanês was a military scholar of Philopoimên, a good officer,³ whose head seems to have been turned by the credit which he won when commanding the Achaian troops in Asia.⁴ He

Other Federal statesmen.
Lykortas.
Diophanês.

¹ Pol. xxv. 9.

² See Thirlwall, viii. 401.

³ Pol. xxiii. 10. Διοφάνης ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, ἄνθρωπος στρατιωτικώτερος ἢ πολιτικώτερος.

⁴ Pol. xxi. 7. Liv. xxxvii. 20, 21.

CHAP. IX. conceived an unworthy jealousy of a greater man than himself, and he seems to have sometimes wantonly thwarted Aristainos. Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n's policy out of mere spite. Aristainos, whom we have already seen twice in office, was not a military man; he was a good speaker, and skilled in civil business; he does not seem to have been either corrupt or wilfully traitorous,¹ but he held that the interests of the League required complete submission to the slightest hint from Rome. His policy therefore was directly opposed to that of Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n. The Macedonian party, once headed by the banished Kykliadas, vanishes altogether.

The Macedonian party extinct.

Discontent against Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n at Megalopolis, B.C. 194.

Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n's long absence in Crete had given great offence in his own city. The war with Nabis had brought Megalopolis to great straits, and it was held, not without reason, that the best soldier of Megalopolis and of Greece ought not to have been absent from his country at such a time. There was a strong disposition among his fellow-citizens to deprive him of their franchise. The Federal body however stepped in; Aristainos was then General, and he was sent, like Aratos on a former occasion,² to compose matters at Megalopolis. Aristainos was, afterwards at least, a political adversary of Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n, but it does not follow that he was a personal enemy, and he may well have wished to save his native city from the disgrace of disfranchising the greatest man in Greece. The mission of Aristainos was successful, and Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n remained a citizen of Megalopolis.³ It is strange to read that it was out of revenge for this insult that Philopoi $\acute{\mu}$ n assisted several places which had hitherto been incorporated with Megalopolis in obtaining the rank of independent members of the League.⁴ This

He raises the smaller Megalopolitan

¹ See Schorn, p. 323. ² See above, p. 256, 551. ³ Plut. Phil. 13.

⁴ See above, p. 256. Plutarch (Phil. 13) does not mention the names of these townships, but numismatic evidence supplies the names of

explanation can only come from writers who did not understand the measure. Philopoimên's internal policy was to promote the most perfect equality among the several cities of the Federation. If these townships were strictly subject districts, their emancipation may have been sought simply as an act of justice, like the liberation of Vaud from the yoke of Bern. And there was another motive which might well be present to the mind of an Arkadian politician. It is clear that, up to this time, the Old-Achaian towns had possessed an undue preponderance; their ten votes might still outweigh the interests of several of the greatest cities in Greece. The plan which Philopoimên steadily pursued was well adapted to counteract this evil. To erect these dependent townships into independent Cantons was to give several more votes to the Arkadian portion of the League, and thus to make the geographical balance more equal.¹ But this more remote advantage would be much less perceptible to local politicians at Megalopolis than the immediate loss of dominion sustained by their own city. Even if we suppose these townships to have been, not mere subject districts, but municipalities sharing in the Megalopolitan franchise, still their separation would offend a strong vein of local patriotism, which is to be found everywhere. The dismemberment of the Great City would seem to many to be an evil which more than counterbalanced the real strengthening of the Arkadian interest

CHAP. IX
 townships
 into in-
 dependent
 Cantons.

Alipheira, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa. There are extant coins of all these places as independent Achaian cities. The list nearly agrees with that given by Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) of those places among the towns united in the *συνοικισμός* of Megalopolis, which were not absolutely deserted. They remained in his time as villages only (*ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται κώμας*), except Alipheira (and perhaps Pallantion), which retained the rank of a city. Alipheira was the district which had before been disputed between Megalopolis and Elis. See above, p. 592.

¹ See Thirlwall, viii. 364.

CHAP. IX. in the Assembly.¹ We can therefore well understand that such a proposal may have made Philopoimên for a while unpopular at home, and may have given his enemies an opportunity of branding him as a traitor to his native town. How the proposal was carried, we know not, but carried it evidently was. Philopoimên steadily adhered to his policy, and it was followed both by him and by Lykortas on other occasions.²

Philo-
poimên's
third
General-
ship,
B.C. 193-
192.

War with
Nabis.

Independ-
ent
action
of the
League.

But if Philopoimên was just now somewhat under a cloud in his own city, he certainly was not so in the general estimation of the League. We have seen the Assembly and the General interfering on his behalf, and the next election once more raised him to the chief magistracy. Nabis continued to make inroads into the Federal territory, and he was now besieging Gythion, one of those Lakonian towns which were at least under Achaian protection, if not actually members of the League. Philopoimên waged war against him with great success, varied only by a defeat at sea, where the Arkadian was out of his element. These campaigns were waged wholly without Roman or Macedonian help. The League acted independently in everything. An Assembly at Sikyôn refused to postpone the war till the Roman fleet could arrive, even though a letter from Titus was produced in which that course was suggested.³ During the same year a Congress of Allies was held at Tegea, in which Achaians, Epeirots, and Akarnanians planned and carried out the

¹ It may be doubted whether the State of New York would willingly be cut up into four or five small States, in order to obtain eight or ten Senators, or whether Liverpool or Birmingham would choose to purchase an increase of Members at the price of being divided into several small boroughs.

² On the Lakonian towns see above, p. 622. The Messénian towns will be mentioned presently. Also Pagai, the port of Megara, coins as an independent Canton, which shows that the like policy was pursued there, either at the reunion of Megara or at some later time.

³ Liv. xxxv. 25.

campaign as freely as could have been done in the days of Markos or Aratos.¹ CHAP. IX.

Meanwhile the Ætolians were intriguing to bring a new foe of Rome into Greece. Antiochos of Syria had long been threatening war with Rome; the Ætolians now induced him to cross at once into Europe. Titus had now returned to Greece with a sort of general commission to look after Greek affairs, but formally as Ambassador along with several colleagues.² An Ætolian Assembly was held, to which Titus first sent Athenian envoys to speak for Rome, and afterwards came himself.³ The majority of the Assembly was inclined to refuse him an audience, but the counsels of age and wisdom prevailed thus far.⁴ These counsels however did not hinder the Assembly from passing a vote to invite Antiochos to come and liberate Greece, nor the General Damokritos from telling Titus, when he asked for a copy of the decree, that he should have one dated from the Ætolian camp on the Tiber.

This absurd vaunt in the Public Assembly was followed by a resolution in the Senate of the Apokletes,⁵ such as could hardly have been carried, or even brought forward, in the councils of any other people. In former times the Ætolian Magistrates had often been charged with conniving at the robberies and piracies of their countrymen. They now openly adopted the principle on which they had so long secretly acted. It was decreed to seize Dêmêtrias, Chalkis, and Sparta on one day. The attempt on Dêmêtrias succeeded, that on Chalkis failed. To Sparta Alexa-

Antiochos
invited
by the
Ætoli-
ans,
B.C. 192.

Treach-
erous
resolution
of the
Ætolian
Senate.

¹ Liv. xxxv. 27.

² Ib. 23.

³ Ib. 32, 33.

⁴ Ib. 33. Principum maxime seniores auctoritate obtinere ut daretur iis concilium.

⁵ Ib. 34. See above, p. 336. Schorn (p. 274) says, "In dem Rathe der Apokleten, welcher fast unabhängig vom Volke regierte, wurde demnach der Plan entworfen." Why? The Ætolian Assembly was clearly sovereign, but it did not follow that it should regulate every detail of every campaign.

CHAP. IX. menos of Kalydôn led a body of horse and foot, who had received orders from the Federal General implicitly to obey their leader in everything. Nabis had asked for Ætolian help, and he believed that Alexamenos had brought it. For a while the Ætolians behaved themselves as allies, but presently they murdered Nabis at a review. Tyrant as he was, they were not the fitting ministers of vengeance. The blow was dealt so suddenly that it was only the national love of plunder which hindered them from seizing and holding Sparta, according to their commission. As it was, they entered the city, but, while they were scattered in search of booty, the Lacedæmonians rallied, and slew Alexamenos and most of his followers. A few only wandered into the Achaian territory, to be there seized and sold as slaves. The Achaian General was not a man to lose such an opportunity. He hastened to Sparta with some troops; the city was in utter confusion; he got together an Assembly of some kind or other,¹ and procured a vote by which Sparta was united to the Achaian League.

Murder
of Nabis
by the
Ætolians.

Philo-
poimén
unites
Sparta to
the
Achaian
League,
B.C. 192.

The union
not for-
cible, yet
contrary to
Spartan
feeling.

It does not appear that on this occasion any violence was used, or any unjustifiable change made in the laws or constitution of the new State.² Sparta, after her first admission to the League, retained so much of her old discipline as had survived the many revolutions of the last fifty years. Nor can it be said with strict truth that Sparta was forced into the League. All that Philopoimén did was to take advantage of an unusually favourable moment, and we can well understand the arguments by which he might, at that particular moment, easily carry the majority³ of a Spartan Assembly along with him.

¹ Liv. xxxv. 37. *Evocatis principibus et oratione habitâ . . . societati Achæorum Lacedæmonios adjunxit.* ² See Schorn, p. 277.

³ Plut. Phil. 15. *Τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων, τοῖς δὲ συμπείσας, προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόσμησεν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν.*

But, even if we did not know what followed, it would be hard to believe that union with the League was the deliberate wish of the Lacedæmonian people. Sparta, shorn of all her rank and power, deprived of all her subject territory, was called upon to enter a Federation which had long been her bitterest enemy. She had to enter it as a single town, with a single vote, as the compeer of the petty Cantons of the old Achaia, perhaps even of the Lakonian townships which had just been set free from her own yoke. Such a position must have been felt by every Spartan as irksome and degrading. For a moment, after the Tyranny and the wars of Nabis, the change would be felt as a relief; but the very return of peace and prosperity under the Federal Government would bring with it aspirations after a higher national being than the position of a single Achaian city could satisfy. That position might do for Phlious and Sikyón, it might do even for Argos and Corinth, but it would not do for the Sparta of Agésilas and Kleomenês. Little more than thirty years had passed since a Spartan King had seen all Peloponnêsos at his feet; the wars of Machanidas, and even of Nabis, had shown that the military spirit of the city still survived. And, beside these feelings of special dislike to the Achaian Government, a succession of revolutions had filled Sparta with elements of confusion inconsistent with lasting quiet under any Government. To Philopoimên and the Achaians it naturally seemed the greatest and most glorious of all acquisitions, when the city which had so lately threatened the whole League, was, without striking a blow, by the mere effect of a speech from an Achaian magistrate, changed into a peaceful member of the Federal body.¹ As matters now stood, Greece needed union above all

¹ Plut. Phil. 15. Θαυμαστῶς μὲν εὐδοκίμησε παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς προσκτησάμενος αὐτοῖς ἀξίωμα πόλεως τηλικαύτης καὶ δυνάμει· οὐ γὰρ ᾗν μικρὸν Ἀχαΐας μέρος γενέσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην.

CHAP. IX. things; to join all Peloponnēsos into one body was a patriotic and a generous project. Unhappily it proved the greater of two evils. Sparta, as a member of the League, proved more troublesome than she had ever been as a border foe. Her affairs as an Achaian Canton gave a more constant handle for Roman intervention, and for intervention in a worse form than they ever could have done had she retained the position of an avowed enemy.

Antiochos
elected
Ætolian
General,
B.C. 192.

His rela-
tions with
Achaia,

Bœotia,

The annexation of Sparta took place before Antiochos landed in Greece. On his coming, he was elected General—seemingly General-Extraordinary¹—of the Ætolian League, with thirty of the Apokletes² to assist him in the duties of his office. It will be remembered that Attalos had preceded him in a similar post;³ and that, even in Achaia, the same office had been conferred, nominally at least, on an Egyptian Ptolemy.⁴ He now strove to win the other Federal states to his side. Achaia would have nothing to say to him; his Ambassadors were heard at Aigion; Titus himself was heard in answer to them; the Assembly voted to have no friends and enemies but those of Rome, and, with zeal perhaps a little premature, it actually preceded Rome in declaring war against both Antiochos and the Ætolians.⁵ But Bœotia openly joined the invader; he went to Thebes, he appeared in the Federal Congress, and a vote was passed receiving him

¹ Liv. xxxv. 45. *Imperatoremque Regem appellandum censuerunt.* (The formula carries one on some centuries.) As Brandstätter (p. 446) says, *Imperator* probably translates στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ. Phainæas, the regular General, would hardly be deposed.

² Liv. u.s. Pol. xx. 1. See above, p. 336. Brandstätter (446) says, "Es ist wohl gewiss, dass diese dreissig mit den Apokleten dieselben sind." But Polybios says τριᾶκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων, showing plainly that the Apokletes were a larger body, and that these thirty were only a Committee of them. See Tittmann, 727.

³ See above, p. 535.

⁴ See above, p. 387.

⁵ Liv. xxxv. 48-50.

as an ally, though without formally casting aside the Roman connexion.¹ Epeiros, under Charops,—so lately the friend of Rome—played a double part; the answer given to the King was that the Epeirots would join him, if he came to their country, otherwise they were too near Italy to expose themselves.² Akarnania was divided: Antiochos bought over one of the leading men named Mnasilochos, who won to his side the General Klytos. By a stratagem they put Medeôn into the hands of the King, and some other cities joined him.³ He also besieged Thourion, but he raised the siege on hearing that the Roman Consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, had entered Thessaly. In Peloponnêsos, the Eleians openly took his side, and asked for troops from him for their defence.⁴

CHAP. IX.

Epeiros,

Akarnania,

and Elis.

The hopes of Antiochos and the Ætoliens were shattered by the victory of the Consul Manius at Thermopylæ.

Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopylæ, B.C. 191.

Among the results of that battle, the point which mainly interests us is the submission of the Ætoliens to Rome.

The whole story is well worthy of study as an illustration of Roman diplomacy, and it is far from lacking in military interest. Ætoliens, fighting on their own soil for their

Ætolian War, B.C. 191-189.

national being, were enemies whom even Rome could not afford to despise. The sieges of Hêrakteia, Naupaktos, Ambrakia, and Samê in Kephallênia gave a foretaste of what was to be done on the same ground in our own days by the defenders of Mesolongi. One or two constitutional

points are also well brought out in the narrative. One of the most striking scenes in the war is when the Ætolian Ambassadors, with the General Phaineas at their head,

Submission of Ætolia to the

¹ Pol. xx. 7. Liv. xxxv. 47. xxxvi. 6.

² Pol. xx. 8.

³ Liv. xxxvi. 12. Aliis suâ voluntate affluentibus, metu coacti etiam, qui dissentiebant, ad Regem convenerunt. Quos placidâ oratione territos quum permulisset, ad spem vulgatâ clementiæ aliquot populi Acarnaniæ defecerant.

⁴ Pol. xx. 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἡλεῖοι παρεκάλουν πέμπειν τῇ πόλει βοήθειαν.

CHAP. IX. unwittingly handed themselves over to the Roman Faith.¹ They knew not that, in Roman technical language, this implied an unreserved surrender of themselves and their country. Manius was not a foe of the school of Titus, and he presently began to exercise the rights of conquest in their harshest form. The Ætolian General found out his mistake, and affirmed that, though he and the Apokletes were ready to submit, yet the National Assembly alone had power to assent to such terms.² By the intercession of Lucius Valerius, Phaineas was allowed a truce, in order to consult the supreme authority of the nation. He first consulted the Apokletes, and then, by their advice, summoned the Assembly.³ The people altogether scouted the notion of submission, and would listen to no reasoning on its behalf.⁴ The war therefore went on. The three elements in the Ætolian constitution here come out very plainly. We see the action of the General, of the Apokletes, and of the National Assembly, the Apokletes filling the place both of the Cabinet Council and of the Senate in the Achaian system.

Working
of the
Ætolian
Constitution.

Ætolia
becomes
the Dependent Ally
of Rome,
B. C. 189.

By the treaty, if treaty it may be called, which ended the Ætolian War, the League lost its independence for ever. It became the dependent ally of Rome. It was the first state, within the proper limits of Old Greece,⁵ which

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 27. 8. Pol. xx. 9. Οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ ἔκριναν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ δὲ Μανίῳ, δόντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει τῷτο, τῷ δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὀνόματι πλανηθέντες, ὡς ἂν διὰ τοῦτο λειοτέρου σφίσιν ἐλέου ὑπάρχοντος. παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἰσοδυναμεῖ τό τε εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτὸν ἐγχειρίσαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι.

² Pol. xx. 10. See Brandstätter, p. 470, note.

³ Ib. . See above, p. 334, 6, 9.

⁴ Ib. Οὕτως ἀπεθριώθη τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀπαντᾶν οὐδεὶς ἐπεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ διαβούλιον.

⁵ I mean in continental Greece, south of Epeiros and Macedonia. Korkyra and the Greek cities of Illyria were already in this, or a still closer, degree of dependence on Rome.

entered into that degrading relation. It might indeed be said that all the Greek allies of Rome were practically dependent allies. But such was not their formal position ; in name Achaia and Rome contracted on equal terms. But Ætolia, though retaining its internal independence, became subject to Rome in all external relations. In the well-known phrase of Roman Law, the League bound itself to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People.¹ This leadership in servitude was a fitting punishment for the Greek state which had been the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece.² The loss of dignity was accompanied by an equal loss of territory. The League gave up all claim to the cities which had been taken from it during the war ;³ Ambrakia and other towns became independent commonwealths ;⁴ Oiniadai and its territory was restored to the Akarnanian League ;⁵ Pleurôn was annexed by the Achaians, who had given considerable aid during the war, and it was probably now that they acquired the still more important and more distant possession of Hêrakteia.⁶ As her own share of the spoil, Rome, besides her general suzerainty over Ætolia, took

CHAP. IX.

Dismem-
berment
of Ætolia.

¹ Pol. xxii. 15. 'Ο δῆμος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀδόλως τηρεῖτω. Liv. xxxviii. 11. *Imperium maiestatemque Populi Romani gens Ætolorum conservato sine dolo malo*. Livy makes one of his usual mistakes in reporting one of the terms of this treaty. The deserters and prisoners were to be given up τῷ ἀρχοντι τῷ ἐν Κερκύρα ; that is clearly to the Roman officer in command there. Livy turns this into *Corcyraeorum magistratibus*, as if it meant the magistrates of the Korkyraian commonwealth.

² See Thirlwall, viii. 392.

³ Pol. xxii. 15. On the date fixed see Thirlwall, u.s.

⁴ See Liv. xxxviii. 44. Schorn (p. 301) remarks, "Griechenland aber ward noch mehr zerstückelt, als es bisher war ; denn die den Aetolern abgenommenen Orte wurden frei und bildeten für sich unabhängige Staaten." This device was of course part of the Roman policy.

⁵ Pol. u.s. Liv. xxxviii. 11.

⁶ See Paus. vii. 11, 3 ; 14. 1. Schorn (301) adds, "Wahrscheinlich war der erstere von dem Achäern erobert worden und der andere freiwillig in die Sympolitie getreten."

CHAP. IX. Kephallênia as part of her immediate domain. The island was excluded from the treaty,¹ and was presently conquered, after a long resistance at the hands of the people of Samê.²

Union of
Elis and
Messênê
with the
Achaian
League,
B. C. 191.

Within Peloponnêsos, the Achaians had already been rewarded for their adhesion to the Roman cause³ by permission to unite Elis and Messênê to the League. Since the annexation of Sparta, these two were the only cities of the peninsula which still retained their distinct existence. The relations between Messênê and the League had commonly been friendly, and it was not very long since Philopoimên had rescued the city from the grasp of the Tyrant Nabis.⁴ Elis, on the other hand, as the ally of Ætolia, had always been hostile; some of the most famous victories of Philopoimên had been won at the cost of Eleian enemies. Yet Elis now seemed less unwilling to enter into the League than Messênê. If, in the course of the various Messênian revolutions, the oligarchic party had now gained the upper hand, the apparent unwillingness of Messênê is easy to be understood. Later events clearly show that there was in the city an Achaian and an anti-Achaian party, and that these were respectively the parties of democracy and of oligarchy. However this may be, the Achaian invitation to join the League received no answer but a declaration of war, and it was only by the interposition of Titus himself that Messênê was at last induced, with a rather bad grace, to enter the Achaian Union. Titus added that, if they ever had reason to complain of the conduct of the Federal Government towards

Dealings
of Flami-
ninus with
Messênê.

¹ Pol. xxii. 15. *Περὶ δὲ Κεφαλληνίας μὴ ἔστω ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις.*

² Liv. xxxviii. 29-30.

³ According to Plutarch (Cat. Maj. 12), there was a party in Achaia, at least at Corinth, Patrai, and Aigion, which openly supported Antiochos. If so, the movement was a merely local one, and was easily stifled. Schorn (p. 279, 289) seems to make too much of it.

⁴ See above, p. 612.

them, they had only to appeal to him.¹ If this was said in the character of a Roman officer, it was a direct breach of the first principles of the Federal relation ; it directly violated the article in the Treaty with Rome which provided that Rome should receive no diplomatic agent from any single city of the League. Titus was, it may be, by this time awaking from his dream of philhellenism, and sinking into a Roman's common way of looking on the rights of other nations. Or rather perhaps, as the personal deliverer of Greece, he would have all Greece look to him as its personal patron and protector. He, Titus Quinctius, not the Roman Senate and People, would be the judge in all Grecian quarrels, and would order every thing for the good of the nation which he loved. But, in either case, he was not disposed to allow any claims of the League to stand in the way of direct Roman interests. The League had bought the island of Zakynthos of a certain Hieroklès, who had commanded there for its sovereign Amynder, and who, on that prince's fall, seems to have thought that he had a right to dispose of it for himself.² The morality of such a transaction seems doubtful, and the right of the League to a possession so acquired might well be disputed either by Amynder or by the Zakynthian people. But it is hard to see on what ground Rome could put in her claim to an island which she had neither purchased nor conquered. So however it was ; Titus, in that quaint parabolic vein which he sometimes affected,³ undertook to prove that the possession of Zakynthos was not expedient for the League itself. The League was a tortoise, safe as long as it kept within its shell of Peloponnèsos, but in danger as soon as it stepped beyond that limit. The same argument would have

Annexa-
tion of
Zakynthos
prevented
by Flami-
nius.

¹ Liv. xxxvi. 31. *Si qua haberent, de quibus aut recusare aut in posterum cavere sibi vellent, Corinthum ad se venirent.* Cf. Schorn, p. 291.

² *Ib.*

³ *Ib.* 32. Cf. xxxv. 49.

CHAP. IX. applied with more force to the Achaian acquisition of Pleurôn and Hêrakleia a little later, to which Titus seems to have made no objection. But Zakynthos, Korkyra, and Kephallênia were all of them possessions which the Romans, like later protectors of Greece, thought good to trust in no hands but their own.¹


The
League
extended
over all
Pelopon-
nêsos,
B.C. 191.

The League had thus, in the days of its decline, attained the widest measure of territorial extent to which it could ever have reasonably looked forward in the days of its greatness. It had fallen to the lot of Diophanês to put the finishing stroke to the work of Markos, Aratos, Lydiadas, and Philopoimên. All Peloponnêsos, together with several places out of Peloponnêsos, was united under a single Federal Government. Unluckily this consummation, so desirable in itself, came a hundred years too late. Things might have run a different course, if the Achaia of Philopoimên had sprung at once to life under the hands of Markos of Keryneia. But the Achaia of Philopoimên had to deal with an ally whose friendship was more deadly than the enmity of all the Kings and Tyrants against whom Markos and Aratos had to struggle. The bright vision of philhellenic generosity was fast passing away from the mind of Rome, perhaps even from the mind of Titus himself. The position of Achaia with regard to Rome was one which it shared with Rhodes, and practically with Macedonia, though Macedonia had now formally sunk to the state of dependent

Relations
between
Achaia
and Rome.

¹ "The League drew in its head, and the island was given up to the Romans." Thirlwall, viii. 387. Cf. Liddell, History of Rome, ii. 42.

Mr. Grote has remarked that the acquisition of territory by purchase is much rarer in Old Greece than in mediæval Europe. We have seen several approaches to it in the course of our history, as the sale of Aigina to Attalos (see above, p. 582). The contemplated acquisition of a new State by purchase finds its parallel in the purchase of Louisiana by the United States under Jefferson in 1803.



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alliance. The League was far too weak to contend against Rome, or to maintain a really equal alliance with Rome, but it was far too strong to become Rome's mere abject flatterer, like so many contemporary Kings and commonwealths. As territory went in those days, the territory of the League was large; most of it lay compactly together; its inhabitants still retained their patriotism and their self-respect; their friendship was still eagerly sought for by foreign powers;¹ they still had statesmen and generals among them, and an army trained to victory under one of the three great captains of the age.² Such a nation needed much heavier reverses than any that they had yet met with to bring them down to the level of the Kings of Bithynia and the Demagogues of Athens. Roman vanity was wounded by the existence of a people whom it was impossible to treat as slaves, and whom there was no excuse for treating as enemies. The Roman Senate did not scruple to make use of every mean and malignant art to degrade and weaken a power which, throughout two dangerous wars, had always shown itself the faithful ally, though never the base flatterer, of Rome. The subtle diplomacy of the Senate soon found where the weak point of the League lay. The Achaian, Arkadian, and Argolic members of the Union were now firmly welded together by the Federal tie. Among them we hear of no dissensions, no hankering after separation. These were doubtless those golden days of Peloponnesian welfare and harmony upon which Polybios grows so eloquent.³ But the newly acquired members, joined in some degree against their own will, furnished admirable materials for Roman intrigue.⁴ It was easy to

¹ See the account of the embassies from Syria, Egypt, and Pergamos in Polybios, xxiii. 7 et seqq. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 396.

² Philopoimên, Hannibal, Scipio. See Liv. xxxix. 50, 52.

³ Pol. ii. 37, 38.

⁴ I cannot help protesting against the way in which this whole period

CHAP. IX.

Roman
intrigues
with the
newly
annexed
Cities.

hearken to every complaint, to fan every flame of discontent, to seize upon every opportunity of meddling in the internal affairs of the League, upon every opportunity of encouraging sycophants and discouraging patriots. Sparta, as we have seen, had been, not indeed forced, but in a manner surprised, into the League. Among the various parties in that divided city, none perhaps heartily loved the Achaian connexion, and some certainly were altogether hostile to it. At Messênê, though the mass of the people seems to have been Unionist, there was a strong oligarchic faction bent upon Secession. Had the Achaian Government been left to itself, a generation, or less, of prudent administration might have healed all these differences. But the Achaian Government had no such chance allowed it. Possibly too the character of Philopimên, brave soldier and honest patriot as he was, was less suited for so delicate a task than the irresistible diplomacy of Aratos. But Aratos himself might have failed, when every one who had a grievance was encouraged to carry it at once to Rome or to the nearest Roman officer. Whatever decision might be given, the mere entertaining such complaints was an insult to the majesty of an equal ally,

is dealt with by Mommsen in his Roman History. He really seems unable to understand that a small state can have any rights, or that a generous or patriotic sentiment can find a place anywhere except in the breast of a fool. Flamininus is called names because, at one time at least of his life, he was really well disposed towards Greece. Philopimên himself is mocked at, because, being unfortunately a citizen of a small state, he was loyally attached to that state. We are even told (i. 568) that the base traitor Kallikratês was a wiser man than he. The manifest fact that Rome did stir up strife in Greece, a fact plainly written in every page of later Grecian history, is dismissed amid a torrent of hard words against those who assert it. Such men are mere "politisirende Philologen." As the words "politisirende Philologen" do not seem to be German, Greek, or any other language, it is hard to know their exact meaning, but they are clearly used as an expression of contempt. But whatever they may mean, an English scholar may be quite contented to be set down as one member of the class, so long as Bishop Thirlwall is another.

and a direct breach of the treaty between Achaia and Rome. As Lykortas once ventured to tell Appius Claudius, Rome had no more to do with the way in which Achaia chose to deal with Sparta than Achaia had to do with the way in which Rome chose to deal with Capua.¹ Nevertheless the history of this time is to a great extent the history of the embassies which went to and fro about the affairs of Sparta. Of this long web of intrigue I shall attempt only a short summary.

Disturbances began early, indeed while the fate of Ætolia was still undecided. A movement showed itself at Sparta; the General Diophanês, accompanied by Titus himself, marched thither to preserve order. This step was contrary to the advice of Philopoimên, who held that, while the war between Rome and Antiochos still continued, the League had better remain quiet. As his counsel was unheeded, he himself hastened to Sparta, composed the differences there by his personal influence, and left no excuse for either the Roman Ambassador or the Achaian General to enter the city.² Two years later, when Philopoimên himself was General for the fifth time, the Spartans, dissatisfied with their new and narrow boundaries, attacked Las, one of the towns separated from Sparta by Titus.³ The Federal Government naturally interfered; an Assembly was held, which heard the complaints of the people of Las, and Philopoimên, as President of the Union, required of the State Government of Sparta that the authors of the outrage should be given up to the Federal authority for trial. The Lacedæmonian answer took the form of the murder of thirty Spartans of

First disturbances at Sparta composed by Philopoimên, B.C. 191.

Spartan attack on Las, B.C. 189.

¹ Liv. xxxix. 37.

² Plut. Phil. 16. Τὸν τε στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὸν ὕπατον [Titus was no such thing] τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἰδιώτης ἀνὰ πείλεισε. I follow Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 384) in his explanation of these words.

³ Liv. xxxviii. 30.

CHAP. IX. Unionist principles ; this was followed by a formal vote of Secession,¹ and by a further resolution to hand over the city to the Roman Faith. The League then declared war by the unanimous vote of every city.² But, while winter hindered its vigorous prosecution, the Consul Marcus Fulvius stepped in ; an Assembly was held at Elis to meet him, at which Lacedæmonian deputies were heard. Fulvius at last obtained that war should be put off till both parties could send embassies to Rome. The Federal Ambassadors were Lykortas and Diophanês, both of them citizens of Megalopolis, but an ill-matched pair. Lykortas stood on the right of the Union to deal as it would with a seceding State, and on the duty of Rome to leave the rights of an allied power uninjured. Diophanês was ready to submit everything to the judgement of the wisest of arbiters, the Roman Senate. They brought back a reply which is not given at length, but which was so ambiguous that both Unionists and Secessionists interpreted it in their own favour.³

Embassy
to Rome,
B.C. 189-
188.

November, B.C. 189. Philopoi-
mên's two suc-
cessive Gen-
eralships,
B.C. 190-
188. Philopoi-
mên was re-elected General for the next year. Either the old law which forbade immediate re-election had been repealed, or else the emergency was held to be ground for dispensing with its observance.⁴ As soon as the season allowed of military operations, he marched to Kompasion on the Lacedæmonian frontier, where the

¹ Liv. xxxviii. 31. Furentes igitur irâ, triginta hominibus ex factione, cum quâ consiliorum aliqua societas Philopœmeni atque exsulis erat, interfectis, decreverunt renunciandam societatem Achæis.

² Ib. 32. Omnium civitatum, quæ ejus concilii erant, consensu bellum Lacedæmoniis indictum est.

³ Ib. Cæterum responsum ita perplexum fuit, ut et Achæi sibi de Lacedæmone permissum acciperent et Lacedæmonii non omnia concessa iis interpretarentur.

⁴ Ib. 33. *Philopœmeni continuatur magistratus.* See Schorn, p. 304. Cf. Pol. xxii. 23. xxiii. 1. This passage strongly confirms the view (see above, p. 275) that the General was now elected late in the year. Livy clearly implies that the *veris initium* (of 188) was not many months after Philopoi-
mên's reelection.

Federal army was reinforced by multitudes of Lacedæmonian exiles. The General of the League repeated his demand for the surrender of the aggressors on Las, and promised them a fair trial. They appeared, but the violence of the Spartan exiles could not be restrained, and seventeen of the accused fell in a tumult. The judicial sentence, by which sixty-three more were executed next day, was probably hardly a more regular proceeding.¹ But, considering the aggression on Las, the formal vote of Secession, and the murder of their own Unionist fellow-citizens, it is not likely that they would have found any more lenient treatment before the most solemn tribunal that the League could have supplied. The General now declared his will or that of the League. The walls of Sparta were to be destroyed; the mercenaries of the late Tyrant, and the slaves enfranchised by him, were to leave the country by a fixed day, on pain of being sold as slaves;² above all, the Laws of Lykourgos, the laws under which Sparta had lived through so many ages, the laws which had reared Leônidas, Agésilaos, and Kleomenês, were to be exchanged for the institutions of Achaia. The League also, by a fresh vote of the Federal Assembly at Tegea, decreed the restoration of all the Spartan exiles.

CHAP. IX.
Execution
of Spartans
at Kom-
pasion,
B.C. 188.

Change
of the
Spartan
laws.

Severity of this kind may not have been abstractedly unjust, but nothing could be more impolitic.³ It at once suggests the question—one of the most important of questions in our own time—whether a Federal Govern-

Impolicy
of Philo-
pimên's
treat-
ment of
Sparta.

¹ Liv. xxxviii. 33. Sexaginta tres postero die comprehensi, a quibus Prætor vim arcuerat, non quia salvos vellet, sed quia perire causâ indictâ nolebat, objecti *multitudini iratæ*, quum aversis auribus pauca locuti essent, damnati omnes et traditi sunt ad supplicium.

This trial seems to have been held before the Military Assembly, held, in war-time, to be invested with the authority of the regular Assembly of the League. See above, p. 275.

² It would probably be held to be against Federal Law for a single city to hire mercenaries. See above, p. 536.

³ See the remarks of Kortüm, iii. 282.

CHAP. IX. ment either can retain, or ought to try to retain, unwilling members in its Union. The Achaian Government would have failed in its duty, if it had not secured *Las* against Spartan aggression, and it was hardly to be expected that it should tolerate the establishment of a revolted Spartan commonwealth in the midst of the cities of the League. But the time was emphatically a time for mercy, it was no time for hasty or irregular execution even of the most guilty traitors. Above all, the conduct of the Achaian Government was impolitic, as holding out a fresh handle for Roman meddling.¹ And one or two pettier matters followed, from which it would seem that Philopoimên, while dealing with the old enemy of his city, forgot that he was an Achaian President and only remembered that he was a Megalopolitan citizen. Many of the mercenaries, staying beyond their time, were seized and sold; but their price was applied, not to any national object, but to rebuild a colonnade at Megalopolis which had been destroyed by Kleomenês. Megalopolis also recovered the disputed territory of Belbinê. Philopoimên seems to have carried the Assembly with him in all these things, as he probably would have carried it with him in any proposals for the humiliation of Sparta. But the whole business was utterly unworthy of such a man. It shows how difficult it was for any Greek to rise above petty local passions, and it may perhaps lead us to a still greater admiration of the Achaian statesmen, who usually rose above them in so great a degree. We must bear in mind that Philopoimên could remember a time when Megalopolis was an independent city, if not under a free government, yet at least with Lydiadas for her master, and also that he had before his eyes the work of Epameinôndas as the great model of his imitation.

From this time onwards, the connexion of the League

¹ See Thirlwall, viii. 396.

with Sparta was the standing difficulty of Achaian politics. CHAP. IX.
 Ceaseless disputes arose; Spartan factions complained at Continued
disputes
at Sparta.
 Rome against one another and against the Federal Govern-
 ment; the very exiles whom Philopoimên had restored
 shared the old Spartan spirit; and could not endure that
 the city which had once been mistress of Greece should be
 cast down to the rank of a single Achaian Canton.¹ At
 one time, four different sets of Spartan envoys appeared B.C. 184.
 at once before the Roman Senate.² It should however be
 remarked that none of them asked for complete separa-
 tion from the League; their complaints were against
 one another, or against particular acts of the Federal
 body. A moderate Spartan politician would probably see
 the vanity of attempting to maintain the existence of
 Sparta as a wholly independent commonwealth. But every Policy
of the
Moderate
party at
Sparta.
 Spartan would naturally revolt at the violent change in
 his ancestral institutions and at the destruction of the
 walls of his city. A position of equality with Messênê
 and Megalopolis, to say nothing of Las and Gythion,
 was irksome, but it might be borne. But the special
 changes of Philopoimên reduced Sparta below the level
 of other Achaian cities; they violated that internal inde-

¹ See Pol. xxiii, 4, 12. xxiv. 2. Liv. xxxix. 33. Some expressions of Polybios (xxiii. 12) are remarkable. The Spartan envoys complain that the city has lost its security and independence—*ἐπισφαλὴ καὶ ἀπαρρησίαστον καταλείπεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐπισφαλῇ μὲν ὀλίγοις ὄσσι, καὶ τοῦτοις τῶν τευχῶν περιρημένων, ἀπαρρησίαστον δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον τοῖς κοινοῖς δόγμασι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πειθαρχεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπηρετεῖν τοῖς δὲ καθισταμένοις ἄρχουσι*. These words need not imply any unconstitutional acts on the part either of the Federal Government or of individual magistrates. The Federal constitution vested larger powers in the chiefs of the League than Sparta had ever vested in her own Kings, and among those chiefs, we may be sure, no Spartan at this time ever found a place. Without supposing any real oppression, the humiliation of receiving orders from Megalopolis was enough. Compare the praise bestowed by Plutarch on Aratos (Ar. 11) for his loyal obedience to the Federal magistrates, even when citizens of insignificant townships.

² Pol. xxiv. 4. Liv. xxxix. 48. Thirlwall, viii. 402.

CHAP. IX. pendency which the Federal Constitution promised to every member of the League. It was natural therefore that every Spartan should wish to obtain the repeal of these insulting ordinances; but it was equally natural that every wise Spartan should wish to preserve the connexion of his city with the rest of Peloponnēsos. When the Spartans themselves did not speak of Secession, Rome could not decently suggest it. But a little later, during the Messēnian troubles, the Senate tried the trick of an affected neutrality. One of its rescripts ran that the affairs of the League were no affairs of the Roman People; if Sparta or Corinth or Argos thought good to secede, Rome would not feel herself called on to interfere.¹ The meaning of this was plain enough; Rome would be well pleased to see the Peloponnesian Confederation fall asunder.² Corinth and Argos however knew what was good for them far too well to be led away by the insidious hint; and even Sparta soon afterwards—Philopoimēn was then no more—definitively renewed her connexion with the League, and set up her pillar like the other Achaian cities.³

B.C. 183.

Roman
intrigues
for the
Dissolu-
tion of the
League.

Formal
Reunion
of Sparta,
B.C. 182.

Quiet in-
corpora-
tion of
Elis.

Of the other two Peloponnesian cities lately annexed, Elis seems to have been the scene of no disturbances, but to have settled quietly down into its place as an Achaian Canton. There is no sign that the Eleians distrusted the Federal Government, or were distrusted by it. We have

¹ Pol. xxiv. 10. Ἀπεκρίθησαν δὲ διότι οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ Κορινθίων ἢ Ἀργείων ἀφίστηται δῆμος, οὐ δεήσει τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς θαυμάζειν ἅν μὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἡγῶνται. Is it possible that the use of the word δῆμος instead of πόλις was itself an insidious hint to the assumption of increased independence by the several cities?

² Ib. Ἀπόκρισιν κηρύγματος ἔχουσιν διδόνειν τοῖς βουλευμένοις ἕκαστον Ῥωμαίων ἀφίστασθαι τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείας.

³ Ib. xxv. 2. Μετὰ ταῦτα στήλης προγραφείσης συνεπολιτεύετο μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡ Σπάρτη.

seen a Federal Assembly held in their city,¹ and the Ambassador sent by Philopoimên to Rome to excuse his doings at Kompasion was an Eleian named Nikodêmos.² At Messênê the question of Union or Secession had become identical with the question of Democracy or Oligarchy in the State Government. When Messênê was admitted to the Union, some changes in the State constitution were made by the influence of Philopoimên,³ which, we cannot doubt, were changes in a democratical direction. But there was a strong oligarchic party, which hoped to recover its power by Roman help. Its leader was one Deinokratês, who is described to us as a good soldier, but as, in other respects, a man of profligate and frivolous, though showy, character.⁴ This man visited Rome as an envoy,⁵ seemingly not from the Messênian Government, but merely from his own party. He received no open encouragement, yet he contrived to obtain a certain degree of countenance from Titus himself. He returned to Greece in his company, and presently he caused a revolution at Messênê and proclaimed Secession from the League.⁶ Philopoimên, in his seventieth year, after forty years of political life, was now General of the Achaians for the eighth time.⁷ He was then lying sick at Argos, but he roused himself at the news. He at once sent Lykortas to reduce the rebels. He himself hastened to Megalopolis, and there collected the cavalry of his native city, the sons of the men who had fought beside Lydiadas at Ladokeia and had followed himself to victory at Sellasia. But it was the last campaign of the old hero.

CHAP. IX.
State of
parties in
Messênê.

Revolt of
Messênê
under
Deino-
kratês,
B. C. 183.

¹ Liv. xxxviii. 32. See above, p. 641.

² Pol. xxiii. 1.

³ Pol. xxiii. 10. Τὸ τοῦ Τίτου διάγραμμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ Φιλοποίμενος διόρθωσιν.

⁴ Pol. xxiv. 5.

⁵ Ib. Παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πρεσβευτής. On the vague use of the word πρεσβευτής, see above, p. 535.

⁶ Plut. Phil. 18.

⁷ Pol. xxiv. 8, 9. Plut. Phil. 18.

CHAP. IX.

Capture
and exe-
cution of
PHILO-
POIMEN at
Messênê,
B.C. 183.

His immediate object was to relieve a loyal Messénian town—either Korônê or Kolônides¹—lying to the south of the revolted capital. In a skirmish with Deinokratês, he was at first successful, but afterwards, surrounded by numbers, the Achaian General was thrown from his horse, and was carried a prisoner to Messênê. But it soon became evident that popular feeling was wholly in his favour; Deinokratês and his Senate therefore hastened to remove their noble captive to a surer keeping. Philopoi-mên drank the cup of hemlock² in a subterranean dungeon—the last hero of Achaia, the last hero of Greece, the last whom Plutarch has thought worthy of a place on the bead-roll of the worthies of his country.

November,
B.C. 183.

According to the Achaian constitution, Lykortas, who had been General of the year before, succeeded Philopoi-mên in office for the remainder of his term. This seems to have been near the end of the official year, and he was reelected at the next regular Meeting of the Assembly, which was shortly afterwards held at Megalopolis.³ It was soon evident that the revolt of Messênê and the death of Philopoi-mên were the work of a mere faction, and that

¹ Plut. Phil. 18. *Κόρινθον τὴν καλουμένην Κολωνίδα*. Liv. xxxix. 49. *Ad praecooccupandum Coronam*. See Thirlwall, viii. 405.

² Plut. Phil. 20. Liv. xxxix. 50. Plutarch adds that some of the Messénians proposed to torture him to death, and that they were afterwards stoned to death at his tomb (c. 21). There is no authority for either statement in Polybios or Livy. It reminds one of the crimes which Quintus Curtius and writers of that kind have impartially heaped alike upon Alexander and upon his enemies.

³ This seems to me the only way to reconcile the statement of Plutarch that Lykortas was *elected* General (*ἐλεγμένοι στρατηγὸν Λυκόρταν*, Phil. 21) soon after Philopoi-mên's death, with what we know, from the direct witness of Polybios (xl. 2, see above, p. 281), to have been the constitutional practice of the League. By the death of Philopoi-mên, Lykortas, as General of the year B.C. 185-4 (see Livy, xxxix. 35, 36), became at once, without election, General for the remainder of the year B.C. 184-3. But, if the death of Philopoi-mên took place very shortly before the November Meeting of B.C. 183, Lykortas would need an almost immediate reelection to continue him in office during the year B.C. 183-2. See Schorn, 318, 21.

the guilt was in no way shared by the mass of the Messênian people.¹ In the course of the next year, popular feeling compelled Deinokratês to sue for peace.² It was granted, as was just, on favourable terms. Lykortas, by the advice of his Cabinet,³ required the surrender of the guilty persons, the reception of a Federal garrison into the citadel of Messênê, and the unreserved submission of all questions to the Federal Assembly. The persons surrendered died, at Lykortas' order, by their own hands, and the Assembly⁴ decreed the readmission of Messênê to the League. In consideration of the damage done to its territory by the war, the restored State was, seemingly at a later Assembly, exempted from all Federal taxes for three years.⁵ But, in accordance with the policy which Philopimên had followed even with his native city,⁶ three of the smaller Messênian towns, Abia, Thouria, and Pharai, were detached from the capital, and were admitted to the Union as independent States, each setting up its own pillar like Argos or Megalopolis.⁷ These towns all lie between Messênê and the Lakonian frontier,⁸ a district which it was specially important to occupy with members attached to the Union both by gratitude and interest.

CHAP. IX.

Readmission of Messênê to the League, May, B.C. 182.

B.C. 182.

Three Messênian towns admitted as independent States, B.C. 182.

¹ Liv. xxxix. 49, 50. Plut. Phil. 19, 20. Pol. xxiv. 12.

² Pol. xxiv. 12.

³ Ib. 'Ο στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν παραλαβὼν τοὺς συνάρχοντας.

⁴ Ib. "Ὡς περ ἐπίτηδες συνέβαινε τότε πάλιν συνάγεσθαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εἰς Μεγὰλην πόλιν ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν σύνοδον. This I take to be the regular Spring Meeting of B.C. 182. Now that the official year began in November, the May Meeting would be the δευτέρα σύνοδος.

⁵ Ib. xxv. 3. Συνέθεντο τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους στήλην, συγχωρήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλανθρώποις καὶ τριῶν ἐτῶν ἀτέλειαν.

⁶ See above, p. 626.

⁷ Pol. xxv. 1. Ἰδίαν δὲ θέμεναι στήλην ἐκάστη μετείχε τῆς κοινῆς συμπολιτείας. Schorn (p. 321) says with truth, "Dieser Anordnung kann als ein Fortschritt in der Ausbildung der Bundesverfassung betrachtet werden."

⁸ They form the district which Augustus afterwards took from Messênê and added to Lakonia. Pausanias, iv. 30. 2.

CHAP. IX. It was during this eventful Presidency of Lykortas that Sparta was, at a Meeting at Sikyôn, finally reunited to the League.¹ The news was announced at Rome both by a Federal and by a Lacedæmonian Ambassador, the latter, one Chairôn, being probably sent by consent of the League.² It must have been in a later year that this same Chairôn entered on a series of demagogic measures at Sparta with an evident view to the Tyranny. When the State Government instituted an inquiry into his conduct, he procured the murder of the chief commissioner.³ The Federal power now interposed. The General, probably Lykortas, went, by order of the Assembly, to Sparta, and procured the condemnation of Chairôn, seemingly by a Spartan tribunal.

Schemes
of Chairôn
at Sparta,
B.C. 180?

Constitutional
notices,
B.C. 191-
183.

Yearly
Meetings
removed
from
Aigion,
B.C. 189.

Our direct information during the period between the war with Antiochos and the death of Philopimên chiefly relates to those external affairs of the League of which I have just attempted a summary. But many important constitutional points are brought out incidentally in our narratives. The detail at which Polybios now writes gives us a minute account of everything of which we have any account at all, and we constantly see the working of the Federal system far more clearly displayed than in earlier times. One important change was introduced by Philopimên, when President for the fifth time, in the year of the Secession of Sparta. Hitherto, though Special Meetings had been called wherever the Government thought fit, the two regular yearly Assemblies had always been held at Aigion. It was now that Philopimên carried his law by

¹ See above, p. 646.

² Pol. xxv. 2. Cf. above, p. 262. This Chairôn had once before appeared at Rome (Pol. xxiv. 4) as the representative of one of the discontented parties. His Federal colleague was Bippos, an Argeian.

³ Pol. xiv. 8. Τὸν ἐπιφανέστατον τῶν δοκιμαστῶν Ἀπολωνίδην.

which these Meetings were to be held in each city of the League in turn.¹ Aigion, a natural centre enough for the old Achaia, was a most unnatural centre for all Peloponnesos; and Philopoimén understood Federal principles too well to give the League the curse of a capital anywhere else. The change too, as tending to equalize all the members of the Union, quite fell in with his policy. It was part of the same plan which led him to sacrifice somewhat of the apparent greatness of his own city by raising her dependent towns to the rank of equal members of the League.²

CHAP. IX.

It is from an incidental notice during this period that we learn the constitution of the Achaian Senate. The Kings of Egypt and Asia still continued to seek the friendship of the League. Many costly gifts were offered by them, which were refused by the Assembly whenever they were thought derogatory to the national honour and independence. One offer from Eumenés of Pergamos, made during the second Presidency of Aristainos, was of a very strange kind. He offered to give the League one hundred and twenty talents, which sum was to be put out to interest, and the proceeds applied to pay wages to the Federal Senators at the times of Assembly.³ The proposal must be taken in connexion with the fact that the Senators so often really formed the Assembly, so that the offer was very like a scheme for taking the whole Achaian League

Constitution of the Senate.

Rejection of Eumenés' offer to pay its members, B.C. 185.

¹ See above, p. 277.

² Liv. xxxviii. 30. Philopoimén summons an Assembly—seemingly a Special Assembly—at Argos, to entertain this question. The Ministers summon another at Aigion. All the world goes to Argos; the Roman Consul Marcus Fulvius, whom the people of Aigion had called in to stop the change, goes there too. The national will is so plain that Fulvius ventures on no opposition, and Philopoimén's bill is passed. The Roman, as usual, is found hostile to any measure tending to increase the strength and harmony of the League.

³ Pol. xxiii. 7. Μισθοδοτεῖσθαι τὴν βουλὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς συνόδοις.

CHAP. IX. into pay.¹ The offer was rejected; the League had no mind to see its Senators pensioners of Eumenês; the law forbade either magistrates or private persons to accept such presents; how then could it be borne that the whole Senate should be bribed in a body?² These arguments were forcibly pressed by an orator named Apollônidas of Sikyôn; the feelings of the Assembly were also strongly stirred up against the King by one Kassander of Aigina,³ who set forth how his native island, once a free Canton of the League, was now in bondage to the very prince who offered them this tempting bribe.⁴

Legal
resistance
to Roman
encroach-
ments.

We have already seen that the Achaian laws required that a Special Assembly should be summoned only to discuss some definite business, and that it could entertain no proposition alien to that business.⁵ This law was more than once appealed to by Philopoimên in order to escape from the unauthorized interference of Roman officers. When a duly commissioned Roman Ambassador came with

¹ See above, p. 807.

² Pol. xxiii. 8. *Τῶν γὰρ νόμων κωλύοντων μηθένα μήτε ἰδιωτῶν μήτε τῶν ἀρχόντων παρὰ βασιλείως δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ μηδ' ὅποιαν πρόφασιν, πάντας ἅμα δωροδοκεῖσθαι προφανῶς, προτρεξαμένους τὰ χρήματα, πάντων εἶναι παρανομώτατον, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἀσχιστον ὁμολογουμένως. τὸ γὰρ ὀψωνιάζεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ὑπ' Εὐμένους καθ' ἑκάστον ἔτος, καὶ βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν καταπεπωκότας οἶονεὶ δέλεαρ, πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὴν αἰσχύνην καὶ τὴν βλάβην.*

It will be seen how completely equivalent bribing the Senate is held to be to bribing the whole Assembly.

³ Ib. Did the Aiginétans, though their city was enslaved, retain their Federal franchise, or had Kassander been admitted to the franchise of some other Achaian city? This speech of an *ἄπολις ἀνὴρ* (see Herod. viii. 61) reminds us of Kanarês and Garibaldi in our own times.

⁴ It was probably now that the decree was passed to abolish all illegal and unseemly honours (*τὰς ἀπρεπεῖς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς παρανόμους*) which had been voted to Eumenês. Two Rhodians, Sôsigenês and Diopieithês, who held some judicial office which it is not easy to explain (*δικαστὰς ὑπάρχοντας κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν*), were set to carry out this decree. A private grudge against Eumenês led them to exceed their commission, and to abolish all honours whatsoever which had been granted to the King. Pol. xxviii. 7. See Schorn, 339.

⁵ See above, pp. 276, 613.

any definite communication from the Senate, an Assembly was summoned, as a matter of course, to hear what he had to say. His communication of itself formed business to be laid before the Assembly according to the law. But both Flamininus and others of his countrymen seem to have thought that it was the duty of the Achaian Government to summon an Assembly whenever any Roman of distinction took a fancy to address the Achaian People, whether he were the bearer of any real communication from the Senate or no. The law just mentioned afforded a good means of refusing such requests. In the same second Presidency of Aristainos, just after the Assembly which declined the gift of Eumenês had dispersed, came Quintus Cæcilius, who had been as Ambassador into Macedonia, requiring that an Assembly should be called together to hear what he had to say about the affairs of Sparta.¹ He seems to have been ordered to go into Peloponnêsos on his return from Macedonia,² but he clearly brought no definite instructions with him. Aristainos, as President, summoned a Cabinet Council³ at Argos, in which we incidentally learn that three citizens of Megalopolis were present beside himself.⁴ Cæcilius spoke, strongly blaming the conduct of the Federal body towards Sparta. Aristainos was silent, showing, as Polybios says, by his very silence that his sentiments were on the side of Cæcilius.⁵ Diophanês openly took the Roman side; Philopoimên, Archôn, and Lykortas—all the speakers mentioned, except Archôn, are Megalopolitans—stood up for their country.

CHAP. IX.

B.C. 185.

The demand of Quintus Cæcilius for an Assembly refused.

¹ Pol. xxiii. 10. Liv. xxxix. 33.

² Liv. u.s. Peloponnesum quoque adire jussi.

³ Pol. u.s. Συνάγοντος Ἀρισταίνου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν. This is clearly a Meeting of the Ministers only, not of the whole Senate (Rath) as Schorn (p. 310) makes it.

⁴ See above, p. 283.

⁵ Pol. u.s. Δῆλος ὃν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σιωπᾶν ὅτι δυσαρεστεῖται τοῖς ἑκονομημένοις καὶ συνευδοκεῖ τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ Καικιλίου λεγομένοις.

CHAP. IX. The demand of Cæcilius for an Assembly¹ was at last met by a request to know what were his instructions from the Senate; if he had any to produce, an Assembly should be held to discuss them, otherwise the law did not allow one to be summoned. Cæcilius had no instructions to show, and he departed without his Assembly. He afterwards complained so bitterly at Rome of the supposed insult which he had received, that it was thought prudent to send Philopoi $\acute{\mu}\eta$ n and Lykortas to defend the conduct of the Achaian Government before the Senate. They were told that, as the Roman Senate was always summoned to hear the Ambassadors of Achaia, so a hearing before the Achaian Assembly ought never to be refused to an Ambassador of Rome.² The sophism is obvious; it was one thing to assemble the Senators of the Roman City; it was another to get together all the citizens, or even all the Senators of Achaia, scattered, as they were, over the whole face of Peloponnêsos. And, after all, the Roman Senate and the Achaian Assembly did not answer to one another. Great as were the powers of the Roman Senate, it was not, like the Achaian Assembly, the body which actually declared war and peace. That last attribute of sovereignty belonged to the Roman People in their Tribes, and they were certainly never assembled to hear the communications of an Achaian envoy.

Discussion
thereon
at Rome.

An As-
sembly
refused
to Flami-
nius,
B.C. 183.

Similarly, when Titus himself, on his way to a mission in Asia, took the Messênian Deinokratês back with him as far as Naupaktos, he wrote thence to the Achaian Government, requiring an Assembly to be summoned. Philopoi $\acute{\mu}\eta$ n was now in the last year of his office and his life. The answer sent was the same as that given to Cæcilius; the Assembly should be summoned if Titus would, accord-

¹ Pol. u.s. Ὁ δὲ Καικίλιος, ὁρῶν τὴν τούτων προαίρεσιν, ἤξιον τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῷ συνάγειν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

² Pol. xxiii. 12. Liv. xxxix. 33.

ing to law, state the business which he had to lay before it. Titus had no statement to make, and the Assembly was not held.¹ CHAP. IX.

§ 3. *From the Death of Philopoimên to the Conquest of Macedonia and Epeiros.*

B.C. 183—167.

With Philopoimên died out the old race of Achaian statesmen, the race which had seen the League in the days of its glory, and indeed of its growth. Philopoimên was born about the time of the deliverance of Sikyôn and the first great extension of the League. He was born when Megalopolis was still a detached unit, the subject of some of the earlier and baser Tyrants who preceded Lydiadas. He was a grown man when his native city joined the League; his youth was contemporary with the last days of Markos and with the full prime both of Lydiadas and Aratos. And he had lived to see a state of things which might have made him wish that either Kleomenês or Antigonos could come back again as lord over Peloponnêsos. But he was taken away before the worst evils came on the land he loved; he had gone through the allotted span of man's life; it was well for him that he was not reserved for the sad old age of Isokratês. And he left the League, if not what it had once been, yet as flourishing and as independent as any state could hope to be in those evil times. Achaia was still the first of existing republics, the compeer of any existing kingdom. The League was still spared the worst forms of Roman inter-

Condition
of the
League
at the
death of
Philo-
poimên.

¹ Pol. xxiv. 5. 'Ἐπεὶ . . . ἔγραφε τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, κελεύων συνάγειν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εἰς ἐκκλησίαν, ἀντέγραψαν αὐτῷ διότι ποιήσουσιν, ἀν γράψῃ περὶ τίνων βούλεται διαλεχθῆναι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς· τοὺς γὰρ νόμους ταῦτα τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἐπιτάττειν· τοῦ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντος γράφειν, κ.τ.λ.

CHAP. IX. ference ; some respect was still paid to the constitution and laws of an equal ally ; and the internal administration was less meddled with by Rome than it had been by Philip. Philopoimên too left his country to the care of statesmen formed in his own school, who had imbibed his prudent maxims of avoiding at once indiscreet defiance and still more indiscreet servility. Lykortas of Megalopolis had the state as it were bequeathed to him by his great fellow-citizen, and Lykortas' son Polybios, to whom we owe our best knowledge of these times, carried the urn of the hero at his funeral pomp. Thus three men's lives embrace the whole history of Federal Greece. Polybios sat at the feet of Philopoimên, and Philopoimên may have sat at the feet of Markos of Keryneia.¹

B.C. 281-
146.

Parties
in the
League ;
the elder
Roman
party not
wilfully
unpa-
triotic.

Growth
of the
extreme
Roman
party
under
Kalli-
kratês.

The exact age of Lykortas is not known ; he must have been much younger than Philopoimên, but still quite old enough to remember when the Achaian League was a really independent power. The statesmen of his generation differed, as we have seen, among themselves ; the policy of Aristainos and Diophanês was less dignified, and really less prudent, than the policy of Philopoimên and Lykortas ; still Aristainos and Diophanês were certainly not wilful traitors. But, under the debasing influence of Rome, a brood of men was growing up throughout Greece who knew nothing of republican or patriotic feelings, and whose only thought was to advance their own selfish interests by the basest subserviency to the dominant power. Such, among the Achaians, was Kallikratês of Leontion, such, in Epeiros, was the younger Charops. These were men of essentially the same stamp as those whom, a century before, the Macedonian Kings had set up

¹ Polybios was contemporary with Philopoimên, and Philopoimên contemporary with Markos, as grown men. This alone is really fit to be called contemporary existence. If a child born just before Chairôneia is reckoned as contemporary with Isokratês, three men's lives might be spread over a much wider space.

as Tyrants in the Peloponnesian cities. Rome was a Republic; she therefore could hardly establish her slaves as Tyrants, and probably they served her better by exercising a practical Tyranny under republican forms. Charops, it is clear, was the author of cruelties hardly inferior to those of Nabis himself;¹ but Law reigned in Achaia down to the moment of her fall; Kallikratês could not rob or banish or murder; he could only act as a vile cross between Tyrant and Demagogue, the opponent of every patriot, the supporter of every measure which could exalt his own power at the cost of the national degradation. We first hear of this wretch under the Presidency of Hyperbatos,² himself seemingly a man of the same stamp, or perhaps only of the school of Aristainos. At any rate, he agreed with Kallikratês in openly avowing the doctrine that no constitutional impediment ought to stand in the way of implicit obedience to the Roman Senate.³ This doctrine, of course, had to be maintained in the teeth of a strong opposition on the part of Lykortas and the patriotic party. The immediate occasion on which Kallikratês is first introduced to us is one of the interminable disputes about the Lacedæmonian exiles. The Senate required their restitution, which Lykortas opposed as unconstitutional. It was determined to send an embassy to Rome to lay the objections of Lykortas before the Senate. By what chance it happened that Kallikratês himself was nominated one of the envoys does not appear.⁴

Presidency
of Hyper-
batos,
B.C. 180-
179.

Slavish
doctrines
of Hyper-
batos and
Kalli-
kratês.

Opposi-
tion of
Lykortas.

B.C. 179.

¹ Pol. xxx. 14. xxxii. 21.

² Pol. xxvi. 1. Hyperbatos is probably a grandson of the person of the same name who was General in B.C. 224. See above, p. 453. Plutarch however writes the name Ὑπερβατᾶς and Polybios Ὑπέρβατος.

³ Ib. Οἱ περὶ τὸν Ὑπέρβατον καὶ Καλλικράτην πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς γραφομένοις παρήνουν, καὶ μήτε νόμον μήτε στήλην μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν τούτου νομίζειν ἀναγκαϊότερον.

⁴ Schorn (p. 323) says, "Anstatt aber den rechtschaffenen Lykortas, welcher den Rath gegeben hatte, an die Spitze der Gesandtschaft zu

CHAP. IX. Perhaps he had not yet displayed himself in his full colours, and it may have been thought desirable that the embassy should not wholly consist of avowed partizans of Lykortas. Of his colleagues we know only that they bore the most glorious names in the history of the League; they were Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aratos of Sikyôn.¹

Embassy
of Kalli-
kratês
to Rome.

Kallikratês of course betrayed his trust; he invited the Senate to exercise a more direct authority in Achaia and the other Grecian states; there were in every city men who were ready to do its work; these men ought to be encouraged, and the men who talked about oaths and laws and pillars should in like manner be made to feel the displeasure of Rome.² The Senate hardly needed such counsel;³ yet it is clear that from this moment there begins another marked change in the way in which Rome treated the Grecian commonwealths. While Philip and Antiochos were formidable, Achaia was treated as an equal ally; with their fall she sank to the position of a dependent ally; now she had to feel what it was to be, in all but name, a subject dependency. From this time forth, Kallikratês and his fellows received their orders from Rome, and communicated them to the Assemblies of the several states. Kallikratês himself came back with a rescript from the Senate, ordering the restoration of the exiles, and recommending himself as the model for all Greek statesmen.⁴ The Senate wrote also to the four other

Rescript
of the
Roman
Senate.

stellen, erwählte *die Regierung*, wie von einem Dämon verblindet, zu diesem Posten den Kallikrates." Why "die Regierung!" Surely Ambassadors were elected by the Assembly. See Pol. xxix. 10.

¹ Aratos was certainly (see Pol. xxv. 7) grandson of the great Aratos, and son of the younger General of that name. And analogy makes it almost certain that Lydiadas was grandson of the illustrious Tyrant.

² Pol. xxvi. 2.

³ Thirlwall, viii. 414.

⁴ Pol. xxvi. 3. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ Καλλικράτους αὐτοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν, παραιο-
πήσασα τοὺς συμπεσβευτάς, κατέταξεν εἰς τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διότι δεῖ

Leagues—Ætolia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Boeotia,—and to Rome's humble slaves at Athens, bidding them all cooperate in restoring the exiles, that is, bidding them all to pick a quarrel with the Achaians if they could. The patriots were awed, and Kallikratēs brought with him a new means of influence, of which we have as yet heard nothing in the history of Greek Federalism. At the next election the traitor was raised to the Presidency, and the historian directly attributes his success partly to deception and partly to bribery.¹ As soon as he entered upon his office, he at once restored the exiles both at Sparta and at Messênê.

CHAP. IX.

Kalli-
kratēs
elected
General,
B.C. 179-
178.

Our next business is to trace the way in which the Federal states of Greece were affected by the war between the Romans and King Perseus, the Third Macedonian War of Roman history. In the course of that war, three of the Greek Leagues were wiped out of the list of independent states, and Achaia received a blow from which she never recovered. By this time Greece had learned what Roman friendship and alliance really meant. The philhellenic dreams of Flamininus on the one side, the feeling of gratitude for recovered freedom on the other, had now utterly passed away. Things had so changed since the famous Isthmian Games that Rome was now felt to be the enemy of Greece, and Macedonia to be her natural bulwark. Macedonian and Roman lordship had both been tried, and the yoke of Macedon had been found to be the lighter of the two. And indeed, with Rome standing by the side of both, Macedonian headship over Greece was not

Effects of
the war
with
Perseus
on the
Federal
states,
B.C. 172-
168.

Greek
patriotic
feeling

τοιούτους ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πολιτεύμασιν ἄνδρας οἷός ἐστι Καλλικράτης. We may infer from this that Lydiadas and Aratos had acted somewhat more worthily of their illustrious names.

¹ Pol. xxvi. 4. Καταπληξάμενος καὶ συντρίψας τοὺς ὄχλους διὰ τὸ μὴδὲν εἶδέναι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένων ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῃ τοὺς πολλοὺς, πρῶτον μὲν ἤρθε στρατηγός, πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς καὶ δωροδοκηθεῖς.

CHAP. IX.
now on
the Mace-
donian
side.

Character
of Perseus.

now likely to be oppressive. If not Perseus personally, yet at least the gallant nation which he so unworthily ruled, was felt to be the champion and bulwark of republican Greece. Some states openly espoused his cause ; in others it is clear that every patriotic heart wished well to him.¹ Perseus, though free from most of his father's vices, had vices of his own, which, though they left him a better man, yet made him, at such a moment, decidedly a worse King. He is described as temperate in his life, and just in his government, and, till he lost his wits among his misfortunes, we hear nothing of any personal cruelty. He was sagacious in laying plans beforehand both in politics and war, but when the moment for action of either kind came, his heart always failed him. Philip, with all his crimes, retained some hold on men's regard, on account of his gallant and kingly spirit, always rising highest in time of danger. Perseus was about as fit to command in a pitched battle as Aratos ; and he had not, like Aratos, the art either of improving a victory or of making up for a defeat. Above all, he was basely and even treacherously covetous, descending to the lowest tricks to gain or to save money. Upon such a prince, the recovered resources of Macedonia, and the general good will of Greece, were utterly thrown away.

Character
of the
war with

As in all the Roman wars of this period, two or three incompetent commanders waged two or three unsuccessful or indecisive campaigns, till the right man came and restored to Rome that superiority which was inherent in her arms whenever they were rightly directed. The war was spread over the Consulships of Publius Licinius,

¹ On the popularity of Perseus in Greece, see Pol. xxvi. 5. xxvii. 7 ; Liv. xlii. 63 ; and especially Appian, Mac. ix. 1, 4. He is accused at Rome, *ὅτι πρὸς πολλῶν ὀξέως ἐν δλίγῃ ἀγαπήτῳ καὶ ἐπαινοῦτο*, and again *ὅτι πολλοῖς ἔθνεσι κεχαρισμένος, καὶ φιλέλλην, καὶ σωφρόνως ἀντὶ μέθης καὶ τρυφῆς ἀρχεῖ*. This is certainly rather hard measure.

Aulus Hostilius, Quintus Marcius, and Lucius Æmilius Paullus. The part played by Titus Quinctius in the war with Philip was played by Lucius Æmilius in the war with Perseus. Æmilius seems to have been quite as well disposed towards Greece as Titus, but his personal good will had no longer the same influence, and he was often made the unwilling instrument of cruelties which he abhorred. As before, I will not enter upon the military details of the war, but only trace its events so far as they bear upon the politics of the Federal states of Greece.¹

CHAP. IX.

Perseus.
B.C. 171-168.Character
of L.
Æmilius
Paullus.

We have seen that Ætolia was as yet the only commonwealth of continental Greece which had entered into any formal relations of dependence upon Rome. Achaia, Bœotia, Epeiros, Athens, were all, in name, equal allies of Rome; but Ætolia had agreed to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People, and to have no friends and enemies but theirs.² Ætolia, then, was now a Roman dependency,

Dependent
condition of
ÆTOLIA.

¹ After the fall of Perseus Macedonia was divided into four Republics. The size of each district, and some expressions of Polybios and Livy, may lead us to believe that the internal constitution of each had something of a Federal form. Polybios speaks of their δημοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεδριακὴ πολιτεία, xxxi. 12. cf. xxxv. 4. xxxvii. 4. (This συνεδριακὴ πολιτεία must be distinguished from the βασιλέως συνέδριον, or Μακεδόνων συνέδριον, in iv. 23 and xxvii. 8, which is merely the King's Privy Council.) Livy (xlv. 18, 29) speaks of the *Concilium* of each commonwealth, a word which he commonly applies to the Assemblies of Federal states. He afterwards (xlv. 32) speaks of *Synedri* as the Senators of the several commonwealths. On the whole then it is most probable that each of the four new Republics had some shadow of an internal Federal constitution. But I doubt the theory of Brandstätter (490) that the four together formed a Federation of four Cantons. This probably comes from the words *commune Concilium gentis* in c. 18, and *Macedoniæ concilium* in c. 32; but the former must be explained, or perhaps held to be cancelled, by the more detailed description in c. 29, and in the latter the *concilium* is the βασιλέως συνέδριον mentioned above. There was no *connubium* or *commercium* between the Macedonian districts (Liv. xlv. 29), and it suited the general policy of Rome to isolate them from one another. Cf. Kortüm, iii. 311. Probably Livy had no very clear idea of the matter himself.

² See above, p. 634.

CHAP. IX. free in its internal administration, but, in all its foreign relations, bound to follow the lead of Rome without inquiry. This state of things had at least the advantage of hindering the Ætolians from practising their old piracies upon other Greek states; but, according to our Achaian and Roman informants, it had at home only the effect of turning their arms against one another.¹ The forms of the constitution were trampled under foot,² and the strife of factions led to mutual bloodshed. It does not appear that these contending parties exactly coincided with the respective favourers of Rome and of Macedonia; debt is mentioned as one cause of dissension;³ it is hinted that both parties appealed to Perseus as an arbiter;⁴ it is certain that, when the Roman envoy Marcellus contrived to appease their differences, he took hostages of both parties alike.⁵ There were however in Ætolia the same parties as elsewhere. The place of Kallikratês and Charops was filled there by one Lykiskos, who was elected General through Roman influence.⁶ Hippolochos, Nikander, and Lochagos seem to have answered, as nearly as Ætolians could, to Kephalos and Lykortas. Ætolian troops served against Perseus under the Roman Consul Licinius, but, when he was defeated by the Macedonian cavalry, the Ætolians made convenient scape-goats; the blame of the defeat was laid on Hippolochos and his friends, and they, with two other Ætolian officers, were, at Lykiskos' suggestion, sent off to Rome.⁷ After this,

Civil dis-
sensions,
B.C. 173.

Roman
and Mace-
donian
parties.
Lykiskos
General,
B.C. 171.

B.C. 171.

¹ Pol. xxx. 14. Liv. xli. 25 or 30; xlii. 2.

² Pol. u.s. "Ἐτοιμοὶ πρὸς πᾶν ἦσαν, ἀποθηριωμένοι τὰς ψυχὰς, ὥστε μὴδὲ βουλὴν δίδόναι τοῖς προστάταις." It is not easy to see exactly what this means. One is tempted to guess that some Magistrates had tried to procure, either for themselves or for some other accused persons, a legal trial before the Apokletes, but that popular fury prevented them by a massacre.

³ Liv. xlii. 5.

⁴ In the speech of Eumenês, ib. 12.

⁵ Ib. 5.

⁶ Ib. 38.

⁷ Pol. xxvii. 13. Liv. xlii. 60. App. Mac. 10.

Caius Popillius and Cnæus Octavius visited both Ætolia CHAP. IX. and other Grecian states, with a decree of the Senate, B.C. 169. forbidding supplies to be furnished to any Roman officers without its authority. In the Assembly held at Thermon to receive them, they asked for hostages, which they did not obtain. At this Meeting, Lykiskos and Thoas raised insinuations against the patriotic party, and were guilty of gross flattery towards the Romans. A tumult arose; Thoas was pelted; and Popillius had the pleasure of rebuking the Ætolians for the breach of order.¹ Soon afterwards Perseus himself entered Ætolia. The calumnies of Lykiskos had driven a leading citizen named Archidamos openly to take the Macedonian side. He offered to admit the King into Stratos, but the other chief men of that city shrank from so bold a step; they called in Popillius from Ambrakia, and Perseus came before the town only to find it in the hands of his enemies. Deinarchos, the Ætolian Master of the Horse, had also been on the point of joining Perseus, but he soon found it expedient to change sides, and to join the Roman army which he had come to oppose.² But, though Stratos was lost, and occupied by Popillius, the whole district of Aperantia, where Archidamos had great influence, openly joined Perseus, and Archidamos himself appears among those who clave to the Macedonian King to the last.³ In the rest of Ætolia, Lykiskos, with a comrade named Tisippos, continued his career. After the battle of Pydna, Æmilius was met in Thessaly by a crowd of suppliant Ætolians, who told him how Aulus Bæbius, a Roman officer, had, at the instigation of Lykiskos, massacred five hundred and fifty Senators or leading men in the council-house,⁴ how he had driven others into exile, and seemingly divided the property of both classes among the chiefs of the Roman party. The

Perseus
in
Ætolia,
B.C. 169.

Part
of the
country
joins him.

Massacre
by A.
Bæbius,
B.C. 167.

¹ Pol. xxviii. 3, 4. Liv. xliii. 17 or 19.

² Liv. xliii. 22.

³ Liv. xlv. 43.

⁴ Liv. xlv. 28.

CHAP. IX. Roman Commissioners—the hands of Æmilius are clear from such iniquity—sat at Amphipolis, confirmed both the banishment and the murders, and merely punished Bæbius for employing Roman soldiers on such a business.¹ Other Ætolians, suspected of patriotism, were summoned to Rome to take their trial there, and a leading man named Andronikos was beheaded on the spot for having borne arms on the Macedonian side.² It has been supposed that the Ætolian League was now formally dissolved;³ at all events the country sank into utter insignificance; we only hear that civil strife continued till the death of Lykiskos; when the land was rid of him, it enjoyed a time of at least comparative prosperity.⁴

Dissolution
of the
League,
B.C. 187?

Death of
Lykiskos,
B.C. 187.

Affairs
of AKAR-
NANIA.
B.C. 171.

B.C. 169.

Debate
in the
Akarna-
nian As-
sembly.

Of Akarnania we hear but little. That gallant and faithful ally of Macedonia was warned at the beginning of the war⁵ that she had now an opportunity of wiping out her old errors by loyal adherence to Rome. Two years later we find the Roman Commissioners, Popillius and Octavius, meeting an Akarnanian Assembly at Thourion,⁶ which was divided between two parties answering to those of Lykortas and Kallikratês in Achaia. The Roman party, led by one Chremês, went further even than their Achaian counterparts, as they asked for Roman garrisons in the Akarnanian towns. The patriots, led by Diogenês, pleaded that Akarnania was the friend and ally of Rome,

¹ Liv. xlv. 81. Cf. Pol. xxx. 10.

² Liv. ib. "Duo securi percussi viri insignes; Andronicus *Andronici* filius Ætolus, quod, patrem secutus, arma contra populum Romanum tulisset, et Neo Thebanus."

One is strongly tempted to read *Archidami* for *Andronici*, as we have heard nothing of any Ætolian Andronikos. The persons of that name in Liv. xxxvii. 13 and xlv. 10 seem to be native Macedonians.

³ Brandstätter (493) and Kortüm (iii. 315) quote, from Justin (Prol. xxxiii.), the words *Ætolicæ civitates ab unitate corporis deductæ*. In every edition that I know of they stand simply, *Ætoli oppressi*.

⁴ Pol. xxxii. 20, 21.

⁵ Liv. xlii. 38.

⁶ Pol. xxviii. 5. Liv. xliii. 17 or 19.

and that none of her cities needed to be dealt with like conquered enemies. The Roman hesitated for the present, but, after the defeat of Perseus, when the Roman Commissioners at Amphipolis sat in judgement on all the states of Greece, Akarnanian as well as Ætolian victims were sent off to Rome. But no change was made in the constitution of the League, except that its capital Leukas was taken from it.¹ Chremês afterwards played in Akarnania the same part as Lykiskos in Ætolia, and his country was delivered from him about the same time.²

Leukas
separated
from Akar-
nania,
B.C. 167.
B.C. 157.

State of
EPEIROS.

Epeiros and Boeotia suffered yet more severely during and after the war with Perseus. In Epeiros we find the same parties as elsewhere, namely the three described by Livy,³ devoted partisans of Rome and of Macedonia, and the moderate men who simply wished to retain as much dignity and independence for their country as such evil times allowed. The Lykortas of Epeiros was Kephalos: its Kallikratês was one Charops, a grandson of the elder Charops,⁴ whom Polybios describes as the vilest of his vile class.⁵ Of Kephalos as a politician we hear the best possible character. He was an old friend of the house of Macedon, but he knew that Epeiros was the ally of Rome; he prayed that peace might endure between the two powers; if war did come, he was ready to discharge towards Rome the duties of an honourable ally, but not to

Parties in
Epeiros,
Kephalos
and
Charops.

¹ Liv. xlv. 31, 34.

² Pol. xxxii. 21.

³ Liv. xlv. 31. Tria genera principum in civitatibus erant; duo, quæ adulando aut Romanorum imperium, aut amicitiam Regum, sibi privatim opes oppressis faciebant civitatibus; medium unum, utrique generi adversum, libertatem et leges tuebatur.

This is candid for a Roman, but the adherents of Rome and of Macedonia must not be put on a level.

⁴ See above, p. 619.

⁵ Pol. xxx. 14. 'Εφ' ὅσον οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων [ἐν Ἡπείρῳ] μετριώτεροι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Αἰτωλίαν ἦσαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὁ προεστὰς αὐτῶν ἀσεβέστερος καὶ παρανομώτερος ὑπῆρχε τῶν ἄλλων. δοκῶ γὰρ μὴ γεγονέναι μὴδ' ἐκείσθαι θηριωδέστερον ἄνθρωπον μὴδὲ σκαιότερον Χάρωπος.

CHAP. IX. degrade his country by any base subserviency.¹ Theodotos, Antinoös, and Philostratos represented the more decided Macedonian party.² At first, Epeiros was true to Rome;³ that she did not remain so was the fault of the ultra-Roman party. The constant calumnies of Charops, the fate which they saw fall upon their fellow-patriots in Ætolia, at last drove Kephalos and his adherents openly to take the Macedonian side. Some of the more zealous partizans of Macedonia went so far as to make an attempt, in which they nearly succeeded, to seize the Roman Consul Aulus Hostilius and deliver him up to Perseus.⁴ During the war, the different districts of the League seem to have been divided. While Phanotê in Chaonia stood a siege in the Macedonian interest, Thesprôtian auxiliaries served in the Roman army against it.⁵ But, on the whole, Epeiros decidedly took the Macedonian side. Molossis had to be conquered as a hostile country by the Prætor Lucius Anicius. Theodotos and Antinoös died in defence of the old capital Passarôn, and Kephalos himself in defence of the Molossian town of Tekmôn.⁶ The vengeance of Rome was terrible, and it was marked by equal baseness and cruelty. Lucius Æmilius, a man whose heart abhorred the vile business on which he was sent,⁷ was the unwilling instrument of the wicked will of the Senate. By the foulest treachery all suspicion was lulled to sleep, and, in one day, seventy towns, mostly in Molossis, were destroyed, and one hundred and fifty thousand persons sold into slavery.⁸ An Assembly was

Geographical
parties
in Epeiros,
B.C. 169.

Conquest
and
desola-
tion of
Epeiros,
B.C. 167.

¹ Pol. xxvii. 13.

² Ib. 14. Cf. Liv. xlv. 26.

³ Liv. xlii. 38. xliii. 5.

⁴ Pol. xxvii. 14.

⁵ Liv. xliii. 21 or 23.

⁶ Ib. xlv. 26. To judge from Livy's account, the heroism of the chiefs would seem not to have been shared by the people. But one would like to have an Epeirot historian.

⁷ Plut. Æm. 30. Αἰμίλιος τοῦτο πράξας μάλιστα παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐπικεικὴ καὶ χρηστὴν οὖσαν.

⁸ Pol. xxx. 15. Liv. xlv. 34. Plut. Æm. 29.

then held, representing what was left of the Epeiros CHAP. IX.
 League; some selected victims were carried to Rome,
 and Charops was left to tyrannize over the rest. What Tyranny
 of Charops,
 B.C. 167-
 157.
 constitutional forms were preserved for him to abuse,
 we know not; ¹ practically life and property were at the
 mercy of an oppressor who, whatever may have been the
 title he bore, was essentially of the same class as Nabis
 and Apollodôros.²

The fate of Bœotia was the most remarkable of all. It Condition
 of Bœotia.
 most clearly illustrates the detestable Roman policy of
 sowing dissension among the Grecian cities, and it shows
 how much the forms of the Greek Federal constitutions
 stood in the way of such intrigues. The Bœotian Con- Bœotian
 alliance
 with
 Perseus,
 B.C. 173.
 federation was not a threatening or a powerful state; but
 it was a little stronger and a little more independent than
 any or all of its cities could have been separately. Roman
 policy therefore seized with delight on any prospect of dis-
 solving the League of Bœotia, as it would have seized with
 still greater delight on any prospect of dissolving the more
 powerful League of Achaia. The Bœotian League alone,
 among all the Greek states, had ventured to contract a
 formal alliance with Perseus.³ This was before the war
 between Rome and Macedonia broke out; but of course
 the act was looked on at Rome as an act of hostility.
 On the first mission of Marcius and Atilius, they were met
 in Thessaly by Bœotian envoys, who were doubtless chosen
 from among the partizans of Rome. When they were Intrigues
 of Q.
 Marcius,
 B.C. 171.
 rebuked for the dealings of the League with Macedonia,
 they had the indiscretion not only to lay the blame on
 Ismênias, the chief of the other party, but to add that the

¹ In Pol. xxxii. 22, *οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν Φωκίᾳ* condemn certain men as
 enemies of Rome. Does this action on the part of a single city imply the
 formal dissolution of the League?

² See the details of his cruelties in Pol. xxxii. 21, 22.

³ According to the speech of Eumenês, Liv. xlii. 12.

CHAP. IX.

Dissolu-
tion
of the
League,
B.C. 171.

decree of alliance with Perseus had passed the Federal Assembly against the will of several of the cities.¹ The Roman caught eagerly at this opening; he would give every city of Bœotia an opportunity of speaking for itself; he would thus know which cities had really opposed the Macedonian alliance.² Some of the discontented cities at once sent separate embassies to Marcius.³ What little Bœotian patriotism was left spent itself, after much tumult, in the election of Ismênias to the post of Federal General, and in an effort, under his management, to procure the Roman acceptance of a formal surrender of the League as a whole.⁴ It was hoped that, by this step, the utter dissolution of the Union would be avoided, at the expense of its becoming, like Ætolia, an acknowledged Roman dependency. This was exactly opposite to the wishes of Marcius, who contrived to obtain separate surrenders from all the cities, except Korôneia and Haliartos, which clave desperately to the cause of Perseus, and suffered the extremities of Roman cruelty in his behalf.⁵ The Bœotian League, as a body with the least shadow of political independence, thus passes away for ever.⁶

¹ Liv. xlii. 38. Quum culpam in Ismeniam, principem alterius partis, conferrent, et quasdam civitates dissidentes in causam deductas.

This of course only means that the votes of those cities were given against the Macedonian treaty. Such a minority would be in the position of the New England States during Madison's war with England.

² Liv. u.s. Appariturum id esse, Marcius respondit, singulis enim civitatibus de se ipsis consulendi potestatem facturos.

³ Ib. 43.

⁴ See Pol. xxvii. 1, 2. for an account of the whole dissension and tumult. The Thespian envoys come with a separate surrender, Ismênias comes with a surrender in the name of the whole League, which was just what Marcius wished to avoid; *κατὰ κοινὸν πάσας τὰς ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις διδοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβευτῶν πίστιν. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐναντιώτατον τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάρκιον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ πᾶσαν διελεῖν τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς οἰκείωτατον.* So below, Marcius' object is said to be *διαλύσαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν τὸ ἔθνος καὶ λυμήνασθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν εὐνοίαν πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν.* So Liv. xlii. 44. *Id quod maxime volebant, discusso Bœotorum concilio.*

⁵ Liv. xlii. 63. xliii. 4.

⁶ See above, p. 210.

Thus four out of the five Greek Federations vanish from the field of history. It remains to trace the fate of the Achaian League from the beginning of the war with Perseus to the extinction of Greek independence. Achaia was far more powerful, and enjoyed far more consideration, than any other state in Greece. All Peloponnêsos was united under a single free constitution; and, allowing for Spartan and Messénian dissatisfaction, it was still moved by a single will. Such a power was not altogether to be despised, least of all on the brink of a war with Macedonia. It might even have been thought that something like real good will and gratitude was due to faithful allies, who had served Rome well against Philip and Antiochos, and who were now so far from taking the side of Perseus that they had—on what special ground we know not—passed a decree forbidding any sort of intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia.¹ The result was that Achaian slaves ran away into Macedonia, and that there was no means of getting them back. Perseus, anxious to win the favour of the League, collected as many of the runaways as he could, and sent them back with a letter to the Achaian people, hinting that there was a way by which such losses could be hindered for the future. The President of the League was Xenarchos, whom Livy describes as a private partizan of Philip,² but, as he was the brother of Archôn, we may probably set him down as a statesman of the school of Lykortas. The greater part of the Assembly wished to repeal the decree; some were favourable to Macedonia; others wanted their slaves back again. Kallikratês of course opposed the repeal; Archôn supported it. Achaia was the ally of Rome, ready, if war broke out, to assist Rome against Macedonia. But that was no reason why

CHAP. IX.

ACHAIA
during
the war
with
Perseus.Decree
of non-
intercourse
between
Achaia
and Macedonia.Debate
on its
proposed
repeal,
B.C. 174.¹ Livy, xli. 23 or 28.² Ib. Qui privatæ gratiæ aditum apud Regem quærebat.

CHAP. IX. Macedonia should be thus politically excommunicated, why the same international courtesy should not take place between Achaia and Macedonia as between Achaia and any other power. The repeal however was deferred; Perseus was thought to have treated the League disrespectfully by merely sending a short letter and not an Embassy.¹ Presently he did send an Embassy to the next Federal Congress at Megalopolis, but the Roman party prevailed so far that his envoys were not allowed to address the Assembly. The next year Marcellus summoned an Achaian Assembly, and praised the League²—it had sunk to that point—for its refusal to repeal the anti-Macedonian decree.

Mission
of Mar-
cellus,
B.C. 173.

Mission
of the
Lentuli,
B.C. 171.

Roman
dealings
with in-
dividual
cities.

Two years later, while Marcius and Atilius visited the Northern states, two Lentuli, Publius and Servius, went through the cities of Peloponnésos, praising each other for their constancy to Rome in the wars with Philip and Antiochos, and hoping that they would continue to follow the same path in the coming war with Perseus.³ This diplomatic intercourse between a foreign power and particular cities was a manifest breach of the first principles of the League. It was worse even than the reception of envoys from discontented cities; it was a direct attempt to stir up discontent where no discontent existed. To exhort this or that city, and not the League as a whole, to retain its fidelity towards Rome was to recognize in each city a capacity for separate political action which the Federal Constitution forbade. One cannot doubt that the Lentuli would have been as well pleased to see the Achaian cities fall away from their Federal Union as their colleagues Marcius and Atilius were to see the like disruption take place in Boeotia. We may suspect that it had been arranged between them thus to labour for the same end in

¹ Liv. xli. 24 or 29.

² Ib. xlii. 6. Collaudatâ gente.

³ Ib. xlii. 37.

different parts of Greece. The cases indeed were different ; CHAP. IX.
 Boeotia had concluded a treaty with the enemy ; Achaia was so firm a friend of Rome as to refuse to Macedonia even common international courtesy. But a natural instinct led every Roman of the vulgar stamp to do all he could to weaken Greek Federalism, as being the source of all Greek independence and power. But, in this case, the insidious attempt wholly failed ; no Achaian city was tempted to fall away ; the mission of the Lentuli excited only indignation mixed with contempt. For, in going through the several cities of the League, they addressed their praises of past fidelity to several commonwealths where they were wholly out of place. Elis and Messênê, which had fought for Antiochos against Rome, and, we may suppose, Sparta also, came in for the same praises as the elder cities of the League.¹

Shortly afterwards, Atilius and Marcius themselves came into Peloponnêsos. They had an interview with the Achaian General Archôn and his Ministry,² and demanded a body of a thousand Achaians to act as the garrison of Chalkis till the Roman army landed. To this Archôn consented. Considering the alliance between Achaia and

Demands
of Atilius
and Mar-
cius.

¹ This is the meaning which I get out of Livy's words (xlii. 37), *Achaëis indignantis eodem se loco esse . . . quo Messenii et Elii, &c.* Livy, as usual, does not understand Federal politics. The Achaians could not complain that two of their own cities were put on a level with themselves ; but the whole body might complain that particular cities were dealt with at all, and the other cities might complain that such inappropriate praise was addressed to Elis and Messênê. Livy does not fully realize that Elis and Messênê were now Achaian cities, much as he once before (589) fancied Elis to be an Achaian city before it became one. Cf. Schorn, p. 342.

² Pol. xxvii. 2. Ἐξημέτισαν ταῖς συναρχαῖαις ταῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ παρεκάλειαν Ἀρχῶνα τὸν στρατηγόν, κ.τ.λ. This language clearly implies that it was an act of the General and his Cabinet (the *δημιοῦργοι*) only. Livy indeed says, "Argis præbitum est iis *concilium*, ubi nihil aliud a gente Achæorum petierunt, &c." (xlii. 44). He probably misunderstood the term *συναρχαίαι*, which is equivalent to *συνάρχοντες*, and that to *δημιοῦργοι*. See above, pp. 282, 649.

CHAP. IX. Rome and the large powers of the Achaian General, this course was perhaps not absolutely illegal; Archôn was one of the sounder Achaian statesmen, and he was not likely to yield to any requests which directly contradicted the Federal Constitution. But it was a dangerous precedent for the Government thus to act upon its own responsibility, at the bidding of a foreign power. This again, like the mission of the Lentuli to the separate cities, may be looked at as another blow struck at the unity, and thereby at the independence, of the Achaian body.

Mission of
Popillius
and Oc-
tavius,
B.C. 170.

Next came the mission of Popillius and Octavius,¹ which was ostensibly designed to stop such requisitions for the future. Such an order was in its place when addressed to Ætolia, which had become a Roman dependency, but it was a monstrous insult when it was addressed to an equal ally like the Achaian League. The decree forbade any city to grant military help to any Roman officer, except by order of the Senate.² This clearly implied that it was the duty of every Greek state to obey every order which really had the Senate's authority. Again, in defiance of all Federal rights, the Roman envoys went through the several cities, publishing the decree, enlarging on the virtues of the Senate, and threatening all who were not avowed supporters of Rome.³ It was not till after this that they condescended to attend the Federal Assembly at Aigion. It was currently believed that they came with the design of accusing Lykortas, Polybios, and even Archôn, before the assembled People, as enemies of Rome. But they did not venture upon an accusation for which they found that there was absolutely no pretence. They therefore did

Further
inroads on
Federal
rights.

¹ See above, p. 663.

² Liv. xliii. 17 or 19. *Senatûs-consultum . . . per omnes Peloponnesi urbes contulerunt, Ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret, præterquam quod Senatus censuisset.*

³ Pol. xxviii. 3.

not appear before the Assembly, but contented themselves with addressing a few words of compliment and exhortation to the Senate.¹ CHAP. IX.

The intentions of Rome towards the League were now made manifest. Every Achaian statesman who was not Rome's abject slave might feel himself threatened by the behaviour of the Roman envoys both in Achaia and in other Greek states. The leading men of the moderate party now held a Convention, to settle their general course of action, and, among other things, to determine what candidates they would propose at the next Federal elections.² Lykortas exhorted to strict neutrality; it was not advisable to help either Rome or Macedonia in a struggle in which it was certain that the conqueror, whichever he might be, would prove a dangerous foe to Grecian freedom. On the other hand, to oppose Rome would be too great a risk; he at least would not venture on it; he had already too often opposed the most distinguished Romans and with too little success. Apollônîdês of Sikyôn and Stratios of Tritaia took a bolder line; they would not oppose Rome, but they would openly and vigorously oppose those among their own citizens who served Rome for their own private advantage. Archôn, on the other hand, argued that they must yield to the times, and give their enemies no occasion for calumny, lest they should share the fate of the Ætolian Nikander and his companions. The majority of the meeting, including

Convention of the
Moderate
Party,
Autumn,
B.C. 170.

¹ This seems on the whole to be the most likely meaning of the narrative in Polybios, where there certainly seems a marked opposition between *συναχθείσης τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκκλησίας* and *συναχθείσης αὐτοῖς τῆς βουλῆς*. But it is possible that it might be one of the cases (see above, p. 307) where the members of the *βουλή* practically discharged the functions of an *ἐκκλησία*, so that the body assembled might be called by either name. Livy (xliii. 17) is amusingly brief.

² Pol. xxviii. 6. This is the passage which I have already mentioned (p. 285) as having been so strangely misunderstood.

CHAP. IX. Polybios himself, agreed in this view, and it was determined to support Archôn as a candidate for the Generalship, and Polybios for the office of Master of the Horse. This description of a private debate among the chief men of an Achaian party¹ is one of the most precious glimpses into Federal politics which the fragments of Polybios afford us. What would one not give for similar details of the political life of the League in earlier days?

Archôn
General,
B.C. 170-
169.

Embassy
from
Attalos,
May, 169.

Debate
on the
restora-
tion of
Eumenês'
honours.

Archôn then was elected General, with Polybios as his second in command, and the policy of the League was to be strict adherence to the Roman alliance, without any slavish subserviency to Roman dictation. Presently there came a communication from Attalos, brother of King Eumenês of Pergamos, asking for the restoration of his brother's honours.² As the President was favourable to the request,³ the Ambassadors were introduced to the Assembly at the Spring Meeting.⁴ The attendance was large; the multitude⁵ was divided; many speeches were made; the restoration of the honours was opposed by a large party on both public and private grounds. Then followed loud calls for Archôn, who, as Head of the Government, was held to be bound to speak on such a subject.⁶ He spoke, and that favourably to the proposal, but he spoke briefly; he had spent large sums on his costly office,⁷ and he feared lest any strong support should be attributed to hopes of private advantage from a grate-

¹ The names mentioned by Polybios are, Lykortas, Polybios, Arkesilaos, and Aristôn from Megalopolis; Archôn from Aigeira; Stratios from Tritaia; Xenôn from Patrai; Apollônides from Sikyôn; and Polyainos, perhaps from the Triphylian Kyparissia (see Pol. xi. 18). Others of course may have been present.

² Pol. xxviii. 7. See above, p. 651.

³ Ib. Προθύμως αὐτῷ κατανεύσαντες [οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρχωνα] ὑπέσχεον συμπράξαι ὑπὲρ τῶν παρακαλουμένων. See above, p. 288.

⁴ Ib. Εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἀγορὰν. But see p. 649.

⁵ Ib. Ὁ μὲν ὄχλος ἄθλος ἦν ἐπὶ τίνος ὑπάρχει γνώμης.

⁶ See above, p. 293.

⁷ See above, p. 294.

ful monarch. Polybios then spoke himself; he showed that the decree under which the honours of Eumenês had been taken away had been misconceived, and carried out in a way not intended by its original authors. It had never been intended to abolish all the honours voted to the King of Pergamos, but only such as were either formally illegal or else in some way disparaging to the dignity of the Achaian nation. A vote was accordingly passed to that effect, and the honours of Eumenês, with the necessary exceptions, were restored to him.¹ The account of this debate also, though its immediate subject is not very important, is one of the most valuable fragments of our history. The mode of conducting diplomatic business, the constitution of the Assembly, the position of the General, the costliness, and therefore the unpaid nature, of his office, are all clearly set forth in the incidental language of a historian who is now describing his own actions.

But much more important business was done in the same Assembly. Quintus Marcius was now in Thessaly. A decree was accordingly passed, on the motion of the General himself,² to help the Romans with the whole force of the League. This being carried, a series of more detailed resolutions were passed. It was voted that the General should collect the army, and make all preparations; that Polybios and some others should go as envoys to Marcius, offering the services of the League; that, if he accepted them, the other envoys should return with his message, but that Polybios should remain to undertake the commissariat department, and to provide supplies in all the

Negociations with Marcius, B.C. 169.

¹ Pol. xxviii. 7, 10. Envoys were sent at the same time to the coronation (*ἀνακλήγηρια*) of the young Ptolemy Philomêtôr, renewing the old friendly relations between his dynasty and the League.

² Ib. 10. *Εἰσήμεγκαν οὖν [οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀρχῶνα] εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς δόγμα.*

CHAP. IX. towns through which the troops would have to pass. Marcius was found in the act of crossing over Mount Olympos into Pieria, when fresh troops were not what he most wanted. The Achaian envoys shared the difficulties of his passage,¹ and had a final interview with him when he had safely reached the Macedonian Hêracleion. The other ambassadors now returned, but Polybios stayed with the Roman army. Presently Marcius heard that Appius Claudius, who had been lately defeated in Illyria, was asking the Achaians for five thousand men.² Marcius bade Polybios go and take care that the request of Appius should be refused—whether out of care for the Achaians or out of spite against Appius, Polybios does not venture to determine.³ Polybios returned to Peloponnêsos; an Assembly at Sikyôn discussed the request of Appius. What was he to do? He could not venture to disobey the secret injunctions of the Consul, neither could he venture to reveal them. He had to oppose a Roman demand, without having any manifestly unanswerable reason to bring forward. At last he took the line that the request of Appius was contrary to the decree of the Senate brought by Octavius and Popillius. It was voted to refer the matter to Marcius, that is, to refuse the request of Appius. The Senate and the Consul were thus obeyed, but Polybios felt that his enemies had gained an excellent handle for calumniating him to Appius Claudius.

Polybios
opposes
Appius
Claudius.

Embassy
from the
Ptolemies,
B.C. 169-
168.

The League had, as we have seen, just renewed its alliance with Egypt. In the course of the winter, envoys came from the two young Ptolemies, Philomêtôr and

¹ See Liv. xliv. 2 et seqq.

² Pol. xxviii. 11.

³ Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 464) adds, "But it might not be an improbable or unjust surmise, that he also wished to entrap the Achæans into a refusal which might afterwards be used as a ground of accusation against them."

Euergetês, who were now reigning as joint Kings, asking for help against Antiochos Epiphanês of Syria. They asked for one thousand foot and two hundred horse, for Lykortas as commander of the whole force, and for his son Polybios as commander of the cavalry.¹ This sort of request plainly shows that, as compared with any power except Rome, the League still held a high place among nations. This embassy at once caused an open division between the two Achaian parties. Kallikratês, supported by Diophanês and Hyperbatos, were for refusing the required help; Lykortas, Archôn, and Polybios were for granting it. The matter was discussed in an Assembly at Corinth, at which few except Senators seem to have been present.² Kallikratês pleaded the general necessity of keeping quiet,³ especially while the war between Rome and Macedon was still undecided. Lykortas and his son pleaded the Egyptian alliance, the benefits received from the Egyptian Kings, and the fact that the Roman Consul had declined the offer of Achaian reinforcements. When the feeling of the Assembly seemed decidedly on the side of Lykortas, Kallikratês appealed to the presiding Ministers not to put the question, alleging some formal ground which hindered the present Assembly from entertaining it.⁴ But, after a while, a Special Meeting

¹ Pol. xxix. 8.

² See above, p. 307. From the context this would seem to have been an ordinary and not a special Meeting. If so, we have to choose between the Autumn Meeting of B.C. 169 and the Spring Meeting of B.C. 168. The words *κοῖντου τοῦ φιλίππου* [Quintus Marcius Philippus] *τὴν παραχειμασίαν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ποιουμένου*, look like the earlier date, and the reference to the embassy of Polybios to Marcius as having taken place the year before (*τῷ πρότερον ἔτει*, c. 9) looks like the later. But *τῷ πρότερον ἔτει* may mean in the last official year, and on the other hand the *παραχειμασία* of Marcius seems to have practically lasted till the arrival of Æmilius.

³ Pol. xxix. 8. *φάσκοντες δεῖν καθόλου μὲν μὴ πραγματοποιεῖν*.

⁴ Ib. 9. *Οἱ περὶ τὸν Καλλικράτην ἐξέβαλον τὸ διαβούλιον, διασείσαντες τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς οἷα οὐσῆς ἐξουσίας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐν ἀγορᾷ*

CHAP. IX. was held at Sikyôn which was very largely attended.¹ Here the subject was fully discussed. Polybios set forth his case. The Romans did not need their help; the Consul Marcius had declined it; even if they needed it, twelve hundred men sent to help an old ally from whom they had received many benefits, would not hinder a state which could bring thirty or forty thousand soldiers into the field² from still helping Rome effectually. On the second day the formal proposals had to be made. Lykortas moved that the proposed auxiliary force be sent to Egypt. Kallikratês moved an amendment that, instead of troops, Ambassadors be sent to reconcile the Ptolemies with Antiochos. According to the forms of the Achaian Assembly, the decisive vote would not be taken till the next day,³ but it was clear that the feeling of the House was strongly with Lykortas.⁴ Kallikratês and his party now sought to compass their end in another way. A messenger, whose coming was probably preconcerted, entered the theatre with a letter from Marcius, requesting the Achaians, at the wish of the Senate, to send Ambassadors to reconcile the Kings. Polybios and his friends, not choosing directly to oppose a letter from a Roman Consul, withdrew their motion.⁵ The amendment of Kallikratês was carried;

Debate at
Sikyôn
on the
Egyptian
question,
B.C. 168.

βουλευέσθαι περὶ βοηθείας. I do not profess to know what the impediment was. Tittmann (684) supposes it to refer to some religious objection to the *ἀγορά* as a place of Meeting. The next Assembly (c. 10) was held in the theatre. Considering what follows, one might think that the objection was to the smallness of the attendance, but it is not easy to see why a thinly attended Meeting, or one attended only by Senators, should be called *ἀγορά*.

¹ Pol. xxix. 9. Μετὰ δὲ τινα χρόνον συγκλήτου συναχθείσης εἰς τὴν τῶν Σικυωνίων πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τοῖς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἐτών. See above, p. 263, 307.

² Ib. Καλῶς γὰρ ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ τρεῖς ἄγειν καὶ τέτταρας μυριάδας ἀνδρῶν μαχίμων.

³ See above, p. 276.

⁴ Ib. Πάλιν δὲ τῶν διαβουλίων προτεθέντων ἀγῶν ἐγίγνετο νεανικῆς, πολὺ γε μὴν ὑπερέχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Λυκῶρταν.

⁵ Ib. 10. Ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων.

three Ambassadors, Archôn of Aigeira, Arkesilaos and Aristôn of Megalopolis, were to be sent on an errand which Roman diplomacy had failed to effect.¹ Then the Alexandrian envoys handed to the presiding Ministers² a letter from the Kings which they had ready for the purpose, asking that Lykortas and Polybios might still be sent, seemingly to help with their counsel in the war with Antiochos.

§ 4. *From the Conquest of Macedonia to the Dissolution of the Achaian League.*

B.C. 167-146.

The discussion on the proposed aid to Egypt took place in the early part of the year 168, before the coming of Æmilius and the battle of Pydna. That great victory marks another stage in the demeanour of the Romans towards the Greek states. The defeat of Antiochos emboldened them to treat their allies as dependents; the defeat of Perseus emboldened them to treat their dependents as slaves. We have seen how they dealt with other Greek states; how Leagues were dissolved and cities destroyed; how the citizens of independent commonwealths were summoned before Roman tribunals, and sent off to Rome to meet with such justice as they might find there. The Achaian League could hardly be dealt with in quite so summary a way. If no gratitude was felt for its signal services, some little respect was still felt for a commonwealth which could arm forty thousand soldiers, and whose alliance was eagerly sought for by the Kings of Egypt and Asia. Achaia could indeed be conquered, like

Effects
of the
Conquest
of Mace-
donia
on the
relations
between
Rome and
Achaia.

¹ Pol. xxxix. 10. Οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὸν Τίτον [Νεμέσιον?] ἀδυνατήσαντες διαλύειν ἀνακεχώρησαν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἀπρακτοὶ τελέως.

² Ib. Ἀνέδωκαν τοῖς ἀρχουσι.

CHAP. IX. Macedonia, and conquered doubtless more easily than Macedonia had been. But it might need to be conquered; it was not clear that the League would, like the feebler states, at once obey any orders which Rome might please to issue. Kallikratês indeed hastened to Amphipolis, along with his kindred spirits from Ætolia and Epeiros;¹ but the suspected Achaians were not summoned along with the suspected Ætolians and Epeirots. The reason is plain; they would most likely not have come, if they had been summoned, and Kallikratês and the other slaves of Rome might have been endangered by the demand. And in truth there was no sort of excuse for summoning them; nothing had been found among the papers of the fallen King which implicated any Achaian citizen.² Therefore, instead of the Achaians being sent for like the other Greeks, two of the Roman Commissioners, Cnæus Domitius and Caius Claudius, were sent as Ambassadors to the Achaian Assembly. The share of Æmilius in this business was wholly against his will; he was an honest man and hated wretches like Lykiskos and Kallikratês.³ But his colleagues were too much for him, and here, just as in Epeiros, he was made the instrument of iniquity which he abhorred.

Embassy
of Domi-
tius and
Claudius,
B.C. 167.

The envoys came, but unluckily no contemporary account of their reception has been preserved. There is here a sad gap among the fragments of Polybios, and we have no longer so much as Livy's translation to fill up the blank. Our sole authority for details is the late and careless antiquary Pausanias. According to him, one Roman Commissioner, whose name he does not mention, was introduced into the Assembly by Kallikratês.⁴ The Roman

Demands
of the
Romans.

¹ Pol. xxx. 10.

² Ib. So Livy, xlv. 31.

³ Ib. 'Ο στρατηγὸς [Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος] οὐκ εὐδοκούμενος κατὰ γὰρ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ταῖς τῶν περὶ τὸν Λύκισκον καὶ Καλλικράτην διαβολαῖς.

⁴ Paus. vii. 10. 7. "Ἐνα δὲ τίνα ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἄνδρα οὐδαμῶς ἐς δικαιοσύνην

affirmed that the chief men of Achaia had helped Perseus during the war with supplies of money and in other ways. He called on the Assembly to condemn them to death; when they were condemned, he would name them. An Assembly whose older members could remember the days of Aratos had not quite sunk to such degradation as this. If any Achaians had aided Perseus, let the Romans name them; at all events no citizen of the League should be condemned unheard. Prompted by Kallikratēs, the envoy answered that all the former Generals of the Achaians were guilty, all were partizans of Macedonia.¹ Up started Xenôn of Patrai, a name already known to us as a statesman of the moderate party;² "Then I am one who come under the charge; I have been General of the Achaians; yet I have never done any wrong to Rome or shown any favour to Perseus; I am ready to be tried on such a charge by the Assembly of the Achaians or even by the Romans themselves." The conscious innocence of Xenôn had carried him too far.³ The Roman caught at the imprudent challenge; he demanded that all whom Kallikratēs named should be sent for trial to Rome. Sent to Rome they were, above a thousand of the best men of Achaia; whether they were carried off by sheer force, or whether the Assembly was so cowed as to pass the required vote, does not clearly appear. Most probably some sort of vote was passed; for the Senate had the mean hypocrisy to reply to one—perhaps the first—of the many Achaian embassies sent on their behalf, that they wondered at the

Challenge
of Xenôn.

Deportation
of the
Thousand
Achaians,
B.C. 167.

πρόθυμον, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα προσεποιήσατο ὁ Καλλικράτης ἐς τοσοῦτον ὥστε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐς τὸ συνέδριον ἐσελθεῖν τὸ Ἀχαιῶν ἔπεισεν. On συνέδριον see above, p. 263.

¹ Paus. vii. 10. 9. Ἀπετόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς οἱ ἐστρατηγηκότες Ἀχαιῶν ἐρέχονται πάντες τῇ αἰτίᾳ. But it must be meant, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 466) says, of those only who had been Generals since the beginning of the war. Kallikratēs himself had filled the office.

² See above, p. 674.

³ Paus. vii. 10. 10. Ὁ μὲν δὲ ὑπὸ συνειδότητος ἐπαρήσιδετο ἀγαθοῖ.

CHAP. IX. Achaïans applying in favour of men whom they had themselves condemned.¹ Now the Achaïan Assembly had most certainly not condemned these men ; it had at most sent them to Rome for trial, though indeed to send them to Rome for trial might be looked on as much the same thing as condemning them. Still such an answer seems to imply an Achaïan vote of some kind ; even the diplomatic impudence of the Roman Senate could hardly have ventured on such an assertion, if the victims had been carried off by mere Roman violence. It is clear that the Achaïans were simple enough to believe that their countrymen would receive some sort of trial ; nay, as there was really nothing whatever to compromise them, they seem to have gone so far as to hope that a trial would prove their innocence, and that they would be restored to their country. Instead of this they were quartered—under what degree of restraint does not appear—in various Etruscan towns, in a dull provincial solitude, out of the reach of either Greek or Roman political life. Several embassies applied in vain for their release. One, which is described by Polybios, pleaded, in rejoinder to the Senate, that the exiles had never been condemned, and directly begged that the Senate would either bring them to trial itself, or allow the Achaïans to try them. Nothing could less suit the Senate's purpose. A fair trial, whether at Rome or in Achaïa, could only lead to an acquittal ; and a release of the victims, whether after trial or without, was held to be dangerous to the interests alike of Rome herself and of the Roman party in Achaïa. The Senate, thus driven to unmask itself, distinctly declared that their release was inexpedient both for Rome and for Achaïa. But, in the very form of its answer, it took care to strike another blow at that Federal unity which it so deeply hated and dreaded. The legal description of the Union

Embassies
on behalf
of the
exiles,
B.C. 164—
151.

Insidious
reply
of the
Senate.

¹ Pol. xxxi. 8.

was carefully avoided, and a form of words¹ was employed CHAP. IX. which could only be meant as another insidious attempt to stir up division. At this answer the people everywhere mourned, not only in Achaia but throughout all Greece.² But Kallikratēs, Charops, and their fellows rejoiced, and ruled everywhere still more undisturbed, while the flower of the Greek nation languished in their Etruscan prisons.

One only among these victims of Roman treachery seems Position of Polybios at Rome. to have been less harshly dealt with than his fellows. Polybios, through the friendship of Æmilius and his son the younger Scipio, found a shelter in that great patrician house,³ and there, by familiar intercourse with the greatest men of Rome, he had those wide views of politics and history thrown open to him of which we reap the fruit in his immortal work. But by thus becoming a citizen of the world, his patriotism as a citizen of Achaia was somewhat dulled. He still loved his country; he lived to do her important services; but, from this time onwards, his tone becomes Roman rather than Achaian. He looks at Greek affairs rather with the eye of a Roman philhellen, a Flamininus or an Æmilius, than with the national patriotism of Philopoiimēn or Lykortas or himself in his earlier days. The Senate refused his release and that of Stratios,⁴ when they were the only men of importance surviving. Yet it was at last through his influence⁵ that, in the seventeenth year of their bondage, after many fruitless

¹ Pol. xxxi. 8. "Ἐγραψαν ἀπέκρισιν τοιαύτην, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνομεν συμφέρεω οὐτε τοῖς ὑμετέροισι δῆμοις τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς οἶκον. Now *οἱ ὑμέτεροι δῆμοι* can only mean the several cities separately. But the interest of the several Achaian cities was no affair of the Roman Senate. It was only with the *ἔθνος* or *κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν* that they could have any lawful dealings.

² Pol. u.s. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαγγελλομένης τῆς ἀποκρίσεως τῆς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς δεδομένης ὑπὲρ τῶν κατατιθεμένων, τὰ μὲν πλήθη συνετρίβη ταῖς διανοαῖαις, κ.τ.λ.

³ Pol. xxxii. 9.

⁴ Ib. 7.

⁵ Plut. Cat. Maj. 9.

CHAP. IX.

Release
of the
exiles,
B. C. 151.

Dealings
of Rome
with
foreign
nations.

embassies,¹ such of the exiles as still survived, now less than three hundred in number, were allowed to return to their homes.²

The treatment of these kidnapped Achaians was probably the most brutal and treacherous piece of tyranny of which a civilized state was ever guilty towards an equal ally which had faithfully discharged all the duties of alliance.³ Rome, in her dealings with foreign nations, knew neither mercy nor justice. It is in this unfavourable light that the City and most of her citizens appear to a student of Grecian history; but it must not be forgotten that Roman vices and Roman virtues sprang from the same source, and that the men who sacrificed the rights of other nations to the interests of Rome were often equally ready to sacrifice themselves and all that they had in the same cause. The man who, in dealing with strangers, appeared only as a brutal conqueror or a base intriguer, often retained every old Roman virtue at the hearth of his own house and in the forum of his own city. It had long been held to be the duty of every Roman to use every means to break the power of any state which still retained strength or independence inconsistent with Rome's claim to universal dominion. The deportation of the Achaian patriots was only one act, though the basest, in a long series of treacherous attempts against the union and freedom of the League. It is even possible that it was only with a sinister purpose that the Senate at last consented to their release. Their advocate Cato obtained their enlargement by an appeal to the con-

¹ Paus. vii. 10, 11. Pol. xxxiii. 1, 2, 13.

² Paus. vii. 10, 12.

³ Mommsen, who cannot understand that a weak state can have any rights against a strong one, does not forsake his friends even in this extremity. The deportation of the Achaians is recorded by him (i. 596) without a word of disapproval; indeed he seems to think it all right and proper; the object was "die kindische Opposition [is that German?] der Hellenen muntodt zu machen."

temptuous pity of his hearers rather than to any nobler feeling.¹ It may be that the Senate foresaw what would come, and set free its victims mainly in order to secure fresh opportunities for intrigue and for final conquest. CHAP. IX.

Even while the flower of the nation was thus detained in Italy, Rome did not cease from her intrigues against the integrity of the Achaian Union. It is impossible to conceive a greater tribute to the importance and benefit of the Federal tie than these constant attempts to dissolve it on the part of the enemy of all Grecian freedom. The discontent of Sparta, never perhaps fully appeased, once more furnished the occasion. There was a dispute about frontiers between the Cantons of Sparta and Megalopolis,² perhaps the old dispute which Philopoimên had somewhat arbitrarily decided in favour of his own city.³ Caius Sulpicius Gallus, one of the most distinguished Romans of his time, was going into Asia to collect accusations against King Eumenês;⁴ for friendly Kings, when they had served their turn, fared no better at the hands of Rome than friendly commonwealths. He was ordered to stop and settle this little matter on his way, and also, if report says truly, to detach as many cities as he could from the Achaian League.⁵ Sulpicius thought it beneath him personally to decide a matter which, as Pausanias remarks,⁶ the great Philip had not thought beneath him; he bade Kallikratês judge between the two contending Cantons. The other part of his commission almost wholly failed. All the

Fresh
intrigues
of Rome.

Dispute
between
Sparta
and Mega-
lopolis.

Mission
of C.
Sulpicius
Gallus,
B.C. 166-
159.

¹ Plut. Cat. Maj. 9.

² Pol. xxxi. 9. Pausanias (vii. 11. 1) makes it a dispute between Sparta and Argos. See Schorn, 377. Considering that the maritime towns of Lakonia were now independent of Sparta, it may be doubted whether the Cantons of Sparta and Argos were conterminous.

³ See above, p. 644.

⁴ Pol. xxxi. 10.

⁵ Paus. vii. 11. 3. *Προπεπεστάλη δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς τῷ Γάλλῳ πόλεις ὁπόσας ἔστιν οἷός τε ὡς πλείστας ἀφεῖναι συλλόγου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν.*

⁶ Ib. 11. 2.

CHAP. IX. cities of Peloponnêsos—Sparta, it would seem, included—knew their interest too well to listen to any intrigues against an Union to which they owed whatever amount of freedom and prosperity they still retained. The Ætolian Pleurôn alone, an outlying Canton unnaturally attached to the Peloponnesian Confederacy, asked for licence to secede. Sulpicius bade its envoys go and ask leave of the Senate, which of course gladly granted it.¹

Separation of
Pleurôn
from the
League.

Yet even now the League retained a degree of power which made its alliance or enmity of importance to foreign states. And in truth the union of all Peloponnêsos formed a power which could have held its own against any kingdom or commonwealth then existing, except Rome itself. There was now a war between Rhodes and Crete. Each party asked for Achaian help; the Ambassadors were heard;² the Assembly was strongly disposed to assist Rhodes; but Kallikratês said that the League ought not to make war or alliance with any one without the consent of Rome. No such engagement had ever been entered into: Achaia was not a dependency like Ætolia, but an equal ally; and nothing in the treaty with Rome forbade the League to take any part it chose in such a quarrel. But the voice of Kallikratês was certainly the voice of prudence; hated as he was—for men shrank from the commonest social intercourse with him³—the Assembly listened on such occasions to the man who spoke the will of the Roman Senate.⁴

Debate
on the
Cretan
alliance,
B.C. 152.

¹ Paus. vii. 11. 3. Ἐπερδάνη δὲ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων συνεδρίου Ἀχαιῶν ἀποστήναι.

² Pol. xxxiii. 15. We here get a glimpse of the mode of transacting business of this kind. The Ambassadors of both sides are heard; then they retire, and the citizens debate the question among themselves. The Cretan envoy Antiphatus was, by the favour of the General, allowed to return and make a second speech; but the proceeding was clearly irregular.

³ See the curious details in Pol. xxx. 20. The boys in the streets hooted after Kallikratês and Andrônidas as traitors; men would not bathe in the same water with them.

⁴ See Thirlwall, viii. 472.

At last the exiles returned ; it might have been better for Greece if they had died in their bondage. Except Polybios and Stratios, no man of any eminence or experience survived among them. The rest had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and they came back full of a deadly hatred towards Rome, which a sojourn among her Italian allies was perhaps not likely to diminish. Stratios returned, to play, almost alone in the last days of Achaia, the part of a prudent and honest statesman. Polybios returned also, but only for a season. Probably he found that he could do his country more real service by acting as her advocate with his powerful Roman friends than by mingling personally in the affairs of a commonwealth between whose leaders and himself there could now be little sympathy.¹ From this moment the violent anti-Roman party had the upper hand in the councils of the League. We have now reached the beginning of the series of events which brought about the final overthrow of the last remains of Grecian independence.

CHAP. IX.

Return of
Stratios
and
Polybios,
B.C. 151.

As Athens was the immediate cause of the war between the Romans and Philip,² so Athens was the immediate cause of the war between the Romans and the League. The strange relations now existing between Athens and Orôpos do not concern our purpose except in two points. The independent action of Orôpos throughout the story bears witness to the utter extinction of the Bœotian League, and we may see another attempt of Rome to reduce the League of Achaia to the same level, when the Senate thought proper to nominate the single city of Sikyôn as arbiter of the dispute.³ Here, as in the mission of Gallus, and indeed in every other act of the Roman Government, we see the same insidious endeavour to tempt the Achaian

Causes
of the
final war
with
Rome.

Disputes
between
Athens
and
Orôpos,
B.C. 156-
150.

¹ See Thirlwall, viii. 476.

² See above, p. 606.

³ Paus. vii. 11. 4.

CHAP. IX. cities to separate political action, contrary to the constitution of the League. At a later stage in the dispute, the injured Orôpians brought their wrongs directly before the Federal Assembly.¹ The Assembly had no wish for a needless war with Athens, and declined to interfere in the matter. But the League had now fallen so low that its

A Spartan
General
of the
League.

Achaian
interference
at
Orôpos,
B. C. 150.

Chief Magistrate was open to a bribe. The present General was a Spartan named Menalkidas, a fact which shows that there was at least no open dispute at this time between Sparta and the Federal power. The Orôpians promised this man ten talents, as the price of his bringing an Achaian army to their help; Menalkidas prudently promised half his gains to Kallikratês; and, by the joint influence of the two, a decree was passed for assisting Orôpos against Athens. Menalkidas however, Spartan as he was, proved a General of the school of Aratos rather than of that of Kleomenês. Like Aratos in Bœotia,² Menalkidas came too late; the Athenians had pillaged Orôpos before he got there. Then Menalkidas and Kallikratês wished to invade Attica, but the troops, especially the Lacedæmonian contingent, refused to serve for such a purpose. They might well plead that a defensive alliance with Orôpos, which was probably all that the Assembly had decreed,³ did not justify offensive operations against Athens. The army thus returned without doing anything; but Menalkidas took care to exact his ten talents from the Orôpians, and took equal care not to pay the five which he had promised to Kallikratês.⁴ As soon as Menalkidas'

¹ Paus. vii. 11. 7.

² See above, p. 375.

³ Compare the relations between Athens, Korkyra, and Corinth. Thuc. i. 44.

⁴ I tell the story as I find it in our only authority (Paus. vii. 11. 7—12. 3). But narratives of secret corruption, though probable enough in the main, are always suspicious in their details, and are likely to contain as much of gossip as of real history. It is especially hard to understand how Menalkidas could have exacted the money from the Orôpians against their will—*δμως ὑπὸ Μεναλκίδα τὰ χρήματα ἐξεπράχθησαν*.

official year was over, Kallikratês impeached him before the Assembly on a charge of treason.¹ He had, so his accuser said, gone as an Ambassador to Rome—doubtless a private Ambassador from Sparta—and had there acted against the interests of the League, by trying to separate Sparta from it. Now, as Menalkidas could hardly have done this during his term of office, it would have been more seemly to have brought these charges a year sooner, as reasons against electing him to the Generalship. Diaios of Megalopolis succeeded Menalkidas as General; his predecessor now gave him three of his talents to get him off the charge. This the new General did, and incurred much unpopularity by so doing.

CHAP. IX.
Novem-
ber ?
B.C. 150.

General-
ship of
Diaios,
B.C. 150-
149.

The impeachment of Menalkidas seems to have stirred up once more the old Spartan dislike to the Achaian connexion. We now hear of yet another Lacedæmonian embassy to Rome about the disputed frontier. The real rescript of the Senate is said to have ordered Sparta to submit to the judgement of the Federal Assembly on all matters not touching life and death.² This answer must have been pleaded on the Spartan side at a meeting of the Assembly. Diaios then affirmed that the exception not genuine; he maintained that the lives of the Lacedæmonians present were at the mercy of the Assembly, and he seems to have called upon them at once to stand their trial on a charge of treason.³ The Spartans proposed to appeal to the Roman Senate; the President quoted

Disputes
with
Sparta,
B.C. 149.

¹ Paus. vii. 12. 2. Πανσάμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς Μεναλκίδαν ἐδίωκεν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς θανάτου δίκην. It is dangerous to draw political inferences from the language of Pausanias in the way that we do from that of Polybios. Do the words πανσάμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς imply something like an Attic εὐθύνη at the end of the Presidential year, or are we to infer that the President could not be impeached while he remained in office?

² Ib. 4. Καταφεύγουσι δὲ αὐτοῖς προεῖπεν ἡ βουλὴ δικάζεσθαι τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν ψυχῆς ἐν συνεδρίῳ τῷ Ἀχαιῶν.

³ Ib. 5. Οἱ μὲν δὲ δικάζειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἤξιουν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκάστου ψυχῆς.

CHAP. IX.

that great and primary article of the Federal Constitution, engraved no doubt on every pillar in every city, which forbade any single State to hold diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers.¹ War now broke out between the League and its troublesome member, though Diaios took care to affirm that he made war, not on Sparta, but on the disturbers of her peace.² The Spartans, unable to resist the whole force of the Union, sent private embassies to the General and to the several cities. They got the same answer everywhere; no city could refuse its contingent to an expedition lawfully ordered by the Federal General.³ Diaios now advanced on Sparta. By this time any real Unionist sentiment which existed there must have been pretty well stifled; the State Government⁴ however did not venture on open resistance. They asked the General to name the guilty persons; he named twenty-four of the chief citizens of Sparta. One Agasisthenês, a leading Spartan, then suggested an ingenious way of at least staving off the danger. Let the twenty-four at once fly to Rome, where they would undoubtedly find means of restoration. When they are gone, let the Spartan Government condemn them to death, and so save appearances with the League. So they did; and Diaios and Kallikratês were sent to Rome after them by the Federal Government. Kallikratês died on the road; Pausanias doubts whether

Diaios
before
Sparta.

Death of
Kalli-
kratês,
B.C. 149.

¹ Paus. vii. 12. 5. 'Αχαιοὶ δὲ ἀντελαμβάνοντο αὐθις ἄλλον λόγου, πόλεις δῶσαι τελοῦσιν ἐς 'Αχαιοὺς μηδεμίαν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς καθεστηκέναι κυρίαν ἄνευ τοῦ κοινού τοῦ 'Αχαιῶν παρὰ Ῥωμαίους ἰδίᾳ πρεσβείαν ἀποστέλλειν. See above, p. 262.

² Ib. 6. Ἐφασκεν οὐ τῇ Σπάρτῃ τοῖς δὲ ταρασσουσιν αὐτὴν πολεμήσαν ἀφίξεσθαι.

³ Ib. Αἱ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ αἱ πόλεις ἐποιούντο τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, οὐ σφισιν ἔξοδον ἐπαγγέλλοντος στρατηγού παρακούειν εἶναι νόμον.

⁴ Pausanias (vii. 12. 7) calls them *oi gérontes*. If one could feel sure that he found this word in Polybios, one would infer that the old Spartan constitution had been partially restored since the innovations of Philopoimén.

his death at such a moment was a gain or a loss to his country.¹ It is at least possible that he might have prevented some of the evils which followed. Diaios and Menalkidas disputed before the Senate, and carried off a rescript, which either must have been singularly ambiguous, or else one party or the other must have lied even beyond the usual measure of diplomatists. According to Pausanias, the real answer was simply that the Senate would send Ambassadors to settle all differences on the spot. But Diaios affirmed in the Federal Assembly that the Lacedæmonians were ordered to submit to the Federal power in everything. Menalkidas meanwhile affirmed in the State Assembly of Sparta that the Senate had decreed that Sparta should be wholly separated from the League.² Damokritos now succeeded Diaios in the Generalship, and made vigorous preparations for war with Sparta.

Damokritos
elected
General,
November,
B.C. 149.

Rome was just now engaged in a fourth Macedonian War. The four Republics, as might be expected, did not answer;³ a claimant of the crown, a real or pretended Philip, arose, and ran through a brief alternation of victory and defeat, much like those of the other Philip and of Perseus. The war ended in the reduction of Macedonia to a Roman Province. Just at this moment, the Prætor Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, who fills in this war the place of Flamininus and Æmilius in the former wars, entered Macedonia. Metellus was a man of much the same stamp as his two great predecessors, a brave and

Fourth
Macedonian
War,
B.C. 149-148.

Mediation
of Q.
Cæcilius
Metellus.

¹ Paus. vii. 12. 8. Οὐδὲ οἶδα εἰ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Ῥώμην ἀφέλῃσεν ἄν τι Ἀχαιοὺς ἢ κακῶν σφίσιν ἐγένετο μειζόνων ἀρχή. Dr. Elder (Dict. Biog. art. Callicrates) somewhat oddly translates this, "His death being, for aught I know, a clear gain to his country."

² Ib. 9. Τοὺς μὲν δὴ [Ἀχαιοὺς] παρήγεν ὁ Δίατος ὡς τὰ πάντα Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφισιν ὑπὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίων βουλῆς εἰσὶν ἐγνωσμένοι. Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ὁ Μεναλκίδας ἡπάτα παντελῶς τοῦ συνεδρεῖν ἐς τὸ Ἀχαικὸν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων αὐθις ἀπηλλάχθαι.

³ Pol. xxxi. 12. Συνέβαινε γὰρ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀήθεις ὄντας δημοκρατικῆς καὶ συνεδριακῆς πολιτείας στασιάζειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς. See above, p. 661.

CHAP. IX. skilful soldier, a faithful servant of Rome, but evidently disposed to deal as gently with Grecian enemies as he could. As some Roman Ambassadors were passing by on their road to Asia, they turned aside, at his request, and asked the Achaian Government¹ to suspend hostilities till the Commissioners should come from Rome to settle the differences between Sparta and the League. Damokritos would not hearken, and by this time the old Spartan spirit was aroused. A pitched battle took place; the Spartans, far inferior in numbers, were utterly routed; Damokritos, it was thought, might have taken the city if he had chosen. He was tried as a traitor, perhaps when his year of office had expired,² and was condemned to a fine of fifty talents. He went into exile, and Diaios succeeded him as General. Metellus now sent another embassy, again asking the new General to refrain from any further action against Sparta till the Roman Commissioners should come. He promised to obey, and he did obey so far as not to carry on any open hostilities; but he left Federal garrisons in those Lakonian towns which were now independent members of the League, and which were doubtless the bitterest enemies of Sparta to be found in the whole compass of the Union.³ We may well believe that neither the citizens of these

Victory and banishment of Damokritos, B.C. 148.

Second Generalship of Diaios, B.C. 148-147.

¹ Paus. vii. 13. 2. *Τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τοῖς Ἀχαιῶν ἐς λόγους ἐλθεῖν*. If this were in Polybios, I should take this to mean that a message was delivered to the Achaian Cabinet without summoning the Assembly; but it is dangerous to make inferences from Pausanias. On the word *ἡγεμόν* cf. p. 299.

² See Paus. vii. 13. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 486, and see above, p. 698.

³ This must be the meaning of the words of Pausanias (vii. 13. 6), *τὰ ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς Σπάρτης πόλιστα ἐς τὴν Ἀχαιῶν ὑπηγάγετο εὐνοίαν, ἐστῆγαγε δὲ ἐς αὐτὰ καὶ φρουράς, ὀρμητήρια ἐπὶ τὴν Σπάρτην Ἀχαιοῖς εἶναι*. Pausanias presently speaks of Iasos as *subject* to the Achaians—*Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τῷ τότε ὑπήκοον*. See above, p. 622. Of this Iasos I can find no mention elsewhere. Probably it was one of the six Elentherolakōnic towns which were reannexed by Sparta, and which therefore do not appear in the list given by Pausanias.

towns nor the Federal garrisons placed in them were very strict in observing the armistice. Menalkidas was now General of the seceding State; he took and plundered Iasos, one of these free Lakonian towns, and thus was guilty of a more direct breach of the truce than Diaios himself.¹ Popular indignation was aroused against him at Sparta, and he put himself out of the way by poison.

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Suicide of
Menal-
kidas,
B.C. 147.

At last the Roman ministers arrived. By this time the Macedonian War was ended, and its successful conclusion, just like those of the wars with Antiochos and Perseus, enabled the Romans to take a higher tone than ever with their Greek allies. Hitherto the Senate had clearly temporized, and had used designedly ambiguous language. It now spoke out plainly enough. The Ambassadors—judges² they are called by Pausanias—came to Corinth, the head of the legation being Lucius Aurelius Orestes. They began, if the words of our informant are to be taken literally, by a more daring breach of all Federal right than any on which they had yet ventured. Instead of communicating their errand, first to the Federal Government, and then to the Federal Assembly, they summoned an utterly unconstitutional meeting of the magistrates of the several cities,³ who had no sort of authority to receive

Embassy
of L.
Aurelius
Orestes,
B.C. 147.

¹ Pausanias (vii. 13. 8) thus sums up his character; *Μενάλκιδας μὲν τέλος τοιοῦτον ἐγένετο, ἀρξάντι ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ νῷ τότε μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ἂν ὁ ἀμαθέστατος στρατηγός, πρότερον δὲ ἔτι τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ὡς ἂν ἀνθρώπων ὁ ἀδικότατος.*

There was not however much to choose between the Secessionist and the Federal commander. It must have been shortly before this time that Diaios caused one Philinos of Corinth and his young sons to be tortured till they died, on a charge of dealing with Menalkidas. (Pol. xi. 5.) These horrors are quite unknown in the better days of the League, unless in the single doubtful case of Aristomachos. See above, p. 493.

² Paus. vii. 14. 1. *Οἱ ἀποσταλέντες ἐκ Ῥώμης Λακεδαιμονίοις δικάσται καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι.*

³ Ib. *Τοὺς τε ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ Δίαον ἐκάλεῖ παρ' αὐτόν.* Justin, xxxiv. 1. *Omnium civitatum principibus Corinthium evocatis.*

It is hard to see who can be meant by this description, except the local

CHAP. IX. communications from foreign powers. The message with which they were charged was the most daring attack on the integrity of the Union that had yet been made. The Roman Senate thought it good that neither Lacedæmon nor Corinth nor Argos nor Hérakleia nor Orchomenos should any longer form part of the League. None of them were really Achaian cities; all were late additions to the Confederation.¹ The cause for the selection of these particular cities is not quite obvious. If we count the accession of Corinth and Argos from their recovery in the days of Flamininus,² all these cities were late acquisitions, and, in a certain sense, they were all Roman gifts. But so, in the same sense, were Elis, Messênê, and the Triphylian and Lakonian towns, none of which are mentioned. It may be that the Senate counted on a lurking feeling of disloyalty in Elis and Messênê, while to cut away Argos and Corinth was to cut away the very vitals of the League. At Argos and Corinth any tendency to Secession had yet to be awakened; the Corinthians especially, though their fathers had fought valiantly against forcible reunion,³ were now equally strenuous against forcible separation. The irregular Assembly which the Romans had got together knew not how to act or how to answer; they could hardly bear to hear the insolent barbarian to the end of his speech. They

Extra-
vagrant
demands
of the
Romans.

magistrates. Of course to address them, instead of the Federal Cabinet, would be quite in the spirit of the Roman policy. It was doubtless hoped, by the compliment thus paid to State, at the expense of Federal, authority, to awaken any lurking Secessionist tendencies which might exist among the cities. The proceeding itself, in point of constitutional right, was as if a foreign power, in transacting business with the United States, should address itself to the several State Governors.

¹ PAUS. vii. 14. 2. Schorn (389) observes that all these cities had been under the power of Philip, which is hardly true of Sparta. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 487) says, "The League was to be reduced to its primitive state, when it included only the Achæan towns." But the proposed dismemberment would have left Elis, Messênê, and all Arkadia except Orchomenos.

² See above, p. 621, 2.

³ See above, p. 616.

then rushed into the streets, and gathered together what they called an Assembly of the Achaian People, but which was really an Assembly only of the Corinthian mob.¹ Its fury spent itself in acts of violence against all Spartans who chanced to be present in Corinth, and seemingly against some persons who were falsely taken for Spartans. The Roman envoys themselves were not actually hurt, but they were at any rate frightened, and the sanctity of their domicile was violated, Spartans or supposed Spartans being dragged from the house where Aurelius lodged. These breaches of International Law formed an admirable handle for the Romans, and Aurelius did not fail to warn and protest. When the people came a little to their senses, the real Lacedæmonians were put in prison, while the strangers who had merely the ill luck to wear Lacedæmonian shoes² were let go free. Presently an embassy, headed by Thearidas, was sent to Rome;—possibly a lawful Assembly had been got together in the meanwhile. The Achaian envoys met yet another Roman embassy on the road.³ Aurelius had taken care to represent the insults which he had received, not as the sudden act of an excited mob, but as a deliberate and preconceived affront to the majesty of Rome.⁴ Sextus Julius Cæsar⁵ now came, with instructions to use very mild words. The last Punic War was still dangerous,⁶ and

CHAP. IX.
Tumult at
Corinth.

Embassy
of Sextus
Julius
Cæsar,
B.C. 147.

¹ Paus. vii. 14. 2. Ταῦτα Ὁρέστου λόγοντος, οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν πάντα ὑπομείναντες ἀκοῦσαι λόγον, ἔθεν ἑς τὸ ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ἐκάλουν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐς ἐκκλησίαν. Of course such an Assembly was utterly illegal, as no notice had been sent to the several cities. But it may be observed that, if the magistrates of each city were really present, there was something like a representation of the several members of the League.

² Ib. Συνήραζον δὲ πάντα τινὰ, καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνιον σαφῶς ὄντα ἠπίσταντο, καὶ ἔτι κούρως ἢ ὑποδημάτων εἵνεκεν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσθῆτι ἢ κατ' ὄνομα προσγένοιτο ὕπόνοια.

³ Pol. xxxviii. 2. Paus. vii. 14. 3.

⁴ Pol. xxxviii. 1.

⁵ He and Orestes had been Consuls together, B.C. 157.

⁶ It is clear from Polybios (xxxviii. 1, 2) that the general belief in

CHAP. IX. it was desirable that an Achaian War should at least be put off till that was finished.

Kritolaos
elected
General,
Autumn
B.C. 147.

Thearidas and his colleagues returned to Peloponnêsos with Sextus. The Roman envoys were introduced to an Assembly at Aigion, perhaps that in which Diaios was succeeded in the Generalship by Kritolaos, a still more bitter and unreflecting enemy of Rome.¹ Sextus used very conciliatory language, which had more effect upon his hearers than suited the schemes of Diaios and Kritolaos.² They then hit upon a strange stratagem. It was agreed that a Conference of some kind or other should be held at Tegea, at which representatives of Rome, Achaia, and Sparta should meet and decide matters. The language of Polybios—for we have now happily for a little time recovered his guidance—does not distinctly imply who were to appear on the Achaian side, but it seems most probably to have been the Council of Ministers. It was determined by Kritolaos and his party, seemingly in a session of that Council,³ that nobody should go to Tegea except Kritolaos himself. Thus the President appeared at the Conference as the sole representative of the League, and told Sextus that he had no power to act without the

Sham
Conference at
Tegea,
B.C. 147.

Achaia attributed the apparent lenity of the Romans to this cause, though he himself holds it to have been genuine. But, in all these later fragments, Polybios seems mainly to speak the language of his Roman friends. And of course it is quite possible that men of more generous minds, such as his friends were, might now and then be able to carry through the Senate a vote less brutal and treacherous than usual. But that the abiding policy of Rome was to break up the League by every sort of intrigue, however base, is too plain a fact to be evaded. Men like Scipio, Æmilius, and Metellus could at most only stop the torrent for a moment. See Thirlwall, viii. 488.

¹ Paus. vii. 14. 4. Τοῦτον δριμύς καὶ σὸν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ πολεμεῖν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἔρως ἔσχε.

² Pol. xxxviii. 2. (The whole chapter.)

³ Ib. 3. Συνεδρεύσαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Κριτόλαον ἔκριναν, κ.τ.λ. This seems to be the most probable meaning. See p. 703. The word συνέδριος and its cognates are constantly used by Plutarch and Pausanias to express the Assembly, but not by Polybios. See above, pp. 261, 282.

Assembly, and that he would refer matters to the next Meeting to be held six months hence.¹ This was mere mockery, and the Romans naturally departed in great indignation. Kritolaos himself spent the winter in proceedings almost as unconstitutional as anything that the Romans themselves had done. He went through the several cities of the League;² he held local Assemblies in each, nominally to announce what had been done at Tegea, but really to excite the people everywhere against Rome. He even went so far as to order the local magistrates³ to stop all proceedings against debtors till the war was over. No wonder the President and his war policy were highly popular.

Uncon-
stitutional
proceed-
ings of
Kritolaos,
B.C. 147-
146.

At this stage of the proceedings it is almost as hard to sympathize with the Achaians as with their enemies. It is one of those cases in which a nation or a party, whose cause is essentially just, contrives, by particular foolish and criminal actions, to forfeit the respect to which it is otherwise entitled. Now, in its last moments, the Federal Government of Achaia had, for the first time, fallen into the hands of a mere mob, led by a President who showed himself a demagogue in the worst sense of the word. The class of men who had hitherto directed the affairs of the

¹ Pol. xxxviii. 3. See above, p. 275. Pausanias (vii. 14. 4, 5) makes this answer of Kritolaos be preceded by a request of Sextus that a regular Assembly might be summoned at once. This Kritolaos pretends to do, but, together with his formal summons, he sends secret instructions, in conformity with which nobody came. This is not easy to believe, and it reads like a misconception of Polybios' account, as if Pausanias had been led astray by the ambiguous word *συνεδρεύσαντες*. It would be easier to believe, though still very unlikely, that the Meeting at Tegea was to be a full Meeting of the Assembly, and that Kritolaos prevented it in this way. Polybios clearly makes the sham summons—to whatever kind of meeting—take place before Kritolaos reached Tegea, while Pausanias places it afterwards.

² Pol. u.s. *Ἐπιπορευόμενος κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τὰς πόλεις, ἐκκλησίας συνήγαγε*.

³ lb. *παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἀρχουσι*. This must mean the local magistrates.

CHAP. IX. League, the old liberal aristocracy, leaders and not enemies of the people, men who had both character and property to lose, were no longer listened to. They were naturally averse to a war in which success was hopeless, and it was therefore easy for Kritolaos to hold them up to popular hatred as traitors. At the next Spring Meeting, held at Corinth, an Assembly was gathered together such as had never before been seen. It was attended by a multitude of low handicraftsmen, both from Corinth and other cities, such as seldom appeared in the Federal Congress.¹ At this Meeting Metellus made yet one more effort. Cnæus Papirius and three other Roman envoys² appeared at Corinth, and addressed the Assembly in the same conciliatory tone as had been employed by Sextus. Hitherto the Achaian Assemblies seem to have been fairly decorous parliamentary bodies, but such a multitude as had now come together was not disposed to listen to any one but its own leaders. The place of meeting made matters worse, as the Corinthian people were the fiercest of all,³ doubtless through indignation at the proposal to separate them from the League. The Roman Ambassadors were received with a storm of derision, and left the Assembly amid the shouts and insults of the multitude.⁴ The Achaian People then went on in due order to discuss the proposals of the envoys to which they had not listened.

Tumultuous Meeting at Corinth, May, B. C. 146.

Efforts of Metellus to preserve peace.

¹ Pol. xxxviii. 4. See above, p. 263. This is the Meeting spoken of by Pausanias, vii. 14. 5. He leaves out the account of Kritolaos' doings during the winter.

² Aulus Gabinius, Caius Fannius, and a third whose name appears in the text of Polybios in the corrupt form τὸν νεώτερον Ἀύλον Μαῖνον. This suggests some such name as Aulus Mænius.

³ Pol. u.s. Πᾶσαι μὲν ἐκορύζων αἱ πόλεις, πανθημεὶ δὲ καὶ μάλιστα πῶς ἢ τῶν Κορινθίων.

⁴ Ib. Χλευάζοντες δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις μετὰ βορόβου καὶ κραιγῆς ἐξέβαλλον. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 490) refers to the somewhat confused account in Strabo (lib. viii. cap. 6. vol. ii. 215), which seems to apply to this time. According to him, the Romans were pelted with mud.

A few only took their side.¹ Kritolaos made a fierce speech against the Romans, which might not have been out of place in the mouth of Kykliadas fifty years sooner. Could we believe in their personal purity, we might have some sympathy for the last champions of Greece, even when such championship had become madness.² But we have seen that Diaios was not above a bribe, and now Kritolaos went on in a strain very unworthy of the successor of Markos and Philopoiimên. One or two sentences indeed of his speech might have been in place in the mouth of either of those great men.³ But he went on to attack the moderate party, to attack the presiding Ministers,⁴ and, when called to order by them,⁵ he appealed to his soldiers⁶ to stand by him, and dared any man, magistrate or not, to touch the hem of his garment. He ended by accusing two of the presiding Ministers, Evagoras of Aigion and the honest old patriot Stratios of Tritaia, of revealing the secrets of the Cabinet to Papirius.⁷ Stratios in vain denied the charge. At last Kritolaos carried two resolutions through the Assembly; one de-

Violence
of Kri-
tolaos
in the
Assembly.

¹ Pol. xxxviii. 4. 'Ολίγοις δέ τισι καὶ λίαν ἥρεσκε τὰ λεγόμενα διὰ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν.

² Paus. vii. 14. 6. Τὸ μὲν δὴ ἄνδρα βασιλέα καὶ πόλιν ἀναλέσθαι πόλεμον καὶ μὴ εὐτυχῆσαι συνέβη φθόνῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δαιμόνων ἢ τοῖς πολεμήσασιν ποιῆι τὸ ἔγκλημα· θρασύτης δὲ ἢ μετὰ ἀσθενείας μανία μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτυχία καλοῖτο.

³ Pol. u.s. Φόσκων βούλεσθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότης δ' οὐκ ἂν εὐδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος· καθόλου δὲ παρῆναι, λέγων ὡς, ἔάν μὲν ἄνδρες ᾖσιν, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσι συμμάχων, ἔάν δ' ἀνδρόγυνοι, κυρίων.

⁴ Ib. Καταπίστατο μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων, διέσυρε δὲ τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους.

⁵ Ib. Τῶν δὲ τῆς γερουσίας βουλομένων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. See above, p. 296.

⁶ Ib. Περιπασάμενος τοὺς στρατιώτας καταπίστατο, κελεύων προσελθεῖν. Were these soldiers citizens or mercenaries? In regular times one cannot fancy mercenaries being present in the Assembly at all, nor citizen soldiers in any military dress or character. But in these days of violence any breach of order may have happened.

⁷ Ib. Ἐφη γὰρ . . . πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα δι' ἀπορρήτων ἐν ταῖς συναρχαίαις διασαφεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Γναῖον.

CHAP. IX. claring war against Sparta, that is, as Polybios truly says, against Rome; the other investing the General for the time being with absolute power, that is, as the same writer adds, making himself Monarch of the League.¹

Beginning
of War
with
Rome,
B.C. 146.

Further
efforts of
Metellus.

War now broke out. The report of Sextus and his colleagues, and the letter of Metellus, determined the Senate to send the newly chosen Consul Lucius Mummius with a land- and sea-force against the League. Rome had now got, in the insults offered to her successive ministers, that which she had doubtless long aimed at getting—a good technical ground for war. But the long-suffering of Metellus made yet one more effort. His real good will to Greece was now sharpened by a personal consideration. Mummius was coming; Metellus would fain finish the struggle, either by war or by diplomacy, before his arrival. He neither wished Mummius to rob him of the credit of subduing Achaia as well as Macedonia, nor yet to see a nation which he was anxious to spare as far as he could handed over to one who was disposed to deal with it far more harshly. Once more, seemingly on his own responsibility, he pledged himself for the safety of the Achaians, if they would give up the cities which Aurelius had required to be separated from the League.* Ignominious as these terms were, they would have left the League in possession of a larger territory than it held during the Social War.

¹ Pol. xxxviii. 4. Προσεμέτρησεν ἕτερον ψήφισμα παράνομον, ὥστε κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὓς ἂν ἐπὶ στρατοπεδείᾳ αἰρήσονται· δι' ἃ τρέπον τινὰ μοναρχικὴν ἀνάλαβεν ἐξουσίαν. See above, p. 484, for the appointment of Aratos as στρατηγὸς αυτοκράτωρ.

One might almost infer from Pausanias (vii. 14. 6) that the Theban Boeotarch Pytheas was present in this Assembly. But his words do not absolutely imply it, and Polybios could hardly have failed to mention it. He merely makes Kritolaos tell the Achaians that several Kings and commonwealths are ready to help them.

² Paus. vii. 15. 2. That is, Lacedæmon, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenos, and Hérakleia. See Schorn, 396, and Thirlwall, viii. 492.

But Kritolaos would listen to no terms, and the mass of the people shared his passions. War had been declared against Sparta, but it was begun in another quarter. Among the cities which the League was called on to surrender, no disaffection is spoken of, nor is any likely to have existed, at Argos or at Orchomenos; the Corinthians, as we have seen, were the fiercest Unionists in all Peloponnêsos; one city only, besides Sparta, hearkened to the Roman call to Secession. This was Hêrakleia, a distant and outlying Canton, which it was foolish to have ever annexed to the League at all. Against these new Secessionists Kritolaos now led his army.¹ On his march he was joined by the whole force of Thebes under the Bœotarch Pytheas.² The Thebans had been sentenced by Metellus to pay damages to Phôkis, Euboia, and Amphissa for various wrongs done to those several states.³ They were therefore ready for any risk. The combined Achaian and Theban force sat down before Hêrakleia, but, on hearing of the approach of Metellus, they raised the siege. A battle took place at Skarpheia near Thermopylæ, in which the Greek army was utterly routed. A chosen reinforcement from Arkadia was overtaken by the Romans at Chairôneia; all, a thousand in number, perished. Kritolaos himself, after the defeat at Skarpheia, disappeared; Pausanias is inclined to think that he drowned himself; according to Livy, he took poison.⁴ At any rate, no more was seen of him, and Diaios, as the General of the year before, assumed his command, according to Law.⁵ He seems to have ventured on many arbitrary measures, such as exacting benevolences,

Secession
and siege
of Hêra-
kleia.

Battle of
Skar-
pheia.
Defeat
and
death of
Kritolaos.

Diaios
succeeds
to the
General-
ship.

¹ Paus. vii. 15. 2. Ἡράκλειαν δὲ προσεκάθηγτο πολιορκούντες οὐ βουλο-
μένους εἰς τὸ Ἀχαιῶν συντελεῖν.

² Cf. Paus. vii. 14. 6. with 15. 9. Polybios (xl. 1.) gives Pytheas a bad character.

³ Paus. vii. 14. 7.

⁴ Paus. vii. 15. 4. Livy, Epit. lii.

⁵ Pol. xl. 2. See above, pp. 281, 648. Livy (u.s.) says, less accurately, *ab Achaia dux* [why not *Prætor*!] *creatus*.

CHAP. IX. and requiring the emancipation and military equipment of twelve thousand slaves.¹ He summoned the whole force of the League to assemble at Corinth. But the whole land was in a wretched state; Elis and Messênê refused their contingents;² we may suppose that their Achaian loyalty had never been very fervent, but they had for years at least acquiesced in their position in the League; they were not however prepared, like the Corinthians, to die for it. Patrai and its dependent towns³ had suffered so severely at Skarpheia that they had no contingent to furnish. Kritolaos however raised four thousand men, whom he sent, under Alkamenês, to garrison Megara and to check the further advance of the Romans.⁴ Meanwhile the Vice-General Sôsikratês had entered into negotiations of some sort with Metellus.⁵ One Andrônidas had gone as envoy; he now returned with Philôn, a Thessalian, still bearing kind words and promises from the Roman General. Meanwhile Metellus advanced; Alkamenês and his garrison escaped to Corinth,⁶ and the Megarians, deprived of all Federal aid, surrendered their city to the Romans. Diaios held an Assembly at Corinth; he was confirmed in his office,⁷

Negotiation
between
Sôsikratês
and Me-
tellus.

¹ Tittmann (677, 8, and 686) relies too much on this clearly illegal act as proving a habit, if not a right, of occasional arbitrary interference on the part of the Federal power.

² Pol. xl. 3. Ἡλείοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι κατὰ χάραν ἔμειναν, προσδοκῶντες τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου κίνδυνον.

³ Ib. Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τούτων συντελικόν. See above, p. 247.

⁴ Paus. vii. 15. 8.

⁵ Pol. xl. 4. Paus. vii. 15. 11. We know this mission only in its results. The words *ἐτι προστάτῃσαι τοῦ διαβουλίου* (Pol. xl. 5), which imply the putting of a question to an Assembly, show that Andrônidas was sent by the authority of some deliberative body or other, under the presidency of Sôsikratês. Possibly Sôsikratês may have collected the Senate, or have done his best, however unsuccessfully, to summon a regular Assembly.

⁶ Paus. vii. 15. 10, 11.

⁷ Pol. xl. 4. Καθεσταμένου στρατηγοῦ διὰ τῶν πολλῶν. After Polybios' clear exposition of the law in c. 2. this seems a needless ceremony, and it is impossible to suppose that we have reached the Autumn Meeting of

and the returning envoys, Andrônidas and Lagios, were dragged to prison with every sort of insult. Philôn was indeed allowed to speak, but the aged Stratios in vain implored Diaios to hearken. The President then held a meeting of his Cabinet,¹ among whom were the former President Damokritos, and Alkamenês—the real traitor, if any one. The result of their deliberations was to drag the Vice-General before some High Court of Justice or other.² He was accused of treason, and condemned to death, and he died under the tortures which were inflicted upon him to extort a confession. This spectacle roused the indignation of the people; their patriotism was unreflecting and unruly, but they were not prepared for such monstrous cruelty and injustice. Andrônidas and the other intended victims were spared on payment of bribes to Diaios.

Cruelty
and cor-
ruption
of Diaios.
Death
of Sôsi-
kratês.

By this time the Achaians had no longer to deal with Metellus, but with a very different foe. Mummius was now at their gates. He was far from being a Roman of the school of Flamininus and Æmilius. He was a plebeian, a man of no hereditary distinction, with a character marked by many of the virtues and vices of the old plebeian character. He was rough and ignorant, but devoid neither of native eloquence nor of a certain practical

Mummius
at the
Isthmus.

B.C. 146, and this was a regular election to the Generalship of B.C. 146-5. This supposition would drive all the remaining events of the war far too late in the year. (See Clinton, in an.) Considering the whole story, the suggestion presents itself whether Sôsikratês had not been set up by his party as Provisional General in opposition to Diaios, so that a formal confirmation would be desirable.

¹ Pol. xl. 4. *Συνεδρεύσαντες*. See above, p. 696. These Ministers were perhaps elected at the violent Spring Meeting at Corinth, which accounts for their being mere creatures of Diaios, while their predecessors (see above, p. 699) did what they could to restrain Kritolaos. The time of election of the Ministers need not have been changed with that of the General.

² Pol. xl. 5. *Καθίσαντες δικαστὰς τοῦ μὲν Σωσικράτους κατεδίκασαν θάνατον*.

CHAP. IX. skill in administration ; ferocious in war, while war lasted, but not inclined to needless oppression when conquest was once secure. Mummius now came to the Isthmus with the Roman army, and with some Pergamenian auxiliaries, led against the Achaian League by an officer who, strangely enough, bore the name of Philopoimên.¹ He was, it is said, joined by the inhabitants of the Corinthian territory of Teuea,² apparently a subject district glad to throw off the yoke of the capital. A slight advantage puffed up Diaios and his troops ;³ he marched forth to a pitched battle at Leukopetra ;⁴ the cavalry fled without a blow ;⁵ the infantry fought bravely, but in vain. Diaios fled to his own city of Megalopolis, killed his wife, perhaps set fire to his house, and lastly poisoned himself.⁶ Of the rest of the army many took refuge in Corinth, and thence escaped in the night along with a large portion of the Corinthians themselves. The city, though it offered no resistance, was sacked and burned ; of the few people who were left in it, the men were slaughtered, the women and children were sold. The history of the Achaian League, as an independent power, was over.

Battle
of Leuko-
petra and
sack of
Corinth,
Sep-
tember?
B.C. 146.

Achaia
not yet

It is commonly said that Achaia was now reduced to the form of a Roman Province. It would seem that this

¹ Paus. vii. 16. 1.

² Strabo, l. viii. c. 6 (vol. ii. p. 214). See above, p. 256. This district must have somehow escaped the liberalizing reforms of Philopoimên and Lykortas.

³ Paus. vii. 16. 2. Yet it is impossible to believe the tales of their excessive presumption in Justin, xxxiv. 2. See Thirlwall, viii. 496.

⁴ Aurelius Victor, c. lx.

⁵ They were, as Bishop Thirlwall says (viii. 496), "all belonging to that class which was opposed to the measures of Disma." Yet it is an inglorious ending for a service which had shone so under Lydiadas and Philopoimên.

⁶ Paus. vii. 16. 4-6. Aur. Vict. u.s. See Thirlwall, u.s. note.

assertion is not strictly accurate.¹ No Roman Prætor was sent into Greece till a much later time ;² but the Governor of Macedonia continued to exercise the same sort of protectorate over the country which we have seen Metellus exercising for some years past. In fact it was not the policy of Rome to reduce any conquered state to the form of a province at the conclusion of the first war against it. This we may see by the history of Carthage, Macedonia, and Ætolia. But Achaia was reduced to a state of dependence which differed only in form from the provincial condition, and which makes it quite needless for me to continue my history any further. Achaia now surrendered herself to the will of Rome,³ as Ætolia had done forty years before. And the arm of the conqueror fell more heavily upon Achaia than it had done upon Ætolia. That Achaia, like Ætolia, sank to the level of acknowledged dependency is involved in the nature of the case ; and the Roman interference with internal institutions was incomparably greater than it had been in the case of Ætolia. Mummius of his own authority, before the usual Board of Commissioners arrived from Rome, imposed a fine upon the League for the benefit of Sparta,⁴ and destroyed the walls

CHAP. IV.

formally
reduced
to a
Province.Settle-
ment
of the
country,
B.C. 146-
145.

¹ See Dr. Smith, Dict. Geog. art. Achaia. Mommsen, ii. 46. Kortüm, iii. 338.

² Plutarch (Cim. 2) says, of the time of Lucullus, *ἡ κρίσις ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῆς Μακεδονίας, οὕτω γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ῥωμαῖοι στρατηγούς διεπέμποντο*. Compare also the language put by Appian (Mithrid. 58) into the mouth of Sulla towards Mithridatès : *Μακεδονίαν τε ἡμετέραν οὕσαν ἐπέτρεχες, καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφηροῦ· οὐ πρὶν τε ἤρξω μετανοεῖν, οὐδ' Ἀρχέλαος ὑπὲρ σου παρακαλεῖν, ἢ Μακεδονίαν μὲν ἐκ ἀσώσεσθαι, τὴν δὲ Ἑλλάδα τῆς σῆς ἐκλῦσαι βίαις*. Here is a marked distinction drawn between the position of Macedonia and that of Greece, one which a late and careless writer like Appian would hardly have introduced, if he had not found it in his authorities. But see Thirlwall, viii. 503.

³ Liv. Epit. lii. "*Omni Achaia in deditionem accepta*."

⁴ Either now, or in the arrangements of the next year, the Lakonian towns (see above, p. 622) must have been reunited to Sparta. They remained subject to Sparta till the reign of Augustus ; they therefore had no share in the nominal revival of the League. Augustus separated

CHAP. IX. of all the cities which had taken a share in the war¹—
 that is, of all except Elis, Messênê, and perhaps Patrai.
 When the Commissioners came, they entirely abolished
 the Federal Constitution, with its Assemblies and Magis-
 tracies, and, in each particular city the constitution was
 changed from Democracy to what the Greeks called
 Timocracy, that is, that species of Oligarchy in which
 wealth, and not birth, is the qualification.² Everywhere
 else throughout Greece, whatever vestiges of Federal
 Union still survived were swept away in like manner.³
 Greece was to contain only separate cities, each of them a
 dependent and tributary ally of Rome. Each city was to
 be wholly isolated from its neighbours; no common As-
 semblies were to bring men of different cities together, nor
 could the citizen of one city any longer hold land in the
 territory of another.⁴ But, when they had thus rooted up
 the dangerous elements of Federalism and Democracy,
 when every city was condemned to weakness and isolation,
 when each was reconstructed with a form of government
 which was sure to make it the humble slave of Rome,
 neither Mummius nor his colleagues seem to have been
 disposed to push the rights of conquest to any specially
 tyrannical extreme. They called in Polybios as the law-
 giver of the new commonwealths;⁵ no man could have
 been better suited for the office. He alone was equally
 familiar with Achaian and with Roman politics; he alone,
 in his calm and capacious intellect, combined a sincere
 wish to benefit his country with an utter absence of all
 merely sentimental patriotism. He did not shrink from

Disso-
 lution
 of the
 League

and aboli-
 tion of
 Demo-
 cracy in
 the Cities.

Polybios
 legislates
 for the
 Achaian
 Cities,
 B.C. 145.

twenty-four towns, but six of them had been recovered by Sparta before the visit of Pausanias.

¹ Paus. vii. 16. 9.

² Ib. Δημοκρατίας μὲν κατέπαυε, καθίστα δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων τὰς ἀρχάς.

³ Ib. See above, p. 184.

⁴ Ib. See above, p. 258.

⁵ Pol. xl. 10. Paus. viii. 30. 9.

making the best of a bad bargain, nor refuse to serve his country because she had fallen from the position which she had held in his youth. During the crisis itself, he was better away; he could not have hindered the war, and he might have been tortured to death like Sôsikratês and Philinos. But now, in his peculiar position, the friend alike of the living Scipio and of the dead Philopoimên, he could mediate, as no other man could, between the conquerors and the conquered. Freedom, greatness, glory he could not restore to his country; but it was something to give to her cities such laws as secured to them internal peace and as high a degree of well-being as their condition allowed. And we may well believe that it was owing to his influence that, after a while, both the Achaians and the other Greeks were allowed to resume something like the forms of their old Federal institutions.¹

The Romans, perhaps the Greeks too, called it a restoration of liberty,² when the Achaian League once more arose, with its Federal General, its Federal Cabinet, and as near an approach to its Federal Assembly³ as the new oligarchic State-constitutions allowed. But its existence was now purely municipal, or rather it was something less than municipal. Town-Autonomy and Federalism, Aristocracy and Democracy, were now, all alike, shadows and pageants. The League lingered on in this shape for some centuries; the exact moment of its final dissolution it

Nominal
revival
of the
League.

¹ Paus. vii. 16. 10. See above, p. 184. The expression of Polybios (xl. 10) that he gave the cities *τοὺς περὶ τῆς κοινῆς δικαιοσύνης νόμους* seems to imply that some part of his legislation took place after the restoration of Federal forms.

² See Boeckh, C. I. i. 712. Thirlwall, viii. 502.

³ The title of the oligarchic Assembly of the revived League seems to have been *συνέδριον*. This accounts for the constant use of that word and its cognates by Plutarch and Pausanias to express the Democratic Assembly of the old League. In Polybios, as we have seen (see p. 282), they are applied to meetings, not of the Assembly, but of the Cabinet Council.

CHAP. IX. would be hard to fix, and it would be useless for my purpose to inquire. It is enough that the history of the Achaian League, as a contribution of the slightest value to political knowledge, ends with the last and most unhappy Presidency of Kritolaos and Diaios.

Devotion
of the
Pelo-
ponnesian
people.

Later
parallela.

B.C. 146.

A.D. 1454.

A.D. 1821-
1827.

A.D. 1862.

Achaia fell ingloriously ; in her last years there is nothing to admire, except the determined, even if misdirected, patriotism of the mass of the people. They may well be pardoned if Kritolaos and Diaios seemed to them as Lydiadas and Philopoimên. They listened to constitutional leaders who had at least the formulæ of patriotism on their lips, and they fought to the death against the invader, when the aristocrats of the cavalry fled without striking a blow. Thrice in the world's history have the gallant people of Peloponnêsos risen like a nation of heroes, and found no leaders worthy of them. They faced the Roman beneath the headland of Leukopetra ; they died sword in hand upon their mountains when Byzantine priests and nobles cringed before the conquering Ottoman ; and, in our own day, they have wrested their independence from the same enemy, in spite of, rather than by the help of, the native rulers and captains of their land. And, at the very moment that I am thus summing up the long history of Greece, a new Revolution, as pure and glorious as any that expelled Macedonian or Ottoman from her soil, has again made Greece the centre of the admiring gaze of Europe. Let us hope that, this time at least, Greece may find leaders worthy of her people, and that her fourth struggle for freedom and good government may be crowned with a more lasting success than any that has gone before it. It at least augurs well for Greece that her Revolution has not been the work of the mob of a capital, but is, if ever revolution was, the deliberate expression of the will of a whole people. And a historian

of Federal Greece may be allowed to rejoice when he hears the revived voice of Grecian freedom first sounding from the lands of his old love. The homes where Greek freedom lingered longest have been those where it has been the first to rise again; Achaia, Akarnania, Ætolia, have been foremost in the good work, and the name of Roufos of Patrai bids fair to win a place alongside of that of Markos of Keryneia. Through the days of Bavarian corruption, just as through those of Roman conquest and of Turkish tyranny, the heart of the Achaian people has still been sound. And, in all cases alike, the most blameworthy points in the character of the oppressed have been mainly the work of the oppressor. That the Achaian League fell, in its last days, from its ancient dignity—that the place of some of the noblest of men was filled by some of the most contemptible—that the seal which had been borne by Markos and Lykortas had passed into the hands of the traitor Menalkidas and the coward Damokritos—all this was mainly the fruit of Rome's own insidious policy. Her arts had tried, and tried in vain, to divide a people which had so well learned the benefits of union. When those arts failed, she shut up the best life of the nation in her Etruscan prisons, and so cut off that stream of uninterrupted political tradition which alone can be trusted permanently to maintain the needful succession of statesmen and of captains. If Achaia died ill, it was mainly the fault of her murderer; and, if she died ill, she had at least lived well. For a hundred and forty years—no short space in any nation's life, and a very long space among the few centuries which we call Ancient History—the League had given to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age had seen, a measure of freedom, unity, and general good government, which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old Athenian Democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld together so many cities into an

CHAP. IX.

Errors
of the
League
mainly the
result of
Roman
intrigue.

B.C. 281-
146.

General
results
of the
Achaian
League.

CHAP. IX.

Roman
opposition
a witness
to its
value.

Union which strengthened them against foreign Kings and Senates, and which yet preserved to them that internal independence which was so dear to the Hellenic mind. It was no slight achievement to keep so many cities for so long a time free alike from foreign garrisons, from domestic mobs, domestic Tyrants, and domestic oligarchs. How practically efficient the Federal principle was in maintaining the strength and freedom of the nation is best shown by the bitter hatred which it aroused, first in the Macedonian Kings and then in the Roman Senate. It was no contemptible political system against which so many Kings and Consuls successively conspired; it was no weak bond which the subtlest of all diplomatic Senates expended so many intrigues and stratagems to unloose.¹ And, if the League fell ingloriously, it at least fell less ingloriously than the kingdoms and commonwealths around it. Better was it to be conquered in open battle, even with a Diaios as its leader, than to drag on the contemptible life of the last Kings of Bithynia and Pergamos or of the beggar Democracy of Athens. The League did its work in its own age by giving Peloponnésos well nigh a century and a half of freedom; it does its work still by living in the pages of its own great historian as the first attempt on a large scale to reconcile local independence with national strength. Ages must pass away before the course of our history will show us another so perfect and illustrious an example of a true Federal Constitution. And never, up to our own day, has Federalism, the offspring of Greece, appeared again in its native land. Yet, when we look at

¹ A remarkable passage of Justin (xxxiv. 1) gives a clear and forcible summary of the whole Roman policy towards the League: "*Achæi nimis potentes Romanis videbantur, non propter singularum civitatum nimias opes, sed propter conspirationem universarum. Namque Achæi, licet per civitates, veluti per membra, divisi sint, unum tamen corpus et unum imperium habent, singularumque urbium pericula mutuis viribus populsant.*"

the map of Greece, and see each valley and peninsula and island marked out by the hand of nature for an independent being—when we think of the varied origin and condition of the present inhabitants of its several provinces—when we think of the local institutions, democratic here, aristocratic there, which preserved the life of the nation through ages of Turkish bondage—we may well ask whether ancient Achaia or modern Switzerland may not be the true model for regenerate Greece, rather than a blind imitation of the stereotyped forms of European royalty. It may be that the favourable moment has passed for ever; it may be that it is now too late to dream of a Federal Republic in a land where thirty years of Bavarian corruption have swept away those relics of ancient freedom which the very Ottoman had spared. However this may be now, there can be little doubt that, a generation back, the blood of Botzarès and the life of Kanarès would have been better given to found a free Hellenic Federation than to establish the throne of any stranger King. And let us pass beyond the bounds of Greece herself, to look at that whole group of nations of which Greece is only one among many, although in some respects the foremost. We may be sure that a day will come when the rod of the oppressor shall be broken; we need no prophet to tell us that wrong and robbery shall not always be abiding, that all the arts of Western diplomatists cannot for ever maintain the Barbarian on the throne of the Cæsars and the Infidel in the most glorious of Christian temples. A day will come when the Turkish horde shall be driven back to its native deserts, or else die out, the victim of its own vices, upon the soil which it has too long defiled. Then will Greek and Serb and Albanian and Rouman and Bulgarian enter upon the full and free possession of the land which is their own. Already does Greece, free and extending her borders, Servia and Wallachia held in only nominal vassalage, Mon-

CHAP. IX.

The
Achaian
League the
natural
model for
liberated
Greece.

Future of
South-
Eastern
Europe.

CHAP. IX. **tenegro**, if crushed for a moment, yet unsubdued in heart, all point to the full accomplishment of the glorious dream. And, when the full day has dawned, are those lands to remain utterly separate and isolated, or are they, so many peoples, nations, and languages, to be fettered down by some centralizing Monarchy which would merely substitute a Christian for an Infidel master? Here would be the grandest field that the world has ever seen for trying the great experiment of Monarchic Federalism. The nations of the Byzantine peninsula, differing in origin, language, and feeling, are united by common wrongs, by a common religion, and by the common reverence of ages for the Imperial City of the Basils and the Constantines. For nations in such a position, the Federal tie, rather than either more complete separation or more close connexion, seems the natural relation to each other. But the traditions of Servia and Bulgaria are not republican; the mere size of the several provinces may seem, in the Old World at least, to surpass the limits which nature has in all ages marked out for European commonwealths. One set of circumstances points to Federal Union, another set of circumstances points to princely government. A Monarchic Federation on such a scale has never yet existed, but it is not in itself at all contradictory to the Federal ideal. When the day of vengeance and of freedom shall have come, it will be for the people of those noble and injured lands—not for Western mediators or Western protectors—to solve the mighty problem for themselves.

Monarchic
Federalism
probably
the true
solvent.

NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE ACHAIA LEAGUE.

THE following will, I trust, be found to be an accurate list of the cities of the Achaian League, as far as they are at present known from either historical or numismatic evidence. I mark those towns of which undoubted Federal coins exist with an asterisk; those whose Federal coinage is doubtful with an obelus; those whose existence as members of the League is known only from the evidence of coins I put in *Italics*. I add also the dates of accession to the League of the several cities, with references to the pages of the history:—

NAME OF CITY.	B.C.	DATE OF ACCESSION.	PAGE.
† Patrai	280		245.
† Dymê	280		245.
Tritaia	c. 279		245.
Pharai	c. 279		245.
* Aigion	275		246.
Boura	275		246.
† Keryneia ¹	275		246.
Leontion	—		246.
* Aigeira	—		246.
* Pellênê	—		246.
* Sikyôn	251		364.
* Corinth	243—223. 196—146 ²		376, 621.
* Megara	243—223. 204—146 ²		377, 611.
* Troizên	243		377.
* Epidauros	243		377.
* Hêraia	Between 240—235. 208 ¹		403, 592.
* Kleônai	—		399.
Kynaitha	—		403.
* Styμφalos	—		403.
Kleitôr	—		403.
* Pheneos	—		403.
* Alea	—		454.
* Telpousa	—		403.
* Mantinea or Antigoneia	—		404.

¹ The inscription on the supposed coins of this city is ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΠΙ-ΝΟΙΩΝ, which however may perhaps more probably be a misreading for ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΩΝ. This formula, ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΚΟΡΙΝΘΙΩΝ, &c. is the usual one on Achaian Federal coins.

² Corinth was out of the League from 223 to 196, and Megara from 223 to 204.

714 NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE ACHAIA LEAGUE.

NAME OF CITY.	B. C.	DATE OF ACCESSION.	PAGE.
* Megalopolis	234		404.
† Aigina	233 (?) — 210		425, 582.
* Hermioné	233 †		425.
* Argos	228		427.
* Phlious	228		427.
* Kaphyai	227		442.
* Tegea	222		495.
† Psôphis	219		538.
* Pagai	208 † ¹		628.
* Phigaleia ²	208 or 196		
Lepreon ³	208 or 196		592, 613, 621.
Orchomenos	199 or 196		613, 621.
Gythion †	195		
Teuthroné †			
† Las, or Asiné ⁴ †			
Pyrrhichos †			
Kainépolis †			
Oitylos †			
Leuktra †			
Thalamai †			
Alagonia †			
Gerénia †			
Asôpos †			
Akriai			
Boiai †			622, 692.
Zarax †			
Epidauras Liméra †			
Brasiai †			
Geronthrai †			
Marios †			
† Eva ⁵ † †			
Iasos † †			
* Eliphasia ⁵ † †			
_____ † †			
_____ † †			
_____ † †			

¹ Pagai most probably became a distinct State on the second incorporation of Megara.

² Phigaleia was probably annexed along with Triphylia.

³ I insert the name of Lepreon as the only city in Triphylia.

⁴ Coins occur with the legend ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΑΣΙΝΑΙΩΝ, but there are other towns of the name in Messenia and Argolis. It is quite uncertain to which of these they are to be referred.

⁵ Coins are said to exist with the legend ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΕΥΩΝ, and they certainly exist with the legend ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΕΛΙΦΑΣΙΩΝ. As these towns are not ascertained, they may probably have been among the six recovered by

NAME OF CITY.	B. C.	DATE OF ACCESSION.	PAGE.
* <i>Alipheira</i>	193 ?		626.
* <i>Asea</i>			
* <i>Dipaia</i>			
* <i>Gortys</i>			
* <i>Pallantion</i>			
* <i>Theisoa</i>	192		630.
* <i>Sparta</i>			
* <i>Elis</i>			
* <i>Messênê</i>			
* <i>Korônê</i> ¹			
Abia	182		649.
Thouria			
Pharai (Mess.)			

Sparta. (See p. 622.) There was a village called Eua in the Thyreatis (Paus. ii. 38. 6), which may have been Eleutherolakônîc. But it seems that there is no coin which can be referred with absolute certainty to any Eleutherolakônîc city as a member of the Achaian League.

¹ As coins occur with ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΚΟΡΩΝΑΙΩΝ, the question between Korônê and Kolônîs in p. 649 is pretty well settled. Korônê must either have been already an independent Canton, or it must have been enfranchised by Lykortas.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

Page 23, line 6. On the relation of Dependent Alliance, see Arnold, *Later Roman Commonwealth*, i. 165.

Page 34, note. Pindar freely applies the name βασιλεύς to the Sicilian Tyrants, but it may be doubted whether Herodotus, when speaking in his person, ever distinctly applies the name to any Tyrant. This has been pointed out by a writer in the *National Review*, October 1862, p. 300.

The Tyrannies, both in continental Greece and the colonies, must be carefully distinguished from the few cases of lawful Kingship which lingered on in a few outlying places, Salamis in Cyprus for instance, long after its general abolition.

Page 138, l. 13. Besides Nairn and Cromarty, the counties of Bute and Caithness (a strangely chosen pair) and Clackmannan and Kinross also elected alternately.

Page 165, l. 19. The sacred spear can hardly fail to have been an institution of the remotest antiquity, and it points to a time when the Theban Archon, like the Athenian Polemarch, had really been a military commander. But his appointment by lot is not likely to have been introduced at Thebes, any more than at Athens, until the office had become a mere pageant. When an office is disposed of by lot, it is, as Mr. Grote shows, a sign that the office is no longer thought to require special qualifications, but is held to be within the compass of an average citizen. The lot is not necessarily democratic; as the great equalizer, it is just as likely to be introduced into an oligarchic body, where the feeling of equality among the members of the ruling order is commonly very strong.

Rotation, as practically adopted in the appointment of the Lord Mayor of London and of the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities, goes on the same principle as the lot. It implies that the office requires no special qualifications, but that one member of the class from whom its occupants are taken is as able to fill it as another.

Page 180, note 3. Compare p. 129, note 4, on the supposed agency of the Corinthian Synod or of the Amphiktyons, and pp. 55, 6, on the hatred of the Boeotian towns towards Thebes.

Page 201, note 5. If we suppose this Assembly to have been armed, like some instances in Achaia and elsewhere (see p. 275), the

Assembly and the army would in fact be the same thing, and there would be hardly any perceptible difference between the views of Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. It is not however likely (see p. 202, note 2) that this military character of the Assembly would be retained as a permanent institution. The instances in Achaia are rare, and are accounted for by special circumstances.

Page 203, note 5. The word *βουλευτήριον* (see p. 306) does seem to be occasionally used for the place of meeting of the Achaian Assembly, but we have seen (p. 307) that there is reason to believe that the Achaian Assemblies were often much more thinly attended than the Arkadian Ten Thousand. But the Achaian Assembly also sometimes met in a theatre.

Page 204, l. 6. From the language of Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) it seems that some of the cities were actually deserted, while others were simply reduced to the condition of dependent villages, or perhaps of municipal towns. These last were, at a later time (see p. 626) restored to an equality with the capital, as independent Cantons of the Achaian League.

Page 209, l. 1. A nearly perfect list of the Lykian cities can be recovered from numismatic evidence. Federal coins of all the six greatest cities exist, except Pinara, and of thirteen others, Antiphilos, Aperlai, Apollônia, Arykanda, Kragos, Kyaneai, Limyra, Massikytos, Phellos, Podalia, Rhodiapolis, Telmêssos, and Trebenna. This gives nineteen cities. A twentieth might be found in Phasêlis, only Strabo distinctly says that that city, though Lykian, was not a member of the League: *ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ αὕτη ἡ πόλις Λυκίακη* * * * *τοῦ δὲ κοινοῦ τῶν Λυκίων οὐ μετέχει, καθ' αὐτὴν δὲ συνέστηκεν* (vol. iii. p. 217). It is however possible that Phasêlis may have seceded from the League between the days of Artemidôros and Strabo, and so have been reckoned among the twenty-three cities of the elder writer. It is certain, from the history of Telmêssos, that the boundaries of the Lykian League, as well as of other Leagues, now and then fluctuated. Telmêssos, a Lykian town, was given by the Romans to Eumenês after the war with Antiochos, B.C. 188; but, on the extinction of the Kingdom of Pergamos, B.C. 133, it was restored to the Confederation. So also there is numismatic evidence, though of a somewhat doubtful kind, for the opinion that Boubôn, a town of the Kibyratio Tetrapolis, (see p. 212) formed part of the Lykian League in its latest stage. There is also evidence of "monetary Leagues" or *Sonderbunds* among some of the Lykian towns, which are thought to have been connected with the disputes which led to the fall of Lykian independence. The only extant Federal coins of Telmêssos belong to one of these Leagues.

Page 209, note 5. On the word *συνέδριον*, see p. 263.

Page 213, note 2. Compare the attempt by the Senate in the first Congress of the United States to confer the title of *Highness* upon the President. See Marshall's *Life of Washington*, v. 238; Jefferson's *Correspondence*, iv. 14.

Page 215, note 1. So Appian, *Mithrid.* 62. Πλὴν εἴ τινας Εὐμενεί καὶ Ῥοδίοις, συμμαχήσασιν ἡμῖν, ἔδομεν, οὐχ ὑποτελείς, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προστάταις εἶναι τεκμήριον δ' ὅτι Λυκίους, αἰτιωμένους τι, Ῥοδίων ἀπεστήσαμεν.

Page 256, note 6. Whether these townships were strictly subject to Megalopolis will be found discussed afterwards, p. 626. It is possible that they may have been more analogous to the Patrian townships mentioned in p. 247.

Page 261, note 1. On this Embassy, see p. 419. The explanation of the apparent breach of rule is probably to be found in the religious character of the mission. The Roman envoys were received by the Corinthians, not as members of the Achaian League, but as administrators of the Isthmian Games. In this character, they must have been in the constant habit of receiving the *θεωρίας* of Greek cities. As the administration of the games always remained a matter purely of State, and not at all of Federal, concern, the reception of this particular sort of embassy—necessary in the presidents of the Games—must have been held not to interfere with the general external sovereignty of the League.

Page 281, note 2. See below, 551. I cannot bring myself to any definite conclusion about these most perplexing words *τῆς συντελείας τῆς πατρικῆς*. No explanation seems quite satisfactory. The use of *πατρικῆς* seems so very strange that, when one remembers the expression in Polybios (xl. 3), Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο συντελικόν, one is strongly tempted to read Πατρικῆς. Yet would Πατρικός be a correct gentile form, and could a citizen of Pharai be a magistrate at Patrai? There is certainly the case of Aratos' State-Generalship at Argos. See p. 259.

Page 291, note 1. The first two Presidents opened each Session of Congress with a speech; at other stages of the Session they sent messages. In both these respects they followed the common practice of Kings. Jefferson extended the custom of the written message to the opening of the Session. See Tucker's *Life of Jefferson*, ii. 111, 2.

Page 293, note 1. Cf. Liv. xxxv. 25. *Multitudo Philopœmenis sententiam expectabat. Prætor is tum erat, et omnes eo tempore et prudentiâ et auctoritate anteibat.* In both these cases the General, like an English Minister, does not speak till after several other speakers, and apparently not till the House began to call for him.

Page 297, l. 1. That in some other Federations, as those of Ætolia and Akarnania (see pp. 338, 620), the General presided in

the Assembly shows the higher political developement of the Achaian system. The Achaian institution of the Ten Ministers seems to have no exact parallel elsewhere. To their existence it is probably owing that we hear less of the Senate in Achaia (see p. 306) than in some other commonwealths.

Page 298, l. 7. I only remember one instance (see p. 538) of the Ministers being mentioned in military affairs, and this is on the reception of a new city into the League, a business as much diplomatic as military.

Page 302, l. 12. See below, p. 509

Page 303, note 2. Jefferson (see his Life by Tucker i. 281—3) strongly objected to the power of reelecting the President, on the ground that a reeligible President would be always reelected, and would in fact become Tyrant. That this fear was chimerical in America was proved by Jefferson's own case, but it was a very real one in Greece. See p. 305.

Page 304, note 4. On the position of the *στρατηγὸς ἀντοκράτωρ*, see below, p. 484.

Page 314, l. 2. The fact that the chaotic period of the old Confederation, 1776—89, intervened makes but little difference. The memory of Kingship had not died out, and the anarchy of the Confederation proved the need of a head of some kind. The Federalists were always charged by their Republican opponents with endeavouring to restore Monarchy, and, in a certain sense, the charge was undoubtedly true.

Page 335, note 5. On certain limitations of the powers of Special Assemblies in Ætolia, see p. 611. Such an Assembly, at least up to B.C. 200, could not make war or peace. The restriction seems a strange one, as one would have thought that a Special Assembly was most likely to be called when some sudden emergency demanded a warlike or peaceful decision. The Law was probably altered in B.C. 200, as afterwards, in B.C. 189 (see p. 630), we find a Special Assembly summoned to decide on the great question of submission to Rome.

Page 345, note 1. On the whole, the explanation less creditable to Philip seems the more probable. See p. 552.

Page 403, note 4. On the date of the acquisition of Hêraia, see p. 603.

Page 416, l. 5. The Leagues of Akarnania and Epeiros thus became hostile to Achaia. The next time we hear of them (see pp. 491, 9), they are Achaian allies. The probable explanation is that the two northern Leagues became allied with Macedonia as soon as Macedonia became hostile to Ætolia, and, as Macedonian allies, became Achaian allies along with Antigonos. As they had no direct

cause of enmity towards Achaia, they could have no repugnance to the Achaian alliance, as soon as Achaia was again unfriendly to Ætolia.

Page 447, note 1. According to Appian (Mithr. 48), Mithridatēs, besides the usual policy of enfranchising slaves and abolishing debts, gave citizenship to the *μέτριοι* in the Asiatic cities which submitted to him. This reads like the proceedings of Aratos at Mantinea, but the existence of a considerable class of *μέτριοι* in the Attic sense is far more likely in the great commercial cities of Asia than in an inland Arkadian town.

Page 495, margin. The date B.C. 223—196 belongs to p. 494.

Page 496, note 4. On the whole, B.C. 221 seems the most probable date; at the same time it requires the battle of Sellasia, the settlement of Sparta and some other cities, the return of Antigonos to Macedonia, his death, the accession of Philip, and the events which led to the Social War, to have followed one another with unusual speed. And in Pol. iv. 35, the Spartans are said, seemingly in B.C. 219, to have been *πολιτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ πατρία σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἔκπτωσιν*. This, however, might possibly be satisfied by a period of two years and a fraction. As the exact date does not bear very immediately on my own subject, I would recommend the question to the attention of professed chronologists.

Page 606, l. 9. The words of Plutarch are *ἐπέμψεν εἰς Ἄργος κρύφα τοὺς ἀναιρήσοντας αὐτόν*. This need not imply that poison was the means to be used.

Page 618, note 2. I should not have said "all Karia," either here or in p. 214. It was only *Καρίας τὰ μέχρι τοῦ Μαιάνδρου*. (Pol. xxiii. 3.) This is however much the larger part of the country.

Page 626, l. 2 from bottom. If the Eleutherolakonic towns were really all admitted into the League, each with an independent vote, (see p. 622) it would be as necessary to strengthen the Arkadian interest against any undue influence on their part as against that of the Old-Achaian cities.

This system of dividing large States is recognized by the American Constitution, which provides that it shall be done only by the joint consent of Congress and of the Legislature of the State interested (Art. iv. § 3.1, a provision reenacted in the Confederate Constitution). Accordingly several new States have been formed, at various times, within the old limits of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Massachusetts. Just now (December, 1862) a bill is before Congress for the unconstitutional recognition of part of Virginia as a district State—unconstitutional, because the requisite consent of Virginia is not given.

It must be remembered that the territory of Megalopolis was at

this time far larger than that of any other member of the League. The other two great States of Elis and Messênê were not yet incorporated. We here see yet another point of likeness between Megalopolis and Virginia. Each might be called the Mother of States as well as the Mother of Presidents.

Page 642, l. 6 from bottom. After all, it is perhaps not absolutely necessary to adopt either alternative. The name of the General for the years 191-0 is not recorded. It is not impossible that it was Philopoimên himself, that the General of the year 190-89 died early in his official year, and that he was, according to law (see pp. 281, 648), succeeded by Philopoimên for the remainder of the year. If Philopoimên was thus only *suffect* General in 189, he might be re-elected General for the year 189-8, as Lykortas was in 183. (See p. 648.) He would thus be in office for nearly three years together without breach of the Constitution.

The eight Generalships (see p. 647) of Philopoimên are not very easy to arrange. According to the conjecture just hazarded, the Generalship of B.C. 189-8 might be called either his sixth or his seventh, according as we count the *suffect* Generalship or not. If it is reckoned as the sixth, he may have filled a seventh Generalship in 187-6. He could not be re-elected in 188-7, and we know that Aristainos was General in 186-5, and Lykortas in 185-4. In 186-5 (see p. 653) Philopoimên was one of the ten *δημοουργοί*. We may suspect that he commonly was so in the years when he was not General.

END OF VOL. I.

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
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